AUKUS

[golder]

Japan is getting closer to joining pillar 2
Why the US is backing Japan’s entry into Aukus: ‘a logical next step’ | South China Morning Post

The United States is backing Japan’s entry into the Aukus security pact, with analysts calling it a long-overdue move to harness Tokyo’s advanced defence technology and bolster Western military cooperation with a key ally in the Indo-Pacific.

[Lonewolf_50]

Originally Posted by ORAC

His Majesty King Charles has officially commissioned HMS Agamemnon, the Royal Navy’s sixth Astute-class attack submarine, during a ceremony at BAE Systems’ Barrow-in-Furness shipyard.

What are the odds that, within the next 20 years, the commanding officer of that fine ship will be named Helen?

[Buster Hyman]

Helen of Barrow-in-Furness doesn’t have the same ring to it though…

[Asturias56]

over 12 years to build............. 24 years since they started the first of class and now we have 6.

[Lonewolf_50]

Originally Posted by Asturias56

over 12 years to build............. 24 years since they started the first of class and now we have 6.

This is why Putin knew that he could go into Ukraine, and nobody could stop him from trying. Your defense industrial base is anorexic. (And ours is losing weight).

[ORAC]

Partly that’s deliberate.

The severe problems at the start of the Astute programme - leading to the Electric Boat Company having to step in to provide assistance - were largely attributed to the run down and virtual disappearance of all trained staff due to the 10 year hiatus after the delivery of the last of Trafalgar class, HMS Triumph, in 1991, to the first of the Astute class being laid down in 2001.

An outcome was the decision to spread construction in future so that the transition from Astute to Dreadnaught, and to what was then SSN-R and is now SSN-AUKUS, would be seamless with the design and production teams being continuously employed and active.

The additional AUKUS work means that additional staff and facilities are now required and being recruited/built. How that will affect the timing of future build programmes is moot.

Meantime it looks production of the last Astute, HMS Agamemnon, is slipping to the recent fire at the site.

https://www.defenceeye.co.uk/2025/01...edule-rethink/


https://www.rand.org/content/dam/ran...D_MG1128.3.pdf

[Birocracy]

watch this space

We acknowledged progress in autonomy and Collaborative Combat Aircraft, including plans to enable increased Japan–Australia collaboration on MQ-28A under the Provision of Defence Articles and Defence Services Memorandum of Arrangement, and Japan Air Self Defence Forces (JASDF) participation in MQ-28A flight test observation and training in 2026.

https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/m...-consultations

[Asturias56]

Excellent RAND paper ORAC - one hopes that someone read it in the last 14 years..... but I doubt it

the second article contained this:-

"A senior Royal Navy source told us the Royal Navy could live with the new plan because it was struggling to crew and support its existing fleet of five Astute submarines. The sixth Astute, HMS Agamemnon is in the Devonshire dock, outside the DDH working up to handed over to the Royal Navy later this year, so she unaffected by the fire. "

It's hard to believe just what a state things are in isn't it..........................

[golder]

The current US and AU and future AUKUS fire control, will have its own AI bot

U.S. Navy Begins Search for Machine Learning Combat Assistants on Submarines - Naval News

The new capabilities delivered by a selected contractor will be fielded by the U.S. Navy, the Royal Australian Navy, and, according to PEO UWS, potentially the Australia/UK/US (AUKUS) Joint Program Office submarine as well.

The RFI lists a large number of requirements for AN/BYG-1 modifications, which include containerization of AN/BYG-1 capabilities, integration of new strike components, addition of tactical decision aids that leverage artificial intelligence and machine learning, integration of third party capabilities with AN/BYG-1, delivery of incremental AN/BYG-1 application software builds every thirteen weeks, and continued integration efforts for the Compact Rapid Attack Weapon (CRAW), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), heavyweight torpedoes (HWT), unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and undersea countermeasures.

Thales and BAE Systems ink MoU for SSN AUKUS sonar suite - Naval News
Thales and BAE Systems ink MoU for SSN AUKUS sonar suite

Sale will go ahead
AUKUS clears US review ahead of PM’s Washington visit: media | news.com.au — Australia’s leading news site for latest headlines

[ORAC]

The most important part of your last post is the last item - that the AUKUS programmer has passed the Colby review.

The NikkeiAsia article referenced.

https://archive.is/20250929155356/ht...les-to-proceed

AUKUS survives Pentagon review, with US submarine sales to proceed

[SLXOwft]

Interesting viewpoint in this article in the current USNI proceedings The Path to a Bigger Submarine Fleet Includes Diesels

Apologies for the length of the quote but I think its worthwhile.

To grow quickly enough to be effective in a future conflict, the U.S. submarine fleet should incorporate diesel-electric air-independent propulsion boats.
...
Concluding sections:

The Challenges of Reintroduction

Reintroducing diesel-electric submarines to the U.S. fleet presents challenges that extend beyond technical considerations. At the top of that list is the Navy itself. Diesel-electric boats are not part of the Navy’s vision. Introducing a new major platform would require a shift in the Navy’s undersea strategy, budgeting, manning, and training.

