Air Cadets grounded?
Just noticed the bit above about the change from A&B Certs to "one solo". IMHO, one solo proves little (but is great achievement), it is post solo consolidation that counts. For example at the Club I flew with in France there was requirement for 12 post solo consolidation flights - I was lucky as I got the Pegase in comparison to the young French boys and girls who had to do it in the Marianne - a heavy glass 2 seater. When I finished a course in UK 3 years ago, BGA even found my old A&B record and issued a duplicate certificate (photo was a tadge different though). If the ACO cannot (eventually) get the boys and girls to A&B could there not be a deal with service gliding clubs to take them on and finish the job, so to speak.
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Leon
I tend to agree about the private pilot licensing however I was referring to EASA145 maintenance standards and the quality assurance standards that are part of EASA145 regulation as the ATC glider issue is one of engineering quality assurance.
Engines, you ask some critically important questions of the MAA, DE&S, 22Gp, and last and least, of me. For myself, I have tried to answer similar questions from Leon. I truly believe that the MOD's ability to ensure airworthiness for the military fleets via its subsidiary the MAA to be unviable.
Tucumseh has described better than I ever could the profound effects of the attack on Air Safety by RAF VSOs in the late 80s/ early 90s and of the subsequent cover up by the MOD. It is the latter that has caused the really long lasting damage. The one hope was the Nimrod Review. If Haddon-Cave had reported the facts of that attack, then reform could have been commenced to ensure that no such attack could happen again by putting Regulation and Investigation outwith the MOD. Instead he described the period of that attack as a Golden Period of Military Airworthiness. Now why would he do that? Why?
So instead of reform the deck-chairs were rearranged and the "Independent" MAA had as its subsidiary the "Independent" MilAAIB! Even the MOD has belatedly seen the nonsense of that, so more deck-chair layouts have given us the Defence Safety Authority, of which the MAA and the Defence Accident Investigation Branch are subsidiaries. The MilAAIB is no more, but the DG DSA now oversees both Regulation and Investigation as part of the MOD!
The cover up continues, the lack of independence continues, the scandal of UK Military Airworthiness continues. I hope that you get your answers from others that you question but with respect the answers are known already. ACO aircraft have been grounded because they lack airworthiness. Other RAF fleets have not been grounded. Are they airworthy? How can they be when the system is so badly broken?
We can carry on counting the number of fairies on a pin head or we can face up to reality, slaughter a few sacred cows, and reform UK Military Airworthiness. We are talking about lives being at risk, we are talking about valuable resources being at risk, we are talking about this nation's security being at risk. Or are we instead talking about certain VSOs' reputations being at risk?
Tucumseh has described better than I ever could the profound effects of the attack on Air Safety by RAF VSOs in the late 80s/ early 90s and of the subsequent cover up by the MOD. It is the latter that has caused the really long lasting damage. The one hope was the Nimrod Review. If Haddon-Cave had reported the facts of that attack, then reform could have been commenced to ensure that no such attack could happen again by putting Regulation and Investigation outwith the MOD. Instead he described the period of that attack as a Golden Period of Military Airworthiness. Now why would he do that? Why?
So instead of reform the deck-chairs were rearranged and the "Independent" MAA had as its subsidiary the "Independent" MilAAIB! Even the MOD has belatedly seen the nonsense of that, so more deck-chair layouts have given us the Defence Safety Authority, of which the MAA and the Defence Accident Investigation Branch are subsidiaries. The MilAAIB is no more, but the DG DSA now oversees both Regulation and Investigation as part of the MOD!
The cover up continues, the lack of independence continues, the scandal of UK Military Airworthiness continues. I hope that you get your answers from others that you question but with respect the answers are known already. ACO aircraft have been grounded because they lack airworthiness. Other RAF fleets have not been grounded. Are they airworthy? How can they be when the system is so badly broken?
We can carry on counting the number of fairies on a pin head or we can face up to reality, slaughter a few sacred cows, and reform UK Military Airworthiness. We are talking about lives being at risk, we are talking about valuable resources being at risk, we are talking about this nation's security being at risk. Or are we instead talking about certain VSOs' reputations being at risk?
By using the word demise I was trying to imply a withering away of a once powerful force to a state of impotence, due to the ever spreading contagion of unairworthiness amongst its fleets. That is the real implication of the grounding of the ACO fleet, a fate shared with the RAF's maritime fleet. It is the tip of an airworthiness iceberg that infects every RAF fleet, operational or otherwise.
ToD:-
I've no idea, which of course is irrelevant. You need to ask your question of the MAA, the same Authority that presided over the Safety Case of the MB Mk 10 seat that killed Flt Lt Cunningham. Turned out there wasn't one, but they didn't know. What makes you think they know the answer to your question?
I'm sorry, I realise my post sounds truculent. It isn't meant to be. It merely illustrates the systemic dysfunction of UK Military Airworthiness. This explains it better than I can, though it gets longer as more is added :-
https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/
What's wrong with, for example, the C-17? Voyager? Herc?
I'm sorry, I realise my post sounds truculent. It isn't meant to be. It merely illustrates the systemic dysfunction of UK Military Airworthiness. This explains it better than I can, though it gets longer as more is added :-
https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/
As usual, Engines and I are in agreement. An excellent post and, as he says, the same old issues arise in this case as did on Nimrod, Chinook, Hercules and the rest. THIS, I believe, is what any campaign should concentrate on. (I'm pretty certain we don't actually have a campaign here). After all, it is what won these cases, and rather easily if I may say so. It is great that the issues are aired here, but a higher profile must be attained. The media and MPs need to be aware that we've been here before, MoD has been castigated by a series of independent Reviews and Inquiries, but it is STILL happening.
