UK - More defence cuts
roving
True, and no doubt the Treasury will take advantage.
But proposed cuts should never pass without comment about waste. Much of the defence budget can be considered "fixed" commitments. Equipment procurement is an easily targeted variable, except things like PFI payments. This makes the Billions worth of waste in recent years even more critical, exacerbated by the policy and practice that this waste is never investigated.
True, and no doubt the Treasury will take advantage.
But proposed cuts should never pass without comment about waste. Much of the defence budget can be considered "fixed" commitments. Equipment procurement is an easily targeted variable, except things like PFI payments. This makes the Billions worth of waste in recent years even more critical, exacerbated by the policy and practice that this waste is never investigated.
I'm amazed we still have so many Chinooks! It must be because they and their crews are so awesome!
p.s. Mrs Bas, for reasons best known to herself, loves to see the Chinook fly past our place. Recently, at an RAF lunch, she mentioned this to a gentleman who turned out to be an ex helicopter test pilot and who was delighted to discuss the technicalities of rotary flight; serves her right!
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I get that Vendee, but they are tired, the RTM engines may have top of the tree once, but are now regarded as old tech. If you work on them, then you'll know, 1553 databuses are ancient, as are the WP's and SP's etc. The D is now superseded, if we keep going there will be no spares. The techs do an amazing job, but a lynx it ain't. Replacing a T6 gauge? Nope. Spares in the stores? Well i can assure you there isn't an abundance.
So I'm afraid I'll disagree, they are tired, as is the spares chain, the training pipeline.....etc.
So I'm afraid I'll disagree, they are tired, as is the spares chain, the training pipeline.....etc.
The D model was old tech when we bought it and, just like Microsoft, Boeing have at some point got to reduce support for legacy platforms.
The Sea Kings and Tornados have been extended far beyond the planned OSD because of the nefarious way in which procurement and budgets are fiddled with in town. You can only defer decisions so far.
The Sea Kings and Tornados have been extended far beyond the planned OSD because of the nefarious way in which procurement and budgets are fiddled with in town. You can only defer decisions so far.
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Whilst the AH was shiny and new, we've really put it through the ringer for 10 years in Afghan. I wouldn't particularly draw a direct comparison to the sea king as it doesn't rely on war fighting tech to remain relevant. As for Tornado, I'm stunned that it's still flying so wouldn't really advocate that as a shining example either.
As has been stated, it's old, designed a long time ago and the support chain will not be there in a few years, then how much will it cost to "refurb" the kit then.
No they're not flying a lot are they?
I wonder why........
As has been stated, it's old, designed a long time ago and the support chain will not be there in a few years, then how much will it cost to "refurb" the kit then.
No they're not flying a lot are they?
I wonder why........
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Load of letters in today's "Times" from former VSO's lambasting the cuts but as usual I doubt it will make a bit of difference..............
The only decent suggestion was to make the T31 contract a final, total fixed price with any overrun the contractor's problem.................. of course that assumes the RN can write a decent spec and then not fiddle endlessly with it during the build phase
The only decent suggestion was to make the T31 contract a final, total fixed price with any overrun the contractor's problem.................. of course that assumes the RN can write a decent spec and then not fiddle endlessly with it during the build phase
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Mainly down to shortage of experienced/skilled maintainers at forward and a very inefficient (and expensive to the taxpayer) servicing regime IMO.
There have been times when there were 10 aircraft having depth servicing in the hangar where I work and no doubt 4 or 5 aircraft undergoing minor servicing on the regiments. Can you imagine Ryanair or BA having 30% of their fleet on the ground at one time for servicing?
Going back to the lack of manpower, its amazing how little time the Army engineers actually spend servicing aircraft as opposed to cleaning their rifles/sport/kit inspections/parades/etc. The RAF were not great in this respect but the Army seem much worse.
