The idea that carrier strike capability fell as a victim to a series of logical decisions that didn't match the emerging circumstances, is a better fit with my world view, than that the RAF had some grand Machiavellian plan to undermine the RN.
As usual, cock-up (by both shades of blue) trumps conspiracy.
But you can't blame some for seeing it all both as part of a grand plan by the light blue to rule the military world, and a total inability by their Airships to understand maritime operations. It goes back 80 years. A few examples:
1. Between the end of WW1 and 1938 almost total starvation of the air resources of the RN, a situation barely recovered in time for WW2.
2. In 1940, the RAF had to be
persuaded to release ship sightings from maritime patrol aircraft to the naval intelligence centre (quoted in Alan Turing's biography).
3. Near starvation of Coastal Command until the middle of WW2 - priority being, of course, given to bomber command (and don't get me started on that!).
4. Failure to provide any serious air resources to support the Mediterranean Fleet throughout 1940 and 41 - resulting in appalling loss of men and ships on Malta convoys from the East and during the evacuation of Crete.
It goes on ...
5. "Moving" Australia in the run-up to Denis Healey's cancellation of the carrier programme, to give a false impression that the RAF could provide world-wide fighter cover for the Fleet.
and then, cancellation of the Harrier.
Like many on this thread, I am amazed and disappointed that the then 1SL did not resign over the issue. Peace time admiral, I guess.