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Suspicion breeds confidence
Spain selling Mirage F1Ms to ARG
According to the Express anyway.
Jet fighter threat to the Falkland Islands | World | News | Daily Express
Seems a logical extension from their Mirage III experience.
Luckily our new carriers are over 70,000 tons
Progress being made but uncertainties remain
Jet fighter threat to the Falkland Islands | World | News | Daily Express
Seems a logical extension from their Mirage III experience.
Luckily our new carriers are over 70,000 tons
Progress being made but uncertainties remain
Last edited by Navaleye; 4th Aug 2013 at 20:04.
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Dear all.
I am indeed Lewis Gaylard, middle initial M for Mark. Don't worry, I have had others ask if 'Gaylard' is a real name....
I certainly don't think I was inflammatory in the comments I made, I certainly did not intend to offend anyone.
My remarks concerning 'Cougar 12' was based on info I had been given, but not allowed to use, for a different magazine article.
When 'Cougar 12' was in the 'Work-up' phase off Plymouth Sound RAF Chinooks turned up 2 days late citing 'Bad Weather'.....later during the 'Corsican Lion' and 'Albanian Lion' phases the same RAF Chinooks refused to embark to HMS Illustrious or HMS Bulwark, again citing bad weather. I understand that an order from above was given so the said Chinooks eventually embarked. Bare in mind that while the Chinooks were not present the combined helicopters of the FAA and AAC were all operating as normal.
So this is where I based my 'Up their game' comment.
And before you ask, the info I received came from within the RAF not from a biased naval/army source.
I hope this clarifies things....
I am indeed Lewis Gaylard, middle initial M for Mark. Don't worry, I have had others ask if 'Gaylard' is a real name....
I certainly don't think I was inflammatory in the comments I made, I certainly did not intend to offend anyone.
My remarks concerning 'Cougar 12' was based on info I had been given, but not allowed to use, for a different magazine article.
When 'Cougar 12' was in the 'Work-up' phase off Plymouth Sound RAF Chinooks turned up 2 days late citing 'Bad Weather'.....later during the 'Corsican Lion' and 'Albanian Lion' phases the same RAF Chinooks refused to embark to HMS Illustrious or HMS Bulwark, again citing bad weather. I understand that an order from above was given so the said Chinooks eventually embarked. Bare in mind that while the Chinooks were not present the combined helicopters of the FAA and AAC were all operating as normal.
So this is where I based my 'Up their game' comment.
And before you ask, the info I received came from within the RAF not from a biased naval/army source.
I hope this clarifies things....
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Thanks Lewis (feels wrong using a 'real' name on the Prune).
Interesting. This is one of those situations when only having all the info will do.
What was the weather between the departure point of the Chinooks, and the fleet? Was it the same as the weather between the RN helos and the fleet?
What was the experience level of the RAF crews? Just because the crews in question may not have had the necessary SQEP to 'make it through the murk' doesn't mean the entire Chinook force can't.
I'm sure there are reasons, related to weather and experience, that might have precluded the Chinooks embarking/playing but I think just these few suggest that, without all the info, opinions are just hearsay.
Having been involved with RAF embarked helo ops, as aircrew, I find it unlikely (although not impossible) that skills have degraded so significantly, and even more unlikely, that the Chinook force (in particular) would 'roll over' because of a bit of clag.
Yours in aviation
Sun.
Interesting. This is one of those situations when only having all the info will do.
What was the weather between the departure point of the Chinooks, and the fleet? Was it the same as the weather between the RN helos and the fleet?
What was the experience level of the RAF crews? Just because the crews in question may not have had the necessary SQEP to 'make it through the murk' doesn't mean the entire Chinook force can't.
I'm sure there are reasons, related to weather and experience, that might have precluded the Chinooks embarking/playing but I think just these few suggest that, without all the info, opinions are just hearsay.
Having been involved with RAF embarked helo ops, as aircrew, I find it unlikely (although not impossible) that skills have degraded so significantly, and even more unlikely, that the Chinook force (in particular) would 'roll over' because of a bit of clag.
Yours in aviation
Sun.
What was the experience level of the RAF crews? Just because the crews in question may not have had the necessary SQEP to 'make it through the murk' doesn't mean the entire Chinook force can't.
As you rightly suggest this is a case of hearsay - we do not know all the facts. It does however, illustrate the potential limitations of a "part-time" capability - even allowing for the Chinook commitment to Herrick - that makes retention of a naval air arm essential. A few years ago I was at SHFHQ for a meeting on embarking cabs aboard ships and was a little surprised to hear the guys with embarked experience professing absolutely no knowledge whatsoever of what BR766 was or what it contained. Given that it is the basic handbook for embarked ops and has contained specific annexes on operating Chinook aboard ship since at least 2000, I was a tad concerned.
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Not a Boffin said:
You make a fair point sir. If the Chinook Force had the time and capacity to conduct an appropriate work up for Cougar 12, and yet failed to do so, then that would be disappointing. I for one will never know if that was the case, or whether there was another reason for their reported failure to embark.
Sun.
