Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say

[Bob Viking]

Downsizer

The Hawk T2 has TCAS. It has it's limitations but it has proved its worth several times over already.
BV

[Kengineer-130]

Tcas (especially the latest versions)is such a good system it would be foolhardy & almost criminally negligent NOT to fit it to any mil aircraft that are capable of carrying it. Obviously it has its limitations & does not remove the need for a good lookout, but it is another layer (and a thick layer it is) of safety that is always welcome.

[Tourist]

Having flown military aircraft with and without TCAS, I am not convinced that it is so obvious.
It is quite good for your SA, and definitely helps you achieve visual contact with other aircraft, however it leads to complacency in my opinion, and the RA has no relevance to military flying. It is vastly over cautious for military operations and essentially puts a stop to all normal military operations with multiple aircraft.

Everybody's first thought is always "it wants me to manuever for that tiny aircraft in the distance?!?! Ridiculous!!"
A military optimised system would have to be developed that could cope with an aircraft that can move like a Typhoon or it would be pointless.
TCAS is designed for airliners and it is reasonably good at that, though it still leads to lookout complacency.

As always, the aim must be kept in mind.
The ultimate aim of the military is operational effectiveness, not safety.
Just because fitting TCAS might reduce collisions with civil aircraft is not enough of a reason in itself to fit it if in doing so we reduce our ability to operate multiple aircraft in close proximity.
Stopping flying altogether would have an even better effect on safety.....

[alfred_the_great]

Stopping flying altogether would have an even better effect on safety.....

Which I think is quite attractive to some people.

[tucumseh]

As for Typhoon, it rarely flies at low level as it p!sses fuel out the back! It has a good air-to-air RADAR that allows it to detect other aircraft and this is coupled to an interrorgator that can detect Mode A (Mode 3) and Mode S. It has an IRST that can also spot anti-col lights, engine heat and aircraft-in-poor-weather. So TCAS would only really augment a good amount of sensors anyway. Also, as some have already pointed out, TCAS will only detect those that transpond - the primary means for all aircraft avoidance in Class G is 'See and Avoid' until the Air Navigation Order mandates transponder carriage in all aircraft in Class G. The lookout in Typhoon is better than many FJs.

These are all perfectly valid points.

What would concern me is, despite the raft of sensors listed, it remains stated MoD policy that they need not be properly integrated and proven functionally safe before being released for training or operational use. This basic requirement has been fully funded on every programme I've ever known (so lack of funding isn't an issue), but the Gods have consistently ruled it can be waived if it means meeting time. Or chopped if something else runs over budget. This remains common today in MoD, as many here will confirm.

This all comes under Technology and System Integration Maturity. Just look at the losses we've had because of FLAT REFUSAL to attain such maturity, with FALSE declarations made that it has been achieved. Tornado ZG710. Chinook ZD576. Sea Kings XV650 & 704 (a mid-air). And so on. The Wg Cdr Spry thread says it all. The MAA can't even get the basic definitions right, so what chance the job being done properly.

Sorry, I do not react well when two 2 Stars tell me to my face that they do not care about the risk of collision, that they'll look at it again if it happens. And when it happened, they still did nothing. This is the background one needs to appreciate when reading Dick Garwood's report. I'd bet my house no-one told him of it.

Stopping flying altogether would have an even better effect on safety.....

The point you miss is that false declarations have been made to the effect aircraft are safe, when they were not. That is completely different from you being told the truth and being able to make allowances and informed decisions.

You're ex-RN. You lost 7 colleagues in 2003. The 3 main contributory factors noted by the BoI wholly coincided with the 3 main areas of degradation between the AEW Mk2 and ASaC Mk7. That degradation was not noted in the RTS. All 3 directly and adversely affected collision avoidance. All 3 had been recognised years before and mitigation put in hand. All 3 were cancelled. Not replaced by alternate mitigation, but CANCELLED because someone (an unqualified civilian who had self-delegated airworthiness authority - again, something Dick Garwood doesn't mention because it would open MoD to legal action) decided the risk would only be addressed if the risks materialised. When they did, 7 died. THAT ethos is what concerns me.

[Tourist]

Tuc

Give it a rest.
Your knowledge of military aviation in general and Seaking ops in particular reminds me of reading the Far East air crash threads. Lots of well intentioned amateurs who are very knowledgeable in areas that have some tertiary relevance to aviation, but totally lacking in the big picture and spout bollocks.
In your case I honestly think you believe the process is more important than the end result.
Military flying can be safe or effective. I have yet to see any evidence it can be both.

[Wensleydale]

Question... Does TCAS keep firing off if flying as a 2 (or more) ship at the same altitude? If so, then surely is it only good for individual aircraft?

