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Long Lead Specialist Skills involves everyone associated with the ship. Deck hands, engineers, ATC, Ships Command team (CO, XO, Navs etc).
Those of us that do this game know that the aircrew are only a very small part of the big picture. It's a team effort that requires practice and skill from all involved.
Those of us that do this game know that the aircrew are only a very small part of the big picture. It's a team effort that requires practice and skill from all involved.
AutoBit
Exactly! The problem is integration.
AndyP
Sadly I am not bright enough to be an academic! I think the people quoted below have plenty of real world experience!
WhiteOvies:
orca:
Bismark:
Bismark:
Not a boffin:
From my first post on the Harrier thread, I have been worried by the lack of systems thinking, and the number of people who forget that the problem is not really individual skills, or groups of individuals, it is how all these efforts are integrated.
Prior to SDSR, the plan was to embark more Harriers aboard the CVS, for longer periods, and more often. This was intended to recover from skill fade during the period the Harriers were committed to Afghanistan, and to prepare for CVF. The fact that a CVS deck ws/is that much smaller than the CVF one will be was neither here nor there - and one could argue that operating the same number of aircraft from a smaller deck demands more skill.
Sending people on exchange is good, but when they return from exchange, how will they practise those skills? Will the entire flight deck party have spent time on exchange? Will the entire range of personnel involved, a future OOW for instance, have had the opportunity to practise working with embarked fixed wing aircraft? How do you provide the ship's company with basic things like awareness of FOD (more of a problem with fixed wing aircraft), jet blast (F-35B will produce more than Harrier), or perhaps Flyco and the OOW working together to ensure that the ship is on the right bearing at the right speed to recover the jets?
Exactly! The problem is integration.
AndyP
Sadly I am not bright enough to be an academic! I think the people quoted below have plenty of real world experience!
WhiteOvies:
The bigger issue is getting everyone else to be ready for a large, busy flight deck. At least there is a team of people looking into this issue and both deckcrew, aircrew and engineers are being appropriately positioned to give them some exposure to this dangerous environment prior to QEC.
All we need to see is a signed document from CAS saying that he will embark his jets as soon as the CO indicates his ship is ready in all respects to conduct aviation.
The second sentence will indicate that he will disembark them only when the Air Management Organisation is fully up to speed, the Air Group is fulfilling ATO tasking, the Air Weapon supply team have produced weapons to surge capacity and these have been loaded on jets and dropped, the Yellow Coats can marshal, chain and chock a fourship in all weathers, whilst another fourship is taxying for take off. The jets will remain embarked until every Fighter Controller in the fleet has worked a fourship through Red Crown procedures and the JFACCHQ have established resilient comms for a week or two and Flyco have exercised being b#ggered about from dawn to dusk. Repeat all for night ops. When all this is crimped the TG in its entirety will take part in a COMAO based exercise of Neptune Warrior type scope and we'll call it good.
The third sentence will indicate that the jets will be back as soon as any of the above notice any degree of skill fade and the process will start again.
The second sentence will indicate that he will disembark them only when the Air Management Organisation is fully up to speed, the Air Group is fulfilling ATO tasking, the Air Weapon supply team have produced weapons to surge capacity and these have been loaded on jets and dropped, the Yellow Coats can marshal, chain and chock a fourship in all weathers, whilst another fourship is taxying for take off. The jets will remain embarked until every Fighter Controller in the fleet has worked a fourship through Red Crown procedures and the JFACCHQ have established resilient comms for a week or two and Flyco have exercised being b#ggered about from dawn to dusk. Repeat all for night ops. When all this is crimped the TG in its entirety will take part in a COMAO based exercise of Neptune Warrior type scope and we'll call it good.
The third sentence will indicate that the jets will be back as soon as any of the above notice any degree of skill fade and the process will start again.
As I am sure has been said elsewhere, the aircraft and pilots just represent the front end of the carrier strike capability. The idiocy of the SDSR decision, which the PM is about to compound in the FR/UK Defence deal (FT Today), is that we risk losing the capability to operate jets off carriers. All of the expertise on the current CVSs will have gone (we are getting rid of the CVSs), the aircrew will have gone (either PVRd, redundant or moved to other aircraft types, the command experience will have gone (as will the met, ATC, FC, deck handlers, planners etc, etc).
