HMS Glorious & Operation Paul
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HMS Glorious & Operation Paul
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/s...aled-vlx9680rp
Secret history behind HMS Glorious disaster during Second World War revealed
Britain’s worst naval disaster in the Second World War resulted from an ambitious secret mission rather than the folly of the main warship’s commander, a new investigation by the grandson of one of the victims has concluded.
Eighty years ago tomorrow, on June 8, 1940, the UK’s largest and fastest aircraft carrier HMS Glorious, and its two destroyer escorts HMS Ardent and HMS Acasta, were sunk in a devastating assault by German battleships. In total 1,519 men died, making it the biggest single loss of life at sea for the UK during the war. Just 41 seamen survived, rescued when Norwegian fishing boats found them three days later.
In recent decades Captain Guy D’Oyly Hughes, commander of the Glorious, has been cast as an arrogant villain and held responsible for the disaster. However Ben Barker, whose grandfather Lieutenant Commander J. F. “Ben” Barker commanded the Ardent and died in the battle, has uncovered fresh evidence that leads to a rival theory. It holds that Captain D’Oyly Hughes was not indulging a petty feud, but pursuing a courageous mission devised by Winston Churchill.
The three Royal Navy ships had initially been part of an operation to evacuate British forces from Norway, almost simultaneous with the retreat at Dunkirk, and had rescued two squadrons of RAF Hurricane and Gladiator fighter planes. Instead of waiting to travel back home with the larger, well-fortified convoy, the trio of ships set sail independently, with only light protection, across the Norwegian sea. Here they were intercepted and attacked by the formidable German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, after warnings from Bletchley Park and Norwegian intelligence about their suspected presence had gone awry.
All three British ships were hit and sunk in an explosion of flames and smoke – captured on German newsreel. The tragedy prompted myriad questions about what the trio of ships had been doing and why they had been sailing alone without better protection. The Admiralty Board of Enquiry made a swift assessment and sealed its findings until 2041 – making it the only aircraft carrier loss to be subjected to a 100-year period of secrecy.
Public interest in the controversy refused to subside, however, and in 1946 the government was forced to publish a brief account of what had happened. It stated the aircraft carrier had been short of fuel and therefore had decided to speed home ahead of the convoy. The account made no sense and was roundly regarded as implausible. It left a vacuum for alternative explanations and one was put forward in 1980 by the navy’s official historian.
This account, published in The Sunday Times, blamed the episode on the supposedly foolish, tyrannical behaviour of Captain D’Oyly Hughes, claiming he decided to rush home to refer a senior aviator, with whom he was embroiled in a feud, to court martial.
In 1997 Mr Barker examined the circumstances around the sinking of the ships for a documentary and came to a similar conclusion. He felt he had not got to the bottom of matters, however, and continued to investigate. He has since uncovered a compelling trail of evidence linking HMS Glorious to Churchill’s “Operation Paul”, a secret plan to attack neutral Sweden and stop the export of iron ore to Hitler’s Germany.
A month before the sinking of the Glorious, Captain D’Oyly Hughes had lunched with Admiral Reggie Drax, an operational commander of the navy and mine-laying expert, in London before the pair attended a meeting with Churchill at the Admiralty. Captain D’Oyly Hughes then played a senior role in a dry run for Operation Paul, practising the daring plan for Swordfish aircraft to lay mines in the strategic Swedish port of Lulea.
In early June Churchill gave instructions for the secret operation to commence. While some paperwork noted that HMS Ark Royal, also in Norway to evacuate British forces, was earmarked to lead the mission, other evidence found by Mr Barker suggested that HMS Glorious was substituted in – and that was why the ship had sailed independently the day it was sunk. Cryptic references were made to the Glorious in the aftermath by senior mandarins and Churchill himself, but further inquiries into the episode were shut down.
German naval war reports shed some light on the battle that destroyed the British aircraft carrier group, recording the extraordinary courage of the ships’ crew as they were under attack. Ardent laid smoke to disguise Glorious, while Acasta hit the enemy battlecruiser Scharnhorst with a torpedo that killed 53 German sailors. The captain of the Scharnhorst noted the “audacity and pluck” of the destroyers even though “success was impossible from the start”. However, Victoria Cross recommendations for their commanders were turned down in what Mr Barker argued was a further bid to block scrutiny of why they had been at sea that day.
Although extensive details about Operation Paul are recorded in war cabinet minutes, Churchill omitted to mention the plan in his memoirs – perhaps disinclined to draw attention to an abortive mission to attack a neutral player during the conflict.
