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Canadian Forces Snowbirds CT-114 down in British Columbia

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Canadian Forces Snowbirds CT-114 down in British Columbia

Old 9th Jun 2020, 18:11
  #261 (permalink)  
 
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"He wasn't ejecting ne'er-do-wells was he?"


Well the "Bulldog Bar " was a bit of an "In Town" weekend evening watering hole for certain RAF Institute of Aviation Medicine characters who knew him , so perhaps there was a degree of top cover !

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Old 11th Jun 2020, 01:03
  #262 (permalink)  
 
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If you don't lose control, there's a very good chance you won't be injured. In a light aircraft.
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Old 11th Jun 2020, 03:23
  #263 (permalink)  
 
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cncpc

In answer to your previous question, it is hard to say for certain.

A pre-take off emergency brief will usually cover warning captions and loss of thrust. We wouldn’t necessarily expect a ‘bang’ with no other warnings or indications.

I think it’s fair to say though that any audible bang would lead your brain to bird strike almost immediately (they may have seen the bird and it now seems likely that a bird was the problem). If that bird went down the engine then the bang would probably have been followed, almost simultaneously, by a rapid increase in engine temperature and associated warnings. A bird strike anywhere else on the airframe could be diagnosed as such pretty quickly due to lack of abnormal engine indications.

In any of the above situations my first instinct would be to get away from the leader. That would definitely involve some upwards movement and also a little lateral movement.

On my aircraft the lateral movement would just be enough to be clear of the lead (remember you would be naturally decelerating so separation is already achieved) and would not involve any sort of turn back towards a reciprocal runway until 280-300 knots had been reached. I cannot speak for what that speed would be in a Tutor.

BV
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Old 11th Jun 2020, 23:16
  #264 (permalink)  
 
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Thanks for taking the time, Bob.

Do you think the brief would include a return to the button of 22? That is an easier (less turning) option than trying to get round to the main runway, isn't it?

Can you give a little insight into the actual process by which a bird going into an intake causes engine problems. I know it does, but not sure of the exact mechanism, or mechanisms. I know that it goes back and into the compressor. From there? Does that lead to a visible flame from the tailpipe?

The pilot certainly acted quickly. It was less than two seconds between bang and starting the zoom.

As for your last sentence, it raises a good point. I've gone over the video and I don't notice any increased separation between the lead and Capt. MacDougall's aircraft following the bang and before the zoom. Too short a time frame for it to be noticeable?
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Old 12th Jun 2020, 07:33
  #265 (permalink)  
 
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cncpc

Happy to help.

Firstly, runway 22 is less than 3000’ long and very narrow. In my aircraft it would not be a consideration. I suggest (although I cannot be certain) that it would not be a viable option for a Tutor either but I stand to be corrected.

Turning back for an alternate runway (assuming it was suitable) would require less speed but since the Tutor had only just passed the upwind end of the runway I would be surprised it it would have either the turning room or energy to make it to there.

As for the bird ingestion ramifications there are two possibilities. One is an engine surge (in the Tutor they call it a compressor stall but it’s the same thing) and the other is a mechanical failure.

A surge is basically a disruption to the airflow through the engine which results in a rapid temperature rise. This can either be a self clearing ‘pop’, a similar surge that requires pilot intervention to clear it (usually throttle to idle and then slowly bring it back up) or a locked in surge where the engine will need to be relit.

Just after take off a pop surge would not be a major drama, a surge requiring idle power to clear it would be alarming but not necessarily terminal. However, a surge requiring a relight would leave you very poorly placed. Obviously more energy would give you more time.

Birds (depending on the size) can obviously do a lot of damage to an engine. It is possible for them to pass through and cause only minor damage. But bigger birds or a higher speed impact can cause an engine to destroy itself almost immediately. Regardless of the level of damage an immediate landing is sensible.

Finally, you say the reaction is quick and I agree if our established timeline is correct. I would expect any pilot of a similar aircraft to be able to react just as quickly. We brief and train for these eventualities extensively.

I/we still don’t know what happened to the Snowbirds aircraft and indeed if a bird did enter the engine whether it was still working. With the age of the aircraft (meaning I doubt there is any useable flight data) and the fact it was completely destroyed I suspect the pilots recollection will be our best hope of knowing what really happened.

BV
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Old 12th Jun 2020, 09:18
  #266 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Arnie Madsen View Post
This is off-topic as far as the Snowbird accident but may interest folks who want a glimpse of the historical first ejection seat tests in Britain 1946 to 1947 ..... I found it interesting ..... notice the design (at the time) was pull eject handle above and behind behind pilots head ..... which also brought down a fabric curtain to protect his face ..... then eject rocket ignites ..... drogue chute pops ..... then full chute on the seat assembly .... then the pilot unbuckles himself from the seat , departs , and opens his personal parachute.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FFAw76CIcq8
Thanks for the video link AM. No rockets though, the early MB seats used cordite cartridges as illustrated in the included instructional diagram. The resulting excessive acceleration led to spinal injuries that later more progressive rocket acceleration avoided. Incidentally, with the exception of the MB Mk1 seat, all subsequent MB seats used the same scissor shackle main chute deployment system up to the MB Mk10 in the Hawk. It was this system that was the subject of an illegal RTI/Hawk/059 that led to Sean Cunningham's death. The in situ service that it called for prevented the critical final check of correct release of the drogue shackle and thus main chute deployment. Such a check is only possible in a proper servicing bay. All this was known of but conveniently forgotten. The bays were closed, the RTI issued, a bolt was overtightened, Sean Cunningham died, and MB were fined £1M. Why?
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Old 12th Jun 2020, 19:29
  #267 (permalink)  
 
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Thanks, Bob. Hopefully we will see what the RCAF determines.