But what is missing in 2020 is the crews on the ships with any experience of aviation - from the CO downwards....I am sure the MAA will have something to say about that, indeed I wonder whether they are doing anything about it at the moment?
I'd put a fair bit of money that the guys who've done exchange tours have not done time in CATCC, Wings / Little F (Air & mini-boss in USN), handlers office or the squadron engineering and logs posts.
While they may be adept at doing the mission plan, launch, mission, recovery thing, they are unlikely to have a great understanding of how to spot a deck, arrange aircraft for servicing vice maintenance, weapons prep and bombing up and how all the various departments both in the squadrons and on the ship work to deliver the sortie rate. People thinking just about aircrew and (to some degree) chockheads are missing the point - it's the corporate experience of how to put it all together that is about to be lost. Nor can that be maintained at HMS Siskin - that just gives the basics of handling, not the fine art of pulling it all together.
As SDSR says "we need a plan to regenerate the necessary skills"- all I can say is it had better be a f8cking good one, cunning eneough to do more than brush your teeth with!
While they may be adept at doing the mission plan, launch, mission, recovery thing, they are unlikely to have a great understanding of how to spot a deck, arrange aircraft for servicing vice maintenance, weapons prep and bombing up and how all the various departments both in the squadrons and on the ship work to deliver the sortie rate. People thinking just about aircrew and (to some degree) chockheads are missing the point - it's the corporate experience of how to put it all together that is about to be lost. Nor can that be maintained at HMS Siskin - that just gives the basics of handling, not the fine art of pulling it all together.
As SDSR says "we need a plan to regenerate the necessary skills"- all I can say is it had better be a f8cking good one, cunning eneough to do more than brush your teeth with!
Originally Posted by WEBF
How will we maintain the skills of flight deck crews, planners, met types, FC and ATC types, and so on? What about the teamwork needed throughout the ship, from the bridge to the Operations Room to the Ship Control Centre?
Sending people on exchange is good, but when they return from exchange, how will they practise those skills? Will the entire flight deck party have spent time on exchange? Will the entire range of personnel involved, a future OOW for instance, have had the opportunity to practise working with embarked fixed wing aircraft? How do you provide the ship's company with basic things like awareness of FOD (more of a problem with fixed wing aircraft), jet blast (F-35B will produce more than Harrier), or perhaps Flyco and the OOW working together to ensure that the ship is on the right bearing at the right speed to recover the jets?
WEBF - you seem to think we've stopped doing flying full-stop. I've been an OOW for a FW Flying (F/A-2 natch), and it's not that different to getting the wind in the SHOL for a helicopter.
As for discrete individuals, they're all on LLSS time, and will come together to learn as a team in QNLZ, trained by a whole variety of organisations.
Whilst I am not necessarily the greatest fan of the RN's processes, the amount of credible effort that is being put into making this a success is re-assuring.
as an NB, there are some poor Pilot Officers who are learning to become Fish-heads; bet they didn't expect that when they walked into the Career's Office.....
As for discrete individuals, they're all on LLSS time, and will come together to learn as a team in QNLZ, trained by a whole variety of organisations.
Whilst I am not necessarily the greatest fan of the RN's processes, the amount of credible effort that is being put into making this a success is re-assuring.
as an NB, there are some poor Pilot Officers who are learning to become Fish-heads; bet they didn't expect that when they walked into the Career's Office.....
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Nostalgic Olden Tymes in RN Carrier Aviation for Deck Crew
A bit of nostalgia for 'WEBF'. I recall reading about RN pilots in this era carrying out their first deck landings after flying some distance (to Far East for example) to join their carrier and carry on from there.
[RN] NAVY NEWS August 2013 page 27
201308 Navy News Aug 13=
[RN] NAVY NEWS August 2013 page 27
"Carrier crossings
READING my copy of the 'Dockyard Dandy' dated July 2013 gave me cause to recall my days in the Fleet Air Arm (1957-67).
I read with great interest, 'Just like riding an Ike'. It may well be the first time 'Jack' has performed as an aircraft director on a super carrier, but not the first time on any carrier.
While in both Hermes and Victorious we cross-operated with the Forrestal and Saratoga (US Sixth Fleet) off Naples. The squadron spent a week on board the American carriers which were the super carriers of their day (60,000 tons).