Drawing together the pieces of the jigsaw, Mr Barker argued a “discernible picture has emerged” of the participation of the Glorious, Ardent and Acasta in Operation Paul, a role that was then covered up in Whitehall. He told The Times: “In covering their tracks, the Admiralty painted a picture of incompetence but to my delight I discovered the opposite was true. The reality is a story of great courage and bravery that deserves its place amongst the Navy’s greatest feats.”
Leading naval historian Andrew Lambert, of King’s College London, threw his support behind Mr Barker’s theory, saying the evidence was compelling and “too high to be mere coincidence”. It suggested “a great injustice has been done by maintaining secrecy on an operation of such audacity, and a battle in which the Royal Navy displayed its characteristic skill and daring in adversity”, Professor Lambert added.
The new account has also been welcomed by Jannie Sayer, daughter of Captain D’Oyly Hughes, who said: “It has been a long haul — of nearly 80 years — to live with the ignominy that has been dealt out to my father and it has given us much joy and relief to see such firm evidence that he was only obeying orders.”
Secret history behind HMS Glorious disaster during Second World War revealed
Britain’s worst naval disaster in the Second World War resulted from an ambitious secret mission rather than the folly of the main warship’s commander, a new investigation by the grandson of one of the victims has concluded.
Eighty years ago tomorrow, on June 8, 1940, the UK’s largest and fastest aircraft carrier HMS Glorious, and its two destroyer escorts HMS Ardent and HMS Acasta, were sunk in a devastating assault by German battleships. In total 1,519 men died, making it the biggest single loss of life at sea for the UK during the war. Just 41 seamen survived, rescued when Norwegian fishing boats found them three days later.
In recent decades Captain Guy D’Oyly Hughes, commander of the Glorious, has been cast as an arrogant villain and held responsible for the disaster. However Ben Barker, whose grandfather Lieutenant Commander J. F. “Ben” Barker commanded the Ardent and died in the battle, has uncovered fresh evidence that leads to a rival theory. It holds that Captain D’Oyly Hughes was not indulging a petty feud, but pursuing a courageous mission devised by Winston Churchill.
The three Royal Navy ships had initially been part of an operation to evacuate British forces from Norway, almost simultaneous with the retreat at Dunkirk, and had rescued two squadrons of RAF Hurricane and Gladiator fighter planes. Instead of waiting to travel back home with the larger, well-fortified convoy, the trio of ships set sail independently, with only light protection, across the Norwegian sea. Here they were intercepted and attacked by the formidable German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, after warnings from Bletchley Park and Norwegian intelligence about their suspected presence had gone awry.
All three British ships were hit and sunk in an explosion of flames and smoke – captured on German newsreel. The tragedy prompted myriad questions about what the trio of ships had been doing and why they had been sailing alone without better protection. The Admiralty Board of Enquiry made a swift assessment and sealed its findings until 2041 – making it the only aircraft carrier loss to be subjected to a 100-year period of secrecy.
Public interest in the controversy refused to subside, however, and in 1946 the government was forced to publish a brief account of what had happened. It stated the aircraft carrier had been short of fuel and therefore had decided to speed home ahead of the convoy. The account made no sense and was roundly regarded as implausible. It left a vacuum for alternative explanations and one was put forward in 1980 by the navy’s official historian.
This account, published in The Sunday Times, blamed the episode on the supposedly foolish, tyrannical behaviour of Captain D’Oyly Hughes, claiming he decided to rush home to refer a senior aviator, with whom he was embroiled in a feud, to court martial.
In 1997 Mr Barker examined the circumstances around the sinking of the ships for a documentary and came to a similar conclusion. He felt he had not got to the bottom of matters, however, and continued to investigate. He has since uncovered a compelling trail of evidence linking HMS Glorious to Churchill’s “Operation Paul”, a secret plan to attack neutral Sweden and stop the export of iron ore to Hitler’s Germany.
A month before the sinking of the Glorious, Captain D’Oyly Hughes had lunched with Admiral Reggie Drax, an operational commander of the navy and mine-laying expert, in London before the pair attended a meeting with Churchill at the Admiralty. Captain D’Oyly Hughes then played a senior role in a dry run for Operation Paul, practising the daring plan for Swordfish aircraft to lay mines in the strategic Swedish port of Lulea.
In early June Churchill gave instructions for the secret operation to commence. While some paperwork noted that HMS Ark Royal, also in Norway to evacuate British forces, was earmarked to lead the mission, other evidence found by Mr Barker suggested that HMS Glorious was substituted in – and that was why the ship had sailed independently the day it was sunk. Cryptic references were made to the Glorious in the aftermath by senior mandarins and Churchill himself, but further inquiries into the episode were shut down.
