Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say
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Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say
Typhoons Need Midair Collision Avoidance System, Safety Officials Say
LONDON – Military air safety officials have described as "unsustainable" a decision not to install an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) on the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) fleet of Eurofighter Typhoons.
In its annual safety report from last August – made public on Jan. 13, the director general of the U.K. Military Aviation Authority (MAA), Air Marshal Richard Garwood, said that an airborne collision warning system for the Typhoon needed to be pursued with "great haste," particularly in light of the MAA’s findings in the midair collision of two Panavia Tornado GR4s in Scotland in July 2012. Three airmen were killed.
The MAA’s report on the crash criticized the U.K. defense ministry for "consistently deferring, reprogramming and reprioritizing the introduction of a collision warning system for the aircraft." The U.K. Tornado fleet is finally getting such a system, but only four years before the type exits service and after the loss of more than 40 lives in midair collisions alone since the Tornado’s introduction to service.
Garwood said that Defense Science and Technology Laboratory studies showed the Typhoon was potentially at a higher risk of midair collision because of its role and performance levels. The report says that the aircraft is perhaps the most likely – though improbable – of the U.K.’s fast jet aircraft to potentially collide with a commercial aircraft, and that under U.K. health and safety rules, any event that killed 50 people or more would have "adverse repercussions for the institution responsible – in this case, the government of the day."
Garwood says that he has informed Secretary of State for Defense Michael Fallon of his concerns, adding "ultimately, the Typhoon will be [in] service for many years and if the MoD [defense ministry] elects not to fit an ACAS, the decision will need to be well documented and the risk held at the highest levels of defense."
In addition, the report raises concerns that the F-35 Lightning II also does not have an ACAS. "We must also be clear on how this capability might be delivered on (F-35) Lightning II, which will provide a whole range of technical and JSF partner-related challenges to any potential program," Garwood writes.
The U.K. Airprox Board, which reports and advises on near misses between aircraft in British airspace, reports there were 14 incidents between U.K. military and commercial aircraft, one of which was reported as posing a real risk of collision.
Responding to the report, the U.K. defense ministry said it was acting on its comments and recommendations and that a concept phase for a collision warning system on the Typhoon was already underway, due for completion in April. "Funding to support full embodiment of the recommended system for the Typhoon is currently being assessed within the ABC [activity-based-costing] 15 financial approvals process," the ministry says, while such a system for the F-35 would be subject to lobbying for inclusion "at a suitable juncture within the JSF program." It adds that such a system would likely be U.K. unique and probably increase the project’s cost.
Major investments in collision avoidance systems for the U.K.’s helicopter fleet are already underway, with much of the front-line helicopter fleet due to be retrofitted by late 2017.
For the second year in a row, Garwood has also warned about the lack of suitably qualified and experienced personnel in aircraft engineering trades. The report also describes a psychological impact of crews coming back from Afghanistan who no longer have to deal with in-theater battlefield threats, but may take flying risks to seek what the report calls "inappropriate stimulation through their flying activities."
The report also alludes to the loss of the Airbus Zephyr pseudo satellite as being the subject of an MAA investigation, but details of when and where the incident occurred have been redacted. The U.K. defense ministry was testing the Zephyr in the winter in the Southern Hemisphere to prove the system’s ability to operate during shorter winter days.
LONDON – Military air safety officials have described as "unsustainable" a decision not to install an airborne collision avoidance system (ACAS) on the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) fleet of Eurofighter Typhoons.
In its annual safety report from last August – made public on Jan. 13, the director general of the U.K. Military Aviation Authority (MAA), Air Marshal Richard Garwood, said that an airborne collision warning system for the Typhoon needed to be pursued with "great haste," particularly in light of the MAA’s findings in the midair collision of two Panavia Tornado GR4s in Scotland in July 2012. Three airmen were killed.
The MAA’s report on the crash criticized the U.K. defense ministry for "consistently deferring, reprogramming and reprioritizing the introduction of a collision warning system for the aircraft." The U.K. Tornado fleet is finally getting such a system, but only four years before the type exits service and after the loss of more than 40 lives in midair collisions alone since the Tornado’s introduction to service.