I presume the cats and traps are what we would have known as catapults and arrester gear.
It is interesting to note the exam and qualification required for such duties, something far removed from my day. When you joined a ship you were thrown into the deep end with dummy runs, using Lansing Bagnalls and Tugmasters to simulate aircraft movements.
The first time we got involved on a live deck was when the aircraft flew on, and the experience was carried through to night flying.
All of this will no doubt appear primitive in comparison with this day and age, however it is well documented that we were the world leaders in operating the deck of a light fleet carrier.
In all my experience of cross-operating we always achieved a greater number of launches and recoveries than other navies including the Yanks, and always had a higher serviceability record.
I wonder if today an EMA would be allowed to operate the crane (jumbo) when duty crash crew?
- Jim 'Paddy' Stroud"
READING my copy of the 'Dockyard Dandy' dated July 2013 gave me cause to recall my days in the Fleet Air Arm (1957-67).
I read with great interest, 'Just like riding an Ike'. It may well be the first time 'Jack' has performed as an aircraft director on a super carrier, but not the first time on any carrier.
While in both Hermes and Victorious we cross-operated with the Forrestal and Saratoga (US Sixth Fleet) off Naples. The squadron spent a week on board the American carriers which were the super carriers of their day (60,000 tons).
I presume the cats and traps are what we would have known as catapults and arrester gear.
It is interesting to note the exam and qualification required for such duties, something far removed from my day. When you joined a ship you were thrown into the deep end with dummy runs, using Lansing Bagnalls and Tugmasters to simulate aircraft movements.
The first time we got involved on a live deck was when the aircraft flew on, and the experience was carried through to night flying.
All of this will no doubt appear primitive in comparison with this day and age, however it is well documented that we were the world leaders in operating the deck of a light fleet carrier.
In all my experience of cross-operating we always achieved a greater number of launches and recoveries than other navies including the Yanks, and always had a higher serviceability record.
I wonder if today an EMA would be allowed to operate the crane (jumbo) when duty crash crew?
- Jim 'Paddy' Stroud"
Last edited by SpazSinbad; 1st Sep 2013 at 07:59. Reason: spelun
a_t_g
But if the glass is half full, it is also half empty. As you know I have quite a few reasons for being a member of the glass half empty school of thought. If it is half empty, where did the missing half go?
Anyway, I think that we have been around this buoy before. In fact quite a few times. See this thread from back in 2006, not long after SHAR was retired:
Harrier Carrier Currency
I think that if the guys quoted here and in my previous post think there are unresolved issues, I believe them. Hopefully these issues are being gripped, maybe behind the scenes....?
But if the glass is half full, it is also half empty. As you know I have quite a few reasons for being a member of the glass half empty school of thought. If it is half empty, where did the missing half go?
Anyway, I think that we have been around this buoy before. In fact quite a few times. See this thread from back in 2006, not long after SHAR was retired:
Harrier Carrier Currency
Originally Posted by orca
... if we want to tell MPs that we have a carrier ready to go that means getting the whole ship working to recover and throw off jets. That means the MCO getting the ATO, the stokers getting the donks up to ramming speed, the briefo's being ready on time, the tractor drivers getting the strike ready at the back having seen them all taxy into the grave yard......
Originally Posted by Widger
It is not just about being a monkey on a stick, it is about the whole ship's team also training and getting used to handling sometimes up to 17 jets in a limited space without killing anyone or damaging anything. It takes at least 10 days to build up the trust between crew and aircrew so that when the s**t hits the fan, you know that you can rely on the guy/girl on the deck or that voice on the radio.Those who fly from ships, RN, Marine, Army or RAF have my utmost respect gained from watching many of them over the last 20 years, put their faith in the equipment and team around them.
Originally Posted by SSSETOWTF
I wholeheartedly agree with both you and Orca though, that it takes a lot of work to get the boys and girls who operate the ship, from the stokers to the deck handlers, up to speed and working as a fully integrated team. So I would suggest that the RN requirement is somewhat driven from that side of things rather than what the pilot has to do/practise.