German naval war reports shed some light on the battle that destroyed the British aircraft carrier group, recording the extraordinary courage of the ships’ crew as they were under attack. Ardent laid smoke to disguise Glorious, while Acasta hit the enemy battlecruiser Scharnhorst with a torpedo that killed 53 German sailors. The captain of the Scharnhorst noted the “audacity and pluck” of the destroyers even though “success was impossible from the start”. However, Victoria Cross recommendations for their commanders were turned down in what Mr Barker argued was a further bid to block scrutiny of why they had been at sea that day.
Although extensive details about Operation Paul are recorded in war cabinet minutes, Churchill omitted to mention the plan in his memoirs – perhaps disinclined to draw attention to an abortive mission to attack a neutral player during the conflict.
Drawing together the pieces of the jigsaw, Mr Barker argued a “discernible picture has emerged” of the participation of the Glorious, Ardent and Acasta in Operation Paul, a role that was then covered up in Whitehall. He told The Times: “In covering their tracks, the Admiralty painted a picture of incompetence but to my delight I discovered the opposite was true. The reality is a story of great courage and bravery that deserves its place amongst the Navy’s greatest feats.”
Leading naval historian Andrew Lambert, of King’s College London, threw his support behind Mr Barker’s theory, saying the evidence was compelling and “too high to be mere coincidence”. It suggested “a great injustice has been done by maintaining secrecy on an operation of such audacity, and a battle in which the Royal Navy displayed its characteristic skill and daring in adversity”, Professor Lambert added.
The new account has also been welcomed by Jannie Sayer, daughter of Captain D’Oyly Hughes, who said: “It has been a long haul — of nearly 80 years — to live with the ignominy that has been dealt out to my father and it has given us much joy and relief to see such firm evidence that he was only obeying orders.”
I have read both Barker's piece and John Winton's book "Carrier Glorious". Winton was not apparently aware of Operation Paul at the time he wrote. but it is worth reading his book alongside Barker's piece for the insights he gives into D'Oyly-Hughes' character
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There is an excellent article in the Britain At War magazine
this one
https://www.artstation.com/artwork/xz5G4E
The Germans recommended the highest awards for the destroyer crews, but it was denied as part of the cover up.
the senior aviator had been left behind as he refused to launch for legitimate reasons previously
this one
https://www.artstation.com/artwork/xz5G4E
The Germans recommended the highest awards for the destroyer crews, but it was denied as part of the cover up.
the senior aviator had been left behind as he refused to launch for legitimate reasons previously
Last edited by NutLoose; 7th Jun 2020 at 22:35.
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Ben Barker's website on the subject: http://www.hmsglorious.com/
glarac.co.uk | The HMS Glorious, Ardent & Acasta Association (GLARAC)
glarac.co.uk | The HMS Glorious, Ardent & Acasta Association (GLARAC)
Last edited by Whinging Tinny; 8th Jun 2020 at 19:14.
The British were pulling out of Norway (starting on May 24th) when the Glorious was sunk (8th June) - so why bother mining Swedish ports when they could use Narvik? She was only carrying 9 Gladiators and six Swordfish on her way back to Norway on 2nd June as space had to be left for the aircraft being recovered - that's not a strike force of any size.
has anyone got a map of her track to & from Norway?
has anyone got a map of her track to & from Norway?
Throws an interesting light on a period the RN and particularly the FAA would probably prefer to forget - Ark Royal's subsequent hunt for Scharnhorst and Gneisenau ended with the loss of 8 of 15 Skuas in an unsuccessful attack on the first. The official historian referred to is of course the author of the RN WW2 Official History, Captain (RN) Stephen Roskill. Whinging Tinny's links both go to GLARAC so here is this one https://www.hmsglorious.com/new-page-1.
I understand the thrust of this to be that as D'Oyly-Hughes wasn't reponsible for Glorious being where she was with only two destroyers therefore he bears little responsibility for the loss. We know five curiously unarmed and (in the available time) unarmable Swordfish were ordered on deck in the final minutes before the action but there were no standing combat patrols - I have a vague memory that the overcrowding caused by the presence of the RAF aircraft made deck operations highly problematic. Would a wise captain have stripped all his offensive armament at once? Barker tries, IMHO not entirely successfully, to address the question "did he fight his ship to the fulness of its current capabilities?" On paper with a top speed of 30 kts vs his opponents' 31 kts he should have been able to connect his additional boilers and keep the range open, if not open it further, while the destroyers kept the Germans occupied. His armament was his aircraft - the 4.7 inch HA/LA guns were irrelevant. I find the argument about it being normal not to fly patrols specious, in the previous few days both Dunkirk and Norway had been evacuated. The situation had changed. If he was zigzaging to avoid U-boats shouldn't he have also been looking for them on the surface? D'Oyly-Hughes was undoubtedly a very brave man but whether he had the competencies necessary in the situation he was put is still open to question. One might say Glorious was unlucky to be badly hit at extreme range. Strikes me that, as usual, Churchill's enthusiams coupled with VSOs mistrust of intelligence caused fatal problems for the professionals. The German propaganda film of the sinking makes for uncomfortable viewing.
