Alternatives to Trident: New Paper
At the risk of making the conversation a bit less tense, I think I have the answer. And it will keep the crabs and the fish heads happy. Possibly:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Wos5e_WlYs
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Wos5e_WlYs
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: Horsham, England, UK. ---o--O--o---
Posts: 1,185
Received 4 Likes
on
2 Posts
And given that no government is going to increase defence spending,
On leaving the EU, instant cash available to pay for a proper defence.
PN - sorry couldn't resist
That's no way to talk about Strike Command!
Toby
Not going to debate endlessly on here. Suffice to say IMO your case does not stand up, either in credibility or cost saving. Endorsements by a self-avowed nuclear disarmament lobbying group or a couple of UK academics do not constitute a valid argument.
As for what to do with a 60000 strong army, I'd suggest much the same as we do with an 82000 strong army. Neither are strong enough to sustain significant scales of ops for any length of time. You may not have noticed, but we're already at 19 DD/FF.
armed, but barely trained, RAF airmen, no RAF Regt
Toby
Not going to debate endlessly on here. Suffice to say IMO your case does not stand up, either in credibility or cost saving. Endorsements by a self-avowed nuclear disarmament lobbying group or a couple of UK academics do not constitute a valid argument.
As for what to do with a 60000 strong army, I'd suggest much the same as we do with an 82000 strong army. Neither are strong enough to sustain significant scales of ops for any length of time. You may not have noticed, but we're already at 19 DD/FF.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Nov 2014
Location: UK
Posts: 28
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
N-A-B
I had noticed the paucity of the surface fleet, which is one of the reasons the plan funds an additional 4 x T26. Not enough, but a start. And calling people names isn't a particularly strong argument.
I come back to my question: how are you proposing to fund CASD and the conventional force when no party forming the next government is going to increase defence spending?
TTr
I had noticed the paucity of the surface fleet, which is one of the reasons the plan funds an additional 4 x T26. Not enough, but a start. And calling people names isn't a particularly strong argument.
I come back to my question: how are you proposing to fund CASD and the conventional force when no party forming the next government is going to increase defence spending?
TTr
Wasn't aware I was calling people names, Toby.
Best hope I don't start - it can get colourful.
As far as your direct question goes, there is a budget for CASD and one for the AF overall in the EPP. While no-one likes everything that's in it (or rather not in it), I'd suggest that it is at least a costed plan, with some credibility.
Which I'm afraid is more than can be said for your proposal, even on the rather optimistic assumption that any CASD "savings" would be ploughed back into defence.
On that note, endex.
Best hope I don't start - it can get colourful.
As far as your direct question goes, there is a budget for CASD and one for the AF overall in the EPP. While no-one likes everything that's in it (or rather not in it), I'd suggest that it is at least a costed plan, with some credibility.
Which I'm afraid is more than can be said for your proposal, even on the rather optimistic assumption that any CASD "savings" would be ploughed back into defence.
On that note, endex.
One issue here: what will be given up to retain Trident? At the very least, current planning will lock-in SDSR10 force levels. If (as Mr Boffin suggests) there is no plan to buy 138 F-35s (in which case someone needs to notify the JSFPO), the idea of a replacement for Tornado becomes unrealistic, particularly if SDSR15 restores two carriers; a smaller F-35B force will be largely devoted to maintaining the sea-based capability.
Not only that, but Trident will squeeze out the systems needed for its own survival - see our MPA thread.
It's also worth noting that the USN can't afford Ohio Replacement without a direct raid on another service's budget.
Not only that, but Trident will squeeze out the systems needed for its own survival - see our MPA thread.
It's also worth noting that the USN can't afford Ohio Replacement without a direct raid on another service's budget.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Estimates of the one-0ff costs of replacing Trident range around £20bn. Add that to an assumed annual running cost of £2bn and some updates you reach a total of around £80Bn over 30 years - about £2.5Bn a year. Assume an alternate deterrent would save around 40%, that's a saving of £1Bn a year at great technical risk of obsolescence and reduction in capability. And, please, don't insult my intelligence by suggestion such a saving will be "ring fenced" for defence.