Half-full is about standard for a lot of military capabilities these days. Doesn't sound like there is too much to complain about, especially as there clearly is a plan: do nothing until the hardware is about to be delivered (really delivered, not just promised) and then start to worry about all the skills and personnel that they should have thought of years earlier; rapid work-up and training programme; delay to declaring IOC because of that (and numerous other issues); eventually someone posts some video on PPRuNe of the new jet doing a couple of launches from and recoveries to the new deck; everything declared OK. 
You can stop fussing now.
You can stop fussing now.
WEBF - some (most?) of those skills are flying skills, regardless of RW or FW. We are continuing 'big deck' flying through to the introduction of QE, so there will be a core of people who know how to strip an ATO etc etc. In some ways (from my small big deck experience) getting lots of RW off the deck is harder than FW flying; the latter is all about getting it into 1 SHOL, the former can involve juggling lots of SHOLs.
Will it be easy and painless - of course not. Will there some lessons to (re)learn - of course. Can we do it - I think so.
Will it be easy and painless - of course not. Will there some lessons to (re)learn - of course. Can we do it - I think so.
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I’m afraid I am someone that does not suffer fools gladly and would it be fair to suggest this might be the case with Commander Ward? My thoughts are did this man set the bar at a very high standard both for himself and those that served alongside him.
I keep hearing how this person has a hatred for those of a light blue persuasion but is that a fair observation? My old boss was disliked by the great majority of senior officers or those who we call flag rank and why was this? Simply because he called a spade a spade and never beat about the bush and when trying to get his point across he never pulled his punches. Sadly that meant he never reached the heights he so rightly deserved but those that served under him would go to hell and back for this man.
Was Douglas Bader a person held in the highest of regard by his senior officers, or is it a case of perhaps cometh the hour, cometh the man
Getting back to Commander Ward, if he disliked RAF pilots as much as some folks allege, then can they explain why he had an RAF pilot as his squadron’s QFI? My own thoughts are that he decided this was the best pilot for the job and never gave it a second thought regarding cut of the cloth. He simply wanted the best person for the job, but never let common sense get in the way of a good old fashioned rant.
If we were in charge of deciding what is the better type aircraft for purely land based operations and the choice was between the Tornado or Harrier, then what aircraft would we choose?
Who decided to give the RAF the ownership of the Harrier force? Had a number of commanding officers that lost their ships during the Falklands campaign become flag officers by the time this decision was made?
If the answer is yes then what did these admirals do to keep their fast jets? If they felt so passionately about this issue then should they have made a stance? Is it fair to put all the blame into the laps of the light blue?
I would have expected the First Sea Lord to have dug his heels in regarding marine strike capability, we are a small island dependant on keeping the sea lanes open come hell or high water. In this modern age is a Navy without top cover simply a bunch of floating targets waiting to be sunk?
Only a fool would believe any claim that land based aircraft would always be available to protect the fleet. That type of claim is best left to the gin and tonic brigade that like to talk a good fight as opposed to fight the good fight.
Do we pick the location of the fight or do we deploy to where we need to fight? To believe a land based force would choose to keep the harrier instead of a better type of aircraft is possibly bad judgemment and to cry foul after the expected happened could be seen as sour grapes? (question)
Just me asking a few questions and is this a better tempered thread than most that talk about this retired senior Naval officer?
Best wishes one and all
John
I keep hearing how this person has a hatred for those of a light blue persuasion but is that a fair observation? My old boss was disliked by the great majority of senior officers or those who we call flag rank and why was this? Simply because he called a spade a spade and never beat about the bush and when trying to get his point across he never pulled his punches. Sadly that meant he never reached the heights he so rightly deserved but those that served under him would go to hell and back for this man.
Was Douglas Bader a person held in the highest of regard by his senior officers, or is it a case of perhaps cometh the hour, cometh the man
Getting back to Commander Ward, if he disliked RAF pilots as much as some folks allege, then can they explain why he had an RAF pilot as his squadron’s QFI? My own thoughts are that he decided this was the best pilot for the job and never gave it a second thought regarding cut of the cloth. He simply wanted the best person for the job, but never let common sense get in the way of a good old fashioned rant.
If we were in charge of deciding what is the better type aircraft for purely land based operations and the choice was between the Tornado or Harrier, then what aircraft would we choose?
Who decided to give the RAF the ownership of the Harrier force? Had a number of commanding officers that lost their ships during the Falklands campaign become flag officers by the time this decision was made?