More on Operation Paul can be found here https://sjohistoriskasamfundet.files...8/fn70_a04.pdf in this the respected naval historian Captain Peter Hore RN rtd. says the loss of Glorious "did not affect planning for Operation Paul."
Glorious would have had to disembark 46 and 263 Squadrons before embarking aditional Swordfish (and presumably her Skuas) before proceding back to Norway as she only had 6 Swordfish and 9 Sea Gladiators onboard. So I am not sure how much time would have been saved over Ark Royal - she was 300nm (slighty north of) due west of Narvik when sunk, so not on a direct course for Scapa. The mines were presumably still on the Clyde so she would have to sail to there from Scapa.
The exceptional skills displayed by the RAF pilots in landing on shouldn't go unremarked, their loss made the tragedy worse.
Winton says DOH "continually rejected the advice of the ship's professional aviators". Could be said of some others more recently?
The clash doesn't seem to have effected Heaths's career - three months later he was Acting Captain in command of the fleet repair ship HMS Vindictive and went on to command to RNASs HMS Nightjar and HMS Heron.
(Asturias I don't have time to rewrite the above - but Op Paul was to hamper shipping across the Baltic from neutral Sweden to Germany. It would be a bloody long way through potentially hostile waters from Narvik but not very far by air overland from Narvik to Lulea. It would though, be interesting to know where the Ark Royal was and if she was in range to intervene.)
I understand the thrust of this to be that as D'Oyly-Hughes wasn't reponsible for Glorious being where she was with only two destroyers therefore he bears little responsibility for the loss. We know five curiously unarmed and (in the available time) unarmable Swordfish were ordered on deck in the final minutes before the action but there were no standing combat patrols - I have a vague memory that the overcrowding caused by the presence of the RAF aircraft made deck operations highly problematic. Would a wise captain have stripped all his offensive armament at once? Barker tries, IMHO not entirely successfully, to address the question "did he fight his ship to the fulness of its current capabilities?" On paper with a top speed of 30 kts vs his opponents' 31 kts he should have been able to connect his additional boilers and keep the range open, if not open it further, while the destroyers kept the Germans occupied. His armament was his aircraft - the 4.7 inch HA/LA guns were irrelevant. I find the argument about it being normal not to fly patrols specious, in the previous few days both Dunkirk and Norway had been evacuated. The situation had changed. If he was zigzaging to avoid U-boats shouldn't he have also been looking for them on the surface? D'Oyly-Hughes was undoubtedly a very brave man but whether he had the competencies necessary in the situation he was put is still open to question. One might say Glorious was unlucky to be badly hit at extreme range. Strikes me that, as usual, Churchill's enthusiams coupled with VSOs mistrust of intelligence caused fatal problems for the professionals. The German propaganda film of the sinking makes for uncomfortable viewing.
More on Operation Paul can be found here https://sjohistoriskasamfundet.files...8/fn70_a04.pdf in this the respected naval historian Captain Peter Hore RN rtd. says the loss of Glorious "did not affect planning for Operation Paul."
Glorious would have had to disembark 46 and 263 Squadrons before embarking aditional Swordfish (and presumably her Skuas) before proceding back to Norway as she only had 6 Swordfish and 9 Sea Gladiators onboard. So I am not sure how much time would have been saved over Ark Royal - she was 300nm (slighty north of) due west of Narvik when sunk, so not on a direct course for Scapa. The mines were presumably still on the Clyde so she would have to sail to there from Scapa.
The exceptional skills displayed by the RAF pilots in landing on shouldn't go unremarked, their loss made the tragedy worse.
Winton says DOH "continually rejected the advice of the ship's professional aviators". Could be said of some others more recently?
The clash doesn't seem to have effected Heaths's career - three months later he was Acting Captain in command of the fleet repair ship HMS Vindictive and went on to command to RNASs HMS Nightjar and HMS Heron.
