Defence White Paper: Delivering Security in a Changing World - Minutes of Evidence taken by the Commons Defence Commitee - 20th April 2004.
Q214 Mr Blunt: In paragraph 2.5 of the White Paper it says, "The most demanding expeditionary operations involving intervention against the state adversaries can only plausibly be conducted if US forces are engaged ..." Are we saying that the United Kingdom on its own will never again be able to fight a state adversary (as we had to do over the Falklands, for example) on our own? Therefore the White Paper is based on an assumption that the United States will always be at our side.
General Sir Michael Walker: I think the assumption is that we would not see ourselves engaging in inter-state conflict on our own. I think that is a very fair assumption.
Q215 Mr Blunt: May I ask you each whether you think that is an assumption on which we should properly rely for the future of British defence.
General Sir Mike Jackson: "Never" is a very conclusive word, is it not? As CDS have said, one needs to make very careful judgments over the probabilities and it is difficult to construct the scenario, it would seem to me, where the United Kingdom would engage on inter-state conflict single-handed. We had the example in 1982, and I trust there will be no repeat performance of that, but, perhaps outside of that particular set of circumstances, it is very hard to see any circumstances in which this country's national interest would be so threatened that it would have to set out alone. It would be part of a wider piece. The assumption, it seems to me, is that it would be part of a wider piece in which the United States inevitably will be involved because it is that wider piece.
General Sir Michael Walker: If I may just add: remember the Falklands was demanding, but I would not have described it as "the most demanding". This did not use all the weapons of war and capabilities that we would use in the most demanding type of operation. There was very little armour used; there was very limited artillery. It was essentially a lighter war-fighting operation. We need to remember that war fighting can happen at any level and with any forces but the most demanding we are talking about here is the exploitation of every single capability that is necessary to prosecute the most demanding form of war. In those circumstances, I do believe it is a fair assumption.
Q216 Mr Blunt: The kernel of my concern is that we appear to be stripping out the air defence capability both of the navy and of the army in the various savings measures that are currently being taken. Of course both of those capabilities were critical in 1982. The operation in 1982, although it was light in the terms you have presented it, we would not now be able to carry out in the course of the next decade when those capabilities are not present for the United Kingdom. That means that the shop therefore appears to be being bet on this assumption, where Lord King, former Defence Secretary, said to the House of Lords that in his experience "the inconceivable usually happens". Maybe by definition we cannot conceive of the circumstances in which it might happen but experience tells us, in my judgment, that Lord King's words would appear more often than not to be correct.
General Sir Michael Walker: I cannot let you get away with the statement that we appear to be getting rid of all the air defence within the army and the navy. I do not know where you have got that from, but that is absolute nonsense.
Q217 Chairman: Tory Central Office maybe!
General Sir Michael Walker: Alan, do you want to comment about your own views?
Admiral Sir Alan West: I would make a couple of points. Within the definitions that you have given about this large scale and the whole spread of capabilities being used, I would agree that it is extremely unlikely that we would ever be involved in an operation without the United States, that inter-state type operation. "Inconceivable" is a word I probably would not ever use, because I think it is true to say that you never know what is going to happen in the future. We have found that again and again and again. But the basis of assuming that we will not be involved at the very highest levels of military capability in an inter-state operation without the US I think is a very sensible basis on which to go forward. I think where you are coming from is a similar thing to the Falklands again.
Q218 Mr Blunt: Not just the Falklands. We are a member of the Commonwealth.
Admiral Sir Alan West: But if maybe I could talk on an operation of that type.
Q219 Mr Blunt: If a Commonwealth country is invaded, that brings with it obligations to the United Kingdom that the United States does not share.
Admiral Sir Alan West: But if I could talk on the specifics, where you talk about air defence being stripped out and capabilities: looking to the future - and I will use the Falklands as a scenario, because one needs a scenario - we will have the capability of doing exactly what we did before. We will keep it with our CVSs, through until the CVF comes; and when the CVF comes, we will be even more capable of conducting that type of operation. The loss of the FA2s - and there has been considerable debate about that - is a loss of air defence capability in the short term, but we of course have layered air defence and we are able still to provide air defence for the carrier group. Focusing more on deep strike is the way we need to go for the future - we are certain of that, looking at the operations that have happened - and would give us an ability to conduct an operation like the Falklands with more capability than we have had in the past. So I am not concerned on that specific but I would not use the word "inconceivable" because I also agree that the one thing of which you can be absolutely certain in defence terms is that it is the thing which you have not predicted that will happen - which is why we need all of the capabilities we have in defence, in those multi-role capabilities, to be able to react to that.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: I would echo that. I would just say that, since we are unable to predict the future and if, as you say, the unexpected usually happens, then the important thing is to be able to react to an uncertain future. The way to do that is not to focus on specific issues but to accept the need for adaptability in our military structure, in our capability and in our tactics. I think that is the issue on which we should be focusing rather than on specific sets of capability that we think might or might not be required in the future.