75th Anniversary Operation Market Garden
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75th Anniversary Operation Market Garden
Today was the main commemorative drop, and like that of D-Day a veteran in his 90's took part in it. The way into this battle, designed to outflank the Siegfried Line/West Wall, was straightforward enough as all such Ops often are. However, again as often happens in war, it started to unravel from the start.
The courage of those who held the bridge at Arnhem and those who desperately tried to reinforce them is well known. In the end the survivors were either captured or escaped in a hastily planned withdrawal across the river downstream. Here is the account of 25th September 1944:-
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/fea...25th-1944.html
and of the commemoration at Down Ampney:-
https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles...t-garden-75th/
Lest we forget...
The courage of those who held the bridge at Arnhem and those who desperately tried to reinforce them is well known. In the end the survivors were either captured or escaped in a hastily planned withdrawal across the river downstream. Here is the account of 25th September 1944:-
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/fea...25th-1944.html
and of the commemoration at Down Ampney:-
https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles...t-garden-75th/
Lest we forget...
I was pretty much unaware of Market Garden before I saw the movie "A Bridge Too Far" (with my dad, shortly after it was released), despite my having considerable interest in WWII history. Granted, I'd paid more attention to the Pacific war (where my dad had served in the US Army Infantry - part of the Americal Division, bronze star and purple heart during his time on Guadalcanal), but still I was surprised how little attention Market Garden got (at least on this side of the pond). 'A Bridge Too Far' remains one of my favorite WWII movie, and seeing it the first time really peaked my interest in Market Garden and I've read quite a bit about it (even lucked into an autographed first edition of the Cornelius Ryan book of the same name at a used book store).
On a business trip to the UK about 10 years ago, I spent a few days in London. One of the pubs I visited while there had a limited run of "Hell's Highway" beer to commemorate Market Garden and XXX Corps.
On a business trip to the UK about 10 years ago, I spent a few days in London. One of the pubs I visited while there had a limited run of "Hell's Highway" beer to commemorate Market Garden and XXX Corps.
Many will be familiar with arguments on the tactical details of Market Garden (eg, selection of landing zones) but there is an equally interesting historical debate on campaign-level aspects that is of continuing relevance today. It’s all about politics: the changing dynamics between alliance partners; the need to consider the ‘home front’ in terms of public perception; differences of view between generals; and the compromises which the supreme commander had to make to balance those things out. On such a massive canvas, the detail of the actual operation was easily overlooked.
Perhaps the most interesting point is the issue of ‘exquisite’ capabilities. Having kept thousands of troops in England for airborne operations, there was understandable organisational pressure to use them before the front line moved out of range (which would have forced the troops to be deployed to the continent, as some said should have happened all along, causing severe loss of face for others). Market Garden was the third such plan, hastily drawn up as earlier iterations were overtaken by events as the front advanced northeast. This was pretty much the last chance to use them from England, and one has to suspect optimism bias in the reaction to intelligence reports of the presence of German reserve armour. The lesson: beware the ‘use it or lose it’ mentality.
Perhaps the most interesting point is the issue of ‘exquisite’ capabilities. Having kept thousands of troops in England for airborne operations, there was understandable organisational pressure to use them before the front line moved out of range (which would have forced the troops to be deployed to the continent, as some said should have happened all along, causing severe loss of face for others). Market Garden was the third such plan, hastily drawn up as earlier iterations were overtaken by events as the front advanced northeast. This was pretty much the last chance to use them from England, and one has to suspect optimism bias in the reaction to intelligence reports of the presence of German reserve armour. The lesson: beware the ‘use it or lose it’ mentality.
I read Max Hastings book "Armageddon", about the last year of the War recently, and it opened my eyes to several aspects of the relationship between the allies which had hitherto passed me by.
The politics and squabbling amongst allied commanders did few of them any credit, with Montgomery a serial offender, and none emerging with entirely clean hands. Market garden was one of a series of what might be called unforced errors which cost lives, and in some cases prolonged the war.
A particularly pointed allegation from the book which I had not heard before is that Bomber Harris ignored direct orders to attack German oil production facilities, preferring to continue attacks on German cities, and it was only his public profile which prevented him from being removed.
The politics and squabbling amongst allied commanders did few of them any credit, with Montgomery a serial offender, and none emerging with entirely clean hands. Market garden was one of a series of what might be called unforced errors which cost lives, and in some cases prolonged the war.
A particularly pointed allegation from the book which I had not heard before is that Bomber Harris ignored direct orders to attack German oil production facilities, preferring to continue attacks on German cities, and it was only his public profile which prevented him from being removed.