[tucumseh]

Thanks Tourist.

Why don't you tell me what was incorrect about my post, instead of denigrating someone who wants you to have a safe aircraft.

First, I recommend you read the BoI and RNFSAIC and understand what they got wrong because information was withheld or they didn't understand. But more importantly, read the report on the investigation conducted in Jan/Feb 2004 that MoD denies took place. That denial is key.

And please tell us what process YOU would like to see undertaken to ensure your aircraft are safe as reasonably possible and fit for purpose. You obviously disagree with the regulations but never say why.

That you apparently don't want or need a safe aircraft puzzles more than a few here. The comment about my experience, in safety and airworthiness, having tertiary relevance to aviation is a cracker. Without it, you can have no aircraft to fly. Or are you saying we should ignore the subject altogether? That would please many in MoD!

[RetiredF4]

See and avoid 1980

Mil Low Flying in W-Germany 1980 was 90.000 hours (slow and fast movers)
Mil Low Flying was possible on 120 days (WX, holidays).
That gives 750 Mil LL hours/ day.
About 100 military aircraft in LL / hour.
Dispersed over about a 1/4 of the BRD (airspace, ADIZ, WX, Notams)
In an altitude band from 250-1500 feet AGL
Accumulating in good WX areas (where civil traffic was flying as well)
No advisory service, no TCAS, no IFF, limited on board radar, no coordination.

How did we survive?

Today the traffic is about 1/20 of those figures in much more airspace (W+E- Germany), think they would compare to other western nations as well.

[anotherthing]

Today the traffic is about 1/20 of those figures in much more airspace (W+E- Germany), think they would compare to other western nations as well.

ilitary traffic maybe... but civilian traffic has increased...

[Tourist]

Tuc

You consistently and deliberately overstate findings from the board to give the impression that they were the cause of the accident whereas in reality they were errors in process.

You are always excited about the Mk7 HISL because it was never properly trialled on the Mk7.

The fact that it was properly trialled on the Mk6 means nothing to you, because they are as far as you are concerned different aircraft.

Do you know how long the conversion course is for a pilot from the Mk6 to the Mk7?

The answer will give you a clue as to importance of a Mk7 HISL trial.

The fact that you state that without a safety and airworthiness dept there would be no aircraft shows how far from the pointy end you are.
You are aware that we had aircraft before safety and airworthiness even existed?

I fully support whichever senior officers have repeatedly blanked/ignored you. Despite your obvious best intentions (I'm sure you are a lovely bloke), you would have negative influence on operational capability and have no business in military aviation.

I do actually believe that safety and airworthiness are important, but they are a long way from the most important aspect of any effective military.

Incidentally, for those who think that F35 is naked without TCAS, go and have a little look at the open source info on the F35 systems and have a think for a moment.

Something else to think on is of course that TCAS is only useful in peacetime for obvious reasons, and TCAS has the unfortunate effect of making people trust and rely on it. This is a bad thing in wartime when it is suddenly turned off....
Train as you fight.

[Tourist]

TCAS RA is designed to remove thought and decision making from the pilot.

In civil aircraft I think this is a great idea implemented quite badly.

The system tells the pilot what he must do to avoid the other aircraft by the proscribed margin.
He is also told that he is not to think, not to look but just to obey instinctively.

Personally, If that is the way you want to go I have never understood why the pilot is not removed from the scenario altogether.
If the pilot is to be merely a conduit, then he can only add errors.
Remove him from the system.
Let the autopilot control the TCAS RA. It's what they are good at. It's only a gentle climb, gentle, descent or level.
Funnily enough, TCAS RAs in the civil world are handled extraordinarily badly. On of the UKs largest carriers admits to a less than 50% rate of correctly handled TCAS RAs.
Fortunately, there are quite correctly huge margins built into the system to protect the soft bodies of passengers.

My personal opinion is that this sort of thing has no place in a military aircraft. The pilot should make the decisions or why is he even there, plus why limit yourself to height change only?
Even the transport fleet will have to turn off the TCAS in wartime so best not to get used to relying on it.

[Chugalug2]

Even the transport fleet will have to turn off the TCAS in wartime so best not to get used to relying on it.

By the same token they'll have to switch off their HISLs and Nav Lights, so best to not get used to them either, Tourist?

Your Lord Flashheart's dialogue no doubt goes down well with the 20 minuters, but that is rather the point isn't it? The "Safety and Airworthiness" people, whom you speak of so dismissively, seek to extend those 20 minutes to allow you to at least close with the enemy and destroy him or be destroyed. A rather more meaningful outcome than colliding with another of your own side, spontaneously exploding, suffering a UFCM, getting blown out of the sky by a Blue on Blue SAM, or any other airworthiness associated nasties on the way there. At least I would have thought so, though perhaps you don't...