If the answer is yes then what did these admirals do to keep their fast jets? If they felt so passionately about this issue then should they have made a stance? Is it fair to put all the blame into the laps of the light blue?
I would have expected the First Sea Lord to have dug his heels in regarding marine strike capability, we are a small island dependant on keeping the sea lanes open come hell or high water. In this modern age is a Navy without top cover simply a bunch of floating targets waiting to be sunk?
Only a fool would believe any claim that land based aircraft would always be available to protect the fleet. That type of claim is best left to the gin and tonic brigade that like to talk a good fight as opposed to fight the good fight.
Do we pick the location of the fight or do we deploy to where we need to fight? To believe a land based force would choose to keep the harrier instead of a better type of aircraft is possibly bad judgemment and to cry foul after the expected happened could be seen as sour grapes? (question)
Just me asking a few questions and is this a better tempered thread than most that talk about this retired senior Naval officer?
Best wishes one and all
John
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Glojo,
Interesting post and you raise some good points, but its worth considering why these Admirals didn't dig their heels in. Pull up a sandbag...dit on.
Late 90's RAF GR7's and FAA FA2's in the gulf flying Northern Watch missions. AMRAAM FA2 providing escort for LGB equipped GR's. Quite a nice little package and also fits the RN's desire to move the CVS away from ASW and more towards a 'Strike Carrier'. Some bright spark says 'Why dont we combine the two fleets into a single force?' Enter the birth of JF2000. Only problem here we are told is that you cant really have two separate C2 organisations, so why dont we txfer control of the Force to the RAF.
Few raised eyebrows from the RN, but dont worry, we'll make a dedicated Maritime Group (3 Gp) that, although part of Strike, will be commanded by an RN 2* who will also have control of all maritime air assists i.e. Nimrod and SAR as well. Sounds reasonable?
3Gp formed and all is looking rosey, but now we're told that there isn't enough money to keep the FA2 going and the GR. Lets scrap the FA2 but use the money saved to upgrade the GR7 to GR9 with 107 engines (ideal for hot weather CVS Ops). Again a few raised eyebrows but OK. It makes sense. Now the only problem here is that, having retired the FA2, 3 Gp is now not big enough to justify Gp status, and so it is disbanded and moved entirely to RAF control in 1 Gp, but with JAMO over site (of note about the same size that 1Gp is now).
RN getting very uncomfortable by now, but we're in it and so have to make do. Added to this GR9's with 107 engines are the best solution for delivering Carrier Strike.
Herrick kicks off and GR7/9 is deployed. Unfortunately the commitment is such that we're going to have to sacrifice some Carrier Strike skills to keep the Force going on Herrick. Cant really argue with that, although again its deeply concerning for the RN. But not to worry, when the Force returns from Ops Carrier Strike will be the No1 priority. The rest, as they say, is history.
Now this is only one side of the story, but for the likes of Sharkey and his allies the whole JF2000/JFH episode shows that the RAF will always drop the Carrier capability at the first sign of difficulty.
So where the Admirals naive? Possibly, but it was death by a thousand cuts, rather then a sweeping blow. I think this episode goes some way to explain the RNs current attitude.
Interesting post and you raise some good points, but its worth considering why these Admirals didn't dig their heels in. Pull up a sandbag...dit on.
Late 90's RAF GR7's and FAA FA2's in the gulf flying Northern Watch missions. AMRAAM FA2 providing escort for LGB equipped GR's. Quite a nice little package and also fits the RN's desire to move the CVS away from ASW and more towards a 'Strike Carrier'. Some bright spark says 'Why dont we combine the two fleets into a single force?' Enter the birth of JF2000. Only problem here we are told is that you cant really have two separate C2 organisations, so why dont we txfer control of the Force to the RAF.
Few raised eyebrows from the RN, but dont worry, we'll make a dedicated Maritime Group (3 Gp) that, although part of Strike, will be commanded by an RN 2* who will also have control of all maritime air assists i.e. Nimrod and SAR as well. Sounds reasonable?
3Gp formed and all is looking rosey, but now we're told that there isn't enough money to keep the FA2 going and the GR. Lets scrap the FA2 but use the money saved to upgrade the GR7 to GR9 with 107 engines (ideal for hot weather CVS Ops). Again a few raised eyebrows but OK. It makes sense. Now the only problem here is that, having retired the FA2, 3 Gp is now not big enough to justify Gp status, and so it is disbanded and moved entirely to RAF control in 1 Gp, but with JAMO over site (of note about the same size that 1Gp is now).
