Sea Jet
Suspicion breeds confidence
Post Somalia, the US has shown absolutely no interest in participating in African ops (unless their is some "war on terror" aspect). In fact it has left responsibility for African policing exclusively to its European allies. Is Africa a likely candidate for a brush fire conflict? - you bet. Will the UK be expected to get involved? - most likley. Can we count on Uncle Sam for any support in Africa? - probably not.
This alone shows the govt's line of not participating in conflicts without the active support of the Americans as being utter Bo**ocks.
The Chinese are exporting the PL-12 missile and one of their biggest export markets has always been Africa.
See here
Burying ones head in the sand and pretending that no threat exists defies logic.
This alone shows the govt's line of not participating in conflicts without the active support of the Americans as being utter Bo**ocks.
The Chinese are exporting the PL-12 missile and one of their biggest export markets has always been Africa.
See here
Burying ones head in the sand and pretending that no threat exists defies logic.
Last edited by Navaleye; 7th Jun 2004 at 15:32.
Some news from Exercise Aurora/Rapid Alliance....
News
As well as fighting submarines we have been continuing to integrate with the rest of the British Task Force such as HMS Invincible and her Sea Harrier contingent. We have been using these aircraft as both “friendly” and “enemy” jets in order to practise our Anti-Air Warfare (AAW). The Task Force as been practising its collective AAW with American jets such as the F-18 Hornet playing the part of the enemy.
News
As well as fighting submarines we have been continuing to integrate with the rest of the British Task Force such as HMS Invincible and her Sea Harrier contingent. We have been using these aircraft as both “friendly” and “enemy” jets in order to practise our Anti-Air Warfare (AAW). The Task Force as been practising its collective AAW with American jets such as the F-18 Hornet playing the part of the enemy.
Suspicion breeds confidence
FRS1 and Sea Eagle
Can anyone tell me if the FRS1 was capable of self designating targets for Sea Eagle?
There's a good site here which suggests it could not, but I seem to remember that it could. Blue Fox certainly had a range greater than Sea Eagle in surface search mode.
There's a good site here which suggests it could not, but I seem to remember that it could. Blue Fox certainly had a range greater than Sea Eagle in surface search mode.
More interesting stuff...
More news
849B Flight heads for the United States
AURORA 04 provides a clear demonstration of the UK’s world-leading expeditionary capability by deploying, sustaining, exercising and recovering a modern and flexible medium sized Maritime Task Group at high readiness.
News from INVINCIBLE
Don't forget to look at more pictures.
More from SUTHERLAND
On Saturday war began. The UK’s Amphibious Forces are engaged in Exercise Rapid Alliance. As part of a US led coalition we are fighting to force the invading Koronan Armed forces from Kartuna and to re-establish peace and order in the Gulf of Sabani in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. These are, of course, fictional names and places, written into a scenario for the purposes of the exercise. However, the complexities and subtleties of the scenario are designed to exercise the coalition in its warfare and decision making. It’s a challenging time for the Ship as we respond to an ever-changing threat and tasking which can vary by the hour.
So that's what the exercise scenario is.....
849B Flight heads for the United States
AURORA 04 provides a clear demonstration of the UK’s world-leading expeditionary capability by deploying, sustaining, exercising and recovering a modern and flexible medium sized Maritime Task Group at high readiness.
News from INVINCIBLE
Don't forget to look at more pictures.
More from SUTHERLAND
On Saturday war began. The UK’s Amphibious Forces are engaged in Exercise Rapid Alliance. As part of a US led coalition we are fighting to force the invading Koronan Armed forces from Kartuna and to re-establish peace and order in the Gulf of Sabani in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions. These are, of course, fictional names and places, written into a scenario for the purposes of the exercise. However, the complexities and subtleties of the scenario are designed to exercise the coalition in its warfare and decision making. It’s a challenging time for the Ship as we respond to an ever-changing threat and tasking which can vary by the hour.
So that's what the exercise scenario is.....