[Tourist]

Chugalug

Taking your comments at face value for a minute.

HISLs and Anti Cols on my aircraft don't in any way affect the way I operate. I cannot see them. They enable others to see me.
Thus they don't require me to change my procedures whether they are on or off.
Thus they are all gain when available and no pain in procedure/skills changing.

TCAS, as any pilot knows, is good enough that you start to rely on it. I think that subconsciously you start to trust it and your lookout gets worse. Perhaps not everybody, but certainly me. I am back to flying an aircraft without TCAS at the moment and I have had to really work on getting my lookout back up to speed.

I, like you, firmly believe that safety and airworthiness has an important role to play. The difference is that I don't think that it should rule the roost. Operational effectiveness should be the god we worship, not safety at all costs.

I can tell that my lack of worship of safety and airworthiness dept irks you, but please don't imagine that being referred to as a twenty minuter upsets me for a moment. If only I had the balls.

[tucumseh]

You consistently and deliberately overstate findings from the board to give the impression that they were the cause of the accident whereas in reality they were errors in process.

I have cited the findings of the BoI. In the past YOU have called into question the competence of the Board members. I share SOME of your concerns. I have questioned why vital information was withheld from them that proved, beyond any doubt, that the 3 main contributory factors THEY cited were also the 3 main areas of degradation between Mk2 and Mk7. That is a simple fact. Had the BoI been aware, I like to think they'd have altered some of their findings and placed emphasis elsewhere.

You are always excited about the Mk7 HISL because it was never properly trialled on the Mk7.

Again, the BoI cited HISL, not I. I followed the evidence that showed, again, the BoI were not told that HISL was not permitted in the aircraft and the process (yes!) whereby only properly authorised staffs are permitted to accept the design was systematically abused by a non-technical civilian, who self-delegated an authority to dictate and approve (!) the design.
Read the reports. HISL was never endorsed by the RN, but a late decision was made to fit it AFTER trials had commenced. That is one long way into the programme, and some 6 years after the contractor was instructed by the RN that HISL would NOT be in the design. Contrary to what MoD now claim, photographic evidence proves it was not fitted to the first Trials Aircraft. Why not? Because there was no requirement and the aircraft was delivered without it! Very simple, verifiable facts.



Also, you confuse the HISL lights themselves with the Installation Design. The lights are fine in isolation, although most would say the wrong type were fitted. (I’d speculate the dimmable ones would have been more suitable, to avoid having to switch them off, but trials would determine that). The installation is very different in form, fit and use to the Mk2 (again, MoD claim HISL is exactly the same as Mk2’s red/rotating ACLs – it isn’t, by a long way), therefore trials are required to establish performance and limitations. (Sorry, not my rules, mandated by SofS). The BoI conducted such a trial and found the installation design, not the lights, wanting. By the way, testing (not trials) determined a serious EMC failure caused by DHSA's installation.

The fact that it was properly trialled on the Mk6 means nothing to you, because they are as far as you are concerned different aircraft

You say there was a Mk6 trial and I cannot disagree as I wasn’t there, but why then did DHSA REFUSE to provide any evidence of these trials when it was requested; or evidence that the trials results had been incorporated into the Mk2 Safety Case and RTS? If the Mk2/6 Authority (DHSA) refuses to provide this safety evidence, then the Mk7 Authority (the PE programme manager) has NOTHING to read across from! You may be able to help there – do you know why DHSA would not provide such evidence? The 2004 investigator, your fellow officer (Lt Cdr John B#####ll), could not find it either and was told by the very same people (by now the Sea King IPT) that they knew NOTHING of HISL or why it was fitted to Mk7. Think about that. He could find no reference whatsoever to HISL in the files of the Sea King IPT at Yeovilton. Now ask why MoD deny this investigation took place!

Do you know how long the conversion course is for a pilot from the Mk6 to the Mk7?

Haven’t a clue. The question at the time would have been conversion between Mk2 and Mk7. There were significant differences in form, fit, function and use, so I assume some conversion was needed; not least because the final decision had been made on who controlled swing arm deployment. Also, it took much longer to determine if “No Go” equipment was working, so when (and where!) was the new No Go/Abort decision point made? Perhaps you could say why, throughout the programme, the RN insisted that the entire FAE of Mk2s, plus the additional 5 aircraft, and all aircrew, would be converted over a single week-end. That was utterly deranged, and it lies at the root why your ASE then withdrew altogether from the programme in 1995. In the event, both Marks were in service together for about 3 years. That’s a hell of a miscalculation. You ask a good question, but mine is a cracker.

