Throws an interesting light on a period the RN and particularly the FAA would probably prefer to forget - Ark Royal's subsequent hunt for Scharnhorst and Gneisenau ended with the loss of 8 of 15 Skuas in an unsuccessful attack on the first. The official historian referred to is of course the author of the RN WW2 Official History, Captain (RN) Stephen Roskill. Whinging Tinny's links both go to GLARAC so here is this one
https://www.hmsglorious.com/new-page-1.
I understand the thrust of this to be that as D'Oyly-Hughes wasn't reponsible for Glorious being where she was with only two destroyers therefore he bears little responsibility for the loss. We know five curiously unarmed and (in the available time) unarmable Swordfish were ordered on deck in the final minutes before the action but there were no standing combat patrols - I have a vague memory that the overcrowding caused by the presence of the RAF aircraft made deck operations highly problematic. Would a wise captain have stripped all his offensive armament at once? Barker tries, IMHO not entirely successfully, to address the question "did he fight his ship to the fulness of its current capabilities?" On paper with a top speed of 30 kts vs his opponents' 31 kts he should have been able to connect his additional boilers and keep the range open, if not open it further, while the destroyers kept the Germans occupied. His armament was his aircraft - the 4.7 inch HA/LA guns were irrelevant. I find the argument about it being normal not to fly patrols specious, in the previous few days both Dunkirk and Norway had been evacuated. The situation had changed. If he was zigzaging to avoid U-boats shouldn't he have also been looking for them on the surface? D'Oyly-Hughes was undoubtedly a very brave man but whether he had the competencies necessary in the situation he was put is still open to question. One might say Glorious was unlucky to be badly hit at extreme range. Strikes me that, as usual, Churchill's enthusiams coupled with VSOs mistrust of intelligence caused fatal problems for the professionals. The German propaganda film of the sinking makes for uncomfortable viewing.
More on Operation Paul can be found here
https://sjohistoriskasamfundet.files...8/fn70_a04.pdf in this the respected naval historian Captain Peter Hore RN rtd. says the loss of Glorious "did not affect planning for Operation Paul."
Glorious would have had to disembark 46 and 263 Squadrons before embarking aditional Swordfish (and presumably her Skuas) before proceding back to Norway as she only had 6 Swordfish and 9 Sea Gladiators onboard. So I am not sure how much time would have been saved over Ark Royal - she was 300nm (slighty north of) due west of Narvik when sunk, so not on a direct course for Scapa. The mines were presumably still on the Clyde so she would have to sail to there from Scapa.
The exceptional skills displayed by the RAF pilots in landing on shouldn't go unremarked, their loss made the tragedy worse.
Winton says DOH "continually rejected the advice of the ship's professional aviators". Could be said of some others more recently?
The clash doesn't seem to have effected Heaths's career - three months later he was Acting Captain in command of the fleet repair ship HMS Vindictive and went on to command to RNASs HMS Nightjar and HMS Heron.
(Asturias I don't have time to rewrite the above - but Op Paul was to hamper shipping across the Baltic from
neutral Sweden to Germany. It would be a bloody long way through potentially hostile waters from Narvik but not very far by air overland from Narvik to Lulea. It would though, be interesting to know where the Ark Royal was and if she was in range to intervene.)