(Asturias I don't have time to rewrite the above - but Op Paul was to hamper shipping across the Baltic from neutral Sweden to Germany. It would be a bloody long way through potentially hostile waters from Narvik but not very far by air overland from Narvik to Lulea. It would though, be interesting to know where the Ark Royal was and if she was in range to intervene.)
Last edited by SLXOwft; 9th Jun 2020 at 08:18. Reason: correction
The clash doesn't seem to have effected Hughes's career - three months later he was Acting Captain in command of the fleet repair ship HMS Vindictive and went on to command to RNASs HMS Nightjar and HMS Heron.
I have a vague memory that the overcrowding caused by the presence of the RAF aircraft made deck operations highly problematic.
The wind at the time was light,from the North West. To launch and recover aircraft it would have been necessary to bring more boilers in line, increase speed and turn about 125 degreea off their mean line of advance. This may have been a factor in the decision not to lauch patrols.
Hurricanes and Glorious
In fact Glorious and the RAF did well here, and the carrier was not really able to escape the attention of one of the most powerful German ships afloat.
Remember the Hurricanes were not 'hooked' and had sandbags lashed to the tail units to help stop them 'nosing over' when braking.
I am not aware that any of the Pilots (most lost) had landed on a carrier ever, so it was a cruel blow that they and their experience was lost as they would no doubt have been a very valuable contribution to the BoB later.
In fact the Norwegian campaign was a factor in the BoB as the Germans lost many ships and transport aircraft, and both the German Navy and Wehrmacht had indicated that any invasion of mainland GB could only be undertaken if there was no effective RAF defensive input.
Later it was naval Sea Gladiators (flown from the Island) that became the early defenders of Malta before the first Hurricanes arrived.
Remember the Hurricanes were not 'hooked' and had sandbags lashed to the tail units to help stop them 'nosing over' when braking.
I am not aware that any of the Pilots (most lost) had landed on a carrier ever, so it was a cruel blow that they and their experience was lost as they would no doubt have been a very valuable contribution to the BoB later.
In fact the Norwegian campaign was a factor in the BoB as the Germans lost many ships and transport aircraft, and both the German Navy and Wehrmacht had indicated that any invasion of mainland GB could only be undertaken if there was no effective RAF defensive input.
Later it was naval Sea Gladiators (flown from the Island) that became the early defenders of Malta before the first Hurricanes arrived.
r it was naval Sea Gladiators (flown from the Island) that became the early defenders of Malta
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In the Britain at War article one of the RAF Pilots had joined the RAF as his mother did not want him going to sea and being lost, in a tragic fate he was one of those that flew onto Glorious and died on her.
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One of the Malta Sea Gladiator pilots, in the early days post WW2, commanded 46 which had flown onto the carrier.. Within the pages of this parish has been spotted, in the distant past, a son of Cross; he also served on 46 many years later.
Crated Gladiators
Sydneys finest, did what it said on the tin without the glamour, many built in the same factory that had built the Glad.
thanks SLX - somewhere in the loft I have a copy of the Official History which has a map of the incident I'm sure.
I remember reading years ago that the reason the Hurricanes went to Glorious was that she'd carried them to Norway in the first place and her lifts were big enough to strike them below without too much trouble - whereas with the old Ark it meant cutting the wing tips off.
They also could have operated patrols as they had done so she made the delivery run at the start of the campaign.
DOH apparently had a well-known penchant for swanning off and operating on his own long before the Norwegian campaign.
Although it was a tragedy, not withstanding the outstanding bravery of the destroyers the German ships missed capturing King Haakon, who I think passed in front of them or the effectively unguarded troopships, which I think passed behind the Germans (it may have been vice versa) - arguably more important targets
I remember reading years ago that the reason the Hurricanes went to Glorious was that she'd carried them to Norway in the first place and her lifts were big enough to strike them below without too much trouble - whereas with the old Ark it meant cutting the wing tips off.
They also could have operated patrols as they had done so she made the delivery run at the start of the campaign.
DOH apparently had a well-known penchant for swanning off and operating on his own long before the Norwegian campaign.
