BOI into the 2012 Tornado Collision over the Moray Firth
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orac
As things stand at the moment the "collision" risk, and flight safety, are not ALARP. That is not my call but that of DG MAA, who in 2010 reported that to remove the option to fit CWS in Tornado would "prejudice the Dept's ability to declare this risk ALARP". This statement was issued after the option had been provisionally removed under PR11. (PR11 being MoD’s Planning Round for 2011 - the annual budget review). Clearly, someone in 2010 had decided that in order to save money it was OK to put Tornado flight safety at risk. --- New Government.
The option was was "reprieved", however the risk remains as being NOT ALARP until CWS is installed. We can talk about various forms of mitigation, but based on my experience with Nimrod this is just a paper excersice to keep the aircraft flying in "apparent" safety.
DV
As things stand at the moment the "collision" risk, and flight safety, are not ALARP. That is not my call but that of DG MAA, who in 2010 reported that to remove the option to fit CWS in Tornado would "prejudice the Dept's ability to declare this risk ALARP". This statement was issued after the option had been provisionally removed under PR11. (PR11 being MoD’s Planning Round for 2011 - the annual budget review). Clearly, someone in 2010 had decided that in order to save money it was OK to put Tornado flight safety at risk. --- New Government.
The option was was "reprieved", however the risk remains as being NOT ALARP until CWS is installed. We can talk about various forms of mitigation, but based on my experience with Nimrod this is just a paper excersice to keep the aircraft flying in "apparent" safety.
DV
It depends, doesn't it. If the aircraft is so un-safe that without this equipment it shouldn't be flown, then the entire fleet should be grounded until either a) it is made safe or b) taken out of service. If the aircraft is safe enough to fly as is, then it is safe enough to fly. Collisions happen, regardless of equipment fitted and procedures followed. It sounds from this thread that the equipment would be at best, a tiny increase in warning capability and likely increase the risk of collision due to desensitivity to warning alarms.
So is the aircraft safe enough or not?
So is the aircraft safe enough or not?
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CM and ATG
I do not know what planet you are on, but I suggest that you read some Class "A" Airprox reports. With closing speeds of 14nm/min there was "non-sighting by crews" even though the visibility was 50kns. What chance would crews have coming off the Tain range in thick mist. This is 2013, not 1913 with "a Hun out of the sun"
DV
I do not know what planet you are on, but I suggest that you read some Class "A" Airprox reports. With closing speeds of 14nm/min there was "non-sighting by crews" even though the visibility was 50kns. What chance would crews have coming off the Tain range in thick mist. This is 2013, not 1913 with "a Hun out of the sun"
DV
If the aircraft is safe enough to fly as is, then it is safe enough to fly.
Collisions happen, regardless of equipment fitted and procedures followed.
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DV,
I am a beginner wrt to CWS but I think your example is a little bit off. If anyone is flying into, in or out of a AWR in thick mist and not aborting, getting a radar service and going home IFR, then they need their brevet torn from their chest - not a CWS.
I am a beginner wrt to CWS but I think your example is a little bit off. If anyone is flying into, in or out of a AWR in thick mist and not aborting, getting a radar service and going home IFR, then they need their brevet torn from their chest - not a CWS.
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orca - So you've never pushed the weather limits then? Honestly? I suppose it depends on your definition of "thick mist", but I think most LL operators have pushed the envelope at times, especially those in an aircraft designed to operate IMC at LL. Some mental fag-packet maths reckons that even with a "legal" 5km of vis, two aircraft closing at 420kt would have only 12 seconds to see and avoid. I agree that lookout is vitally important, especially for combat aviators, but I don't see why there is such resentment in some quarters to a system designed to save the lives of our friends and colleagues.
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KP,
I have no hostility whatsoever with/to any system, I just think that particular example was poorly chosen.
Limits are limits. Pushing limits is pushing limits. Breaking limits is unprofessional. Flying in AWRs in 'thick mist' is imbecility (if one assumes you think you are VFR).
But I take your point about IMC TFR.
I haven't expressed an opinion yet as to what I think about CWS incidentally.
I have no hostility whatsoever with/to any system, I just think that particular example was poorly chosen.
Limits are limits. Pushing limits is pushing limits. Breaking limits is unprofessional. Flying in AWRs in 'thick mist' is imbecility (if one assumes you think you are VFR).
But I take your point about IMC TFR.
I haven't expressed an opinion yet as to what I think about CWS incidentally.
JTO,
I can tell you're passionate about this one, but...
Yeah. I'm sure posters here think a fatal collision is fit punishment for poor lookout. Really, Dude! A bit over the top there.
I can tell you're passionate about this one, but...
