Alternatives to Trident: New Paper

[ThinkTanker]

With thanks to those who contributed to my question on how F-35C carrier conversion training would've been conducted, CentreForum's new alternatives to Trident paper is now available.

I hope it is of interest, and in these budget constrained times ahead of a very tough SDSR, stimulates a debate, even if there is no evidence of a debate on the opportunity costs with 80 days to the election.

Regards,

TTr

[ShotOne]

Thank you for a thought-provoking read. I was 100% in favour of like for like Trident replacement until I did. For those who don't manage all 108 pages, stand out points were that we could afford lots of good defence equipment without SSBN's, the lib-dem policy was bonkers whether you're pro or anti nuke, but your thesis hangs on the question of the F35's guaranteed ability to deliver the sunshine on target.. and of convincing everyone including potential adversaries of that ability.

[Rhino power]

Originally Posted by ShotOne

stand out points were that we could afford lots of good defence equipment without SSBN's...

The problem with that 'stand out point', is that money not spent on maintaining a SSBN fleet is highly unlikely to then be considered as 'money now available' for lots of other nice new defence equipment! Our defence budget is already a pittance of GDP (2.3/4%?). Why should existing capabilities be considered for the chop under the pretext of funding other new kit? I realize this may be a rather simplistic point of view (but then, i am rather simplistic...).

-RP

[Lima Juliet]

You haven't thought of the option of nuke-tipped TLAM from Astute Class. I think this would further disperse our nuclear forces if needed. They already carry TLAM and so this would be a no-brainer for me. You would now have free-fall and submarine based deterrence.

Nice article, though.

LJ

[Roadster280]

Hasn't TLAM-N been retired by the USN? Would Raytheon be allowed to sell it to the RN?

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

F-35s with nukes can be shot down, assuming they even get off the ground. TLAMs can also be shot down. Tridents with MIRVs can't.

There is no better deterrence than a boomer.

Why not do a joint development with the USN? They're looking to replace their Ohios in a similar timeframe.

[rh200]

I'm afraid that with all the defense budgets being squeezed, and the likely hood of western nations ever again having the ability to defend themselves conventionally to any reasonable extent, the ability to bring fire from the heavens is the only sure fire way of defending your freedom.

The way the world is going at the moment, the one's that don't have strategic nuclear missiles should probably start looking at them.

[ORAC]

There is no better deterrence than a boomer. Why not do a joint development with the USN?

We have been, there are several contracts worth $ 800 million in place - presumably to tie us firmly into the programme and choice before a formal decision.

[Jimlad1]

"You haven't thought of the option of nuke-tipped TLAM from Astute Class. I think this would further disperse our nuclear forces if needed. They already carry TLAM and so this would be a no-brainer for me. You would now have free-fall and submarine based deterrence."

Its an absolute no brainer for the simple reason that we'd have to develop on our own a nuclear warhead to put on TLAM and then ensure we can plan the missions, execute them and that sufficient numbers of missiles can make it through to actually deliver the desired effect. It is vastly vastly more expensive than the current setup.

[Not_a_boffin]

For Leon - Tube-launched TLAM (as can be used by UK SSN) is highly likely to be out of service by the mid to late 20s - unless we pay to retain that capability. Plus (as ever) you risk nuclear alerts every time you want to give someone the good news with a conventional one.

On the paper :

Apparently a single RAF squadron is going to be able to hold sufficient targets at risk by delivering 30 weapons. At 2 buckets per Dave, that means a 15 ship successful penetration, so if you factor in attrition from a half decent Russian IADS, that's a lot of cabs launched - and more to the point, a lot of tankers we ain't got. Doesn't smell like a single RAF squadron to me - or a second RN squadron for that matter. Particularly not if launching from UK and proceeding at a sedate 450kts or thereabouts. 3-4 hour run to get to St Petersburg?

All of it rests on this rather ethereal idea that the Moscow criterion is no longer valid. Given that nice Mr Putin seems to be a bit short on manners atm, I'd personally want him to be sure we'd be able to entomb him if we had to, rather than just incinerate several million Russian civpop.

