SDSR rumours.
If a 3rd F-35B sqn is in the longer-term offing, it seems fairly likely that it would get a FAA numberplate, which means that options for keeping the IX(B) Sqn numberplate alive post-Tornado OSD are few. As a single-digit number with quite extensive senior backing (VCDS and DCom Ops are both former commanders) I suspect that one of the rumoured new Typhoon sqns will take the numberplate, either on disbandment of the third Tornado sqn or at Tornado OSD. Protestations about fighter heritage should be given a stiff ignoring given that Typhoon will shoulder the majority of the RAF's attack duties (with Storm Shadow, Brimstone 2 and Paveway IV) even after F-35 enters service - and let's face it, it's far more likely to use any of those weapons in anger than it is to shoot anything down. I reckon the Air Force Board will take the view that 'hibernating' IX(B) for a potential 4th F-35 squadron is too risky an approach.
31 and 12 Sqns? Looks like the history books beckon, sadly.
31 and 12 Sqns? Looks like the history books beckon, sadly.
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Sacred cows such as squadron numbers should have been confined to the history books the day the Royal Navy gave-up Greenwich.
I'm sorry, but we're talking about the continuance of the Service, not a few battle honours.
I'm sorry, but we're talking about the continuance of the Service, not a few battle honours.
Introduction of workplace parking charges on a graduated basis. Designated slots charged at 50% of the daily rate of the occupier other wise the nearer to the door/higher the rank, the more you pay. (A new trade group, with a brand new CHQ and 2* post as HoB , to be introduced to regulate on-base parking).
From another thread- Cpl's pay for WSOps, leading to a study into the introduction of NCO pilots on the premise that not so much command ability is required in the 21stC; and with the long lost air dropped nuke capability.
Makes sense.
CG
Makes sense.
CG
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Introduction of workplace parking charges on a graduated basis. Designated slots charged at 50% of the daily rate of the occupier other wise the nearer to the door/higher the rank, the more you pay. (A new trade group, with a brand new CHQ and 2* post as HoB , to be introduced to regulate on-base parking).
On the subject of Sqn numbers, why not just logicify the whole thing and go for:
0x: fast 'n' pointy
1x: sneaky beaky
2x: fat 'n' heavy
3x: wokka
4x: training
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The RAF is getting smaller but is trying to behave like it did in the 1980's, IMHO it shot it's self in the foot in SDSR 2010 by keeping too many FJ Sqns and taking too many hits in other areas (I know we lost a fair few FJs). I don't think the whole Force structure looked relevant for future Ops, I think this was proved by the subsequent loss of a couple more Sqns after SDSR as we still looked fat. For example many of our neighbors had already bitten the bullet and done this by halving (or more) their FJ fleets and making sure they were efficient and capable (Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium) also by mixing them with SAM systems, etc. while we persisted with the Battle of Britain concept.
As for Sqn number plates, we are only fooling ourselves by trying to prop up so many on inappropriately on none FL units, if we only put them on FL units we could demonstrate how much we have shrunk and it might be help the public understand what they have e.g: in 1990 we had 50? now we have 15? much like the RN do with ship numbers.
The rivalry of Sqn numbers is becoming corrosive and distracting us from what is important. It's time to try something new, perhaps rotate them every 2 or 3 years (Maybe tie with the new CO?), that would provide good PR opportunities, provide potential confusion to Foreign Int Services on force structure and personnel, chance to clear out dead wood, prevent rivalries becoming damaging and distracting, allow more history to be revisited/discovered, etc.
As for Sqn number plates, we are only fooling ourselves by trying to prop up so many on inappropriately on none FL units, if we only put them on FL units we could demonstrate how much we have shrunk and it might be help the public understand what they have e.g: in 1990 we had 50? now we have 15? much like the RN do with ship numbers.