So we should leave the collision risk as it is to punish crews for not spotting each other - WTF???
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orca - OK, fair enough. I'd agree with you on operation in "thick mist", but again the definition is probably important - a numerical visibility might be more useful. An AWR is probably a much safer place to operate in reduced visibility than the rest of the UKLFS, certainly as a singleton. Of course, at most ranges the pattern extends beyond the AWR boundary, which may be a flaw in that argument! I don't know if it was an issue in this incident, but I think there's a difference between sustained operation in weather that's below limits, and pressing through for a few seconds in the hope/knowledge that the situation will improve. I'm not talking about full-up IMC, but, say, less than 5km vis in a shower.
CM:-
Rest assured that crews who are protected with CWS are still required to do so, and are liable to get an unpleasant and possibly final surprise if they do not.
So as noted so many times past, RAF crews can take the blame solely for anything untoward, no matter how the MOD and the Services have failed them with duff or non-existent kit. Be it positively dangerous FADECs, illegal RTS's, unresolved UFCM's, dry bays that aren't, IFFs that fail unsafe, Strobe Lights that blind, and Fuel Tanks that explode on receiving a small arms hit; hang the guilty barstewards if by chance they survive!
You don't happen to sport a very sporting moustache and have a famous WW1 General as a distant relative by any chance? Name of Mel... something or other? Meh!
No one is suggesting that going to war is safe. That is palpable nonsense, but the RAF has a vested interest in making itself as safe as it can be subject to training when it is not at war, so that as much of it and its crews survive for when it does go to war. If training for war is incompatible with CWS then there is a case for inhibiting it under certain conditions. There is not a case for therefore not fitting it, other than protecting the 6 o'clock of those who have obstructed in the past. That case is illegal, immoral, and the very reason that UK Military Air Safety is now in crisis mode.
Or as some of us keep saying, just look out of the window.
So as noted so many times past, RAF crews can take the blame solely for anything untoward, no matter how the MOD and the Services have failed them with duff or non-existent kit. Be it positively dangerous FADECs, illegal RTS's, unresolved UFCM's, dry bays that aren't, IFFs that fail unsafe, Strobe Lights that blind, and Fuel Tanks that explode on receiving a small arms hit; hang the guilty barstewards if by chance they survive!
You don't happen to sport a very sporting moustache and have a famous WW1 General as a distant relative by any chance? Name of Mel... something or other? Meh!
No one is suggesting that going to war is safe. That is palpable nonsense, but the RAF has a vested interest in making itself as safe as it can be subject to training when it is not at war, so that as much of it and its crews survive for when it does go to war. If training for war is incompatible with CWS then there is a case for inhibiting it under certain conditions. There is not a case for therefore not fitting it, other than protecting the 6 o'clock of those who have obstructed in the past. That case is illegal, immoral, and the very reason that UK Military Air Safety is now in crisis mode.
Orca, sorry I’m late replying, but others have posted good replies. In summary, and as Distant Voice says, it is MoD who have admitted this. We’re just discussing it and, in effect, debating whether or not very senior staffs are correct. Some think there are, others (bravely!) think they are not.
My concern is that this debate is taking place so many years after the general problem was reported and staffs threatened with dismissal for seeking to follow these regs. That root problem, confirmed by numerous internal review teams under the RAF’s Inspector of Flight Safety, is the systematic refusal to implement the mandated regulations, often choosing a lengthier and more expensive route that produces a functionally unsafe system.
One example I chose, as it is topical, was the flat refusal to properly integrate IFF failure warnings in (inter alia) the GR4A; which, if present would (according to the BoI) have prevented the 2003 Patriot shootdown. Boscombe followed the mandated regs; the RAF, project office and their friendly 2 Star flatly refused to. (The same 2 Star having management oversight of Nimrod, Chinook.........)
Boscombe were placed under inordinate pressure, and then direct orders, to withdraw their recommendation that MAR should not be granted when an IFF is functionally unsafe as it could (the word used in the regs) result in, for example, friendly fire and loss of aircraft. They, and MoD project staffs, were instructed to falsely state the IFF installation satisfied the regs. The recommendation to inspect the entire fleet was rejected, twice, at 2 Star level. 2 Died. An IFF going u/s during a mission is bad luck. To provide an IFF and claim it is working, knowing it is not, is criminal.
These days I prefer to simply highlight the irrefutable fact that all the cases we discuss here, Nimrod, Chinook, Sea King, Tornado etc, are inextricably linked by this single policy – the regs are optional if it means delivering to time and cost. Safety regulations are irrelevant (to quote MoD at the XV230 inquest). And, perhaps worst of all, it is acceptable to make a false statement that the system IS safe, and issue direct orders to subordinates to make such a statement. That is beyond criminal.