Suspicion breeds confidence
Here's an interesting article from the UK Defence Forum . It looks at the need for maritime expeditionary warfare and suggests that we should be enhancing our aviation capacity not reducing it.,
Suspicion breeds confidence
Interesting comment on the need for modern air defence assets from Gen Hornberg of the USAF.
"With air superiority, everything is possible. Without it, hardly anything's possible" he added. "People jump to the conclusion that it is ours just because we go. And that's blatantly false."
The US have woken up the fact the the some 3rd World countries now have equipment equal or superior to our own. Yet the Uk govt is still hell bent on denying the fleet the means to defend itself for 6 years - better make that 10 years the way CVF is panning out.
"With air superiority, everything is possible. Without it, hardly anything's possible" he added. "People jump to the conclusion that it is ours just because we go. And that's blatantly false."
The US have woken up the fact the the some 3rd World countries now have equipment equal or superior to our own. Yet the Uk govt is still hell bent on denying the fleet the means to defend itself for 6 years - better make that 10 years the way CVF is panning out.
Some of you might find this interesting.....
The First Sea Lord's address to RUSI
Nothing on the 801 NAS website/page yet....or any other ones specifically mentioning the Sea Harrier, but have a look at this:
More news from that exercise
.........simulated high threat environment of the exercise. To this end, the ship encountered a number of ‘enemy’ aircraft and fast attack craft that tested the speed and effectiveness of Middleton’s reactions.
Wouldn't it be better to assume that Mine Counter Measures operations only take place when there is air superiority? Lack of weapons etc considered? And the same with Fast Attack Craft, in 1991 the coalition Minehunters only started to sweep the mines of the Kuwaiti coastline (part of bluffing Saddam into expecting an amphibious assault - forcing him to commit thousands of troops to defending the beaches) after Iraq's surface vessels had been dealt with. Why would it be different now?
Two additional comments...
1. Most possible scenarios would be in places where tanker support would be available, increasing the range/endurance/time on station of the Sea Harriers on CAP.
2. There has been talk of the limited defence provided by Sidewinder (or ASRAAM) armed Harrier GR7/9s, but surely this would still be available (as a back up in an emergency) if both aircraft types were operated?
The First Sea Lord's address to RUSI
Nothing on the 801 NAS website/page yet....or any other ones specifically mentioning the Sea Harrier, but have a look at this:
More news from that exercise
.........simulated high threat environment of the exercise. To this end, the ship encountered a number of ‘enemy’ aircraft and fast attack craft that tested the speed and effectiveness of Middleton’s reactions.
Wouldn't it be better to assume that Mine Counter Measures operations only take place when there is air superiority? Lack of weapons etc considered? And the same with Fast Attack Craft, in 1991 the coalition Minehunters only started to sweep the mines of the Kuwaiti coastline (part of bluffing Saddam into expecting an amphibious assault - forcing him to commit thousands of troops to defending the beaches) after Iraq's surface vessels had been dealt with. Why would it be different now?
Two additional comments...
1. Most possible scenarios would be in places where tanker support would be available, increasing the range/endurance/time on station of the Sea Harriers on CAP.
2. There has been talk of the limited defence provided by Sidewinder (or ASRAAM) armed Harrier GR7/9s, but surely this would still be available (as a back up in an emergency) if both aircraft types were operated?
WEBF,
You quoted;
..."Most possible scenarios would be in places where tanker support would be available, increasing the range/endurance/time on station of the Sea Harriers on CAP"....
So, therefore most possible scenarios wouldn't require carrier born Sea Harriers at all!
A flight of SHAR's cannot reasonably defend ANYTHING apart from the CVS itself against a capable sophisticated air threat as there aren't (or rather weren't) enough jets or jocks in the RN's flight sized squadrons.
You quoted;
..."Most possible scenarios would be in places where tanker support would be available, increasing the range/endurance/time on station of the Sea Harriers on CAP"....
So, therefore most possible scenarios wouldn't require carrier born Sea Harriers at all!