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In retrospect (a vital tool for all armchair warriors!) this strategic thrust was doomed from the start. Intelligence, Comms, DZ locations, Logistics, all were found wanting from Day 1. However, even if there were better preparations made, it all came down to one road and its various bridges that XXX Corps had to traverse to a very tight schedule if they were to get to 1st Airborne in time. We concentrate perhaps too much on the Battle of Arnhem itself when down that vital road things were going awry. Perhaps more attention should be focussed instead on the Nijmegen Bridge and the town itself. This from Wiki:-
If the force sent to the Groesbeek Heights (there was no serious German threat from there) had instead taken the Nijmegen Bridge, the SS would have been kept out and the way to Arnhem secured much sooner. Easy to say of course, but on such choices battles and even wars are won or lost.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Nijmegen
To their north, the 82nd arrived with a small group dropped near Grave securing the bridge. They also succeeded in capturing one of the vitally important bridges over the Maas-Waal canal, the lock-bridge at Heumen. The 82nd concentrated their efforts to seize the Groesbeek Heights instead of capturing their prime objective, the Nijmegen bridge. The capture of the Groesbeek Heights was to set up a blocking position on the high ground to prevent a German attack out of the nearby Reichswald and to deny the heights to German artillery observers. Browning, the commander of the 1st Airborne Army agreed with the assertions of Gavin, the commander of the 82nd, that Groesbeek Heights are the priority. Gavin wanted to occupy the Grave and Maas (Meuse)-Waal canal bridges before Nijmegen bridges. He would only send troops when these bridges were secure releasing troops to seize the Nijmegen bridge. Before the operation on 15 September Gavin verbally ordered Lt-Col Linquist of the 508th to send a battalion to the Nijmegen bridge after landing. He had decided that there were enough troops for the other objectives. Linquist later said he understood he should send a battalion after his regiment had completed their earlier assigned targets. Linquist's battalion approached the bridge that evening delaying the seizure of the bridge. The battalion was stopped by a SS unit that had driven south from Arnhem. A part of the SS unit returned to Arnhem but found the northern end of the Arnhem bridge occupied by the British 1st Airborne. In an attempt to cross the bridge most of the SS unit was killed including the commander.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Market_Garden
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Nijmegen
The Tank Museum has sent some of its collection to Holland to help the Dutch Army museum remember Market Garden. They are making a videos showing some of the vehicles taking part which can be found here https://www.youtube.com/channel/UChl...AzoEVsnbOfpcqw
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I did a Staff Ride to Arnhem at the time of the 70th, we started at Joe’s Bridge, the point where XXX Corps began their advance up Hell’s Highway. We visited the significant places on the way up to Nijmegen where we spent the night, then on to Arnhem...... which we reached in 2 days, which was the same schedule for XXX Corps, but without the opposition from the Germans. It was a comfortable schedule for us but a totally unrealistic one for them.
It was interesting to see the drops over the Heath & to meet some of the veterans but the crowds did rather get in the way of exploring all the locations. One of my great uncles was on Urquhart’s Staff in Oosterbeek, I’d always wanted to visit but found it difficult to look around there were so many people.
It was interesting to see the drops over the Heath & to meet some of the veterans but the crowds did rather get in the way of exploring all the locations. One of my great uncles was on Urquhart’s Staff in Oosterbeek, I’d always wanted to visit but found it difficult to look around there were so many people.
I read Max Hastings book "Armageddon", about the last year of the War recently, and it opened my eyes to several aspects of the relationship between the allies which had hitherto passed me by.
The politics and squabbling amongst allied commanders did few of them any credit, with Montgomery a serial offender, and none emerging with entirely clean hands. Market garden was one of a series of what might be called unforced errors which cost lives, and in some cases prolonged the war.
The politics and squabbling amongst allied commanders did few of them any credit, with Montgomery a serial offender, and none emerging with entirely clean hands. Market garden was one of a series of what might be called unforced errors which cost lives, and in some cases prolonged the war.
Part of what makes Market Garden so perplexing is that it was so out of character for Monty but would have been the sort of thing you'd expect from Patton.
Interesting. Isn't there a bit in the film where some German top brass are wondering who is running the operation and decide it must be Patton? Two contrasting possibilities if Patton had run the show - either the allies would have taken the bridge or it would have been an even bigger disaster for them in terms of lives lost. All entirely academic of course
Ignore your Intelligence showing Panzer Divisions in the area....run your entire attack up a single two lane road across a bunch of bridges (any one of which if lost or destroyed shoots your whole plan in the ass), take three days to get all your forces dropped into the battle area, and you want to drag Patton into it somehow?
There was an Airborne Army sitting around looking for work thus a "plan" was devised to put it to use....in Montgomery's area of operations of course.
Eisenhower should have been a mite less diplomatic I am thinking.
Deal with reality.....Montgomery was a proper Knob on this one and a great many brave Man died because of his gross failure.
There was an Airborne Army sitting around looking for work thus a "plan" was devised to put it to use....in Montgomery's area of operations of course.
Eisenhower should have been a mite less diplomatic I am thinking.