There's also the rather quaint idea that we'd be able to defend our "dispersed" force from attack. There's a limited amount of dispersal options which would be known to opfor. It doesn't take a genius to go after a large part of that subset (by a number of means) which immediately reduces your oppos defensive problem. They're almost inviting an attack on the UK, something you don't really get with CASD.

That's before you get to the warhead design issues, additional force structure etc etc.

I'm afraid it all smacks of "I don't like Trident and I want to find a way of presenting binning it as a cut to the deficit without pain in social spending or tax rises. How can we get it cancelled without looking like unilateralists and promise more defence while achieving savings (which we may or more likely may not actually put towards defence)?"

[Lima Juliet]

TLAMs can also be shot down. Tridents with MIRVs can't.

Nothing is guaranteed to reach the target as some other bugger always has some capability:



^^^ Declassified Version^^^

[ThinkTanker]

Thanks to all for taking the time to engage with it, esp. ShotOne reading late last night. And yes, the LDs official position is risible, though Nick Harvey appears to have modified it in his speech in the Trident debate on 20 Jan.

RP noted

The problem with that 'stand out point', is that money not spent on maintaining a SSBN fleet is highly unlikely to then be considered as 'money now available' for lots of other nice new defence equipment!

This is why we present it as a force package, and make very clear on pages 72 - 73 that the savings have to stay in the MoD budget. We should be holding the Treasury's feet to the fire.

Leon Jabachjabicz said,

You haven't thought of the option of nuke-tipped TLAM from Astute Class. I think this would further disperse our nuclear forces if needed. They already carry TLAM and so this would be a no-brainer for me. You would now have free-fall and submarine based deterrence.

TLAM-N is being retired for the reasons Prof Jeffrey Lewis sets out on his blog. The other problem is one of nuclear signalling that we don't currently have as all UK CMs are conventional.

FA18

F-35s with nukes can be shot down, assuming they even get off the ground. TLAMs can also be shot down. Tridents with MIRVs can't.

There is no better deterrence than a boomer.

Quite true, but the issue here is of minimum deterrence versus the gold standard, and crucially, of the opportunity cost of SSBNs. Trident will consume 25 - 33% of the equipment budget from 2018-32, denuding the conventional forces. This is why a dual capable model we propose provides a credible minimum nuclear force - but at the same time substantially improves the UK's conventional capability.

rh200

the ability to bring fire from the heavens is the only sure fire way of defending your freedom.

Against what threat, rh200? Trident can't deter ISIL, stop Russia going into Crimea or sort out the Taliban.

Not_a_boffin

Apparently a single RAF squadron is going to be able to hold sufficient targets at risk by delivering 30 weapons. At 2 buckets per Dave, that means a 15 ship successful penetration, so if you factor in attrition from a half decent Russian IADS, that's a lot of cabs launched - and more to the point, a lot of tankers we ain't got. Doesn't smell like a single RAF squadron to me - or a second RN squadron for that matter. Particularly not if launching from UK and proceeding at a sedate 450kts or thereabouts. 3-4 hour run to get to St Petersburg?

The plan is for all RAF and FAA F-35C squadrons to be dual capable. The paper provides nuclear IOC based on one squadron but it would be rolled out across the F-35C fleet.

All of it rests on this rather ethereal idea that the Moscow criterion is no longer valid. Given that nice Mr Putin seems to be a bit short on manners atm, I'd personally want him to be sure we'd be able to entomb him if we had to, rather than just incinerate several million Russian civpop.

Is Putin madder than Brezhnev or his pre-Gorby successors? I doubt it. And that is why we've used the declassified 1978 Duff Group minimum deterrence criteria, which were reaffirmed in 1982 as Duff Mason. The Moscow Criterion has been dead in UK policy circles since 1978, though no one mentioned it until the files were released under the 30 year rule.

There's a limited amount of dispersal options which would be known to opfor. It doesn't take a genius to go after a large part of that subset (by a number of means) which immediately reduces your oppos defensive problem. They're almost inviting an attack on the UK, something you don't really get with CASD.