A flight of SHAR's cannot reasonably defend ANYTHING apart from the CVS itself against a capable sophisticated air threat as there aren't (or rather weren't) enough jets or jocks in the RN's flight sized squadrons.
No Pr00ne...
During the Falklands conflict, Both Sea Harrier sqaudrons were boosted in size by drawing aircraft from storage and from 899 NAS. The Pilot numbers were boosted by using pilots from 899 as well as pilots who were employed on non flying posts. The same could be done today....and there are Sea Harrier drivers in the RNR air branch.
As for the tankers bit, read BEagle's posts on the tanker thread(s).
In late 2001, US carrier based aircraft relied heavily on land based tanker support, including RAF Tristars and VC10s. Yet it was still more effective to base them aboard carriers, rather than trying to find land base. A tanker usually has a longer range than a fighter, so land based fighters covering a group of ships at sea reqiure more tankers support than carrier based ones which do not have to transit from their base to the area of operations.
During the Falklands conflict, Both Sea Harrier sqaudrons were boosted in size by drawing aircraft from storage and from 899 NAS. The Pilot numbers were boosted by using pilots from 899 as well as pilots who were employed on non flying posts. The same could be done today....and there are Sea Harrier drivers in the RNR air branch.
As for the tankers bit, read BEagle's posts on the tanker thread(s).
In late 2001, US carrier based aircraft relied heavily on land based tanker support, including RAF Tristars and VC10s. Yet it was still more effective to base them aboard carriers, rather than trying to find land base. A tanker usually has a longer range than a fighter, so land based fighters covering a group of ships at sea reqiure more tankers support than carrier based ones which do not have to transit from their base to the area of operations.
Suspicion breeds confidence
During the Falklands War, Sea Harriers were on cap at times 300 miles from Hermes and Invincible and making a credible job of airspace denial with just 2 AIM 9s. So its capable of a lot more than defending its home ship.
Last edited by Navaleye; 8th Jul 2004 at 12:32.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Rumours abound that the RAF will lose its Harrier cabability but not the Navy. Is joint Horce Harrier about to become Single Service Harrier?
Navaleye,
What, ALL 100% RAF? They could call it something like, oh, say, 38 Group?
If it did go all Fishead it would be a VERY small force now wouldn't it?
As the Navy can barely supply enough jocks for two flights, how the hell would they fill three whole real sized squadrons?
What, ALL 100% RAF? They could call it something like, oh, say, 38 Group?
If it did go all Fishead it would be a VERY small force now wouldn't it?
As the Navy can barely supply enough jocks for two flights, how the hell would they fill three whole real sized squadrons?
Suspicion breeds confidence
The last time I looked the FAA had 28 fully qualified pilots, plus others in training. The Italians and Spanish seem to get by with a lot less.
Their has always been a migration officers to/from the RAF and the FAA. When the F4 was withdrawn, I gather all aircrew were given the opportunity of joining the RAF and I believe there were some takers.
Of course, we have no idea what is going to be announced, but I would expect that they would have looked at making the Harrier force exclusively maritime focussed, enabling them to cut a squadron.
Just my 2p.
Their has always been a migration officers to/from the RAF and the FAA. When the F4 was withdrawn, I gather all aircrew were given the opportunity of joining the RAF and I believe there were some takers.
Of course, we have no idea what is going to be announced, but I would expect that they would have looked at making the Harrier force exclusively maritime focussed, enabling them to cut a squadron.
Just my 2p.
Some might argue that the reason the Navy has less jet jocks that it needs is partly due to a number of factors - namely under investment, operational tempo and political interference.
In the early 80s, it was decided that only two carrier air groups would be formed, instead of three (one per carrier). In peacetime this seemed fair enough, whilst it led to more wear and tear on both machines and personnel, it was something that could be justified.
In the 1990s the UK decided to deploy a carrier to the Adriatic, in response to the conflict in what was Yugoslavia. Whilst many will argue that this was for political reasons, the fact was that the Royal Navy had a carrier in theatre from early 1993 to early 1996.