RN getting very uncomfortable by now, but we're in it and so have to make do. Added to this GR9's with 107 engines are the best solution for delivering Carrier Strike.
Herrick kicks off and GR7/9 is deployed. Unfortunately the commitment is such that we're going to have to sacrifice some Carrier Strike skills to keep the Force going on Herrick. Cant really argue with that, although again its deeply concerning for the RN. But not to worry, when the Force returns from Ops Carrier Strike will be the No1 priority. The rest, as they say, is history.
Now this is only one side of the story, but for the likes of Sharkey and his allies the whole JF2000/JFH episode shows that the RAF will always drop the Carrier capability at the first sign of difficulty.
So where the Admirals naive? Possibly, but it was death by a thousand cuts, rather then a sweeping blow. I think this episode goes some way to explain the RNs current attitude.
Last edited by AutoBit; 5th Sep 2013 at 02:05.
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A quick question from a non mil pilot. Has inter service rivalry done any good for the RN and the RAF? Is anything beyond normal squadron banter just harmful to both services?
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Autobit,
Not being a FJ mate, I found your post very helpful in understanding how we came to be where we are. The idea that carrier strike capability fell as a victim to a series of logical decisions that didn't match the emerging circumstances, is a better fit with my world view, than that the RAF had some grand Machiavellian plan to undermine the RN.
Sun.
Not being a FJ mate, I found your post very helpful in understanding how we came to be where we are. The idea that carrier strike capability fell as a victim to a series of logical decisions that didn't match the emerging circumstances, is a better fit with my world view, than that the RAF had some grand Machiavellian plan to undermine the RN.
Sun.
The idea that carrier strike capability fell as a victim to a series of logical decisions that didn't match the emerging circumstances, is a better fit with my world view, than that the RAF had some grand Machiavellian plan to undermine the RN.
But you can't blame some for seeing it all both as part of a grand plan by the light blue to rule the military world, and a total inability by their Airships to understand maritime operations. It goes back 80 years. A few examples:
1. Between the end of WW1 and 1938 almost total starvation of the air resources of the RN, a situation barely recovered in time for WW2.
2. In 1940, the RAF had to be persuaded to release ship sightings from maritime patrol aircraft to the naval intelligence centre (quoted in Alan Turing's biography).
3. Near starvation of Coastal Command until the middle of WW2 - priority being, of course, given to bomber command (and don't get me started on that!).
4. Failure to provide any serious air resources to support the Mediterranean Fleet throughout 1940 and 41 - resulting in appalling loss of men and ships on Malta convoys from the East and during the evacuation of Crete.
It goes on ...
5. "Moving" Australia in the run-up to Denis Healey's cancellation of the carrier programme, to give a false impression that the RAF could provide world-wide fighter cover for the Fleet.
and then, cancellation of the Harrier.
Like many on this thread, I am amazed and disappointed that the then 1SL did not resign over the issue. Peace time admiral, I guess.
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Hi Autobit and thank you for the reply and I just feel the Navy was at the very least naive regarding this issue, to me the outcome was as predictable as night following day but once politicians become involved we have more dusks and dawns as opposed to black or white.
We are extremely lucky in having some highly qualified folks on this forum whose opinions I value and whilst I am asking questions regarding the conduct of the most senior Naval officers I will now drift slightly
off topic and point my finger in a different direction.
I think it fair to suggest I hold the Navy responsible for the loss of our marine strike capability but what about our Marine Long Reconnaissance capability? Again we are a small island dependant on keeping our sea lanes open and in this regard we had a highly professional dedicated service that was second to none in carrying out this role.
I accept we have a shortage of funds but we need to look after our own before we look after others and should this type of aircraft be a requirement to the defence of our sea lanes? What resource do we now have to carry out this role? Do our senior officers not believe in standing up for what is right? we can talk about a lack of funding until the cows come home and if our senior officers allow these cuts they will happen but let us not forget we give in excess of £480m to Syria each year in aid and is the total yearly budget approximately £9billion per year? Lunatics, aslums and ruling come to mind but no doubt the whole World appreciates our generosity.