Precisely, and MoD's machinations are clearly aimed at deflecting attention from these departments. It is now 6 years, but I recall being alarmed at who the MAA appointed to do one particular aircraft audit, which was the subject of a legal Review at the time. That aircraft had not enjoyed a Local Technical Committee (whose job, ultimately, is to deliver a valid safety case) for over EIGHT years. The auditor said so what, I always ignored that mandated requirement as well, and nothing more was said. A little digging by the MAA would have revealed the number of deaths arising from this, but they don't seem interested in such things. Or at least, the senior MAA staff don't allow the concerns of knowledgeable MAA staff to be printed. I mention the LTC because it is the process that it controls that has broken down in this ATC case.
And that is linked to Leon's question of Chug about what to do. Understanding the simple chain Build Standard > Safety Case > RTS reveals where the boundaries of responsibility must be established. No MAA document goes remotely near this, hence the bugger's muddle we see. The mandated Standard that does spell it out was cancelled without replacement in 2008. As I tend to say, a solution emerges..... If the MAA want a copy, they only have to ask, but alternatively they could nip down to Neighbourhood 1 at ABW and just ask for current contract documents which continue to call it up. Unsurprisingly, they are the projects that run well.
But to my mind, one of the biggest questions to be answered is this - where was the Military Aviation Authority? Hadn't they carried out audits of the Air Cadet Fleet? (They were, after all, RAF aircraft). Wasn't the PT checked out? Hadn't they checked out 22 Group?
And that is linked to Leon's question of Chug about what to do. Understanding the simple chain Build Standard > Safety Case > RTS reveals where the boundaries of responsibility must be established. No MAA document goes remotely near this, hence the bugger's muddle we see. The mandated Standard that does spell it out was cancelled without replacement in 2008. As I tend to say, a solution emerges..... If the MAA want a copy, they only have to ask, but alternatively they could nip down to Neighbourhood 1 at ABW and just ask for current contract documents which continue to call it up. Unsurprisingly, they are the projects that run well.
If I may just add something on the issue of cost. Doing the job correctly in the first place is invariably cheaper and better in the long run.
The example I always use involved multiple fatalities in 2003. The mandated regulations were ignored and an unsafe design was installed. Boscombe refused to issue MAR recommendations but the 2 Star ruled that (any) aircraft need not be functionally safe. The correct design in one aircraft had been costed at a mere £50k. Correcting the unsafe design cost £4.4M and lost the programme 5 months (which was recovered as the TI didn't have any faults during trials). But the other aircraft was not corrected, and two died. Not counting the tragic loss of aircrew, this single event cost MoD around £60M (not sure of cost of the aircraft, and accept that cost is sunk anyway). The same applied to Nimrod - just add another few zeroes. And Chinook Mk3, around £300M. Please don't mention cost and alleged unaffordability. There's a reason why we don't have the money and it's nothing to do with budget cuts. It is all about not implementing the same regulations and systematically and quite consciously wasting money.
The example I always use involved multiple fatalities in 2003. The mandated regulations were ignored and an unsafe design was installed. Boscombe refused to issue MAR recommendations but the 2 Star ruled that (any) aircraft need not be functionally safe. The correct design in one aircraft had been costed at a mere £50k. Correcting the unsafe design cost £4.4M and lost the programme 5 months (which was recovered as the TI didn't have any faults during trials). But the other aircraft was not corrected, and two died. Not counting the tragic loss of aircrew, this single event cost MoD around £60M (not sure of cost of the aircraft, and accept that cost is sunk anyway). The same applied to Nimrod - just add another few zeroes. And Chinook Mk3, around £300M. Please don't mention cost and alleged unaffordability. There's a reason why we don't have the money and it's nothing to do with budget cuts. It is all about not implementing the same regulations and systematically and quite consciously wasting money.
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Chug,
Thanks for coming back, I really appreciate it. Discussion is always good.
I fully agree that the move of merging the old RNAIU (renamed and expanded to become the MAAIB) with the MAA was a nonsense on stilts from the very start. Moving the Defence Accident Investigation Board (DAIB) away from the MAA has to be welcomed.
The DSA is (in my view) a renaming of something that that actually existed for many years, most recently as the Defence Safety Board. It provides (again my view) a necessary 'safety focus' at the relevant level to allow the MoD to properly discharge its safety responsibilities, both to its own personnel and the wider public. The DSB was supported by a number of organisations that had built up excellent safety records, such as the Ordnance Board (the old 'OB') that looked after weapons, CINO (Chief Inspector Naval Ordnance), and the RN's Nuclear Safety Committee. I'm struggling to find a better place for it within MoD, unless it went to VCDS or someone of that ilk.
The key point was that these organisations did their jobs properly. They ensured that people understood the regulations and implemented them via clear lines of responsibility. The problem that Haddon-Cave (in my view correctly) established was that successive reorganisations in military aviation administration, many in the name of 'jointery', had diluted and confused the lines of responsibility. The problem he didn't identify so clearly was that the essential safety relevant regulations had also been mangled (and in some cases deleted altogether) as part of the reorganisations. (JSP553 was a particularly bad publication that should have been strangled at birth).