During this time, either 800 or 801 was embarked on the in theatre carrier, whilst the other one trained back in the UK and elsewhere. This high operational tempo (50% of the time in theatre) probably helped a few people decide to PVR.
This level of operations continued after the Dayton peace accord was signed, deployments (lengthy ones) continued in the Adriatic, and the Gulf (Saddam was sabre rattling and kicking out UN inspectors throughout the late 90s).
In 1999, the proposal to relocate the Sea Harrier force away from Yeovilton to RAF bases led to a number of PVRs and threats to PVR. I have had that confirmed to me personally be people I know. It also got reported in this article here.
In any case, more SHAR drivers could be found in an ermegency - from 899, ones doing other jobs, either flying or desk jobs or even in "fishead" type positions. And of course there is the RNR Air Branch.
On a slightly different topic:
I found something interesting the other day whilst tidying. In late 2001 Air Forces Monthly published a special entitled Carriers - Air Power At Sea Naturally the Sea Harrier was mentioned.....
In an article by Commander Tim Gedge - he finishes with:
".......The primary mission was to carry out an amphibious operation and drop bombs on grounnd forces. The biggest shortfall was not having any embarked AEW aircraft. This was a catastrophic omission and one that cost us several warships and many lives.
At the time, a political decision had been taken to sell the carriers. Politicians had decided we did not reallly need a global reach navy, the carrier Hermes was being sold to India and it was planned to sell Invincible to Australia. How wrong these decisions were. We won in 1982 because, to the last man, we had trained harder than the enemy, because we had a small number of superb aircraft, and because we made luck happen.
After the Falklands, huge efforts were made to remedy the shortfalls in capability. Now all that remains is to insist that the lessons ae not forgotten......"
A question from me - does the removal of Sea Dart from the CVS allow more aircraft to be carried?
In the early 80s, it was decided that only two carrier air groups would be formed, instead of three (one per carrier). In peacetime this seemed fair enough, whilst it led to more wear and tear on both machines and personnel, it was something that could be justified.
In the 1990s the UK decided to deploy a carrier to the Adriatic, in response to the conflict in what was Yugoslavia. Whilst many will argue that this was for political reasons, the fact was that the Royal Navy had a carrier in theatre from early 1993 to early 1996.
During this time, either 800 or 801 was embarked on the in theatre carrier, whilst the other one trained back in the UK and elsewhere. This high operational tempo (50% of the time in theatre) probably helped a few people decide to PVR.
This level of operations continued after the Dayton peace accord was signed, deployments (lengthy ones) continued in the Adriatic, and the Gulf (Saddam was sabre rattling and kicking out UN inspectors throughout the late 90s).
In 1999, the proposal to relocate the Sea Harrier force away from Yeovilton to RAF bases led to a number of PVRs and threats to PVR. I have had that confirmed to me personally be people I know. It also got reported in this article here.
In any case, more SHAR drivers could be found in an ermegency - from 899, ones doing other jobs, either flying or desk jobs or even in "fishead" type positions. And of course there is the RNR Air Branch.
On a slightly different topic:
I found something interesting the other day whilst tidying. In late 2001 Air Forces Monthly published a special entitled Carriers - Air Power At Sea Naturally the Sea Harrier was mentioned.....
In an article by Commander Tim Gedge - he finishes with:
".......The primary mission was to carry out an amphibious operation and drop bombs on grounnd forces. The biggest shortfall was not having any embarked AEW aircraft. This was a catastrophic omission and one that cost us several warships and many lives.
At the time, a political decision had been taken to sell the carriers. Politicians had decided we did not reallly need a global reach navy, the carrier Hermes was being sold to India and it was planned to sell Invincible to Australia. How wrong these decisions were. We won in 1982 because, to the last man, we had trained harder than the enemy, because we had a small number of superb aircraft, and because we made luck happen.
After the Falklands, huge efforts were made to remedy the shortfalls in capability. Now all that remains is to insist that the lessons ae not forgotten......"