The answer will give you a clue as to importance of a Mk7 HISL trial.

Given the above, and that the Mk2 TI aircraft pitched up without HISL, then one assumes the conversion would include use of HISL, and operating with it at night. But because HISL was NOT required, there were no night flying trials scheduled.

The fact that you state that without a safety and airworthiness dept there would be no aircraft shows how far from the pointy end you are.
You are aware that we had aircraft before safety and airworthiness even existed?

Just because MoD only mandated Safety Cases for modifications (e.g. Mk2 to Mk7) in the early 90s, doesn’t mean it was ignored before that. It was simply called the Safety Argument, and probably something similar for decades before. You misunderstand engineering if you think someone suddenly recently dreamed up safety of design and aircraft certification.

I fully support whichever senior officers have repeatedly blanked/ignored you. Despite your obvious best intentions (I'm sure you are a lovely bloke), you would have negative influence on operational capability and have no business in military aviation.

You fully support the officers who made false declarations that military aircraft were safe and compliant, knowing they were not? Your prerogative but forgive me if I don’t break the law. They're allowed to, I'm not.



You misunderstand airworthiness and fitness for purpose. That is not a criticism; the MAA/MoD are the same. Attaining airworthiness should be largely invisible to you, and for a long time was. What you see discussed now is only because the senior officers you support decided not to bother, so it came to the fore when aircrew died in what MoD (not me) stated were airworthiness related accidents. The catalyst was the raft of Chinook losses that led to CHART in 1992. Read the very first paragraph. Like many, when you talk about “airworthiness” you actually mean Fitness for Purpose. By definition, attaining airworthiness must precede FFP. Without airworthiness certification, you simply do not see the aircraft. (Chinook Mk2 being the obvious exception!). But I’m afraid you do get aircraft that are improperly certified. The Mk7 is a good example; the RTS in 2003 was error-strewn. I would like the process you hate to be largely invisible to you again, because that would mean the regulations have been implemented. Leaving you to make other difficult decisions on FFP.

[Tourist]

Again, a total lack of understanding.

Do you know what a Mk7 pilot is?

A Mk7 pilot of the crash era is a Mk5/6 pilot that pissed off the appointer and has to spend a tour in purgatory bagging before being allowed to escape. From the pilots perspective it's just a pinger with the fun/interesting stuff and somebody to chat to removed.

Mk7 pilots might come from a Mk2 (if they had really pissed off the appointer!)but more likely from a mk5/6

I know what a HISL is. I have flown Seakings with them and without them. I don't need a trial to know what they do and how they work. They are a flashing light.

Empires can get out of hand, and safety and airworthiness is just such an empire.

[212man]

Let the autopilot control the TCAS RA. It's what they are good at. It's only a gentle climb, gentle, descent or level.

New Airbus' do (including RW EC225s). Why spill your coffee, drop your paper and disconnect the AP when it'll do it for you? (fly the RA that is, not drop your coffee....)

[Tourist]

212man

That's good to know! About time. Seems crazy the old system.

[Chugalug2]

A Safety and Airworthiness Empire? Yer avin a larf, aintcha? The whole point of tuc's testimony is that the process of UK Military Airworthiness provision was broken (mainly by RAF VSO's I'm sad to say, though hopefully that makes your day Tourist) in the early 90's.

So what, that's decades ago, time has moved on and so have we, etc etc. Unfortunately the short term gains that those idiots sought then came at the price of the loss of corporate knowledge, never mind the poor sods who paid the price in resultant fatal air accidents. The MAA doesn't do Airworthiness because it doesn't understand it. It may bother you with lots of form filling, courses, papers, definitions, etc, etc. Unfortunately those are the actions of a bureaucracy, not an Authority (because they have none!). Some Empire, if only!

As tuc says, all this stuff should be invisible. It is part of Air Safety when all you should be concerned about is the other part of Air Safety which is Flight Safety. That is all I had to concern myself with as a Sqn FSO back, ...well a long time ago. The reason why the Mk10 seat that killed Flt Lt Cunningham never had a Safety Case was because of the deliberate sabotage carried out against the Royal Air Force by its own Very Senior Officers, and you say that they have your full support? Says it all really.

[Tourist]

Chug

More silly rhetoric.

I'm not surprised you get ignored.
In amongst the explosion of words you two produce at the drop of a hat are no doubt some reasonable points in your areas of knowledge. You lose all credibility when you stray into others areas and talk about sabotage.
Sabotage is deliberately damaging to the service.
I don't know the rights or wrongs of the case to which you refer, in fact I know nothing about it, however I am entirely 100% sure that if mistakes/breaks from the rules were made they were well intentioned in what the person or persons thought were the best interests of the service.
To suggest otherwise is childish.