I do think (and I know you'll disagree, and I understand why) that the movement of the MAA to the DSA, and the relocation of the DAIB are at least in the right direction. Having the MAA as a three star fiefdom outside the MoD's safety management organisation was another 'nonsense on stilts'.
I do agree that there has been a scandal with regards to military aircraft airworthiness. I also agree that the RAF's senior officer cadre has a hell of a lot to answer for. However, where I must (respectfully) part company with you is the 'way forward'. I've not set my ideas out clearly enough, and my apologies for that, so here's my 'nice to see it happen' list.
First, get a panel of experienced 'greybeards' to scrub the MAA regulations and restore the intent and the detail of the missing DefStan that Tuc so often (and quite correctly) refers to. Also, restore and emphasise the basic principle of 'Build Standard-Safety Case - RTS' to the regs.
Second, restore some sense to the system and devolve responsibility for the detailed management of airworthiness engineering back down to the people who should be doing it - the Chief Engineers. MAA should set out high level policy and regulations, the Chief Engineers should issue the relevant orders and instructions to implement them. They are the people who need to re-establish LTCs, MCCs, and CCBs that actually do what they are supposed to do. The MAA's current effort to run the whole world of aviation engineering from the centre is not going to work in war, and that (last time I looked) is what Joe Public pays the Services to do.
Thirdly, start training a cadre of airworthiness engineers to implement proper airworthiness standards and practices. Give them clear lines of responsibility to their Chief Engineers, and the power to say 'NO'. Especially to say no to aircrew, whatever their rank.
While that lot is going on, have the public enquiry. Hang the guilty b******s. It will put the fear of God into those in the MoD who persist in failing to implement mandated regulations.
That's just my first stab, I'm sure others have better and more relevant ideas. I'm not sure that any public enquiry will happen soon, but perhaps the Air Cadet glider fiasco could be used to get MoD to answer what I think is the $64,000 question:
'Has the RAF been flying school children in non-airworthy aircraft?'. Yes or no answer please, preferably from AOC 22Gp.
Best regards as ever to all those trying to do the right thing at the right time
Engines
Thanks for coming back, I really appreciate it. Discussion is always good.
I fully agree that the move of merging the old RNAIU (renamed and expanded to become the MAAIB) with the MAA was a nonsense on stilts from the very start. Moving the Defence Accident Investigation Board (DAIB) away from the MAA has to be welcomed.
The DSA is (in my view) a renaming of something that that actually existed for many years, most recently as the Defence Safety Board. It provides (again my view) a necessary 'safety focus' at the relevant level to allow the MoD to properly discharge its safety responsibilities, both to its own personnel and the wider public. The DSB was supported by a number of organisations that had built up excellent safety records, such as the Ordnance Board (the old 'OB') that looked after weapons, CINO (Chief Inspector Naval Ordnance), and the RN's Nuclear Safety Committee. I'm struggling to find a better place for it within MoD, unless it went to VCDS or someone of that ilk.
The key point was that these organisations did their jobs properly. They ensured that people understood the regulations and implemented them via clear lines of responsibility. The problem that Haddon-Cave (in my view correctly) established was that successive reorganisations in military aviation administration, many in the name of 'jointery', had diluted and confused the lines of responsibility. The problem he didn't identify so clearly was that the essential safety relevant regulations had also been mangled (and in some cases deleted altogether) as part of the reorganisations. (JSP553 was a particularly bad publication that should have been strangled at birth).
I do think (and I know you'll disagree, and I understand why) that the movement of the MAA to the DSA, and the relocation of the DAIB are at least in the right direction. Having the MAA as a three star fiefdom outside the MoD's safety management organisation was another 'nonsense on stilts'.
I do agree that there has been a scandal with regards to military aircraft airworthiness. I also agree that the RAF's senior officer cadre has a hell of a lot to answer for. However, where I must (respectfully) part company with you is the 'way forward'. I've not set my ideas out clearly enough, and my apologies for that, so here's my 'nice to see it happen' list.
First, get a panel of experienced 'greybeards' to scrub the MAA regulations and restore the intent and the detail of the missing DefStan that Tuc so often (and quite correctly) refers to. Also, restore and emphasise the basic principle of 'Build Standard-Safety Case - RTS' to the regs.
Second, restore some sense to the system and devolve responsibility for the detailed management of airworthiness engineering back down to the people who should be doing it - the Chief Engineers. MAA should set out high level policy and regulations, the Chief Engineers should issue the relevant orders and instructions to implement them. They are the people who need to re-establish LTCs, MCCs, and CCBs that actually do what they are supposed to do. The MAA's current effort to run the whole world of aviation engineering from the centre is not going to work in war, and that (last time I looked) is what Joe Public pays the Services to do.
Thirdly, start training a cadre of airworthiness engineers to implement proper airworthiness standards and practices. Give them clear lines of responsibility to their Chief Engineers, and the power to say 'NO'. Especially to say no to aircrew, whatever their rank.
While that lot is going on, have the public enquiry. Hang the guilty b******s. It will put the fear of God into those in the MoD who persist in failing to implement mandated regulations.
That's just my first stab, I'm sure others have better and more relevant ideas. I'm not sure that any public enquiry will happen soon, but perhaps the Air Cadet glider fiasco could be used to get MoD to answer what I think is the $64,000 question:
'Has the RAF been flying school children in non-airworthy aircraft?'. Yes or no answer please, preferably from AOC 22Gp.