Although it was a tragedy, not withstanding the outstanding bravery of the destroyers the German ships missed capturing King Haakon, who I think passed in front of them or the effectively unguarded troopships, which I think passed behind the Germans (it may have been vice versa) - arguably more important targets
I rather suspect that D'Orly-Hughes is a convenient diversion from the real incompetence which was alive and well in Whitehall (where else?). A half baked operation to mine the Lulea roads in neutral Sweden depends upon Glorious off loading the RAF fighters salvaged from the abortive Norwegian campaign, installing long range tanks and mine racks onto the already embarked Swordfish, and embarking further aircraft at Scapa Flow. Time was off the essence, the sooner Glorious could be back in Norwegian waters and launching Operation Paul then the greater its chances of success. We had now quit Norway, the Germans were rapidly taking our place and the Luftwaffe would be taking over the northern fighter airfields. So the decision is taken to start the laborious modifications to the Swordfish on the way to Scapa Flow. That basically disarms and hence dooms Glorious and her two escorts, Ardent and Acasta. She maintains an anti submarine zigzag but considers herself now out of danger from enemy aircraft. What isn't anticipated is the possible presence of strong surface naval units. But such a force is already at sea, detected by Bletchley Park and confirmed to the RAF Senior Officer by Norwegian coast watchers. None of this intelligence reaches Glorious (or any other RN ship it would seem) which is stunned by the arrival of two pocket battleships (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) and sends a sighting report received by the cruiser HMS Devonshire, also heading back home and not far from the resulting action. In normal circumstances she would have gone to the aid of her three sister ships, but she has the Norwegian Royal Family on board and elects to continue as ordered, maintaining radio silence.
The outcome was inevitable and 1519 men died, but before she succumbed Acasta struck Scharnhorst with a torpedo, doing considerable damage and obliging the task force to return to port. The convoys packed full of troops escaped unscathed as a result, as did the Norwegian King. Both destroyers acquitted themselves bravely as witnessed by their enemy but no such recognition came from the Royal Navy. Indeed the widow of Acasta's captain is denied access to a survivor and is told nothing of how he conducted himself or how he died. Some things never change, NoK have been treated with contempt and lied to by the Admiralty's love child, the MOD, since. D'Orly-Hughes lost his ship (and his two escorts) which no doubt is enough to hang him in order to encourage other captains. How about the Admirals though? Why weren't their collars felt?
The outcome was inevitable and 1519 men died, but before she succumbed Acasta struck Scharnhorst with a torpedo, doing considerable damage and obliging the task force to return to port. The convoys packed full of troops escaped unscathed as a result, as did the Norwegian King. Both destroyers acquitted themselves bravely as witnessed by their enemy but no such recognition came from the Royal Navy. Indeed the widow of Acasta's captain is denied access to a survivor and is told nothing of how he conducted himself or how he died. Some things never change, NoK have been treated with contempt and lied to by the Admiralty's love child, the MOD, since. D'Orly-Hughes lost his ship (and his two escorts) which no doubt is enough to hang him in order to encourage other captains. How about the Admirals though? Why weren't their collars felt?
Having found and followed all the links above I find the whole story fascinating. One thing I have been unable to find out is what actually happened to Cdr JB Heath, the original Cdr (air) who got offloaded in Scapa. Did he actually get Court Martialled? There is a list of WW2 RN Officers here
https://www.unithistories.com/office...fficersH4.html
Which includes a JB Heath but makes no mention of his service on HMS Glorious
https://www.unithistories.com/office...fficersH4.html
Which includes a JB Heath but makes no mention of his service on HMS Glorious
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Thread Starter
Having found and followed all the links above I find the whole story fascinating. One thing I have been unable to find out is what actually happened to Cdr JB Heath, the original Cdr (air) who got offloaded in Scapa. Did he actually get Court Martialled? There is a list of WW2 RN Officers here
https://www.unithistories.com/office...fficersH4.html
Which includes a JB Heath but makes no mention of his service on HMS Glorious
https://www.unithistories.com/office...fficersH4.html
Which includes a JB Heath but makes no mention of his service on HMS Glorious
....After a major dispute he put ashore his Commander, Flying, J.B. Heath, and was preparing to court martial both Heath and Lieutenant Commander Slessor. Lieutenant Commander Slessor had written a despairing letter to his wife saying,
J.B. and I are in great trouble. I can't tell you the story but you'll guess the cause of it. It was bound to come sooner or later I suppose, and perhaps it's a good thing. I needn't tell where right lies, nor that my conscience is absolutely clear, but we do need your thoughts and prayers very much.
That was a message from a man serving on a very unhappy ship.Lieutenant Commander Slessor perished in the sinking. Commander Heath was cleared of all charges and continued his distinguished service in other sectors, finishing as Commanding Officer of HMS Heron at Yeovilton.
HMS Heron Commanding Officers: Captain John B. Heath: August 1945 – February 1947
Last edited by ORAC; 10th Jun 2020 at 06:14.
Thanks ORAC
So the JB Heath listed on that site is the same one. Wonder why there is no mention of HMS Glorious on his record. As far as I can see he is shown as Air Materiel Dept, Admiralty, HMS President.