A question from me - does the removal of Sea Dart from the CVS allow more aircraft to be carried?
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 30th Jul 2004 at 23:22.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Yes, it did increase available deck space, more importantly, however, the removal provided the magazine space required for weapons storage.
Suspicion breeds confidence
Weapons stowage is a major weakness on a CVS. 1 full day of high tempo ops can empty the bomb room on a CVS. This normally requires an RFA in tow and regular RAS practise.
An extra RFA also means more room for stores of all kinds, and more room for helicopters. Fort Victoria and Fort George can carry five Sea king/Merlin each, other RFAs smaller numbers.
As I suspected...
At last, here is news of what 801 have been doing off the US coast....
801 NAS Aurora 04 Deployment
The Exercise pitted friendly ‘Blue’ maritime forces against enemy ‘Red’ land-based assets, in a bid to achieve total air and surface superiority prior to an amphibious assault. The Red forces comprised of US Navy F-18 Hornets, F-14 Tomcats, Learjets and other missile simulating platforms – many of which had not been encountered before by the Squadron pilots.
Meanwhile, the recent cuts have included the premature retirement of three Type 42 Destroyers and three Type 23 Frigates. If T23s have been sacrificed in order to save T42s, it means that the Sea Dart missile capability is still deemed important - meaning that area anti air warfare is still desirable. Without the Sea Harrier, the T42/Sea Dart is particularly important. However, I still stand by my T42 vs T23 comments.......
801 NAS Aurora 04 Deployment
The Exercise pitted friendly ‘Blue’ maritime forces against enemy ‘Red’ land-based assets, in a bid to achieve total air and surface superiority prior to an amphibious assault. The Red forces comprised of US Navy F-18 Hornets, F-14 Tomcats, Learjets and other missile simulating platforms – many of which had not been encountered before by the Squadron pilots.
Meanwhile, the recent cuts have included the premature retirement of three Type 42 Destroyers and three Type 23 Frigates. If T23s have been sacrificed in order to save T42s, it means that the Sea Dart missile capability is still deemed important - meaning that area anti air warfare is still desirable. Without the Sea Harrier, the T42/Sea Dart is particularly important. However, I still stand by my T42 vs T23 comments.......
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 30th Jul 2004 at 23:38.
Suspicion breeds confidence
In open water warfare the T42 definately has the edge over a T23. 180nm+ radar range with a quoted 35nm range weapon in Sea Dart. Woodward says in his book that (when its working) it can take down a four ship formation at 15 miles. The new versions (which may or may not have autopilots) are much more lethal than the Block 1 types used in the Falklands. But... the 909s still can't track targets flying low over land, so iI guess it is of less value than a T23 close in.
Interesting.....particularly since virtually everyone agrees most future operations will be in the littoral.
And the Type 42 is primarily an Anti Air platform - but if there is no air threat as many insist......?
There are no plans to fit CEC to the Type 42 either.
Anyway, surely battlespace superiority is a pre requisite of power projection (including amphibious operations)? This is what the recent exercise (see the link from the 801 NAS news) demonstrates. No T42s took part in Exercise Aurora/Rapid Alliance/Blinding Storm, but the Sea Harrier did!
According to the Ministers the three T23s will be mothballed so they can be reactivated if and/or when needed. Assuming they don't get sold!!
Just to clarify my earlier point.........
Sea Dart has a considerably greater range than Sea Wolf (either version) and can therefore provide area anti air warfare capability. It was originally designed to counter medium to high altitude aircraft, although I believe modifications and improvements post 1982 means it can deal with missile threats, including low altitude threats. It does suffer from the limitation of having only two missiles ready on the launcher, s such it can be saturated my numbers. Whilst the reload time is not long, that time is very significant when dealing with multiple aircraft or salvos of missiles, particularly if these are flying at supersonic speeds.