Best regards as ever to all those trying to do the right thing at the right time
Engines
Last edited by Engines; 31st May 2016 at 15:02.
Engines
Spot on about the Ordnance Board. Throughout my career it was patently obvious to me where competence was taught and demanded in MoD, and the OB was one. It was a disgraceful decision to disband it, on a par with AMSO's 1987 policy to waste money and his successor's policy to run down airworthiness management.
Turning to these senior oversight committees, the Defence Airworthiness Group was established in March 1993; I'd like to think as a direct reaction to AMSO's policies kicking in with a vengeance that year. The committee was a good idea but the members were somewhat lacking. They oversaw the disbandment of LTCs in June that year; which is the evidence that prevented any legal action following the Nimrod Review. (The IPT should have inherited a safety case, but it was no longer policy to have one). Their first real decision was to rob aircrew of a major defence in depth! If I say that one of them was ACAS, who a few months later made a false declaration in the Chinook Mk2 RTS (see Philip Report), then you get the idea. On the other hand, another member was Commandant A&AEE. I wonder what the topic of conversation was at the first meeting in 1994? You ****, you're asking for trouble ignoring the mandate that Mk2 isn't airworthy. And then the next one - Told you. 29 dead. Those events set the tone and MoD has never recovered. The membership was 12, two of whom were your FONA and Controller Navy. History tells us the vote would have been about 7-5 in favour of airworthiness, but the person most involved in practical implementation would have been against. The following year the RAF Chief Engineer took over that particular post, so nothing changed. Lesson - it's all about people.
Spot on about the Ordnance Board. Throughout my career it was patently obvious to me where competence was taught and demanded in MoD, and the OB was one. It was a disgraceful decision to disband it, on a par with AMSO's 1987 policy to waste money and his successor's policy to run down airworthiness management.
Turning to these senior oversight committees, the Defence Airworthiness Group was established in March 1993; I'd like to think as a direct reaction to AMSO's policies kicking in with a vengeance that year. The committee was a good idea but the members were somewhat lacking. They oversaw the disbandment of LTCs in June that year; which is the evidence that prevented any legal action following the Nimrod Review. (The IPT should have inherited a safety case, but it was no longer policy to have one). Their first real decision was to rob aircrew of a major defence in depth! If I say that one of them was ACAS, who a few months later made a false declaration in the Chinook Mk2 RTS (see Philip Report), then you get the idea. On the other hand, another member was Commandant A&AEE. I wonder what the topic of conversation was at the first meeting in 1994? You ****, you're asking for trouble ignoring the mandate that Mk2 isn't airworthy. And then the next one - Told you. 29 dead. Those events set the tone and MoD has never recovered. The membership was 12, two of whom were your FONA and Controller Navy. History tells us the vote would have been about 7-5 in favour of airworthiness, but the person most involved in practical implementation would have been against. The following year the RAF Chief Engineer took over that particular post, so nothing changed. Lesson - it's all about people.
tuc:-
Spot on, tuc! That is the real conundrum. You can have all the committees and appointments imaginable but if the man at the top says jump, what do you do? That is why Regulators and Investigators have to be entirely separate from the Operator and from each other, lest that one illegal command comes down from above to suborn the regs and/or fix the investigation. Both have happened in the past under the present arrangement of all three in the same bed. The results are still with us and, arguably, now worse than ever.
Engines,
The MAA in other words has failed utterly to do so in the last 6 years. Why? Because they are stymied by the very report that is their raison d'etre, Haddon-Cave's. There is nothing wrong with the present system because he commends it! Until that lie is faced up to, nothing will change.
Which is the very reason that no-one wants to touch this with a barge pole; the RAF Provost Marshal, the civilian police, HoC select committees, HoL committees, the UK Government, MPs, Coroners Courts, FAIs, even the media. That just about ticks off the whole of the UK Establishment I think, but if it doesn't I suspect that those not mentioned would concur with the rest.
As tuc infers, any system is only as strong as its weakest link. That turned out to be people being forced to choose between their careers and their duty. Most chose the former, and so people died. We will go on being in disagreement on this key issue I'm afraid. Separation and Independence is what keeps civilian aviation safe. It could do the same for military aviation and thus maintain our Air Power for use in war (its ultimate purpose as you so rightly point out).
Lesson - it's all about people.
Engines,
First, get a panel of experienced 'greybeards' to scrub the MAA regulations and restore the intent and the detail of the missing DefStan that Tuc so often (and quite correctly) refers to. Also, restore and emphasise the basic principle of 'Build Standard-Safety Case - RTS' to the regs.
have the public enquiry. Hang the guilty b******s. It will put the fear of God into those in the MoD who persist in failing to implement mandated regulations.
As tuc infers, any system is only as strong as its weakest link. That turned out to be people being forced to choose between their careers and their duty. Most chose the former, and so people died. We will go on being in disagreement on this key issue I'm afraid. Separation and Independence is what keeps civilian aviation safe. It could do the same for military aviation and thus maintain our Air Power for use in war (its ultimate purpose as you so rightly point out).
Tuch and Chug,
I very much enjoy reading your well articulated posts and agree wholeheartedly with your stance and opinions of the lack of independence of the MAA, MAAIB, and any other acronym they have rebranded.