There have been times when there were 10 aircraft having depth servicing in the hangar where I work and no doubt 4 or 5 aircraft undergoing minor servicing on the regiments. Can you imagine Ryanair or BA having 30% of their fleet on the ground at one time for servicing?
Going back to the lack of manpower, its amazing how little time the Army engineers actually spend servicing aircraft as opposed to cleaning their rifles/sport/kit inspections/parades/etc. The RAF were not great in this respect but the Army seem much worse.
Whilst the AH was shiny and new, we've really put it through the ringer for 10 years in Afghan. I wouldn't particularly draw a direct comparison to the sea king as it doesn't rely on war fighting tech to remain relevant. As for Tornado, I'm stunned that it's still flying so wouldn't really advocate that as a shining example
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Why are you stunned that Tornado is still flying. The reason that it is is that it is still more than capable of doing the the job it is required to do. Moreover it carries all of the current ordinance. Its cost per flying hour is significantly lower than previous due to industry based support contracts with Bae and rolls royce.
We're MAKING it work because Harrier is gone, Jag is gone. Let's not hijack the thread but it was on its knees in Afghan, its overworked in Cyprus. Marham haven't got techs they've got magicians. I'm sure the boss at Marham's name is Dumbledore.
Oh come on Buster! I'm not getting into it but it's the only thing we have left!!
We're MAKING it work because Harrier is gone, Jag is gone. Let's not hijack the thread but it was on its knees in Afghan, its overworked in Cyprus. Marham haven't got techs they've got magicians. I'm sure the boss at Marham's name is Dumbledore.
We're MAKING it work because Harrier is gone, Jag is gone. Let's not hijack the thread but it was on its knees in Afghan, its overworked in Cyprus. Marham haven't got techs they've got magicians. I'm sure the boss at Marham's name is Dumbledore.
However we have to face the fact that the MoD are always making cuts. What I am saying is that it is still the most capable jet in terms of weapons delivery and I note that the RAF operate mixed Typhoon and Tornado in order to make best use of both types.
Remember Marham are largely reliant on Bae and rolls royce for operational availability.
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The Germans MAY be mooting 2040 but that's out of absolute necessity, nothing else. Again, not my idea of a shining example of the ultimate model of fleet management.
It was pointed out the manpower issues are the probably the biggest drama, and I'm in agreement. It IS a job now. And guess what, people can and will vote with their feet.
The best the Army can come up with as a recruitment campaign is.....live in **** and have a laugh doing it. Brilliant.
It was pointed out the manpower issues are the probably the biggest drama, and I'm in agreement. It IS a job now. And guess what, people can and will vote with their feet.
The best the Army can come up with as a recruitment campaign is.....live in **** and have a laugh doing it. Brilliant.
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I'm sorry, where on earth did you get that from? As well as delivering 3-4 from 6 helicopters daily in camp (yes, as well as doing Sqn PT one early morning a week) an AAC Sqn is also far lighter logistically and more personnel efficient.In my (fairly recent) days they'd routinely deploy on operations/training with an Engr det of less than 15 plus a smattering of groundcrew covering a/c moves, DAS, crypto (rather than using Engrs), refuelling (rather than TSW) and air-ground comms. Given the vast numbers of RAF Engrs that seem to rock up on tour/Ex, throwing mud via It ain't half hot mum perceptions of the Army is bizarre...
I bet you think the Army does drill and shouts at each other a lot everyday too...
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Mate, I'm gonna take issue there. Since the reversion to squadron responsibility the serviceability has increased dramatically. I would advise you to think about how you're putting that across, because it's starting to sound like civi engineering good, REME/Army bad.....just my interpretation.
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Mate, I'm gonna take issue there. Since the reversion to squadron responsibility the serviceability has increased dramatically. I would advise you to think about how you're putting that across, because it's starting to sound like civi engineering good, REME/Army bad.....just my interpretation.