Make no mistake, despite the formation of the MAA this remains the formal policy of DE&S (to be precise, their Policy Secretariat), as advised only this year to Ministers and the Head of the Civil Service, who accepted this advice and issued rulings to that effect.
My concern is that this debate is taking place so many years after the general problem was reported and staffs threatened with dismissal for seeking to follow these regs. That root problem, confirmed by numerous internal review teams under the RAF’s Inspector of Flight Safety, is the systematic refusal to implement the mandated regulations, often choosing a lengthier and more expensive route that produces a functionally unsafe system.
One example I chose, as it is topical, was the flat refusal to properly integrate IFF failure warnings in (inter alia) the GR4A; which, if present would (according to the BoI) have prevented the 2003 Patriot shootdown. Boscombe followed the mandated regs; the RAF, project office and their friendly 2 Star flatly refused to. (The same 2 Star having management oversight of Nimrod, Chinook.........)
Boscombe were placed under inordinate pressure, and then direct orders, to withdraw their recommendation that MAR should not be granted when an IFF is functionally unsafe as it could (the word used in the regs) result in, for example, friendly fire and loss of aircraft. They, and MoD project staffs, were instructed to falsely state the IFF installation satisfied the regs. The recommendation to inspect the entire fleet was rejected, twice, at 2 Star level. 2 Died. An IFF going u/s during a mission is bad luck. To provide an IFF and claim it is working, knowing it is not, is criminal.
These days I prefer to simply highlight the irrefutable fact that all the cases we discuss here, Nimrod, Chinook, Sea King, Tornado etc, are inextricably linked by this single policy – the regs are optional if it means delivering to time and cost. Safety regulations are irrelevant (to quote MoD at the XV230 inquest). And, perhaps worst of all, it is acceptable to make a false statement that the system IS safe, and issue direct orders to subordinates to make such a statement. That is beyond criminal.
Make no mistake, despite the formation of the MAA this remains the formal policy of DE&S (to be precise, their Policy Secretariat), as advised only this year to Ministers and the Head of the Civil Service, who accepted this advice and issued rulings to that effect.
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Thank you for the reply Tucumseh.
I am still undecided in my own mind. I totally agree with you wrt IFF which is an entry level requirement, and having read the H-C report recently the Nimrod issue is equally as cut and dried.
Is CWS really an entry level requirement though? I have never operated with one but can see the utility. On the other hand I have flown a machine that gave so many secondary warnings that you got used to ignoring them - to the point that I ignored a really important one once. I understand false alarms are not unheard of with CWS. One also assumes it would be annoying in BFM etc, although there may be a way of suppressing it.
On the other hand I think the 'just keep looking out' argument a little simplistic, naive even. But the counter argument that a close air prox is tantamount to a collision is (to me) daft as well. That would make every time I walked on a pavement the same as actually being run over.
And I can also see that if we aren't safe without it then a failed BIT = crew out, which seems a little extreme. But maybe that's right.
So, in adequately perhaps, I remain on the fence.
I suspect the fence is there because the R in ALARP is multi faceted and allows for human interpretation.
I am still undecided in my own mind. I totally agree with you wrt IFF which is an entry level requirement, and having read the H-C report recently the Nimrod issue is equally as cut and dried.
Is CWS really an entry level requirement though? I have never operated with one but can see the utility. On the other hand I have flown a machine that gave so many secondary warnings that you got used to ignoring them - to the point that I ignored a really important one once. I understand false alarms are not unheard of with CWS. One also assumes it would be annoying in BFM etc, although there may be a way of suppressing it.
On the other hand I think the 'just keep looking out' argument a little simplistic, naive even. But the counter argument that a close air prox is tantamount to a collision is (to me) daft as well. That would make every time I walked on a pavement the same as actually being run over.
And I can also see that if we aren't safe without it then a failed BIT = crew out, which seems a little extreme. But maybe that's right.
So, in adequately perhaps, I remain on the fence.
I suspect the fence is there because the R in ALARP is multi faceted and allows for human interpretation.
There are two parts to this debate. There are those who are arguing against the RAF’s decision that a CWS is needed in Tornado; and those, like myself, who are asking why MoD have decided to serially lie over the events between 1998 (endorsement) and today (still not fitted).
The former is a Requirements issue and we all know the failure to manage this component of acquisition is the biggest cause of late, over-cost and under-performing equipment projects. It is the main reason why the GOCO bid collapsed; largely because I suspect MoD (London) didn’t want to address this underlying failure. It suits them to let procurers in DE&S take the blame. (The problem with DE&S is not the procurers, but those at the top who have yet to attain the basic entry criteria for what was MoD(PE) and DPA. And no, this is not thread drift).