Is there a focussed and formal effort/campaign, beyond well written posts on a public forum (not meant to be derogatory), that is actively taking HMG to task over this scandal? My blood boils when I realize what has gone on/is going on, and I am hoping that knowledgeable professionals such as yourselves are taking these issues to task formally. Having lost several close friends on Nimrod XV230 and being proud to have gone solo on a T21 glider as a 17 year old Air Cadet, I am keen to see this shambles proved as such publically and a fit for purpose replacement introduced.
Is there a focussed and formal effort/campaign, beyond well written posts on a public forum (not meant to be derogatory), that is actively taking HMG to task over this scandal? My blood boils when I realize what has gone on/is going on, and I am hoping that knowledgeable professionals such as yourselves are taking these issues to task formally. Having lost several close friends on Nimrod XV230 and being proud to have gone solo on a T21 glider as a 17 year old Air Cadet, I am keen to see this shambles proved as such publically and a fit for purpose replacement introduced.
Avtur, thank you for your kind words and support for those like tucumseh and myself who want to return airworthiness to the UK Military Airfleet. I must correct you on one point though, tucumseh is very much the professional of which you speak, but I am but a mere spear-carrier, entering from stage right; an ex-driver airframe.
Like most of my genre I had little or no idea of what airworthiness was, other than it was obviously a jolly good thing to have. My involvement in the campaign therefore began with the Mull of Kintyre thread (29 Killed) and the obviously unjust assault by RAF VSOs on the reputations of the deceased pilots.
That campaign eventually succeeded, not only in restoring the pilots' reputations but in revealing that the aircraft was flying under an illegal RTS and grossly unairworthy. Similarly the Iraq (Parliamentary Questions) Hercules (10 killed) thread proved the aircraft to be knowingly unfit for purpose and resulted in the retrofit of Explosion Suppressive Foam (ESF) into the rest of the fleet being used on active duty. Other threads have revealed the illegal replacement of anti-collision lights with High Intensity Strobe Lights (HISLs) on the Royal Navy's Sea King ASaC's (7 Killed) when two of them collided in poor visability, the known IFF lack of failure warning when a Tornado (2 Killed) was shot down in a blue on blue tragedy, and the complete lack of a safety case for the MB Mk10 seat fitted to the Hawk (1 Killed). Then we came to the Afghanistan Nimrod (14 Killed) that your friends died in. Again, knowingly flagrant breaches of airworthiness regulations in the fuel system were revealed.
So, 63 avoidable deaths in 6 airworthiness related fatal accidents with 7 aircraft lost covered in this forum alone, and then followed by the grounding of the entire RAF Maritime capability. All avoidable predictable tragedies. The solution to all of this waste was supposed to be the result of the Nimrod Review, but Haddon-Cave reneged on his duty, fudged the report and protected the VSOs who had perpetrated the original attack on Air Safety, which still renders UK Military Airworthiness dysfunctional to this very day because the cover up continues.
All of this is in the way of pre-amble to answer your question:-
The answer is yes, but it needs people like yourself who are professionally outraged that what was once a source of justified pride, UK Military Air Safety, could be reduced to such a parlous state. In retrospect the individual campaigns were the easy bit; ESF, Fox's Mull Statement, even getting the MAA and MilAAIB, were all tangible outcomes. The big one of course is to get Military Air Regulation and Accident Investigation working to restore UK Military Airworthiness. The MAA as presently constituted can't do that, the DSA can't, the MilAAIB is already history. The only solution that can be depended upon is independent and separate Regulation and Investigation, from the MOD and from each other.
I don't take offence about your comments about our efforts on this forum, but I would encourage all like yourself to join in. The internet is the game changer. The people who instigated this scandal in the 80s/90s never imagined that their illegal actions could become the subject of comment on a world wide basis. They bullied those who enforced the regs into suborning them instead. Those who wouldn't were moved and replaced by those who would, mainly because they were untrained and inexperienced. Now those who learn of the persecution of their forebears can fight against that injustice, the fatal damage done to their profession, and for those whose very lives depend upon it. Which rather brings us back to the Mull pilots again...
Like most of my genre I had little or no idea of what airworthiness was, other than it was obviously a jolly good thing to have. My involvement in the campaign therefore began with the Mull of Kintyre thread (29 Killed) and the obviously unjust assault by RAF VSOs on the reputations of the deceased pilots.
That campaign eventually succeeded, not only in restoring the pilots' reputations but in revealing that the aircraft was flying under an illegal RTS and grossly unairworthy. Similarly the Iraq (Parliamentary Questions) Hercules (10 killed) thread proved the aircraft to be knowingly unfit for purpose and resulted in the retrofit of Explosion Suppressive Foam (ESF) into the rest of the fleet being used on active duty. Other threads have revealed the illegal replacement of anti-collision lights with High Intensity Strobe Lights (HISLs) on the Royal Navy's Sea King ASaC's (7 Killed) when two of them collided in poor visability, the known IFF lack of failure warning when a Tornado (2 Killed) was shot down in a blue on blue tragedy, and the complete lack of a safety case for the MB Mk10 seat fitted to the Hawk (1 Killed). Then we came to the Afghanistan Nimrod (14 Killed) that your friends died in. Again, knowingly flagrant breaches of airworthiness regulations in the fuel system were revealed.
