Many will be familiar with arguments on the tactical details of Market Garden (eg, selection of landing zones) but there is an equally interesting historical debate on campaign-level aspects that is of continuing relevance today. It’s all about politics: the changing dynamics between alliance partners; the need to consider the ‘home front’ in terms of public perception; differences of view between generals; and the compromises which the supreme commander had to make to balance those things out. On such a massive canvas, the detail of the actual operation was easily overlooked.

Perhaps the most interesting point is the issue of ‘exquisite’ capabilities. Having kept thousands of troops in England for airborne operations, there was understandable organisational pressure to use them before the front line moved out of range (which would have forced the troops to be deployed to the continent, as some said should have happened all along, causing severe loss of face for others). Market Garden was the third such plan, hastily drawn up as earlier iterations were overtaken by events as the front advanced northeast. This was pretty much the last chance to use them from England, and one has to suspect optimism bias in the reaction to intelligence reports of the presence of German reserve armour. The lesson: beware the ‘use it or lose it’ mentality.

I did a Staff Ride to Arnhem at the time of the 70th, we started at Joe’s Bridge, the point where XXX Corps began their advance up Hell’s Highway. We visited the significant places on the way up to Nijmegen where we spent the night, then on to Arnhem...... which we reached in 2 days, which was the same schedule for XXX Corps, but without the opposition from the Germans. It was a comfortable schedule for us but a totally unrealistic one for them.

It was interesting to see the drops over the Heath & to meet some of the veterans but the crowds did rather get in the way of exploring all the locations. One of my great uncles was on Urquhart’s Staff in Oosterbeek, I’d always wanted to visit but found it difficult to look around there were so many people.

My reading is that Monty was responding to earlier pressures from London to drive the pace. On top of the well-known issues of manpower shortage and the need to show British ‘pluck’ to keep spirits up on the home front, there was concern over Stalin’s intent. By this stage of proceedings, Churchill had identified the potential for post-war tension and a strategy of beating the Soviets to Berlin had been discussed in London. (The same logic explains Churchill’s seeming obsession with the Mediterranean theatre long after it ceased to be critical to the Nazis’ defeat).

The Americans had other strategic concerns. So when Monty agitated for support from London for his ‘rapid thrust’ idea, which he thought was aligned to Churchill’s intent, he was surprised by the tepid response. The political realities of coalition-keeping had taken hold without Monty being aware. Churchill had gone to view the Mediterranean landings in person and Brooke was left to break it to Monty that he would have to play nicely under Ike’s Alliance-friendly ‘broad front’ strategy. Logistics were insufficient for two rapid thrusts across Europe, while a single thrust would have to be led either by the British or the Americans, which neither would countenance.

Eisenhower approved Market Garden essentially as a sop to Monty: a chance to begin a ‘single thrust’ approach without risking everything and to see what came of it. Even this limited ambition outraged Patton, desperate for fuel to continue eastward, but Bradley had the good sense to recognise that he had to cooperate so that Monty (and by extension the British public) couldn’t blame the US for any failure. And that calculation just about worked. As an exercise in leadership and coalition management by Eisenhower, it was expensive but effective. The mind boggles as to the scale and impact of the decisions he had to take.