You obviously know where I work. The skill level is much higher there compared to the regiments, mainly because the staff are older and have greater experience of aircraft maintenance in general and the Apache in particular. I would say that 50% of the technicians have been on the Apache for ten years or more. Yes they go home at 16.00 most days but they do spend all day doing their primary job of servicing aircraft with no diversions.
Obviously we don't go on exercise or deployment and we don't go to war anymore. More and more depth servicing is going civy which means the military guys are restricted to first line stuff and consequently, IMO they are losing knowledge. As I'm sure you know, plans for the training sqn and 450 hr servicings to go completely civy are well advanced. I don't know what the solution is. I see the efficiency and financial benefit of increased civilianisation but the cost is falling skills levels in the military.
And those issues that Vendee describes aren't confined to the AH fleet............
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Whilst at risk of hikacking this thread...
Vendee, I would absolutely agree there is core role for civvi engineering support. It is clearly cheaper but there is a risk, as you say, of the experience and best practice migrating to the civilian end as that is their sole focus.
But we also must strike a balance between sustaining readiness vs vital core competency, be it flying or fixing aircraft. Is that balance always right? Possibly not but I have seen it done very well, and also quite badly as it is easy to become transfixed by routine. But a 'them and us' approach is not helpful from either side.
Vendee, I would absolutely agree there is core role for civvi engineering support. It is clearly cheaper but there is a risk, as you say, of the experience and best practice migrating to the civilian end as that is their sole focus.
But we also must strike a balance between sustaining readiness vs vital core competency, be it flying or fixing aircraft. Is that balance always right? Possibly not but I have seen it done very well, and also quite badly as it is easy to become transfixed by routine. But a 'them and us' approach is not helpful from either side.
A few comments.
1. The AH may well still be in apparent good serviceable condition but the Project Team will be looking at supportability (availability of parts and cost) beyond the short term. In all aircraft types there comes a "tipping point" where the cost of ownership and obsolescence of critical components makes the case for upgrade compelling. The UK AH were unique in several ways, but also retained legacy parts from the US Army - in effect, the worse of both worlds from a supportability perspective. By aligning with the AH-64E program now, these risks and costs can be mitigated by certainty of supply (stand fast the concerns over "op sovereignty") and the lowest through-life costs by leveraging off the US Army's vast acquisition and support contracts. As an ex-RM, however, I will caution against the potential loss of independent capability as the AAC will now, largely, be left with an aircraft designed around US Army TTPs/SOPs. Some of our procedures will likely need to change. There is also the thorny issue over UK-offset; the WAH-64 was the "poster child" for paying over the odds to secure UK jobs. It seems that, in this case, only the support contract is up for grabs.
2. Mil vs Civ. Applicable across Defence, there is a drive to deliver savings whilst maintaining output - after all, how would people be judged for promotion if there wasn't? The problem that is building, however, is that this "bubble" has been built and sustained by a cadre of well trained people leaving the military with the necessary skills and qualifications. The "death spiral" occurs when, due to contractorisation, key skills are lost (e.g. Heavy Rects at Depth) and the outflow from an increasingly smaller military (which is why, after all, contractorisation exists...) reduces, and other, more lucrative, second careers are available (and many, under NEM, will not leave with an immediate Pension). Eventually you reach a point where the contractor has to bump up the pay and do the training; these costs are passed directly back to the military who, by this point, lack the skills, mass and resource to bring the job back "in house". This is the major issue I have with schemes such as MFTS and IOS - once you reach a certain point you cannot go back without a massive increase in cost and personnel.
3. Anything is ultimately supportable, if you have the money. Tornado will reach a point where the OTS spares are dwindling and the operators are forced to either change and qualify new components or resume the production of obsolete parts. Both are very expensive - I put a piece of DAS kit back into production once, and the manufacturers had to drag people out of retirement to tell them how to do it. Their comment was "it would have been easier to ask NASA to start building Saturn Vs again". The cost was eye-watering yet considered cheaper than buying, qualifying and declaring a newer system. The GAF can keep the GR going for some time yet, especially if they buy (a la USMC and GR9) a load of parts off us when ours go OSD.