So, 63 avoidable deaths in 6 airworthiness related fatal accidents with 7 aircraft lost covered in this forum alone, and then followed by the grounding of the entire RAF Maritime capability. All avoidable predictable tragedies. The solution to all of this waste was supposed to be the result of the Nimrod Review, but Haddon-Cave reneged on his duty, fudged the report and protected the VSOs who had perpetrated the original attack on Air Safety, which still renders UK Military Airworthiness dysfunctional to this very day because the cover up continues.
All of this is in the way of pre-amble to answer your question:-
Is there a focussed and formal effort/campaign, beyond well written posts on a public forum (not meant to be derogatory), that is actively taking HMG to task over this scandal?
I don't take offence about your comments about our efforts on this forum, but I would encourage all like yourself to join in. The internet is the game changer. The people who instigated this scandal in the 80s/90s never imagined that their illegal actions could become the subject of comment on a world wide basis. They bullied those who enforced the regs into suborning them instead. Those who wouldn't were moved and replaced by those who would, mainly because they were untrained and inexperienced. Now those who learn of the persecution of their forebears can fight against that injustice, the fatal damage done to their profession, and for those whose very lives depend upon it. Which rather brings us back to the Mull pilots again...
Last edited by Chugalug2; 2nd Jun 2016 at 10:22. Reason: Words, dear boy, words
Chug; thank you for the informative reply. Although I understand the value and merits of a web campaign, which has clearly had the success you describe, I was wondering whether there were any other lines of attack ongoing, say for example broad sheet newspaper articles, petitions, or getting MPs on side to fix the MAA construct? Perhaps the public who do not frequent aviation forums et al may be disturbed to keep reading in "hard" media or perhaps on programmes such as panorama (if that still exists) how unfit for purpose the military airworthiness system is today, and why. When you present facts like you did, it is hard not to be appalled and alarmed. Thanks for all you are doing.
Thank you avtur.
Today is the 22nd anniversary of the Mull of Kintyre crash. Yesterday, the Coroner agreed to reopen the Birmingham pub bombings inquest as hitherto concealed evidence had been revealed. If the legal system agreed to do that for Military inquests/FAIs, it would be snowed under; but if someone grasps the nettle may I suggest starting with MoK and Sea King ASaC, where MoD serially lied in court and contaminated the entire process. There is another similarity - in all three cases the innocent were blamed. In many ways, ASaC is the worst of them all as MoD maintain their stance, in the face of written, photographic and recorded evidence proving innocence. The truth is easy. When you are up against this level of Department of State sponsored deceit, justice is more difficult.
Today is the 22nd anniversary of the Mull of Kintyre crash. Yesterday, the Coroner agreed to reopen the Birmingham pub bombings inquest as hitherto concealed evidence had been revealed. If the legal system agreed to do that for Military inquests/FAIs, it would be snowed under; but if someone grasps the nettle may I suggest starting with MoK and Sea King ASaC, where MoD serially lied in court and contaminated the entire process. There is another similarity - in all three cases the innocent were blamed. In many ways, ASaC is the worst of them all as MoD maintain their stance, in the face of written, photographic and recorded evidence proving innocence. The truth is easy. When you are up against this level of Department of State sponsored deceit, justice is more difficult.
Avtur, you are absolutely right that once the extent and depth of the malevolent attack on Air Safety, and perhaps even more importantly the continuing cover up of that by the MOD and the RAF Star Chamber, is understood then there is indeed shock and outrage as a result. I remember my own reluctant realisation that part of the leadership of my own Service had acted illegally and wilfully in destroying an entire system merely for their own short term purposes. You will see from the list of institutions in my #2590 above, some of the representations and evidence that have been presented to date. When a QC is given clear evidence of subvertion of the regulations and turns it on its head by calling that a Golden Period you get a real idea of the mountain that has to be climbed to get the message accepted and acted upon. Similarly the media, both broadcasters and newspapers, are prepared to highlight tragedies such as Mull, but balk at spending half the programme or article in explaining what airworthiness is, let alone describing the system that is supposed to provide and maintain it, and then further explaining the systemic damage that prevents that being done. So it isn't easy, but TV productions, radio interviews, newspaper articles, have all been produced with campaign input. MPs have been lobbied, ministers quizzed and informed differently to what has been "staffed" to them, evidence presented to military and civil police authorities. As has been made clear by the tenacious efforts of those campaigning re the Hillsborough and Birmingham scandals; justice delayed is truly denied, but better late than never! Just so with this scandal, the importance is to prevent recurrence, in our case of Airworthiness Related Fatal Military Air Accidents. That has to start with the acceptance of what has happened, the reform of the system so that it cannot happen again, and rebuilding it so that it can once again provide for Air Safety.
The one great thing that militates against getting all that out into the public arena is us, the aviation professionals. We all discourse with our own jargon, with acronyms that are constantly shifting so that Bletchley Park would have trouble keeping abreast of them, and starting out with a level of knowledge completely denied to the layman. That has to be overcome if we are to build up an awareness of the problem and what we think needs doing about it.
Some here will almost certainly dismiss my proposals re independence and separation for example. Unless there is an agreed agenda then there is no campaign, just noise. That is why I believe that PPRuNe is so useful. Many who read these threads never post, but may well pass on what they learn to others, spreading the word. Those who do post can fashion their style so that when they post to their MP for example, it is in a concise, informative, and authoritative style. Some MPs have already got the message and questioned ministers accordingly. There is no Golden Bullet, especially when the opposition lies, misrepresents, and generally obfuscates. Persistence is the key, and the more that join in the sooner we will prevail.