Meanwhile back to Commander Ward
We are extremely lucky in having some highly qualified folks on this forum whose opinions I value and whilst I am asking questions regarding the conduct of the most senior Naval officers I will now drift slightly
off topic and point my finger in a different direction. I think it fair to suggest I hold the Navy responsible for the loss of our marine strike capability but what about our Marine Long Reconnaissance capability? Again we are a small island dependant on keeping our sea lanes open and in this regard we had a highly professional dedicated service that was second to none in carrying out this role.
I accept we have a shortage of funds but we need to look after our own before we look after others and should this type of aircraft be a requirement to the defence of our sea lanes? What resource do we now have to carry out this role? Do our senior officers not believe in standing up for what is right? we can talk about a lack of funding until the cows come home and if our senior officers allow these cuts they will happen but let us not forget we give in excess of £480m to Syria each year in aid and is the total yearly budget approximately £9billion per year? Lunatics, aslums and ruling come to mind but no doubt the whole World appreciates our generosity.
Meanwhile back to Commander Ward
Do a Hover - it avoids G
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Dat581
In my experience interservice rivalry in the UK - the only place I have experience of - is the most terrible waste of intellectual horsepower, money and time. It has contributed to many delays and costs.
An example was the lobbying of the PM (the weekend before the PM's SDR statement) by a few very senior officers who had their own personal agenda. This resulted in the PM going against the MOD properly staffed decision to acquire the F-35B and change the buy to the F-35C. It took nearly two years and a lot of money we could not afford for the MOD to re-justify and implement the original plan.
The problem any PM has in such a situation is that he cannot be an expert in most topics, plus we can bet the impressive senior individuals involved gave him one of the most exceptional briefs of his career.
In general it is my experience that world class professional liars (whoever they work for and whatever their aims) are very impressive people unless you really know the subject they are talking about.
In my experience interservice rivalry in the UK - the only place I have experience of - is the most terrible waste of intellectual horsepower, money and time. It has contributed to many delays and costs.
An example was the lobbying of the PM (the weekend before the PM's SDR statement) by a few very senior officers who had their own personal agenda. This resulted in the PM going against the MOD properly staffed decision to acquire the F-35B and change the buy to the F-35C. It took nearly two years and a lot of money we could not afford for the MOD to re-justify and implement the original plan.
The problem any PM has in such a situation is that he cannot be an expert in most topics, plus we can bet the impressive senior individuals involved gave him one of the most exceptional briefs of his career.
In general it is my experience that world class professional liars (whoever they work for and whatever their aims) are very impressive people unless you really know the subject they are talking about.
Interesting anecdote John, first time I've seen it portrayed in such terms.
This resulted in the PM going against the MOD properly staffed decision to acquire the F-35B and change the buy to the F-35C.
This is potentially a massive story if it could be verified - it would be interesting to see what advice he was given, and if indeed the PM knew that the wider MOD advice differed etc.
It certainly appears that the decision was taken without appropriate diligence - I would hope that the risks and uncertainties were laid out for the politicians at the time. Most such brave* decisions carry such caveats.
*brave = ill informed wild ar*e guess without supporting evidence or analysis.
This resulted in the PM going against the MOD properly staffed decision to acquire the F-35B and change the buy to the F-35C.
This is potentially a massive story if it could be verified - it would be interesting to see what advice he was given, and if indeed the PM knew that the wider MOD advice differed etc.
It certainly appears that the decision was taken without appropriate diligence - I would hope that the risks and uncertainties were laid out for the politicians at the time. Most such brave* decisions carry such caveats.
*brave = ill informed wild ar*e guess without supporting evidence or analysis.
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I'm sure all this is not news to the majority but you might want to ponder the following. (Aimed at the CV has to be better than STOVL because it must be types - or the closely allied 'I've never done it but...' brigade).
Both a STOVL and CV operator spend a maritime mission trying to use their fuel at a rate which gets them to the correct amount at the back end of the sortie. Statement of the obvious.
In the STOVL game this is a little bit below hover weight as you come along side the boat. Less adds risk, more makes the whole thing totally impossible.
In the CV game it's far more restrictive because there's a bigger chance of you missing the wires so you carry a number of missed passes as well - whilst having to be below maximum trap weight.