1. The AH may well still be in apparent good serviceable condition but the Project Team will be looking at supportability (availability of parts and cost) beyond the short term. In all aircraft types there comes a "tipping point" where the cost of ownership and obsolescence of critical components makes the case for upgrade compelling. The UK AH were unique in several ways, but also retained legacy parts from the US Army - in effect, the worse of both worlds from a supportability perspective. By aligning with the AH-64E program now, these risks and costs can be mitigated by certainty of supply (stand fast the concerns over "op sovereignty") and the lowest through-life costs by leveraging off the US Army's vast acquisition and support contracts. As an ex-RM, however, I will caution against the potential loss of independent capability as the AAC will now, largely, be left with an aircraft designed around US Army TTPs/SOPs. Some of our procedures will likely need to change. There is also the thorny issue over UK-offset; the WAH-64 was the "poster child" for paying over the odds to secure UK jobs. It seems that, in this case, only the support contract is up for grabs.
2. Mil vs Civ. Applicable across Defence, there is a drive to deliver savings whilst maintaining output - after all, how would people be judged for promotion if there wasn't? The problem that is building, however, is that this "bubble" has been built and sustained by a cadre of well trained people leaving the military with the necessary skills and qualifications. The "death spiral" occurs when, due to contractorisation, key skills are lost (e.g. Heavy Rects at Depth) and the outflow from an increasingly smaller military (which is why, after all, contractorisation exists...) reduces, and other, more lucrative, second careers are available (and many, under NEM, will not leave with an immediate Pension). Eventually you reach a point where the contractor has to bump up the pay and do the training; these costs are passed directly back to the military who, by this point, lack the skills, mass and resource to bring the job back "in house". This is the major issue I have with schemes such as MFTS and IOS - once you reach a certain point you cannot go back without a massive increase in cost and personnel.
3. Anything is ultimately supportable, if you have the money. Tornado will reach a point where the OTS spares are dwindling and the operators are forced to either change and qualify new components or resume the production of obsolete parts. Both are very expensive - I put a piece of DAS kit back into production once, and the manufacturers had to drag people out of retirement to tell them how to do it. Their comment was "it would have been easier to ask NASA to start building Saturn Vs again". The cost was eye-watering yet considered cheaper than buying, qualifying and declaring a newer system. The GAF can keep the GR going for some time yet, especially if they buy (a la USMC and GR9) a load of parts off us when ours go OSD.
agree there is core role for civvi engineering support. It is clearly cheaper but there is a risk, as you say, of the experience and best practice migrating to the civilian end as that is their sole focus.
The other side of the coin was demonstrated to me very early by one example. We (HQ staff responsible for availability, maintainability, reliability) always monitored proposed workshop postings. I was given the heads up that a Chief on Portland’s radar bench was to be posted elsewhere. We had no say in this - later, in MoD(PE), we could intervene, but not as part of the RN. His relief was completely untrained. The increased arisings at 4th Line cost an extra £1M per year, because the Recovery Rate at 2nd Line, required to be 80%, plummeted to mid-20s. (All support funding is predicated on these Line Recovery Rates). That money had to come from somewhere. And that’s just one piece of avionic kit. That was mid-80s, and one suggestion - swiftly shot down - was to have civilians (MoD or contractors) and servicemen both working on the bench at 2nd Line (ashore), the former providing the continuity to maintain the Recovery Rate. In the case I describe, the sensible solution was to send a Fleetlands diag on 6 months detached duty to Portland, at minimal cost (or at least slightly less than £1M subsistence allowance), but this was shot down as well as it would be to admit a problem.
I concede it is a vexed subject with many possible “solutions”. But I’d say the current situation is driven by the perceived need for savings, without looking at efficiency and operational effectiveness. But I doubt if an accurate investment appraisal has been done to demonstrate actual savings.