Engines
Spot on about the Ordnance Board. Throughout my career it was patently obvious to me where competence was taught and demanded in MoD, and the OB was one. It was a disgraceful decision to disband it, on a par with AMSO's 1987 policy to waste money and his successor's policy to run down airworthiness management.
Turning to these senior oversight committees, the Defence Airworthiness Group was established in March 1993; I'd like to think as a direct reaction to AMSO's policies kicking in with a vengeance that year. The committee was a good idea but the members were somewhat lacking. They oversaw the disbandment of LTCs in June that year; which is the evidence that prevented any legal action following the Nimrod Review. (The IPT should have inherited a safety case, but it was no longer policy to have one). Their first real decision was to rob aircrew of a major defence in depth! If I say that one of them was ACAS, who a few months later made a false declaration in the Chinook Mk2 RTS (see Philip Report), then you get the idea. On the other hand, another member was Commandant A&AEE. I wonder what the topic of conversation was at the first meeting in 1994? You ****, you're asking for trouble ignoring the mandate that Mk2 isn't airworthy. And then the next one - Told you. 29 dead. Those events set the tone and MoD has never recovered. The membership was 12, two of whom were your FONA and Controller Navy. History tells us the vote would have been about 7-5 in favour of airworthiness, but the person most involved in practical implementation would have been against. The following year the RAF Chief Engineer took over that particular post, so nothing changed. Lesson - it's all about people.