Both jets will carry fuel for the approach they intend to do, i.e. instrument or visual - but the CV then has to carry more fuel in the instrument case because a run around the IMC bolter/wave-off pattern costs you more than a visual pattern.
But in summary you carry fuel for more 'goes' in the CV environment than you do in the STOVL.
Then there's timing.
Traditionally in the STOVL game you get airborne knowing when you'll arrive at the deck, in the CV game you know when you have to be overhead to watch the launch - prior to making your approach - or when to be in marshal, so the feast is more flexible and the only way you have of making it work is by carrying (and probably jettisoning) more fuel.
Now - I am not for one second saying you can get more out of the F-35B than you can the C, but I am saying that the true 'useable mission fuel' is actually a country mile closer than the sales docs suggest - which is of course what the arm chair quarterbacks read.
Last point. I have no idea what he USMC do pre-embarkation but JFH did a pre-embarkation sim and a couple of VLs in the week prior. The Sea Harrier force did....errr, nothing laid down.
A USN CVW will probably be mandated by CAG to do as many as eight or even ten FCLP sorties prior to embarkation, which these days might take most of a month. The LSO types will also ensure (quite rightly) that these are dedicated sorties.
That's ten sorties where you do nothing tactical and simply (simply) fly the ball.
This extends into the deck environment. JFH day deck qual was five trips of which the last two were tactical. F-18 CQ is ten day and six night traps - none of which are tactical.
So if you have a month to spare from your training to 'train to land', CV is great. Well - not great - but 'better' than STOVL by a margin which is actually far smaller than most assume.
Both a STOVL and CV operator spend a maritime mission trying to use their fuel at a rate which gets them to the correct amount at the back end of the sortie. Statement of the obvious.
In the STOVL game this is a little bit below hover weight as you come along side the boat. Less adds risk, more makes the whole thing totally impossible.
In the CV game it's far more restrictive because there's a bigger chance of you missing the wires so you carry a number of missed passes as well - whilst having to be below maximum trap weight.
Both jets will carry fuel for the approach they intend to do, i.e. instrument or visual - but the CV then has to carry more fuel in the instrument case because a run around the IMC bolter/wave-off pattern costs you more than a visual pattern.
But in summary you carry fuel for more 'goes' in the CV environment than you do in the STOVL.
Then there's timing.
Traditionally in the STOVL game you get airborne knowing when you'll arrive at the deck, in the CV game you know when you have to be overhead to watch the launch - prior to making your approach - or when to be in marshal, so the feast is more flexible and the only way you have of making it work is by carrying (and probably jettisoning) more fuel.
Now - I am not for one second saying you can get more out of the F-35B than you can the C, but I am saying that the true 'useable mission fuel' is actually a country mile closer than the sales docs suggest - which is of course what the arm chair quarterbacks read.
Last point. I have no idea what he USMC do pre-embarkation but JFH did a pre-embarkation sim and a couple of VLs in the week prior. The Sea Harrier force did....errr, nothing laid down.
A USN CVW will probably be mandated by CAG to do as many as eight or even ten FCLP sorties prior to embarkation, which these days might take most of a month. The LSO types will also ensure (quite rightly) that these are dedicated sorties.
That's ten sorties where you do nothing tactical and simply (simply) fly the ball.
This extends into the deck environment. JFH day deck qual was five trips of which the last two were tactical. F-18 CQ is ten day and six night traps - none of which are tactical.
So if you have a month to spare from your training to 'train to land', CV is great. Well - not great - but 'better' than STOVL by a margin which is actually far smaller than most assume.
orca,
In view of the recent success with X-47, has there ever been a serious push towards making automatic landings the mandatory / only option for recovering to a CV, even for manned aircraft? If suitable levels of redundancy could be built in at both ends, presumably the training and fuel margins for CV ops could be reduced. I'm sure it's been considered, but interested to know why it doesn't seem to be on the table for F-35C.
In view of the recent success with X-47, has there ever been a serious push towards making automatic landings the mandatory / only option for recovering to a CV, even for manned aircraft? If suitable levels of redundancy could be built in at both ends, presumably the training and fuel margins for CV ops could be reduced. I'm sure it's been considered, but interested to know why it doesn't seem to be on the table for F-35C.
Last edited by Easy Street; 8th Sep 2013 at 19:52.