Garwood said that Defense Science and Technology Laboratory studies showed the Typhoon was potentially at a higher risk of midair collision because of its role and performance levels. The report says that the aircraft is perhaps the most likely – though improbable – of the U.K.’s fast jet aircraft to potentially collide with a commercial aircraft, and that under U.K. health and safety rules, any event that killed 50 people or more would have "adverse repercussions for the institution responsible – in this case, the government of the day."
Garwood says that he has informed Secretary of State for Defense Michael Fallon of his concerns, adding "ultimately, the Typhoon will be [in] service for many years and if the MoD [defense ministry] elects not to fit an ACAS, the decision will need to be well documented and the risk held at the highest levels of defense."
In addition, the report raises concerns that the F-35 Lightning II also does not have an ACAS. "We must also be clear on how this capability might be delivered on (F-35) Lightning II, which will provide a whole range of technical and JSF partner-related challenges to any potential program," Garwood writes.
The U.K. Airprox Board, which reports and advises on near misses between aircraft in British airspace, reports there were 14 incidents between U.K. military and commercial aircraft, one of which was reported as posing a real risk of collision.
Responding to the report, the U.K. defense ministry said it was acting on its comments and recommendations and that a concept phase for a collision warning system on the Typhoon was already underway, due for completion in April. "Funding to support full embodiment of the recommended system for the Typhoon is currently being assessed within the ABC [activity-based-costing] 15 financial approvals process," the ministry says, while such a system for the F-35 would be subject to lobbying for inclusion "at a suitable juncture within the JSF program." It adds that such a system would likely be U.K. unique and probably increase the project’s cost.
Major investments in collision avoidance systems for the U.K.’s helicopter fleet are already underway, with much of the front-line helicopter fleet due to be retrofitted by late 2017.
For the second year in a row, Garwood has also warned about the lack of suitably qualified and experienced personnel in aircraft engineering trades. The report also describes a psychological impact of crews coming back from Afghanistan who no longer have to deal with in-theater battlefield threats, but may take flying risks to seek what the report calls "inappropriate stimulation through their flying activities."
The report also alludes to the loss of the Airbus Zephyr pseudo satellite as being the subject of an MAA investigation, but details of when and where the incident occurred have been redacted. The U.K. defense ministry was testing the Zephyr in the winter in the Southern Hemisphere to prove the system’s ability to operate during shorter winter days.
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Having flown with TCAS in 'fast jets' for a couple of years now, I wouldn't fly without it. It must be considered as a 'no go' item if u/s. It is beyond comprehension that it is not mandatory on all Service aircraft.
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I now fly air ambulance in the southern lake district, you have NO idea how close a FJ looks as it flies over you as you are landing.........
The Director General of the MAA should not be pleading with the Military Air Operator (the MOD) to fit such an essential safety system as TCAS, he should be compelling it to do so. The reason he cannot do so of course is that the MAA is a subsidiary of the MOD, and just as bizarrely the MilAAIB is a subsidiary of the MAA. Unless and until all three are separate and independent of each other, the MOD can do, or not do, as it pleases.
As to the severe shortages of qualified and experienced personnel in RAF Engineering Trades, there is an even greater shortage of engineers, both Service and CS, qualified and experienced in airworthiness provision. As the DG well knows, that was as a direct result of the MOD's deliberate policy of replacing them with unqualified and inexperienced non-engineers in Haddon-Cave's so called 'Golden Period'. Why doesn't he say so? Because the MAA is a subsidiary of the MOD!
As to the severe shortages of qualified and experienced personnel in RAF Engineering Trades, there is an even greater shortage of engineers, both Service and CS, qualified and experienced in airworthiness provision. As the DG well knows, that was as a direct result of the MOD's deliberate policy of replacing them with unqualified and inexperienced non-engineers in Haddon-Cave's so called 'Golden Period'. Why doesn't he say so? Because the MAA is a subsidiary of the MOD!
Chug
You repeatedly state that the MOD, MAA and MilAAIB must be separate and independent of each other. For civil aviation, the AAIB and CAA are independent of each other but both belong to the Dept of Transport and answer to the same minister. (Yes, EASA is an added layer, but it is DofT that acts on behalf of the State with EASA, not the CAA.)
