You consistently and deliberately overstate findings from the board to give the impression that they were the cause of the accident whereas in reality they were errors in process.
I have cited the findings of the BoI. In the past YOU have called into question the competence of the Board members. I share SOME of your concerns. I have questioned why vital information was withheld from them that proved, beyond any doubt, that the 3 main contributory factors THEY cited were also the 3 main areas of degradation between Mk2 and Mk7. That is a simple fact. Had the BoI been aware, I like to think they'd have altered some of their findings and placed emphasis elsewhere.
You are always excited about the Mk7 HISL because it was never properly trialled on the Mk7.
Again, the BoI cited HISL, not I. I followed the evidence that showed, again, the BoI were not told that HISL was not permitted in the aircraft and the process (yes!) whereby only properly authorised staffs are permitted to accept the design was systematically abused by a non-technical civilian, who self-delegated an authority to dictate and
approve (!) the design.
Read the reports. HISL was never endorsed by the RN, but a late decision was made to fit it AFTER trials had commenced. That is one long way into the programme, and some 6 years after the contractor was instructed by the RN that HISL would NOT be in the design. Contrary to what MoD now claim, photographic evidence proves it was not fitted to the first Trials Aircraft. Why not? Because there was no requirement and the aircraft was delivered without it! Very simple, verifiable facts.
Also, you confuse the HISL lights themselves with the Installation Design. The lights are fine in isolation, although most would say the wrong type were fitted. (I’d speculate the dimmable ones would have been more suitable, to avoid having to switch them off, but trials would determine that). The installation is very different in form, fit and use to the Mk2 (again, MoD claim HISL is exactly the same as Mk2’s red/rotating ACLs – it isn’t, by a long way), therefore trials are required to establish performance and limitations. (Sorry, not my rules, mandated by SofS). The BoI conducted such a trial and found the installation design, not the lights, wanting. By the way, testing (not trials) determined a serious EMC failure caused by DHSA's installation.
The fact that it was properly trialled on the Mk6 means nothing to you, because they are as far as you are concerned different aircraft
You say there was a Mk6 trial and I cannot disagree as I wasn’t there, but why then did DHSA REFUSE to provide any evidence of these trials when it was requested; or evidence that the trials results had been incorporated into the Mk2 Safety Case and RTS? If the Mk2/6 Authority (DHSA) refuses to provide this safety evidence, then the Mk7 Authority (the PE programme manager) has NOTHING to read across from! You may be able to help there – do you know why DHSA would not provide such evidence? The 2004 investigator, your fellow officer (Lt Cdr John B#####ll), could not find it either and was told by the very same people (by now the Sea King IPT) that they knew NOTHING of HISL or why it was fitted to Mk7. Think about that. He could find no reference whatsoever to HISL in the files of the Sea King IPT at Yeovilton. Now ask why MoD deny this investigation took place!
Do you know how long the conversion course is for a pilot from the Mk6 to the Mk7?
Haven’t a clue. The question at the time would have been conversion between Mk2 and Mk7. There were significant differences in form, fit, function and use, so I assume some conversion was needed; not least because the final decision had been made on who controlled swing arm deployment. Also, it took much longer to determine if “No Go” equipment was working, so when (and where!) was the new No Go/Abort decision point made? Perhaps you could say why, throughout the programme, the RN insisted that the entire FAE of Mk2s, plus the additional 5 aircraft, and all aircrew, would be converted over a single week-end. That was utterly deranged, and it lies at the root why your ASE then withdrew altogether from the programme in 1995. In the event, both Marks were in service together for about 3 years. That’s a hell of a miscalculation. You ask a good question, but mine is a cracker.
The answer will give you a clue as to importance of a Mk7 HISL trial.
Given the above, and that the Mk2 TI aircraft pitched up
without HISL, then one assumes the conversion would include use of HISL, and operating with it at night. But because HISL was NOT required, there were no night flying trials scheduled.
The fact that you state that without a safety and airworthiness dept there would be no aircraft shows how far from the pointy end you are.
You are aware that we had aircraft before safety and airworthiness even existed?
Just because MoD only mandated Safety Cases for modifications (e.g. Mk2 to Mk7) in the early 90s, doesn’t mean it was ignored before that. It was simply called the Safety Argument, and probably something similar for decades before. You misunderstand engineering if you think someone suddenly recently dreamed up safety of design and aircraft certification.
I fully support whichever senior officers have repeatedly blanked/ignored you. Despite your obvious best intentions (I'm sure you are a lovely bloke), you would have negative influence on operational capability and have no business in military aviation.
You fully support the officers who made false declarations that military aircraft were safe and compliant, knowing they were not? Your prerogative but forgive me if I don’t break the law. They're allowed to, I'm not.
You misunderstand airworthiness and fitness for purpose. That is not a criticism; the MAA/MoD are the same. Attaining airworthiness should be largely invisible to you, and for a long time was. What you see discussed now is only because the senior officers you support decided not to bother, so it came to the fore when aircrew died in what MoD (not me) stated were airworthiness related accidents. The catalyst was the raft of Chinook losses that led to CHART in 1992. Read the very first paragraph. Like many, when you talk about “airworthiness” you actually mean Fitness for Purpose. By definition, attaining airworthiness must precede FFP. Without airworthiness certification, you simply do not see the aircraft. (Chinook Mk2 being the obvious exception!). But I’m afraid you do get aircraft that are improperly certified. The Mk7 is a good example; the RTS in 2003 was error-strewn. I would like the process you hate to be largely invisible to you again, because that would mean the regulations have been implemented. Leaving you to make other difficult decisions on FFP.