So we are in a position with 18 ORPs hosting 4 x F-35C each on QRA, with one or both carriers out and about. What are you going to attack them with that is a bolt from the blue that will destroy them all? Oh, and make the US rescind it's NATO Art V guarantee? Nothing credible springs to mind, N-a-B.

Thanks again,

TTr

[Jimlad1]

But in doing the nuclear dave mission, you've essentially lost access to your carrier force as it'll have to permanently stooge around in striking distance and dedicated to the nuclear role. Its worth noting that this would cost a fortune, create a complex logistics chain that is vulnerable (why sink the carrier when you could sink the RFA?), and also means that you'd need the ability to keep 1-2 CVBGs on station permanently and with sufficient crews able to fly the nuclear mission which dont exist.

I remember when you came here for help you got a lot of people like myself who've spent years on this advising you that the Dave option was a complete non-starter and would cost far more than the current options. It is a shame you've disregarded expert advice, and it feels like you had pre-determined that F35 was the answer, regardless of the practicalities involved.

[rh200]

Against what threat, rh200? Trident can't deter ISIL, stop Russia going into Crimea or sort out the Taliban.

Its not about the threats we have now, or any other half baked ones. The fact is, we seem to think things get easier, they don't they get harder. Having an arsenal that can keep things to low level conflicts is imperative if we want to stop having wars between the major players.

By wars amonsgts the major players, I'm talking about world wars, with the death tolls in the tens if not hundreds of millions. In effect, it just regulates us to what we have now, pain in the @rse conflicts.

The problem being, the Yanks seem to be on shaky ground, and I'm not sure how long they can be relied to be the foundation of our defense. This is where the problem comes in, what does the modeling show if the yanks are taken out of the equation.

Human nature dictates that when there is a power vacuum there will be a stampede to fill it. So the question becomes, do you have enough deterrent to make it hurt enough, so that another larger player will leave you alone? Factor in, the potential that other major player may control their media and are prepared to loose a city or two?

[ThinkTanker]

JimLad,

The carriers would not be expected to be within striking range at all times. In the same way as QRA numbers varied in line with the international situation, the carrier deployment would be modulated. Of the three scenarios we model in the paper, only one (UK versus North Korea) requires the carrier; in the others (Middle East, Russia), the carrier increases flexibility and adds a threat axis.

This is expressly designed to be a lower cost, lower capability system than Trident, albeit one that meets the Duff-Mason minimum deterrence criteria.

It also significantly enhances RN / FAA conventional capability....

TTr

[Not_a_boffin]

Sorry Toby

If you want to get into the detail of the Duff Criteria, you'd need a proper debate over time. You say the Moscow criterios has been dead in policy circles since the late 70s. I think I'll need a bit more evidence than the word of a former RAFR IntO, DFiD CS or an academic study. More pertinently, just going for Options 3a and 3b from the Duff report and dismissing everything else as gold-plating may suit your thesis, but misses the import of option 2 - which was to go after C2 facilities as well. Messrs Khruschev, Brehznev, Andropov and Chernenko were well aware they were personally vulnerable, as did Gorby.

Your "attrition" analysis covers only SAM in the target area. We have forgotten that a working IADS starts killing threats much further out than that. Specifically long range radars of various frequencies and interceptors / CAPs. LO is not a magic cloak as I'm sure you're well aware, it just forces more defensive resources to counter it, through reducing reaction time. But frankly, if your attack run is 1200nm, that's plenty of time to organise.

Your force structure seems to indicate something like 100+ F35 ready to go. Which is a bit of a stretch to maintain from a buy of 138 cabs - something by the way, which will cost additional money that you haven't included in your costs. I don't believe that a UK buy of 138 is in the EPP, but am happy to be convinced otherwise.

As for vulnerability of the dispersed force, I don't have to kill them all, nor do I have to kill them at the same time. I'm just reducing my defensive problem. If I'm in a state that requires me to have my nuclear force dispersed, it's likely that I'm expecting a bit of a pagga with someone. If that someone decides to use non-nuclear means to hit a number of my ORPs, not only is my deterrent reduced, but I have to think hard about whether that strike actually merits a nuclear response. Am I in use it or lose it territory? Article V does not commit the US to a nuclear response as a response to a conventional attack by the way.

