NATO vs Russia
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From: Oz
Russia doesn't want the Ukraine pwer sey, they want whats on the other side. To plug the gaps betweeen the natural barriers such as the Carpathian mountains. here is a good explanation .
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From: PLanet Earth
Norway signing up to be under the French nuclear umbrella has me curious. Why, if the reason is known does one NATO nation need sign up for nuclear protection from another NATO nation when Article V should already do that. An attack on one is an attack on all, cept for no nukes unless you've signed an additional agreement?
French Nuclear Force was not scaled and foreseen initially to provide cover for others as well. If this is the future path the French Arsenal will have to be scaled up.
Last edited by henra; 3rd June 2026 at 10:00.
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From: UK
Norway signing up to be under the French nuclear umbrella has me curious. Why, if the reason is known does one NATO nation need sign up for nuclear protection from another NATO nation when Article V should already do that. An attack on one is an attack on all, cept for no nukes unless you've signed an additional agreement?
So this is unusual for the French.
It would be interesting to know if Norway has had discussions with the UK on the subject. Without tactical nuclear weapons or anything other than Trident the UK would not provide Norway with any means of staged posture whereas the France can offer that.
The really curious aspect is that within NATO that Norway has found it necessary to solicit an alternative to the US nuclear umbrella. They have presumably made some very serious assessments about threat from enemies and reliability of allies before entering into this agreement and making it public.
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From: surfing, watching for sharks
France has traditionally been kept its nuclear forces aside of NATO.
So this is unusual for the French.
It would be interesting to know if Norway has had discussions with the UK on the subject. Without tactical nuclear weapons or anything other than Trident the UK would not provide Norway with any means of staged posture whereas the France can offer that.
The really curious aspect is that within NATO that Norway has found it necessary to solicit an alternative to the US nuclear umbrella. They have presumably made some very serious assessments about threat from enemies and reliability of allies before entering into this agreement and making it public.
So this is unusual for the French.
It would be interesting to know if Norway has had discussions with the UK on the subject. Without tactical nuclear weapons or anything other than Trident the UK would not provide Norway with any means of staged posture whereas the France can offer that.
The really curious aspect is that within NATO that Norway has found it necessary to solicit an alternative to the US nuclear umbrella. They have presumably made some very serious assessments about threat from enemies and reliability of allies before entering into this agreement and making it public.
Still doesn't answer the question. Article 5 doesn't limit itself to conventional weapons attacks, therefore it shouldn't limit itself to only conventional weapons employment other than the select few who sign up to this agreement. Those who haven't signed on for France's umbrella should be asking questions whether they would similarly be protected.
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From: UK
Still doesn't answer the question. Article 5 doesn't limit itself to conventional weapons attacks, therefore it shouldn't limit itself to only conventional weapons employment other than the select few who sign up to this agreement. Those who haven't signed on for France's umbrella should be asking questions whether they would similarly be protected.
So I'm not sure that you could say that it limits to, or extends beyond, conventional weapons.
The US has used its nuclear stature to provide stated and implied protection to its allies. The Norway-France agreement may be a tangible sign that the perception of US nuclear stature has shifted.
There will likely be other nations in NATO making their own assessments and looking at their options.
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From: surfing, watching for sharks
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From: surfing, watching for sharks
I don't recall article 5 making any specific mention of any type of weapon.
The US has used its nuclear stature to provide stated and implied protection to its allies. The Norway-France agreement may be a tangible sign that the perception of US nuclear stature has shifted.
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From: UK
An accurate statement which begs the question of why a nation must be a signatory to an additional agreement beyond being a member of NATO to receive this nuclear insurance policy.
Very plausible. Wouldn’t that implied threat remain under article 5 via the UK or French arsenals? There’s actually 9 nations who have signed up, Norway is just the latest. That leaves over 20 other NATO nations who haven’t inked similar agreements with France. I’m curious if there would be a different level of French military response afforded to them if the balloon goes up?
Very plausible. Wouldn’t that implied threat remain under article 5 via the UK or French arsenals? There’s actually 9 nations who have signed up, Norway is just the latest. That leaves over 20 other NATO nations who haven’t inked similar agreements with France. I’m curious if there would be a different level of French military response afforded to them if the balloon goes up?
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Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
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From: Peripatetic
Perhaps I may elucidate.
Firstly, NATO article 5 does not require any allied nation to provide any military response to an attack on another. Under the terms of the article a stiff diplomatic note to the attacker would suffice, and perhaps a stern ticking off at the UN. [1]
The fear being, under the present administration, that is all that would be given in the event of a Russian attack on, say, the Baltic states etc.
The American "nuclear umbrella" is therefore somewhat thin and cannot be relied upon.
The next point brings me to a discussion of NATO history and the transition from the policy of "Tripwire" to Flexible Response".