Requirements should always be challenged of course and I wonder if this one is being challenged as a result of this thread. I’ve challenged a few in my time. I didn’t agree with AML buying Active Dipping Sonar kit for Hercules and Sea King HC Mk4. (The latter with the RN’s agreement, which was bizarre and didn’t help my argument). I didn’t agree with the Army plans to buy some video kit from the US with an NTSC output, only to bin it when, for some extraordinary reason, it didn’t work when plugged into PAL kit. I didn’t agree with letting the BOWMAN contract for obsolete VHF & HF radios (also binned), when kit two generations newer was already being delivered and deployed (and, to cap it all, the subject of two concurrent replacement programmes). But hey ho, you can’t win them all.
Merry Xmas, war is over (according to Cameron).
The former is a Requirements issue and we all know the failure to manage this component of acquisition is the biggest cause of late, over-cost and under-performing equipment projects. It is the main reason why the GOCO bid collapsed; largely because I suspect MoD (London) didn’t want to address this underlying failure. It suits them to let procurers in DE&S take the blame. (The problem with DE&S is not the procurers, but those at the top who have yet to attain the basic entry criteria for what was MoD(PE) and DPA. And no, this is not thread drift).
Requirements should always be challenged of course and I wonder if this one is being challenged as a result of this thread. I’ve challenged a few in my time. I didn’t agree with AML buying Active Dipping Sonar kit for Hercules and Sea King HC Mk4. (The latter with the RN’s agreement, which was bizarre and didn’t help my argument). I didn’t agree with the Army plans to buy some video kit from the US with an NTSC output, only to bin it when, for some extraordinary reason, it didn’t work when plugged into PAL kit. I didn’t agree with letting the BOWMAN contract for obsolete VHF & HF radios (also binned), when kit two generations newer was already being delivered and deployed (and, to cap it all, the subject of two concurrent replacement programmes). But hey ho, you can’t win them all.
Merry Xmas, war is over (according to Cameron).
Please tell me that Tornados etc at least have a transponder that can be picked up by a civvy TCAS on the other aircraft? could at least get half the solution right.
Flug
Flug
Originally Posted by Tuc
There are two parts to this debate. There are those who are arguing against the RAF’s decision that a CWS is needed in Tornado; and those, like myself, who are asking why MoD have decided to serially lie over the events between 1998 (endorsement) and today (still not fitted).
I do respect your stance on this - as with many things you rightly stand for, but I don't think it's fair to say that anyone here is actually saying that some sort of CAWS should not be fitted. Some very good alternatives have been put forward (I would commend more thought given to Link16/JTIDS) and folk have expressed some doubts about some of the systems. That doesn't mean anyone here is siding with the forces of darkness.
The debate here (it is a debate) is not polarized into those that are against "it" and those that challenge the MOD. Sorry, Mate, I disagree with you on that point. I don't usually.
Courtney
I think we are at cross purposes because I don't think you really disagree with the opinions I've expressed.
I have no real interest in what system is fitted, although you surprised me by implying JTIDS isn't fitted to any Tornado. Not saying you're wrong by any means, it's just that I recall it being a requirement many moons ago in the mid-80s.
My offerings centre on the fact that, regardless of what system is fitted, it remains MoD policy that (a) it need not be functionally safe, (b) a false declaration may be made that it is safe, knowing it is not, and (c) it is an offence to refuse to make that false declaration. I will never agree with this policy, although I know many do. The MAA are fully aware of it and continue to keep quiet.
Your JTIDS comments reminded me that it was the same MoD Directorate/IPT that implemented the above polices so zealously, their mantra being "It works on the bench in isolation, so there is no need to integrate or test it in the aircraft". Hence, Burridge's recommendations regarding functional safety of the IFF in the ZG710 BoI.
I think we are at cross purposes because I don't think you really disagree with the opinions I've expressed.
I have no real interest in what system is fitted, although you surprised me by implying JTIDS isn't fitted to any Tornado. Not saying you're wrong by any means, it's just that I recall it being a requirement many moons ago in the mid-80s.
My offerings centre on the fact that, regardless of what system is fitted, it remains MoD policy that (a) it need not be functionally safe, (b) a false declaration may be made that it is safe, knowing it is not, and (c) it is an offence to refuse to make that false declaration. I will never agree with this policy, although I know many do. The MAA are fully aware of it and continue to keep quiet.
Your JTIDS comments reminded me that it was the same MoD Directorate/IPT that implemented the above polices so zealously, their mantra being "It works on the bench in isolation, so there is no need to integrate or test it in the aircraft". Hence, Burridge's recommendations regarding functional safety of the IFF in the ZG710 BoI.