I am not quite clear how you think an independent MAA would be able to compel the MOD - a Department of State - without elevating its ownership to Cabinet level. And if you put the MAA with the CAA in DofT, you then have the spectacle of an OGD telling the MOD what its spending priorities are, which would definitely not be a good thing. This is not the same as Treasury having a say in affordability or budgetary control.
I can see there may be an argument for separating the MilAAIB from the MAA, though again I am not sure where you would put it, but you still end up with the risk being held by SofS as the point where all this meets.
For now, you have an MAA (and a DG prepared to say what he thinks) that is at least independent of the single Services and answerable through PUS to SofS. I do not see how you are going to get a better arrangement by taking the regulatory function outside the MOD, when control of their own specialist regulation is a core function of all Govt Departments.
I think what we may all be agreed on is that key safety measures should be treated separately within the overall resourcing process.
ff
You repeatedly state that the MOD, MAA and MilAAIB must be separate and independent of each other. For civil aviation, the AAIB and CAA are independent of each other but both belong to the Dept of Transport and answer to the same minister. (Yes, EASA is an added layer, but it is DofT that acts on behalf of the State with EASA, not the CAA.)
I am not quite clear how you think an independent MAA would be able to compel the MOD - a Department of State - without elevating its ownership to Cabinet level. And if you put the MAA with the CAA in DofT, you then have the spectacle of an OGD telling the MOD what its spending priorities are, which would definitely not be a good thing. This is not the same as Treasury having a say in affordability or budgetary control.
I can see there may be an argument for separating the MilAAIB from the MAA, though again I am not sure where you would put it, but you still end up with the risk being held by SofS as the point where all this meets.
For now, you have an MAA (and a DG prepared to say what he thinks) that is at least independent of the single Services and answerable through PUS to SofS. I do not see how you are going to get a better arrangement by taking the regulatory function outside the MOD, when control of their own specialist regulation is a core function of all Govt Departments.
I think what we may all be agreed on is that key safety measures should be treated separately within the overall resourcing process.
ff
Well done Distant Voice. Further proof, in any is needed, that the MoD/MAA need look no further than pprune for its Corporate Knowledge.
Well said Chug.
Well said Dick Garwood, although an acknowledgement that (a) you're simply repeating evidence to Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip and (b) it was the RAF's Chief Engineer who began the decimation and marginalisation of engineering posts in 1991, wouldn't have gone amiss.
Why so long to release the report? Coincidence that last week the chair of the HoC Defence Committee (Rory Stewart MP) called forward a report into another accident, which made all the above points and was summed up by one be-knighted MP as "I fear we are faced with another Chinook situation"?
Well said. Yet another old policy ditched by the RAF Chief Engineer in 1991! Resurrection was recommended to DPA's DCE in January 2000, and again to H-C and Philip. Hopefully the MAA will change its mind and support you. So far, they've sided with their MoD bosses.
Well said Chug.
Well said Dick Garwood, although an acknowledgement that (a) you're simply repeating evidence to Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip and (b) it was the RAF's Chief Engineer who began the decimation and marginalisation of engineering posts in 1991, wouldn't have gone amiss.
Why so long to release the report? Coincidence that last week the chair of the HoC Defence Committee (Rory Stewart MP) called forward a report into another accident, which made all the above points and was summed up by one be-knighted MP as "I fear we are faced with another Chinook situation"?
I think what we may all be agreed on is that key safety measures should be treated separately within the overall resourcing process
Fortissimo:-
I repeatedly say so because the MOD and its subsidiary, the RAF, have repeatedly demonstrated their ability and willingness to subvert the Regulatory and Investigation processes (which are presently vested in the MAA and the MilAAIB).
You cite the DoT as an exemplar but of course they are not a major operator as is the MOD, let alone an air operator. I notice though that even then the DoT contains executive agencies, the DVLA and the DVSA (Driver & Vehicle Safety Agency). If the MAA and MilAAIB were outwith the MOD but responsible to the SoS for Defence (who could thus be briefed by them as well as by the MOD) perhaps a lot of the disinformation that is the MOD's forte could be confronted.