In the early days of NATO, when the USA was the sole nuclear power, and even when Russia had just a few warheads, and each side had only IRBMs (Thor, Cuban Missile Crisis and all that), the policy was "Tripwire". Any attack on NATO would automatically be responded to to with a nuclear response. All well and good.
However, once the threat grew and, with ICBMs and SSBNs, the USA would then be at threat if an exchange took place, substantial doubt grew as to whether such a policy was credible - well covered in Yes Prime Minister" [2].
As a result NATO moved to a policy of "Flexible Response" and nuclear coupling. Any attack would be met by an increasingly strong response from the battlefield to the strategic level. But these levels of response would all contain nuclear weapons where, at the lower levels, use was delegated to the brigade etc. Hence nuclear mines, Honest John, Pershing, WE177 etc. [3]
THe idea being that, since use would escalate, and since neither Washington or Moscow had total control, the risk of escalation to a full scale exchange was such that no one would risk an attack at all.
That policy lasted up the deployment of GLCMs to Greeham Common etc and the end of the Cold War since when, gradually, all have been withdrawn except a handful of US B61 freefall bombs - under total US presidential control - in countries not directly at threat, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey and the UK. [4]
How does the French Nuclear Deterrence scheme improve on the above?
Firstly, on the strategic level, it provides a nuclear guarantee apart from the US umbrella, and not one under NATO control where use could be vetoed at the Military Committee level by the USA. That does not assure it's use (I have no idea of the actual guarantees in the signed treaties and and doubt they will ever be published), but it adds significantly to the risk Russia would have to take and consider.
Secondly, on the tactical level, it involves France deploying FAF elements of their Force de Dissuasion [5] to 9 partners including 4 under direct threat - Denmark, Poland, Norway and Sweden, bringing back the policy of nuclear coupling with a possible theatre tactical use escalating to a strategic level - drawing in the USA. [6]
[1] https://cepa.org/article/willfully-v...0aAq4lEALw_wcB
[2] [3] https://www.academia.edu/126475709/D...n_the_Cold_War
https://christophbluth.substack.com/...ctical-nuclear
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B61_nu...omb#Deployment
[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Force_de_dissuasion
[6] https://www.france24.com/en/europe/2...clear-umbrella
Firstly, NATO article 5 does not require any allied nation to provide any military response to an attack on another. Under the terms of the article a stiff diplomatic note to the attacker would suffice, and perhaps a stern ticking off at the UN. [1]
The fear being, under the present administration, that is all that would be given in the event of a Russian attack on, say, the Baltic states etc.
The American "nuclear umbrella" is therefore somewhat thin and cannot be relied upon.
The next point brings me to a discussion of NATO history and the transition from the policy of "Tripwire" to Flexible Response".
In the early days of NATO, when the USA was the sole nuclear power, and even when Russia had just a few warheads, and each side had only IRBMs (Thor, Cuban Missile Crisis and all that), the policy was "Tripwire". Any attack on NATO would automatically be responded to to with a nuclear response. All well and good.
However, once the threat grew and, with ICBMs and SSBNs, the USA would then be at threat if an exchange took place, substantial doubt grew as to whether such a policy was credible - well covered in Yes Prime Minister" [2].
As a result NATO moved to a policy of "Flexible Response" and nuclear coupling. Any attack would be met by an increasingly strong response from the battlefield to the strategic level. But these levels of response would all contain nuclear weapons where, at the lower levels, use was delegated to the brigade etc. Hence nuclear mines, Honest John, Pershing, WE177 etc. [3]
THe idea being that, since use would escalate, and since neither Washington or Moscow had total control, the risk of escalation to a full scale exchange was such that no one would risk an attack at all.
That policy lasted up the deployment of GLCMs to Greeham Common etc and the end of the Cold War since when, gradually, all have been withdrawn except a handful of US B61 freefall bombs - under total US presidential control - in countries not directly at threat, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey and the UK. [4]
How does the French Nuclear Deterrence scheme improve on the above?
Firstly, on the strategic level, it provides a nuclear guarantee apart from the US umbrella, and not one under NATO control where use could be vetoed at the Military Committee level by the USA. That does not assure it's use (I have no idea of the actual guarantees in the signed treaties and and doubt they will ever be published), but it adds significantly to the risk Russia would have to take and consider.
Secondly, on the tactical level, it involves France deploying FAF elements of their Force de Dissuasion [5] to 9 partners including 4 under direct threat - Denmark, Poland, Norway and Sweden, bringing back the policy of nuclear coupling with a possible theatre tactical use escalating to a strategic level - drawing in the USA. [6]
[1] https://cepa.org/article/willfully-v...0aAq4lEALw_wcB
[2] [3] https://www.academia.edu/126475709/D...n_the_Cold_War
https://christophbluth.substack.com/...ctical-nuclear
[4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B61_nu...omb#Deployment
[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Force_de_dissuasion
[6] https://www.france24.com/en/europe/2...clear-umbrella