Sorry, a lot of words which generally implies little to say. We are always open to suggestions and guidance. This is a many headed Hydra that we have to slay. A few heads have already been felled so come on in and join the fray!
The one great thing that militates against getting all that out into the public arena is us, the aviation professionals. We all discourse with our own jargon, with acronyms that are constantly shifting so that Bletchley Park would have trouble keeping abreast of them, and starting out with a level of knowledge completely denied to the layman. That has to be overcome if we are to build up an awareness of the problem and what we think needs doing about it.
Some here will almost certainly dismiss my proposals re independence and separation for example. Unless there is an agreed agenda then there is no campaign, just noise. That is why I believe that PPRuNe is so useful. Many who read these threads never post, but may well pass on what they learn to others, spreading the word. Those who do post can fashion their style so that when they post to their MP for example, it is in a concise, informative, and authoritative style. Some MPs have already got the message and questioned ministers accordingly. There is no Golden Bullet, especially when the opposition lies, misrepresents, and generally obfuscates. Persistence is the key, and the more that join in the sooner we will prevail.
Sorry, a lot of words which generally implies little to say. We are always open to suggestions and guidance. This is a many headed Hydra that we have to slay. A few heads have already been felled so come on in and join the fray!
Last edited by Chugalug2; 2nd Jun 2016 at 13:37.
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Gentlemen ...
Some might recall that I wrote to my local MP requesting that he present a very specific question to PUSoS for Defence, Mr Julian Brazier TD, MP.
I now have a reply ...
Just to recap on my specific question (Bold) and context (Bold) for that question ... here is my original Post (2272/Page 114).
PUBLISHED IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Here is the reply from the PUSoS for Defence. I have only redacted reference to my name and address.
Without prejudice ...
I intend to reply to the PUSoS, via my MP, this Month. To be clear, whilst I lament the drastic reduction in the scale of Air Cadet Gliding (when fully recovered), it is clear that cost economics (rightly or wrongly) are now the primary Drivers. By that I mean the 'cost' of maintaining continuous airworthiness of a reduced fleet (to MAA Spec) and what appears to be a desire to increase the life of the aircraft assets.
I'm still not quite sure if it was CAMO (something new to me), which was created in 2014, or the MAA, created in 2010, that detected the original 'configuration control discrepancies' ... What prompted this action ... Was it a 'Compliance/Enforcement' intervention by the MAA ... Or did 22Group put their hand-up. In any case, what went on (or didn't) prior to 2014 ... Was it the loss of experienced staff through headcount/cost reduction, plain incompetence or other contributory factors.
Whilst I won't presume to 'advise' the PUSoS ... But it seems a bit odd to me for the 'contributory parties' to 'discuss the apportionment of respective liabilities' ... that, IMHO, should be done by an independent arbiter and the outcome made public (as we are talking about Public money).
Please feel free to add on this Thread or PM me ... But I'm going to stick to the scope of my original question to the PUSoS in my reply, as I feel decisions are now 'fixed' in terms how the Air Cadet Gliding will work in the future
Coff.
Some might recall that I wrote to my local MP requesting that he present a very specific question to PUSoS for Defence, Mr Julian Brazier TD, MP.
I now have a reply ...
Just to recap on my specific question (Bold) and context (Bold) for that question ... here is my original Post (2272/Page 114).
PUBLISHED IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Dear Mr Merriman …
I watched carefully the debate held yesterday at Westminster Hall entitled ‘Future of Gliding and the Air Cadet Organisation’
Parliamentlive.tv - Westminster Hall
I would have liked to write direct to the Minister, Julian Brazier, but it is clear from his Constituency Web Site that he only replies to correspondence emanating from a Kent Constituency Postal Address. I am therefore writing to you to seek an answer to a very specific question about this issue as my MP.
There has, as yet, been no satisfactory explanation as to ‘How and Why’ the entire Air Cadet Glider Fleet (of some 146 aircraft) suddenly became un-airworthy/un-serviceable which necessitated the ‘Grounding’ of the entire fleet for some two years. I’m afraid I don’t have the detail on the original Total CapEx Spend back in the early 90’s for the 81 Grob Viking Gliders and 65 Grob Vigilant Motor Gliders, but I’m informed that the Vikings alone cost c. £7m when acquired some 25 years ago … so in total, for the entire fleet of 146 aircraft, a not insignificant original investment by the MOD/RAF.
So as a UK Tax Payer I believe I’m entitled to ask for an explanation as to ‘How and Why’ the entire Air Cadet Gliding Fleet became un-airworthy/un-serviceable.
I’m aware from Hansard that Serco was awarded a ‘Glider Maintenance Contract’ of £9.4m for a seven year period from Feb 2008 to Mar 2015. Without prejudice I ask … Did the contractor fail to provide the service they were contracted to supply, either through poor engineering practice or record keeping ? Did the MOD/RAF fail to effectively ‘Supervise’ and/or ‘Oversee’ the contractors work ? Or was it a combination of both these possibilities or were there other reasons ?
To be clear, I’m well acquainted with the detail of the proposed current ‘Recovery Programme’ put forward by the MOD/RAF, and whilst these plans are most lamentable, they can detract attention away from the specific question I have asked above.