The rivalry of Sqn numbers is becoming corrosive and distracting us from what is important. It's time to try something new, perhaps rotate them every 2 or 3 years (Maybe tie with the new CO?), that would provide good PR opportunities, provide potential confusion to Foreign Int Services on force structure and personnel, chance to clear out dead wood, prevent rivalries becoming damaging and distracting, allow more history to be revisited/discovered, etc.
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More Rumour.
Good quality DT rumours here, someone is spinning but quite what I'm not sure;
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11981015/Armed-Forces-personnel-to-be-denied-automatic-pay-rises-as-George-Osborne-looks-to-make-efficiency-savings.html
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11981015/Armed-Forces-personnel-to-be-denied-automatic-pay-rises-as-George-Osborne-looks-to-make-efficiency-savings.html
IMHO it shot it's self in the foot in SDSR 2010 by keeping too many FJ Sqns and taking too many hits in other areas (I know we lost a fair few FJs). I don't think the whole Force structure looked relevant for future Ops, I think this was proved by the subsequent loss of a couple more Sqns after SDSR as we still looked fat. For example many of our neighbors had already bitten the bullet and done this by halving (or more) their FJ fleets and making sure they were efficient and capable (Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium) also by mixing them with SAM systems, etc. while we persisted with the Battle of Britain concept.
- The decisions that led to the 'loss of a couple more sqns after SDSR' - reducing the Tornado force from 7 to 5 to 3 squadrons - were all taken as part of that SDSR and its 3-month exercise, they just weren't announced or implemented immediately. But they were all laid out plainly in the classified plans alongside the headline chopping of the Harrier force.
- Keeping 'too many FJ sqns'? Within months of the SDSR, Op ELLAMY showed that we had cut them too far - the op was only possible without impact on Afghanistan because the sixth and seventh Tornado squadrons had not quite shuffled off the parade square yet. Then Op TURUS and Op SHADER forced the reversal of the PR11 decision to FURTHER cut the Tornado force to just 2 squadrons! And now I think pretty much everyone expects that the Typhoon force will grow to compensate for the retirement of Tornado, whereas previously we were going to decline yet again.
- 'Battle of Britain model'? Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands all have the benefit of very small FIRs than can easily be protected by a combination of SAMs and QRA. Plus the latter two are well-surrounded by NATO members and will rarely be responsible for making the first intercept and identification of an unidentified contact. Conversely we have to defend an enormous patch, much of which is over sea, and quite often have to go and make first identifications, both things which SAMs are poor at. So there are very good operational reasons why we haven't copied the F-16/Patriot model.
The logic of SDSR10 and PR11 would have seen our fast jet force reduced from 30 squadrons during Gulf War 1 to just 6 squadrons in 2020. That isn't halving, as in the examples you quoted - it's an 80% reduction. Apart from those capabilities which have been deleted, I think you will struggle to find such a precipitous decline anywhere else in our forces. These cuts have been widely accepted as a mistake in senior circles and SDSR15 is almost certain to see the direction of travel reversed.
If I was looking for imbalances in our force structure, or questions of relevance to future ops, I would be asking what exactly we propose to do with 60 Chinook, a number which was only arrived at as a sop to an angry public during HERRICK. The size of that fleet is a legacy of a particular kind of war, the kind which Robert Gates advised any leader considering to "have his head examined".
Last edited by Easy Street; 7th Nov 2015 at 10:47.
The RAF is getting smaller but is trying to behave like it did in the 1980's, IMHO it shot it's self in the foot in SDSR 2010 by keeping too many FJ Sqns and taking too many hits in other areas (I know we lost a fair few FJs). I don't think the whole Force structure looked relevant for future Ops, I think this was proved by the subsequent loss of a couple more Sqns after SDSR as we still looked fat. For example many of our neighbors had already bitten the bullet and done this by halving (or more) their FJ fleets and making sure they were efficient and capable (Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium) also by mixing them with SAM systems, etc. while we persisted with the Battle of Britain concept.