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Old 15th Jun 2020, 20:14
  #268 (permalink)  
 
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No explanation was provided about why action on the parachute upgrade was not started when the problem was identified four years ago.

A witness at the crash scene claimed that Casey’s parachute did not open.
Canadian military knew in 2016 Snowbirds ejection seats needed upgrading but project still only in early stages
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Old 15th Jun 2020, 21:36
  #269 (permalink)  
 
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Capt Casey's parachute may well not have opened and the witness is probably quite correct, but it will be for the inquiry to determine whether this was because there was an issue with the parachute/seat combination or whether her ejection was outside seat limits. As Chug and others will know, changing the parachute part of an escape system is not a simple or quick task.

Sadly, I have been to 3 funerals of friends whose ejections were outside the seat performance envelope, which was why their chutes did not fully deploy. Whatever, it still sucks.
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Old 16th Jun 2020, 06:45
  #270 (permalink)  
 
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It's 40 years since I flew it, but the Martin-Baker Departure Lounge in the Macchi had a barometric unit which would not allow seat separation unless the height was below 10,000' (it was in this case), the deceleration was less than 3g (had to be) and speed less than 250kt (I think this was the 3rd condition.)
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Old 16th Jun 2020, 07:50
  #271 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by Ascend Charlie View Post
It's 40 years since I flew it, but the Martin-Baker Departure Lounge in the Macchi had a barometric unit which would not allow seat separation unless the height was below 10,000' (it was in this case), the deceleration was less than 3g (had to be) and speed less than 250kt (I think this was the 3rd condition.)
BUT as your MB seat moved up the rails a drogue gun would have fired to deploy a stabilising parachute. This would be ready to pull the main chute out the instant the altitude was in limits and tumbling stopped.

From the accident video I can’t help thinking that had these been MB seats, even an earlier Mk4, we would have seen drogue deployment and seat separation on the video.


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Old 16th Jun 2020, 08:18
  #272 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by ASRAAMTOO View Post
BUT as your MB seat moved up the rails a drogue gun would have fired to deploy a stabilising parachute. This would be ready to pull the main chute out the instant the altitude was in limits and tumbling stopped.

From the accident video I can’t help thinking that had these been MB seats, even an earlier Mk4, we would have seen drogue deployment and seat separation on the video.
MB Drogue Gun had a 0.5 Sec delay once intiated and BTDU 2.25 Sec (IIRC) - both operating simultaneously.
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Old 16th Jun 2020, 13:02
  #273 (permalink)  
 
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I have a letter from James Martin dated 4th May 1963 in which he says” I am taking steps to have the timing of the firing mechanism changed from one second to .25 seconds as one second is too long especially near the ground. In a quarter of a second the canopy is well clear of the ejection path of the seat.”
This was with reference to the 4b seat.
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Old 16th Jun 2020, 14:11
  #274 (permalink)  
 
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The Mk 4 Seat in the JP 3 and 4 had a 0.6 second delay from handle pull to primary cartridge firing to allow for canopy jettison after that the sequence was listed in the aircrew manual as follows:

As the seat ascends its guide rails, a static rod trips the drogue gun time delay mechanism. After a 1/2 second delay the drogue gun fires and extracts the controller drogue: this in turn develops the main drogue, thus checking forward speed and stabilising the seat in a horizontal attitude.

Also as the seat ascends, a second static rod frees the barostat time release mechanism. When free descent reaches 10,000feet, or at once if ejection has taken place below that height - and providing the g stop is not in operation - the barostat removes an obstruction to the gear train of the time release mechanism allowing it to operate. After 1 1/4 seconds the drogues and combined harness are released from the seat, the parachute withdrawal line pulls free of the guillotine gate and parachute deployment and seat separation follow automatically. At high airspeeds below 10,000 feet the g stop similarly impedes the gear train until the speed has dropped to a value safe for parachute deployment.
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Old 16th Jun 2020, 15:39
  #275 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by cncpc View Post
Thanks for taking the time, Bob.

Do you think the brief would include a return to the button of 22? That is an easier (less turning) option than trying to get round to the main runway, isn't it?

Can you give a little insight into the actual process by which a bird going into an intake causes engine problems. I know it does, but not sure of the exact mechanism, or mechanisms. I know that it goes back and into the compressor. From there? Does that lead to a visible flame from the tailpipe?

The pilot certainly acted quickly. It was less than two seconds between bang and starting the zoom.

As for your last sentence, it raises a good point. I've gone over the video and I don't notice any increased separation between the lead and Capt. MacDougall's aircraft following the bang and before the zoom. Too short a time frame for it to be noticeable?
Here is quite a good example of what a bird ingestion can do to a large turbofan - it illustrates the surging Bob talks about:
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Old 30th Jun 2020, 23:24
  #276 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Aug 2016
Location: Alberta
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CBC News reported yesterday that the ejections seat in the Oct 2019 crash became tangled in the chute risers which lead to the minor injuries to the pilot. Here's a link to the CBC Story https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saska...rash-1.5631647
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