Yours sincerely
I watched carefully the debate held yesterday at Westminster Hall entitled ‘Future of Gliding and the Air Cadet Organisation’
Parliamentlive.tv - Westminster Hall
I would have liked to write direct to the Minister, Julian Brazier, but it is clear from his Constituency Web Site that he only replies to correspondence emanating from a Kent Constituency Postal Address. I am therefore writing to you to seek an answer to a very specific question about this issue as my MP.
There has, as yet, been no satisfactory explanation as to ‘How and Why’ the entire Air Cadet Glider Fleet (of some 146 aircraft) suddenly became un-airworthy/un-serviceable which necessitated the ‘Grounding’ of the entire fleet for some two years. I’m afraid I don’t have the detail on the original Total CapEx Spend back in the early 90’s for the 81 Grob Viking Gliders and 65 Grob Vigilant Motor Gliders, but I’m informed that the Vikings alone cost c. £7m when acquired some 25 years ago … so in total, for the entire fleet of 146 aircraft, a not insignificant original investment by the MOD/RAF.
So as a UK Tax Payer I believe I’m entitled to ask for an explanation as to ‘How and Why’ the entire Air Cadet Gliding Fleet became un-airworthy/un-serviceable.
I’m aware from Hansard that Serco was awarded a ‘Glider Maintenance Contract’ of £9.4m for a seven year period from Feb 2008 to Mar 2015. Without prejudice I ask … Did the contractor fail to provide the service they were contracted to supply, either through poor engineering practice or record keeping ? Did the MOD/RAF fail to effectively ‘Supervise’ and/or ‘Oversee’ the contractors work ? Or was it a combination of both these possibilities or were there other reasons ?
To be clear, I’m well acquainted with the detail of the proposed current ‘Recovery Programme’ put forward by the MOD/RAF, and whilst these plans are most lamentable, they can detract attention away from the specific question I have asked above.
Yours sincerely
Without prejudice ...
I intend to reply to the PUSoS, via my MP, this Month. To be clear, whilst I lament the drastic reduction in the scale of Air Cadet Gliding (when fully recovered), it is clear that cost economics (rightly or wrongly) are now the primary Drivers. By that I mean the 'cost' of maintaining continuous airworthiness of a reduced fleet (to MAA Spec) and what appears to be a desire to increase the life of the aircraft assets.
I'm still not quite sure if it was CAMO (something new to me), which was created in 2014, or the MAA, created in 2010, that detected the original 'configuration control discrepancies' ... What prompted this action ... Was it a 'Compliance/Enforcement' intervention by the MAA ... Or did 22Group put their hand-up. In any case, what went on (or didn't) prior to 2014 ... Was it the loss of experienced staff through headcount/cost reduction, plain incompetence or other contributory factors.
Whilst I won't presume to 'advise' the PUSoS ... But it seems a bit odd to me for the 'contributory parties' to 'discuss the apportionment of respective liabilities' ... that, IMHO, should be done by an independent arbiter and the outcome made public (as we are talking about Public money).
Please feel free to add on this Thread or PM me ... But I'm going to stick to the scope of my original question to the PUSoS in my reply, as I feel decisions are now 'fixed' in terms how the Air Cadet Gliding will work in the future
Coff.
Last edited by CoffmanStarter; 10th Jul 2016 at 12:19.
Well done Coff.
Neither. The failure is systemic and it was noted in numerous internal MoD audits e.g. 1988, 91, 96, 97, 98...... In 1991 AMSO issued an edict that CC would NOT be maintained. In March 1999 Sir Robert Walmsley, the Chief of Defence Procurement, admitted the systemic nature to the Public Accounts Committee. Neither knew the significance of his statement, so nothing was done, except CDP reiterated to his staff that it would NOT be carried out. That year, I know all my CC funding for 2 complete aircraft fleets was withdrawn. Every last penny. If an equipment or aircraft is not under Configuration Control, one cannot have a valid Build Standard or Safety Case. It is much more than historical maintenance records. It is fundamental airworthiness certification documentation.
When MoD claim they can't find such records, it is odds-on they haven't bothered to ask the person who is paid to ensure they are retained. Phone the holder, pitch up, look up archive register, pull files, photocopy...... The MAA don't employ anyone junior enough who would know where to start.
I'm still not quite sure if it was CAMO (something new to me), which was created in 2014, or the MAA, created in 2010, that detected the original 'configuration control discrepancies'
When MoD claim they can't find such records, it is odds-on they haven't bothered to ask the person who is paid to ensure they are retained. Phone the holder, pitch up, look up archive register, pull files, photocopy...... The MAA don't employ anyone junior enough who would know where to start.
Chug;
Not at all. I am very grateful for your, and everyone else's detailed and very explicit answers to my original question, and I also applaud Coffman, for his well targeted questioning to his MP. These were clearly the questions that were not asked/avoided at that farcical parliamentary "debate".
Since my initial question yesterday, I am quite reassured that there are many activities being undertaken to address these issues. I cannot say enough how grateful I am for all these efforts. The safety of our military aviators must not be put at risk because of systemic failures and cover-ups that are wholly preventable and immoral. Good luck.
Sorry, a lot of words which generally implies little to say
Since my initial question yesterday, I am quite reassured that there are many activities being undertaken to address these issues. I cannot say enough how grateful I am for all these efforts. The safety of our military aviators must not be put at risk because of systemic failures and cover-ups that are wholly preventable and immoral. Good luck.