Belgium has cut from eight squadrons to four, they have a population of approximately 10 million
We have cut from 30 squadrons (37 if you want to include the OCUs!) to eight squadrons. Now, you work out the sums and tell me who has been the more ruthless in decimating its raison detre for existing, for the FJs, as they simply referred are the principal means of delivering ardnance in just about every way. Further, there is no way that the RAF today acts the way it did in the 1980s, on far to many subjects! Oh we had a maritime fleet of 35 Nimrods back in the day as well, all for ASW, nothing more, another three for elint at Wyton.
If the RAF lose any more FJ squadrons then it may as well be subsumed into the Navy and Army as it can barely justify its independence in a country the size and output of the UK and with the size of the other two services such as they are. RAF manning used to be nearly a third greater than that of the senior service, today they are virtually comparable, the RAF use to stand at slightly more than 50% of the the Army's total strength, today its slightly more than a third and this is after the much hugh and cried cuts to the army's strength. Just observations made in my spare time. By the way, the transport and rotary fleets have maintained numbers quite well and istar, I'm sure is vital, has gone from strength to strength.
FB
FB
Globe Trotter asked:
Easy answer to that - none whatsoever. The UK no longer has sufficient aerodromes, training aircraft or QFIs to support anything more then the handful of military pilots undergoing flying training these days....
The last increase I can recall was around the time the Tornado was introduced. Valley was at full stretch and the RAF had 3 TWUs at Brawdy, Chivenor and Lossiemouth. QFIs in non-instructional posts were pulled back to augment UAS training a little later, but there was sufficient capacity in the system to replace them....
Once the UK could afford to give potential pilot recruits 30 hours of PPL-level flying on Flying Scholarship schemes, then either 2½ years at RAFC training to Wings standard - or 3 years at university flying about 30 hours a year at the UAS under regular RAF QFIs.... The JP course was about 140 hours, but reduced to around 120 for UAS graduates.
Since then it's been cut after cut after cut. MoD cannot even manage a fleet of Air Cadet gliders, there are no Flying Scholarships, UASs do so little flying that they're hardly worthy of the title and most of their 'staff' are retread FTRS long out of regular service. Cranwell has a few plastic pigs and a handful of King Airs and the ogre of MFTS is about to put the final nail of the coffin of the once proud RAF flying training system.....
So coping with a pilot training surge requirement? No chance whatsoever
What capacity exists to increase pilot throughput should that be an outcome?
The last increase I can recall was around the time the Tornado was introduced. Valley was at full stretch and the RAF had 3 TWUs at Brawdy, Chivenor and Lossiemouth. QFIs in non-instructional posts were pulled back to augment UAS training a little later, but there was sufficient capacity in the system to replace them....
Once the UK could afford to give potential pilot recruits 30 hours of PPL-level flying on Flying Scholarship schemes, then either 2½ years at RAFC training to Wings standard - or 3 years at university flying about 30 hours a year at the UAS under regular RAF QFIs.... The JP course was about 140 hours, but reduced to around 120 for UAS graduates.
Since then it's been cut after cut after cut. MoD cannot even manage a fleet of Air Cadet gliders, there are no Flying Scholarships, UASs do so little flying that they're hardly worthy of the title and most of their 'staff' are retread FTRS long out of regular service. Cranwell has a few plastic pigs and a handful of King Airs and the ogre of MFTS is about to put the final nail of the coffin of the once proud RAF flying training system.....
So coping with a pilot training surge requirement? No chance whatsoever
Thread Starter
BEagle
I would agree with virtually everything you said apart from your final point. It might be via non traditional means but in true military fashion, we will find a way!
BV
BV
Which final point? About the utter bolleaux of MFTS, Ascent and its snake oil salesmen?
Good luck finding enough QFIs who will be happy to move to Anglesey.....
Good luck finding enough QFIs who will be happy to move to Anglesey.....