In the meantime wee are due to spend around £200bn this year on welfare, if you lump state pensions and benefits together; and another $11Bn in foreign aid.
So we take all those risks for such a small saving? Why?
In the meantime wee are due to spend around £200bn this year on welfare, if you lump state pensions and benefits together; and another $11Bn in foreign aid.
So we take all those risks for such a small saving? Why?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
N-a-B,
In the interests of accuracy:
RAF Bomber Command disbanded on 1 Apr 1968 and the V-Force relinquished QRA on 30 Jun 1968. Post-QRA, less 3 months, was Strike Command.
In the interests of accuracy:
Post QRA things did improve but still on the cheap with armed, but barely trained, RAF airmen, no RAF Regt.
Think Tanker
I've only had a chance to skim read the paper but a couple of things spring to mind:
1. F-35C is the carrier variant and is probe and drogue refuelled so no need to add the cost of converting Voyager to boom refuelling, which is just as well as
2. You have understimated the costs for providing a new long-range MPA. Once training systems, additional new build facilities, maintenance and crews for your MPA you would need to at least double your costs, and maybe treble them. Particularly if you wanted the UK to remain a 1st world player in the ASW/ASuW business.
Like others on here, I think the biggest flaw in the paper is the assumption that anything "saved" by cancelling successor would be reinvested in the rest of Defence. It won't be, it will be spent on the sacred cow that is the NHS, or on education, or on keeping the feckless, lame and lazy in benefits.
I've only had a chance to skim read the paper but a couple of things spring to mind:
1. F-35C is the carrier variant and is probe and drogue refuelled so no need to add the cost of converting Voyager to boom refuelling, which is just as well as
2. You have understimated the costs for providing a new long-range MPA. Once training systems, additional new build facilities, maintenance and crews for your MPA you would need to at least double your costs, and maybe treble them. Particularly if you wanted the UK to remain a 1st world player in the ASW/ASuW business.
Like others on here, I think the biggest flaw in the paper is the assumption that anything "saved" by cancelling successor would be reinvested in the rest of Defence. It won't be, it will be spent on the sacred cow that is the NHS, or on education, or on keeping the feckless, lame and lazy in benefits.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
N-a-B, not at all.
The peripheral point is that the system cost is one thing, infrastructure and force protection something else.
There are some many variables of course with a deployed SSBN having by far the best protection, reaction time and reach. Dave, OTOH, can be deployed as a very visible deterrent, a la V-Force during Confrontation, but a deployment time in days and a response time in hours (flash to bang).
Taking out one SSBN would reduce the deterrent by a minimum of 25%. Neutralizing 25% of the F35 deterrent should be impossible.
The peripheral point is that the system cost is one thing, infrastructure and force protection something else.
There are some many variables of course with a deployed SSBN having by far the best protection, reaction time and reach. Dave, OTOH, can be deployed as a very visible deterrent, a la V-Force during Confrontation, but a deployment time in days and a response time in hours (flash to bang).
Taking out one SSBN would reduce the deterrent by a minimum of 25%. Neutralizing 25% of the F35 deterrent should be impossible.
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: London
Posts: 7,072
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"much more cost effective nuclear deterrent relying on aircraft delivered gravity bombs.""
ye Gods - even the Vulcan wasn't asked to do that by 1963
I hope he intends to be one of the crew.................
ye Gods - even the Vulcan wasn't asked to do that by 1963
I hope he intends to be one of the crew.................
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
HH, wrong. We didn't get lay down until 1966. The Mk1a' s remained into 1967 with that bundle of joy ,Yellow Sun, with a rapid climb into the valley of death.
Flying level across an enemy airfield at 200 feet in broad daylight would have seen the guns volley and thunder.