Deal with reality.....Montgomery was a proper Knob on this one and a great many brave Man died because of his gross failure.
In Antony Beever's work in Arnhem it is noted that the route constituted one of the key questions in the Dutch Army Staff College exams, and those candidates who planned to advance from Nijmegen straight up the main road to Arnhem were failed on the spot.
Last edited by diginagain; 23rd Sep 2019 at 10:30.
tdracer is not "dragging Patton into it" - he merely wondered how things would have panned out if he had run the show, a valid question I would have thought.
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You are right, SASless: Montgomery indeed ignored intelligence about the presence of SS Panzer divisions in the area. However, these badly-mauled formations had recently retreated from the Falaise Pocket and were more in regimental strength, than full-strength divisions. What was not grasped was the extraordinary ability of the German military to reinforce and re-equip these divisions, driven by Generalfeldmarshall Model.
Had the XXX Corps had been led by a commander with Patton's drive, rather than by Lt Gen Horrock, (who was in poor health, but a favourite of Monty's,) progress down the road to Arnhem might have been faster.
Diginagain: I wonder what was the Dutch Staff College DS solution was to the Nijmegen-Arnhem route?
Had the XXX Corps had been led by a commander with Patton's drive, rather than by Lt Gen Horrock, (who was in poor health, but a favourite of Monty's,) progress down the road to Arnhem might have been faster.
Diginagain: I wonder what was the Dutch Staff College DS solution was to the Nijmegen-Arnhem route?
Part of what makes Market Garden so perplexing is that it was so out of character for Monty
The Americans had other strategic concerns. So when Monty agitated for support from London for his ‘rapid thrust’ idea, which he thought was aligned to Churchill’s intent, he was surprised by the tepid response. The political realities of coalition-keeping had taken hold without Monty being aware. Churchill had gone to view the Mediterranean landings in person and Brooke was left to break it to Monty that he would have to play nicely under Ike’s Alliance-friendly ‘broad front’ strategy. Logistics were insufficient for two rapid thrusts across Europe, while a single thrust would have to be led either by the British or the Americans, which neither would countenance.
Eisenhower approved Market Garden essentially as a sop to Monty: a chance to begin a ‘single thrust’ approach without risking everything and to see what came of it. Even this limited ambition outraged Patton, desperate for fuel to continue eastward, but Bradley had the good sense to recognise that he had to cooperate so that Monty (and by extension the British public) couldn’t blame the US for any failure. And that calculation just about worked. As an exercise in leadership and coalition management by Eisenhower, it was expensive but effective. The mind boggles as to the scale and impact of the decisions he had to take.
Last edited by Easy Street; 23rd Sep 2019 at 17:59.
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"I was told that on Dutch Staff College exercises based on Groesbeck, between the wars, when the task set was an advance on Arnhem from Nijmegen, a solution involving the use of that road got no marks at all. The preferred solution was an advance in a north-westerly direction to force a crossing over the Lek lower down and then to move in on Arnhem from the west."
I had the honour to talk to both Hackett and an officer (who picked up a medal) in the Guards Armoured on separate occasions in the early 90's - both in very odd circumstances I have to say
They both described it as a gamble - probably worth taking originally but far too risky when the intelligence was in - but they were never sure who actually saw that intelligence in detail
At the end of the day everyone did their best but it was never going to work....
I was astonished how phlegmatic they were about it TBH - they just kept on repeating how lucky they'd been as individuals to come through when so many of their men and mates didn't
They both described it as a gamble - probably worth taking originally but far too risky when the intelligence was in - but they were never sure who actually saw that intelligence in detail
At the end of the day everyone did their best but it was never going to work....
I was astonished how phlegmatic they were about it TBH - they just kept on repeating how lucky they'd been as individuals to come through when so many of their men and mates didn't
Armored units and mechanized Infantry against lightly armed airborne troops....odd how that would turn out when the Airborne Troops are forced to concentrate in discrete defensive positions.
Not to mention that the Piat anti armor weapon was at best pitiful....the American 3.5 Inch Bazooka was not much better.
A few 75MM Pack Howitzers for artillery and mortars against German 88's.....really?
Not to mention that the Piat anti armor weapon was at best pitiful....the American 3.5 Inch Bazooka was not much better.
A few 75MM Pack Howitzers for artillery and mortars against German 88's.....really?
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6 pounders carried in Horsas, 17pounders carried in Hamilcars.
Actually the PIAT was surprisingly effective (being able to penetrate upto 4" of armour) and it didn't produce a backblast, unlike the Bazooka, which lent to its use for FIBUA.The main problems with it were recoil and the difficulty in cocking it.
Actually the PIAT was surprisingly effective (being able to penetrate upto 4" of armour) and it didn't produce a backblast, unlike the Bazooka, which lent to its use for FIBUA.The main problems with it were recoil and the difficulty in cocking it.