Sea Wolf has a much smaller range, but was designed with anti missile capability in mind. It can destroy the target at a sensible range, 3nm for the conventional launch type the T22s have or 4nm for the vertical launch type the T23 has. More significantly, the two versions have twelve or 32 missiles ready to fire. As such saturation is unlikely to be a problem, although it can only defend ships less than three or four miles away.
Neither system can engage missile carrying aircraft before they get within missile firing range. The Sea Harrier can, which is why its loss is such a dangerous move. The recent announcement on defence talked a lot about Force Multipliers - could it not be said that the Sea Harrier is a force multiplier for a maritime task group? Local air superiority and all that...
It seems very odd that we bin organic air defence at a time when other nations are doing their best to get it, or improve their capability (Italy is building a second carrier).
Several other elements of the recent cuts have implications on these issues and on future maritime operations:
-Reduction in RAF air defence aircraft numbers - the idea of the RAF providing land based air defence is even less feasible.
-Loss of Army and RAF Regiment Ground Based Air Defence systems - this has implications for situations were forces are put ashore and still face an air threat.
-Reliance on a smaller number of larger ships (RFAs and Ro-Ros) for transporting equipment. Hence losing one is more of a loss.
-Reducing the frigate/destroyer numbers so that several peacetime tasks can no longer be done (according to CINCFLEET). Since it is unlikely that our commitment to fighting terrorism would be comprimised, so things like Atlantic Patrol Task - South look vulnerable.
The next few years may be very dangrous for the UK and her interests.
And the Type 42 is primarily an Anti Air platform - but if there is no air threat as many insist......?
There are no plans to fit CEC to the Type 42 either.
Anyway, surely battlespace superiority is a pre requisite of power projection (including amphibious operations)? This is what the recent exercise (see the link from the 801 NAS news) demonstrates. No T42s took part in Exercise Aurora/Rapid Alliance/Blinding Storm, but the Sea Harrier did!
According to the Ministers the three T23s will be mothballed so they can be reactivated if and/or when needed. Assuming they don't get sold!!
Just to clarify my earlier point.........
Sea Dart has a considerably greater range than Sea Wolf (either version) and can therefore provide area anti air warfare capability. It was originally designed to counter medium to high altitude aircraft, although I believe modifications and improvements post 1982 means it can deal with missile threats, including low altitude threats. It does suffer from the limitation of having only two missiles ready on the launcher, s such it can be saturated my numbers. Whilst the reload time is not long, that time is very significant when dealing with multiple aircraft or salvos of missiles, particularly if these are flying at supersonic speeds.
Sea Wolf has a much smaller range, but was designed with anti missile capability in mind. It can destroy the target at a sensible range, 3nm for the conventional launch type the T22s have or 4nm for the vertical launch type the T23 has. More significantly, the two versions have twelve or 32 missiles ready to fire. As such saturation is unlikely to be a problem, although it can only defend ships less than three or four miles away.
Neither system can engage missile carrying aircraft before they get within missile firing range. The Sea Harrier can, which is why its loss is such a dangerous move. The recent announcement on defence talked a lot about Force Multipliers - could it not be said that the Sea Harrier is a force multiplier for a maritime task group? Local air superiority and all that...
It seems very odd that we bin organic air defence at a time when other nations are doing their best to get it, or improve their capability (Italy is building a second carrier).
Several other elements of the recent cuts have implications on these issues and on future maritime operations:
-Reduction in RAF air defence aircraft numbers - the idea of the RAF providing land based air defence is even less feasible.
-Loss of Army and RAF Regiment Ground Based Air Defence systems - this has implications for situations were forces are put ashore and still face an air threat.
-Reliance on a smaller number of larger ships (RFAs and Ro-Ros) for transporting equipment. Hence losing one is more of a loss.
-Reducing the frigate/destroyer numbers so that several peacetime tasks can no longer be done (according to CINCFLEET). Since it is unlikely that our commitment to fighting terrorism would be comprimised, so things like Atlantic Patrol Task - South look vulnerable.
The next few years may be very dangrous for the UK and her interests.