Flying level across an enemy airfield at 200 feet in broad daylight would have seen the guns volley and thunder.
ThinkTanker,
In post 20 of this thread you include three quotes, from no doubt learned and respected individuals, written in support of your paper - it might have been more even handed if you had also perhaps pointed out that 2 of these 3 people were also thanked by you on page 2 of your paper for their help in producing it!
To most people it would appear that, as contributors to the paper they are commenting on, their opinion of it is almost certainly likely to be biased in favour!!
Ah - I've just found the name of the third person you quoted in your list of acknowledgements! So none of the quotes on post 20 comes from an unlinked, unbiased, source!! All of them contributed in some way to the paper.
In post 20 of this thread you include three quotes, from no doubt learned and respected individuals, written in support of your paper - it might have been more even handed if you had also perhaps pointed out that 2 of these 3 people were also thanked by you on page 2 of your paper for their help in producing it!
To most people it would appear that, as contributors to the paper they are commenting on, their opinion of it is almost certainly likely to be biased in favour!!
Ah - I've just found the name of the third person you quoted in your list of acknowledgements! So none of the quotes on post 20 comes from an unlinked, unbiased, source!! All of them contributed in some way to the paper.
Join Date: Mar 2011
Location: Sussex
Age: 66
Posts: 371
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This thread could get more amusing if we started discussing why Dave C, as yet nowhere near IOC nor with a nuclear role model, or a standoff weapon, is better than say a Rafale for the carrier born, hose and drogue, solution. Not that I particularly think that an aircraft borne deterrent is the answer.
ThinkTanker,
I must admit that I haven't read every word of your paper yet, and probably never will, but I have come across the following.
You state that the unrefuelled operational radius of the F-35C is 615nm. However, you then go on to say that multiple in-flight refuelling can give a radius of action (based on an aircrew fatigue limit of 12 hours, which presumably equates to 5000nm flown) of 2500nm. It therefore appears you are not planning one way missions, but expect our gallant aviators to be able to return.
The supposed logic of this argument then allows you to conveniently draw 2500 nm circles around various possible operating bases to show the global coverage of such a force. However, you don't seem to mention (unless I've missed it?) the issue of taking a non stealthy tanker through hostile air defences until it is somewhere within 600 odd miles of your intended target? For example Figure 11 on page 69, which you use to illustrate targets in Russia being attacked from Akrotiri. Then of course the tanker has to loiter somewhere for a couple of hours for our gallant F-35 pilot(s) to return post strike and be refuelled on the way home.
I'd be indebted to anyone who can tell me where to look in the paper for the answer to my question if I've missed it.
I must admit that I haven't read every word of your paper yet, and probably never will, but I have come across the following.
You state that the unrefuelled operational radius of the F-35C is 615nm. However, you then go on to say that multiple in-flight refuelling can give a radius of action (based on an aircrew fatigue limit of 12 hours, which presumably equates to 5000nm flown) of 2500nm. It therefore appears you are not planning one way missions, but expect our gallant aviators to be able to return.
The supposed logic of this argument then allows you to conveniently draw 2500 nm circles around various possible operating bases to show the global coverage of such a force. However, you don't seem to mention (unless I've missed it?) the issue of taking a non stealthy tanker through hostile air defences until it is somewhere within 600 odd miles of your intended target? For example Figure 11 on page 69, which you use to illustrate targets in Russia being attacked from Akrotiri. Then of course the tanker has to loiter somewhere for a couple of hours for our gallant F-35 pilot(s) to return post strike and be refuelled on the way home.
I'd be indebted to anyone who can tell me where to look in the paper for the answer to my question if I've missed it.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Nov 2014
Location: UK
Posts: 28
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
N-a-B
Fine, N-a-B. But you've still not answered the question of "how small a conventional force are you prepared to tolerate to have CASD Trident?" It's a fair question, as asked by LO.