Within the Navy, the support of the submarine force would be paramount. The nuclear submarine force has evolved into an elite community with deeply ingrained beliefs about what constitutes excellence. Reintroducing diesel-electric submarines would require navigating complex questions about communities, status, career progression, and institutional identity.

Would service on diesel submarines carry the same prestige as nuclear assignments? Would diesel submarine commanders have equal promotion opportunities? How would the unified submarine force maintain its cohesion if split between nuclear-powered and conventional platforms?

The nuclear navy ethos—characterized by high technical standards, rigorous qualification processes, and elite status—represents a cultural achievement worth preserving. Any introduction of diesel submarines must address legitimate concerns about diluting this culture while creating space for complementary capabilities.

Reintroducing diesel-electric submarines would require substantial infrastructure development, even if the boats were built elsewhere. New maintenance facilities with expertise in diesel propulsion, battery systems, and AIP technologies would be needed. Supply chains for parts and components would need to be developed. Homeporting decisions would require facilities suitable for diesel submarine operations.

Training would be another challenge. The nuclear training pipeline—among the most rigorous in any military—produces submariners with deep expertise in nuclear propulsion. A diesel submarine force would require a parallel pipeline or adapting existing programs to accommodate different propulsion technologies without compromising standards.

Perhaps the greatest challenges lie in the political and industrial realms. The nuclear submarine industrial base is a national security asset developed over decades with substantial investment. Stakeholders would question whether introducing diesel submarines might divert resources, attention, or political support from nuclear programs. The perception of competition between nuclear and diesel programs could create zero-sum thinking that could undermine the complementary nature of the proposal.

In addition, the U.S. Navy and Congress would need to decide whether to develop indigenous diesel submarine construction capability or purchase platforms from allies. Both approaches present complex tradeoffs between speed of acquisition, technology transfer, industrial development, and alliance politics.

These are just some of the challenges that must be overcome to successfully reintroduce diesel-electric submarines to the fleet. While the questions and challenges appear substantial, they are not insurmountable. Preserving and extending U.S. undersea supremacy will require boldness, thoughtful planning, and institutional leadership.

Alternate Paths

The diesel-electric submarine route is not the only viable path toward this end. The Navy could increase the demand signal and funding for nuclear submarines. Such a plan would be more expensive both in ship and yard conversions but it is possible. The Navy could double down on LUUVs, hoping to overcome the challenges in those systems. Specifically, the service would need to solve either the persistent communication problem to enable reliable man-in-the-loop operations or solve the ethical problem of letting artificial intelligence act independently in strike missions.

The diesel-electric path seems more controllable, more reliable, and likely more effective. Modern diesel submarines are not perfect, but they are cost-effective, stealthy, and could be built quickly. It also is worth noting that this is not the first proposal for reintroducing diesel-electric submarines to the U.S. fleet. Independent strategists and think tanks have made similar pitches (See “Conventional Submarines Would Bring Affordable Lethality to the U.S. Fleet,” pp. 32–37.) Various approaches—research and development, contractor-owned/contractor-operated, or expanded partner-nation cooperation—also could allow the United States to investigate the benefits of diesel without committing immediately.

[Bengo]

Could someone please explain why the USN might now have an operational requirement for a non-nuclear boat? Is there a threat that only a non nuclear boat can deal with?

[golder]

autonomous undersea vehicles are more probable

Anduril Ghost Shark Now Australian A$1.7 BN Program Of Record
According to Australian Defence Media information Anduril will commence immediately with low rate initial production of the Ghost Shark XL-AUV. The effort will move into “high rate production” by 2026.

Notably Defence Minister Richard Marles emphasies that Ghost Shark will provide intelligence, surveillance and strike capabilities within five years. Ghost Shark itself is the carrier platform for relevant payloads.

[SLXOwft]

Originally Posted by Bengo

Could someone please explain why the USN might now have an operational requirement for a non-nuclear boat? Is there a threat that only a non nuclear boat can deal with?

There is a view, which I share, that SSKs are better suited to operations in the littoral environment particularly in constrained waters. Modern SSKs are very different from the previous generations of slow boats with limited non-diesel endurance. My interpretation of Jordan Spector's thesis is that they are a much cheaper way to supplement the SSNs in roles that don't need their expensive capabilities.

To quote from the article:

Then there are the areas where these boats have the advantage—shallow, constrained waters in which their smaller size and displacement enable missions that would ground SSNs. Diesel-electric submarines can lurk quietly to conserve power and minimize detectability. Here, they can monitor traffic, gather intelligence, or lie in wait for targets while presenting minimal detection opportunities.

Such a capability would be invaluable in choke points such as the Taiwan Strait, Malacca Strait, Persian Gulf, Baltic Sea, Black Sea, or the Greenland, Iceland, and United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, where water depths often fall below 60 meters. These are the tactics Russia employs with its diesel-electrics.