So the JB Heath listed on that site is the same one. Wonder why there is no mention of HMS Glorious on his record. As far as I can see he is shown as Air Materiel Dept, Admiralty, HMS President.
A belated (and overly long) reply
Oxenos,
Thanks, yes 'Heath's' I have corrected.
Regarding overcrowding I may be thinking of another ship (possibly even Navy) - though it was put forward as a theory in a history of the Scharnhorst I have read. (ACM Cross went a long way for a man who joined on a short service commission!)
The account linked by Imagegear is most illuminating. It contradicts the stripping down theory as it states the Swordfish that were sent up were "loaded with anti-sub bombs, without torpedo(sic)". One can only assume Capt. D'Oyly-Hughes had weighed the available information of likely risks against his orders and available fuel. He came to a decision that was to prove fatal for himself and many others. He must have thought that in the event of an encounter with a U-boat he would have time to bring up and launch his depth charge armed Swordfish. It was nearly 30 minutes from the sighting until they were readied on deck. I can not find anything about the minimum WoD requirements for a Swordfish but I know there was at least one occasion when a lightly loaded one took off from a ship at anchor as the prevailing wind was sufficient.
This account also includes "By 5. June 1940, when the Admiralty repeated its wish that the Glorious should proceed to Devonport"(after return from Narvik) - granted this may have changed by the 8th but is indicative of the confused state of affairs.
I cannot understand why they were at fourth degree readiness but it may have been normal practice at the time. What about Fw200 Condors - was there no need to be able to 'Hack the Shad'? The air threat, though minimal, was real e.g. the AA cruiser HMS Curlew had been sunk by JU88s of KG30 when operating near Narvik on 26 May. I am pretty sure they would have still been in range of both JU88s and He111s. I think there are grounds for an accusation of contributory negligence. The order to sail independently, confusion in the Admiralty and refusal to act on the intelligence (although Battleships of the Home Fleet were ordered out) were probably the real causes. One forgets that radio communications were unreliable but I find it difficult to believe that none of the ships encountered (and sunk) by Hipper (when in company with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) managed to get off a signal - it may never have been received. If the Op Paul theory is correct then Churchill was the main author of the disaster. I think is clear Dudley Pound was trying to frustrate his plan especially in light of the recent heavy losses of FAA aircraft.
As POBJOY implies the Narvik campaign was disastrous for the Kriegsmarine which all ten destroyers involved (half the total number). All three air arms involved achieved successes both the FAA and Luftwaffe sinking ships.The RAF contribution was impressive. In the two weeks 46 Sqn Hurricane pilots were credited with 14 kills and a number of probables. 263 Squadron's flew 249 sorties in their Gladiators(!) and claimed 26 enemy aircraft destroyed. It is of note that Admiral Marschall had left all his destroyers with the Hipper when they parted company – probably through necessity.
They were more than doubly unlucky as Admiral Marschall was under orders to avoid action and was removed from his fleet command partly for having disobeyed.
Well this all reminds me not to make bold statements when not in possession of all the facts.
In my response to Asturias56 I should have acknowledged that one of the original aims of the Narvik operations was to stop the shipments of Swedish iron ore from there.
Chugalug2 I think you are right.
Probably various reasons – may have thought it would not have been conducive to the "good order and discipline of the service", and to national morale to haul VSOs over the coals in an overt manner. The UK had just withdrawn from France as well as Norway. An accident of war was more acceptable than something that could have brought down the new administration. It was the earlier failures in Norway that brought down Chamberlain.
VAdml.later Adml. Wells subsequent career was hardly stellar. Though to be fair he received a MID (6/1/42) for “coolness & resource in Home Fleet operations, esp. Norwegian waters”
26.07.1939 - 20.08.1940 Rear-/Vice-Admiral, Aircraft Carriers [HMS Ark Royal (aircraft carrier)] (despatches twice)
25.09.1940 - 30.09.1940 HMS .... (additional; for special service)
01.10.1940 - 06.01.1942 HMS President (additional; for unemployed time)
07.01.1942 - 15.04.1944 Flag Officer Commanding Orkneys
and Shetlands [HMS Iron Duke / HMS Proserpine]
16.04.1944 - 27.07.1944 HMS President (additional; for disposal)
28.07.1944 - 29.10.1944 Flag Officer-in-Charge, Aberdeen [HMS Bacchante (RN base, Aberdeen) (additional)]
30.10.1944 - 31.12.1945 Commanding Officer, HMS Bacchante (RN base, Aberdeen) & Naval Officer-in-Charge Aberdeen (to serve in the rank of Capt.)