I do not know what the answer to this bureaucratic tangle is, it's well above my pay grade, but lives have been lost, much money wasted, and defence capability compromised or completely lost. Trenchard came up with a solution to a similar dilemma nearly 100 years ago. Time perhaps for another Trenchard to appear? Is there such a one?
You repeatedly state that the MOD, MAA and MilAAIB must be separate and independent of each other.
You cite the DoT as an exemplar but of course they are not a major operator as is the MOD, let alone an air operator. I notice though that even then the DoT contains executive agencies, the DVLA and the DVSA (Driver & Vehicle Safety Agency). If the MAA and MilAAIB were outwith the MOD but responsible to the SoS for Defence (who could thus be briefed by them as well as by the MOD) perhaps a lot of the disinformation that is the MOD's forte could be confronted.
I do not know what the answer to this bureaucratic tangle is, it's well above my pay grade, but lives have been lost, much money wasted, and defence capability compromised or completely lost. Trenchard came up with a solution to a similar dilemma nearly 100 years ago. Time perhaps for another Trenchard to appear? Is there such a one?
"Mildly" Eccentric Stardriver
any event that killed 50 people or more would have "adverse repercussions for the institution responsible – in this case, the government of the day."
What if it kills 40?
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Transponders with Mode S have been around for years and are not that expensive. If security is a problem, Mode 5 (a cryptographically secure version of mode S) transponders are available for not much more. A single mid air collison prevented will more than pay for all the transponders.
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You repeatedly state that the MOD, MAA and MilAAIB must be separate and independent of each other. For civil aviation, the AAIB and CAA are independent of each other but both belong to the Dept of Transport and answer to the same minister. (Yes, EASA is an added layer, but it is DofT that acts on behalf of the State with EASA, not the CAA.)
Last edited by Vendee; 14th Jan 2015 at 19:49. Reason: typo
One word of caution; Transponders and TCAS/NDS-B will not stop Mid Airs from happening. An awful lot of users in Class G airspace (light aircraft, gliders, microlights etc) don't have a transponder, and are often the hardest to acquire visually. TCAS is a massive improvement, but it is not a total solution.
Ok, so the inevitable argument for a totally independent MAA rears its head again, but putting that to one side for now and focussing on the system we currently have to work with, what Dick Garwood has done is clearly put the responsibility for the next none-TCAS equipped RAF FJ mid-air squarely on the shoulders of the Defence Minister. Which is where it should lie. It's his decision, put up or take responsibility.
Yes, the RAF have delayed, prevaricated and delayed again, but surely this is an example of exactly how the MAA can put pressure on specific people outside their domain?
JMHO.
Yes, the RAF have delayed, prevaricated and delayed again, but surely this is an example of exactly how the MAA can put pressure on specific people outside their domain?
JMHO.
Herod
Quite right.
Make no mistake, there are some in MoD who chose to interpret this HSE definition as meaning MoD don't need to bother if the aircraft holds under 50. The same people who continue to advise Ministers that, if a safety related fault or defect is identified in an aircraft, only that tail number need be fixed.
But well done, again, Dick Garwood for daring to voice these opinions. And, of course, they only are opinions, because the MAA does not get funding to mitigate the risks, so is really only a monitor, not a true Authority (or manager or leader). As it took great delight in pointing out during the Mull Review when asked by Minister about safety. I wonder if DG will now ask his MoD masters and Ministers to change the official line that only one MoD employee has thought it proper to have safe aircraft, and that this employee was utterly wrong. A line reiterated last year, yet again, by DE&S Secretariat. And copied to the MAA.
Para 9
Slightly odd wording. Surely he'd just phone CAS and ask "Have you written to SoS?", and then make a firm statement in the report?
My main concern upon reading this report? Reinventing the wheel. Does his staff not know that many of the intiatives are mandated policy? The section on Def Stan 00-970 completely ignores the fact 00-970 was mandated in every aircraft related contract by Controller Aircraft. The problem is that direct entrants to MoD (the majority now) have been taught for over 20 years that no Def Stan is mandated. Trouble is, they use this as an opportunity to save money, by removing the standard from the contract and allowing the contractor to deliver sub-standard designs. There is no appreciation that if you waive one relevant standard, you must invoke another, because standards are one of the 4 pillars of airworthiness (along with Compliance, Independence and a Safety Management System).