[Flap Track 6]

Originally Posted by SLXOwft

There is a view, which I share, that SSKs are better suited to operations in the littoral environment particularly in constrained waters. Modern SSKs are very different from the previous generations of slow boats with limited non-diesel endurance. My interpretation of Jordan Spector's thesis is that they are a much cheaper way to supplement the SSNs in roles that don't need their expensive capabilities.

It’s the old high/low mix argument again. There are some missions that the hardcore full fat SSNs are not suited to, especially littoral operations and some that the SSKs are not suited to, such as long range blue water operations. The Australians have been round this buoy a couple of times recently when looking at their requirements. The USN is probably the only navy in the world which could afford to operate both, but I doubt if they would, for all the reasons stated in the article.

[ORAC]

There is a view, which I share, that SSKs are better suited to operations in the littoral environment particularly in constrained waters. Modern SSKs are very different from the previous generations of slow boats with limited non-diesel endurance. My interpretation of Jordan Spector's thesis is that they are a much cheaper way to supplement the SSNs in roles that don't need their expensive capabilities.

Which has a relevancy in the Baltic, Mediterranean, Gulf and even the SCS - but for the USA?

Unless based in Europe, a friendly Gulf state or somewhere such as Singapore the transit time/endurance makes them impractical, whether from the USA, Pearl or Australia - hence why Australia is now buying AUKUS.

These is no littoral waters threat in US coastal which would require a conventional sub - better handled by surface or P-8A assets; and if you start looking at northern waters and under the icecap, you are back to the SSN being a better platform.

[Dryce]

Originally Posted by Flap Track 6

It’s the old high/low mix argument again. There are some missions that the hardcore full fat SSNs are not suited to, especially littoral operations and some that the SSKs are not suited to, such as long range blue water operations. T

SSNs tend to be quite good at dealing with littoral operations in far away places. The RN managed to dominate the Argentine Navy in 1982 and also undertake other operations.

There's a tendency to project SSKs as being quiet and short range. I think really it comes down to manoeuvre. SSKs can be designed to operate at long distances. AIP gets you useful endurance under the surface but not necessarily the ability to move very far or very fast without having to interact with the surface to breath and recuperate. There have been regular reports over the years of SSKs in exercises getting to take pot shots at carriers. But the reality is that while a SSK is indeed dangerous to a large surface assets - they have to be in the right place at the right time. Their ability to hunt and kill is limited by the ability to chase and choose position without being tied t the surface. When it comes to doing sneaky stuff in littoral waters that SSKs are supposed to be good at - the SSN can be sneakier for longer and likely has more options as to how it enters and leaves an operational area or repositions and adapts to a situation.

If you you are sending a cheaper SSK over long distance then you are arguably not saving quite as much as the headline purchase costs would suggest compared with a SSN. The SSK will have shorter time in its area of operation and greater exposure during transit. You then need more of them. Any additional threat against the SSK in transit that means it has to evade and impact its speed of advance further reduces its operational capability. You need even more of them.

[Flap Track 6]

Originally Posted by Dryce

SSNs tend to be quite good at dealing with littoral operations in far away places. The RN managed to dominate the Argentine Navy in 1982 and also undertake other operations.

I’m not sure that the British SSN ops in the South Atlantic were really littoral, AIUI, they were well offshore using their radar to detect incoming raids once the Arg navy had gone to port. Sinking the Belgrano became time critical because she was steaming towards shallower waters where Conqueror couldn’t safely follow. There was an O boat SSK involved in the later stages used for SF insertion and inshore reconnaissance.
Your other points are valid, and the cost impact has to be factored. A nuclear navy is not cheap.

[ORAC]

Indirectly related. If they want an SSN why not join AUKUS rather than a unique French hybrid?

https://x.com/juitdeketting/status/1...625361577?s=61

​​​​​​​Dutch navy magazine 'Marineblad' published a plea for SSNs for the RNLN (Suffren-class derivatives bought from France.) Not completely unfunded IMO. The plea for nukes in the RNLN is a, rather unknown, broken record.

The wish for SSNs for the RNLN dates back decades, with plans for UK or US supported domestic designs being proposed as late as the early 70s. In the end the idea was dropped as the RNLN doubled down on oceanic SSKs (Zwaardvisch, Walrus and Morey class designs)

Current RNLN doctrine still foresees Dutch submarines being deployed on the front lines in the High North. Hence why the relatively large and ocean-going Orka-class SSK was procured, as a sort of 'proto-nuke'. A role and environment in which, arguably, a 'real' SSN excels.

https://www.marineblad.nl/artikel/ne...-onderzeeboten

[ORAC]

Defense firms are giving evidence on AUKUS to the defense committee from 10.30 a.m.

https://www.parliamentlive.tv/Event/...5-c1f32a105b28