Apologies for the length of this - I should probably shut up now.
Thanks, yes 'Heath's' I have corrected.
Regarding overcrowding I may be thinking of another ship (possibly even Navy) - though it was put forward as a theory in a history of the Scharnhorst I have read. (ACM Cross went a long way for a man who joined on a short service commission!
)The account linked by Imagegear is most illuminating. It contradicts the stripping down theory as it states the Swordfish that were sent up were "loaded with anti-sub bombs, without torpedo(sic)". One can only assume Capt. D'Oyly-Hughes had weighed the available information of likely risks against his orders and available fuel. He came to a decision that was to prove fatal for himself and many others. He must have thought that in the event of an encounter with a U-boat he would have time to bring up and launch his depth charge armed Swordfish. It was nearly 30 minutes from the sighting until they were readied on deck. I can not find anything about the minimum WoD requirements for a Swordfish but I know there was at least one occasion when a lightly loaded one took off from a ship at anchor as the prevailing wind was sufficient.
This account also includes "By 5. June 1940, when the Admiralty repeated its wish that the Glorious should proceed to Devonport"(after return from Narvik) - granted this may have changed by the 8th but is indicative of the confused state of affairs.
I cannot understand why they were at fourth degree readiness but it may have been normal practice at the time. What about Fw200 Condors - was there no need to be able to 'Hack the Shad'? The air threat, though minimal, was real e.g. the AA cruiser HMS Curlew had been sunk by JU88s of KG30 when operating near Narvik on 26 May. I am pretty sure they would have still been in range of both JU88s and He111s. I think there are grounds for an accusation of contributory negligence. The order to sail independently, confusion in the Admiralty and refusal to act on the intelligence (although Battleships of the Home Fleet were ordered out) were probably the real causes. One forgets that radio communications were unreliable but I find it difficult to believe that none of the ships encountered (and sunk) by Hipper (when in company with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) managed to get off a signal - it may never have been received. If the Op Paul theory is correct then Churchill was the main author of the disaster. I think is clear Dudley Pound was trying to frustrate his plan especially in light of the recent heavy losses of FAA aircraft.
As POBJOY implies the Narvik campaign was disastrous for the Kriegsmarine which all ten destroyers involved (half the total number). All three air arms involved achieved successes both the FAA and Luftwaffe sinking ships.The RAF contribution was impressive. In the two weeks 46 Sqn Hurricane pilots were credited with 14 kills and a number of probables. 263 Squadron's flew 249 sorties in their Gladiators(!) and claimed 26 enemy aircraft destroyed. It is of note that Admiral Marschall had left all his destroyers with the Hipper when they parted company – probably through necessity.
It was doubly unfortunate that when the German battlecruisers did appear they were upwind, so that the carrier could not fly off aircraft and run away from them at the same time
The first hit from Scharnhorst with her third salvo reached Glorious from 24.175 meters (26.450 yards), which is the longest gunfire hit on any enemy warship ever achieved
Well this all reminds me not to make bold statements when not in possession of all the facts.
In my response to Asturias56 I should have acknowledged that one of the original aims of the Narvik operations was to stop the shipments of Swedish iron ore from there.
Chugalug2 I think you are right.
How about the Admirals though? Why weren't their collars felt?
VAdml.later Adml. Wells subsequent career was hardly stellar. Though to be fair he received a MID (6/1/42) for “coolness & resource in Home Fleet operations, esp. Norwegian waters”
26.07.1939 - 20.08.1940 Rear-/Vice-Admiral, Aircraft Carriers [HMS Ark Royal (aircraft carrier)] (despatches twice)
25.09.1940 - 30.09.1940 HMS .... (additional; for special service)
01.10.1940 - 06.01.1942 HMS President (additional; for unemployed time)
07.01.1942 - 15.04.1944 Flag Officer Commanding Orkneys
and Shetlands [HMS Iron Duke / HMS Proserpine]
16.04.1944 - 27.07.1944 HMS President (additional; for disposal)
28.07.1944 - 29.10.1944 Flag Officer-in-Charge, Aberdeen [HMS Bacchante (RN base, Aberdeen) (additional)]
30.10.1944 - 31.12.1945 Commanding Officer, HMS Bacchante (RN base, Aberdeen) & Naval Officer-in-Charge Aberdeen (to serve in the rank of Capt.)
Apologies for the length of this - I should probably shut up now.
Last edited by SLXOwft; 10th Jun 2020 at 18:58. Reason: Grammar and omissions