ORAC wrote
The MoD continues to use a capital cost figure of £15-20bn in 2005/6 prices. Inflated to today's prices, and with an allowance for the historical cost overruns of UK submarines, you come to a cap of £33bn today. It's not the through life costs that are that high (c.£2-3bn a year), but the capital spending is compressed into 2018-32, where like SSBN(X), it eats everyone's else lunch.
And since no-one is going to increase defence spending (or even commit to keeping it at 2%), then you've got to make choices.
Roland Pulfrew
It's not required, but it is in there to enhance overall conventional force projection, especially in NATO Europe. The role in the nuclear mission is to keep RIVET JOINT on station at range.
[/Quote]2. You have understimated the costs for providing a new long-range MPA. Once training systems, additional new build facilities, maintenance and crews for your MPA you would need to at least double your costs, and maybe treble them. Particularly if you wanted the UK to remain a 1st world player in the ASW/ASuW business.[/Quote]
Indeed, it is the capital costs, as it says. Without access to the MoD LTCs, this was always going to be hard, so there are over-estimates in there too - e.g., assuming UK B61-12 production is *twice* the unit cost of the US, no savings from cancelling Crowsnest, £1bn to reinstate nuclear C2 amongst others.
Biggus: Yes, they did all see it, and support the conclusions. These were their reasons why.
Thanks to all!
As far as your direct question goes, there is a budget for CASD and one for the AF overall in the EPP. While no-one likes everything that's in it (or rather not in it), I'd suggest that it is at least a costed plan, with some credibility.
ORAC wrote
Estimates of the one-0ff costs of replacing Trident range around £20bn.
And since no-one is going to increase defence spending (or even commit to keeping it at 2%), then you've got to make choices.
Roland Pulfrew
1. F-35C is the carrier variant and is probe and drogue refuelled so no need to add the cost of converting Voyager to boom refuelling, which is just as well as
[/Quote]2. You have understimated the costs for providing a new long-range MPA. Once training systems, additional new build facilities, maintenance and crews for your MPA you would need to at least double your costs, and maybe treble them. Particularly if you wanted the UK to remain a 1st world player in the ASW/ASuW business.[/Quote]
Indeed, it is the capital costs, as it says. Without access to the MoD LTCs, this was always going to be hard, so there are over-estimates in there too - e.g., assuming UK B61-12 production is *twice* the unit cost of the US, no savings from cancelling Crowsnest, £1bn to reinstate nuclear C2 amongst others.
Biggus: Yes, they did all see it, and support the conclusions. These were their reasons why.
Thanks to all!
Join Date: Apr 2008
Location: The Whyte House
Age: 95
Posts: 1,966
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Gonna need more carriers. If we were to declare our carriers as the deterrent, you can bet your ass that the Russians will assign a couple of attack submarines to each deck. Slightest hint of trouble: glug glug glug.
Replacing SSBN as the only really guaranteed second strike capability assurance by something Carrier/Aircraft based is as stupid as it gets.
You want nuclear deterrence:
You need SSBN.
End of Story.
The US found this out in the 60s. And they stick to it. That is why they scrapped MX/Peacemaker and kept Minuteman without worrying too much. Their real Nuclear Deterrence is Trident/Ohio anyway.
This is not to be mixed up with what you need for regional squirmishes. Horses for courses.
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Exiled in England
Age: 48
Posts: 1,015
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ThinkTaker - have a read of "command and control"
It's a factual account of the Damascus Titan whoopsie ( and no disrespect to the dead, they were the poor brave bastards at the bottom)
In the book you will read an awful lot about the numbers and the close calls
And you are advocating going from the most reliable system we have ever had to a less reliable one - and I use reliable here in the sense of less likely to have a whoopsie
It's a factual account of the Damascus Titan whoopsie ( and no disrespect to the dead, they were the poor brave bastards at the bottom)
In the book you will read an awful lot about the numbers and the close calls
And you are advocating going from the most reliable system we have ever had to a less reliable one - and I use reliable here in the sense of less likely to have a whoopsie