HAS ain't all that these days - Granby showed that over 20 years ago. PGM can be mounted on a number of stand-off conventional systems and unless my skim read has missed something you haven't got local SAM defences for your ORP - or expansion of the RAFReg to provide FP against ground attacks.

There's a whole lot of "we won't worry about that" and " it's all gold plating" woven through your arguments, all of which tend to assume out any thought that F35C couldn't actually do the job. All of which re-inforces my initial impression that it's an artifice to provide a policy option (read coalition trade item) that appears to retain a deterrent and strengthen conventional forces, but which can be conveniently dropped once the decision to bin Trident has been taken.

And no, it doesn't

significantly enhance RN / FAA conventional capability....

. What it does is tie a signficant amount of that to a deterrent mission, which will incur a significant training and operational burden. Which reminds me that you haven't included modifying QE/PoW for SW provision.

[Pontius Navigator]

NaB, the only bit I want to comment on is the risk from an attempted coup de main on the nuclear forces by non-nuclear assets.

This is indeed use it or lose it territory. Enhanced force protection, at additional cost, is essential if we want to slacken the trip wire. The V-force FP, in today's terms was risible - 2 RAF police with 9mm and VP with a couple of trainees with pickaxe handles. Main gates with a simple knife rest and perimeter hedge with a couple of strands of hard wire. Post QRA things did improve but still on the cheap with armed, but barely trained, RAF airmen, no RAF Regt.

[Jimlad1]

The problem with relying on carriers to deliver deterrence is that you actually have one in the right place at the right time.

Like I said, this 'study' feels like a fairly shambolic piece of poorly contrived 'research' which ignores any inconvenient truths to instead put across a fairly poorly written, frankly ignorant, piece of work which is far too long, and only good for getting face time for the authors career and not a serious piece of work.

[ThinkTanker]

N-a-B

Always good to debate. Can I suggest that you have a look at John Ainslie's meticulous paper on Unacceptable Damage?

What does the UK's conventional force look like when Successor is consuming such a large proportion of the procurement budget 2018-32? What do we do with an Army of 60,000? RN with <20 FF/DDs?

The point here is choice. And given that no government is going to increase defence spending, then I choose to meet the minimum deterrence criteria (especially within an NATO setting) and spend more on our conventional forces rather than getting stuck with a very capable, but massively expensive, single-role asset to meet a Tier 2 threat.

[ThinkTanker]

You're welcome to you opinion, JimLad, but (i) you're completely wrong on my motivation in writing this and (ii) others don't agree with you.

From the Media Release

Paul Ingram, Executive Director, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), said:

"The government thought they had sunk the debate over any credible alternatives, but overstretched their credibility when claiming that like-for-like replacement of Trident is the only viable option. This report demonstrates more clearly than any other that a new government must reopen the review and properly consider all options and capabilities afresh, placing national and international security at the heart of the discussion."

Dr Jeffrey Lewis, Director of East Asia Non-Proliferation Program, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, said:

"Finding the funds to pay for Trident replacement is shaping up to be a major challenge for the next UK government. It doesn't have to be, as CentreForum demonstrates in this smartly argued brief for a credible but much more cost effective nuclear deterrent relying on aircraft delivered gravity bombs."

Dr Nick Ritchie, Lecturer, International Security, University of York, said:

"CentreForum has produced a very timely report that challenges Whitehall's political fixation on Trident and its proposed replacement. It builds an authoritative case that if the UK remains committed to deploying nuclear weapons then it makes strategic and fiscal sense to opt for an air delivered system based on the Joint Strike Fighter (F35 Lightning II). In doing so CentreForum opens up the debate on Britain's nuclear future as we head into the general election in terms of whether to retain nuclear weapons at all, if so, what a UK nuclear arsenal might look like."

Which comes back to the question of choice. What UK conventional force are you prepared to live with to retain CASD?