Ah, Independence. Defined by MoD as;
“Being commercially and managerially independent of the (insert body) both to preserve objectivity and to minimise pressure for premature acceptance.”
Does the MAA satisfy this definition?
Quite right.
Make no mistake, there are some in MoD who chose to interpret this HSE definition as meaning MoD don't need to bother if the aircraft holds under 50. The same people who continue to advise Ministers that, if a safety related fault or defect is identified in an aircraft, only that tail number need be fixed.
But well done, again, Dick Garwood for daring to voice these opinions. And, of course, they only are opinions, because the MAA does not get funding to mitigate the risks, so is really only a monitor, not a true Authority (or manager or leader). As it took great delight in pointing out during the Mull Review when asked by Minister about safety. I wonder if DG will now ask his MoD masters and Ministers to change the official line that only one MoD employee has thought it proper to have safe aircraft, and that this employee was utterly wrong. A line reiterated last year, yet again, by DE&S Secretariat. And copied to the MAA.
Para 9
The Secretary of State will have been informed of the societal concern with regard to Typhoon MAC by the Chief of the Air Staff in accordance with MAA requlations.
My main concern upon reading this report? Reinventing the wheel. Does his staff not know that many of the intiatives are mandated policy? The section on Def Stan 00-970 completely ignores the fact 00-970 was mandated in every aircraft related contract by Controller Aircraft. The problem is that direct entrants to MoD (the majority now) have been taught for over 20 years that no Def Stan is mandated. Trouble is, they use this as an opportunity to save money, by removing the standard from the contract and allowing the contractor to deliver sub-standard designs. There is no appreciation that if you waive one relevant standard, you must invoke another, because standards are one of the 4 pillars of airworthiness (along with Compliance, Independence and a Safety Management System).
Ah, Independence. Defined by MoD as;
“Being commercially and managerially independent of the (insert body) both to preserve objectivity and to minimise pressure for premature acceptance.”
Does the MAA satisfy this definition?
It beggars belief. A Tucano collided with a Police helicopter near Wookey in Somerset in 1997 and still nothing has been fitted to RAF jets.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/downloads/RAFp...a_vol3_no4.pdf
As for Typhoon, it rarely flies at low level as it p!sses fuel out the back! It has a good air-to-air RADAR that allows it to detect other aircraft and this is coupled to an interrorgator that can detect Mode A (Mode 3) and Mode S. It has an IRST that can also spot anti-col lights, engine heat and aircraft-in-poor-weather. So TCAS would only really augment a good amount of sensors anyway. Also, as some have already pointed out, TCAS will only detect those that transpond - the primary means for all aircraft avoidance in Class G is 'See and Avoid' until the Air Navigation Order mandates transponder carriage in all aircraft in Class G. The lookout in Typhoon is better than many FJs.
So I would say that this is a nice-to-have rather than a must-be-fitted item. I applaud AVM Dick for raising this, but if it means slowing up operational capability (like a full weapons drop clearance), and there is a finite pot of money, then TCAS/ACAS should wait in my opinion.
Lj
Responding to the report, the U.K. defense ministry said it was acting on its comments and recommendations and that a concept phase for a collision warning system on the Typhoon was already underway, due for completion in April. "Funding to support full embodiment of the recommended system for the Typhoon is currently being assessed within the ABC [activity-based-costing] 15 financial approvals process," the ministry says, while such a system for the F-35 would be subject to lobbying for inclusion "at a suitable juncture within the JSF program." It adds that such a system would likely be U.K. unique and probably increase the project’s cost.
LJ
Quote:
Having flown with TCAS in 'fast jets' for a couple of years now, I wouldn't fly without it.
Genuine question, what mil fast jets have TCAS?
Having flown with TCAS in 'fast jets' for a couple of years now, I wouldn't fly without it.
Genuine question, what mil fast jets have TCAS?
LJ