Many will be familiar with arguments on the tactical details of Market Garden (eg, selection of landing zones) but there is an equally interesting historical debate on campaign-level aspects that is of continuing relevance today. It’s all about politics: the changing dynamics between alliance partners; the need to consider the ‘home front’ in terms of public perception; differences of view between generals; and the compromises which the supreme commander had to make to balance those things out. On such a massive canvas, the detail of the actual operation was easily overlooked.
Perhaps the most interesting point is the issue of ‘exquisite’ capabilities. Having kept thousands of troops in England for airborne operations, there was understandable organisational pressure to use them before the front line moved out of range (which would have forced the troops to be deployed to the continent, as some said should have happened all along, causing severe loss of face for others). Market Garden was the third such plan, hastily drawn up as earlier iterations were overtaken by events as the front advanced northeast. This was pretty much the last chance to use them from England, and one has to suspect optimism bias in the reaction to intelligence reports of the presence of German reserve armour. The lesson: beware the ‘use it or lose it’ mentality.