Originally Posted by
oxenos
By Hughes's, I think you mean Heath's.
Oxenos,
Thanks, yes 'Heath's' I have corrected.
Regarding overcrowding I may be thinking of another ship (possibly even Navy) - though it was put forward as a theory in a history of the Scharnhorst I have read. (ACM Cross went a long way for a man who joined on a short service commission!
)
The account linked by
Imagegear is most illuminating. It contradicts the stripping down theory as it states the Swordfish that were sent up were "loaded with anti-sub bombs, without torpedo(sic)". One can only assume Capt. D'Oyly-Hughes had weighed the available information of likely risks against his orders and available fuel. He came to a decision that was to prove fatal for himself and many others. He must have thought that in the event of an encounter with a U-boat he would have time to bring up and launch his depth charge armed Swordfish. It was nearly 30 minutes from the sighting until they were readied on deck. I can not find anything about the minimum WoD requirements for a Swordfish but I know there was at least one occasion when a lightly loaded one took off from a ship at anchor as the prevailing wind was sufficient.
This account also includes "By 5. June 1940, when the Admiralty repeated its wish that the Glorious should proceed to Devonport"(after return from Narvik) - granted this may have changed by the 8th but is indicative of the confused state of affairs.
I cannot understand why they were at fourth degree readiness but it may have been normal practice at the time. What about Fw200 Condors - was there no need to be able to 'Hack the Shad'? The air threat, though minimal, was real e.g. the AA cruiser HMS Curlew had been sunk by JU88s of KG30 when operating near Narvik on 26 May. I am pretty sure they would have still been in range of both JU88s and He111s. I think there are grounds for an accusation of contributory negligence. The order to sail independently, confusion in the Admiralty and refusal to act on the intelligence (although Battleships of the Home Fleet were ordered out) were probably the real causes. One forgets that radio communications were unreliable but I find it difficult to believe that none of the ships encountered (and sunk) by Hipper (when in company with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) managed to get off a signal - it may never have been received. If the Op Paul theory is correct then Churchill was the main author of the disaster. I think is clear Dudley Pound was trying to frustrate his plan especially in light of the recent heavy losses of FAA aircraft.
As
POBJOY implies the Narvik campaign was disastrous for the Kriegsmarine which all ten destroyers involved (half the total number). All three air arms involved achieved successes both the FAA and Luftwaffe sinking ships.The RAF contribution was impressive. In the two weeks 46 Sqn Hurricane pilots were credited with 14 kills and a number of probables. 263 Squadron's flew 249 sorties in their Gladiators(!) and claimed 26 enemy aircraft destroyed. It is of note that Admiral Marschall had left all his destroyers with the Hipper when they parted company – probably through necessity.
It was doubly unfortunate that when the German battlecruisers did appear they were upwind, so that the carrier could not fly off aircraft and run away from them at the same time
The first hit from Scharnhorst with her third salvo reached Glorious from 24.175 meters (26.450 yards), which is the longest gunfire hit on any enemy warship ever achieved
They were more than doubly unlucky as Admiral Marschall was under orders to avoid action and was removed from his fleet command partly for having disobeyed.
Well this all reminds me not to make bold statements when not in possession of all the facts.
In my response to
Asturias56 I should have acknowledged that one of the original aims of the Narvik operations was to stop the shipments of Swedish iron ore from there.
Chugalug2 I think you are right.
How about the Admirals though? Why weren't their collars felt?
Probably various reasons – may have thought it would not have been conducive to the "good order and discipline of the service", and to national morale to haul VSOs over the coals in an overt manner. The UK had just withdrawn from France as well as Norway. An accident of war was more acceptable than something that could have brought down the new administration. It was the earlier failures in Norway that brought down Chamberlain.
VAdml.later Adml. Wells subsequent career was hardly stellar. Though to be fair he received a MID (6/1/42) for “coolness & resource in Home Fleet operations, esp. Norwegian waters”
26.07.1939 - 20.08.1940 Rear-/Vice-Admiral, Aircraft Carriers [HMS Ark Royal (aircraft carrier)] (despatches twice)
25.09.1940 - 30.09.1940 HMS .... (additional; for special service)
01.10.1940 - 06.01.1942 HMS President (additional; for unemployed time)
07.01.1942 - 15.04.1944 Flag Officer Commanding Orkneys
and Shetlands [HMS Iron Duke / HMS Proserpine]
16.04.1944 - 27.07.1944 HMS President (additional; for disposal)
28.07.1944 - 29.10.1944 Flag Officer-in-Charge, Aberdeen [HMS Bacchante (RN base, Aberdeen) (additional)]
30.10.1944 - 31.12.1945 Commanding Officer, HMS Bacchante (RN base, Aberdeen) & Naval Officer-in-Charge Aberdeen (to serve in the rank of Capt.)
Apologies for the length of this - I should probably shut up now.