However, one might have thought that sufficiently qualified crews would be tagged for that high-profile deployment - it's not like it suddenly popped up demanding bodies unexpectedly - in which case pre-deployment planning should have included a deck qual phase in all weathers up to the limits allowed in BR766 and the AP and if that got scrubbed, then a plan B put in place, prior to trying to deploy cabs/crews to theatre.
Sun.
According to the Express anyway.
Jet fighter threat to the Falkland Islands | World | News | Daily Express
Seems a logical extension from their Mirage III experience.
Luckily our new carriers are over 70,000 tons
Progress being made but uncertainties remain
Jet fighter threat to the Falkland Islands | World | News | Daily Express
Seems a logical extension from their Mirage III experience.
Luckily our new carriers are over 70,000 tons
Progress being made but uncertainties remain
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Great reporting by the Express. Only two RAF Typhoons in the Falklands, apparently.
Sadly sometimes true. Other members will know better than me that on at least one occasion a brace of FI Typhoons has scrambled with the tanker in tow, only to find MPA below minimums for a return. Leaving them forced to ask would the Argies mind very much if we overflew to land somewhere more friendly! Nothing like advertising the fact. Argie SF on standby for just such a recurrence one might imagine, scratch the remaining 2 Typhoons, game over. Feel free to point out any glaring anomolies/ paranoia/ painful truth in this statement
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So, paraphrasing a little bit, what we have in the Falkland Islands can guard against Argentine conquest, but were we to remove a pair of aircraft from the orbat they would waltz on in?
Golly this Typhoon thing must be good.
Golly this Typhoon thing must be good.
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Incidentally, I am not sure what the actual upshot of Mr Gaylard's point is. The very existence within JHC of CHF is somewhat fundamental proof that the powers that be accept that aviation in the maritime is an area which requires its own experts. Any suggestion that a RAF crew, collection of crews or hierarchy felt the same is laudable.
As MSOCS points out the RAF JFH chaps did admirably when 'plugged into' the supervisory 'socket' that a career in the maritime provides.
As MSOCS points out the RAF JFH chaps did admirably when 'plugged into' the supervisory 'socket' that a career in the maritime provides.
One of the problem is that the commitments of the last decade have reduced the familiarity of Junglies to the shipborne environment, and many younger Royal Marines see their Corps as a light brigade instead of a specialist amphibious force.
Since we are talking about aircraft/ship operations, we should focus not just on those who operate the aircraft but also those aboard the ship. Part time aviation means they may well lose those skills. Ships also lose familiarity with aircraft.
It seems odd that many have gone from training and preparing to fight at sea, or from the sea, to forgetting about the sea...
Twenty years ago the RN was heavily committed to operations in the Adriatic. For several years we had a CVS deployed, placing huge strains on the ships' crews, and the various FAA squadrons. It looked like post Cold War the carrier would be more in demand - which was the case throughout the 90s (and into 2000/2001). This was later recognised by SDR 98.
So what went wrong? Was it that the assets were placed under the control of people who were not committed to naval operations, who turned he capability into a part time one?
Since we are talking about aircraft/ship operations, we should focus not just on those who operate the aircraft but also those aboard the ship. Part time aviation means they may well lose those skills. Ships also lose familiarity with aircraft.
It seems odd that many have gone from training and preparing to fight at sea, or from the sea, to forgetting about the sea...
Twenty years ago the RN was heavily committed to operations in the Adriatic. For several years we had a CVS deployed, placing huge strains on the ships' crews, and the various FAA squadrons. It looked like post Cold War the carrier would be more in demand - which was the case throughout the 90s (and into 2000/2001). This was later recognised by SDR 98.
Originally Posted by WEBF
Ignoring exercises, show the flag activities, and SAR operations.....
For a large part of the 1990s, the main UK military effort was in Bosnia. A carrier was deployed continuously in the Adriatic for those years, with both Sea Harriers and Sea Kings doing all sorts of stuff, including enforcing the no fly zone over Bosnia, doing reece, and ground attack - the Sea Harrier participated in NATO air attacks against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995. On here, many have been dismissive of the small number of aircraft (six Sea Jets) embarked, but turn a blind eye to the fact that the RAF contributions ashore had similar numbers of aircaft, but without the mobility or swing role. The embarked ASW and AEW Sea Kings also contributed to operations. Remember, Yugoslavia did have an air force and a navy.
In the late 90s carriers took part in various other activities, including helping police the no fly zone over Southern Iraq and at least a couple of stand offs with Saddam Hussein. I think that RAF Harrier GR7s were embarked for the first time during one of these crises, hence the inclusion of the Joint Force Harrier concept in the 1998 SDR. After Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, HMS Invincible was sent to the Arabian Gulf as (so the media said) there was a missile threat to the RAF base in Kuwait and the UK wanted another option. On her way back to the UK, Invincible got diverted to the Adriatic to participate in the Kosovo operations.
In 2000, the UK intervention in Sierra Leone involved HMS Illustrious with both types of Harrier embarked, a fact that may not have registered with the UK commander ashore, Brigadier David Richards (now a Knight, a General, and CDS). The political and psychological messages sent by deploying large warships close to land should also be remembered, as well as constant presence, large numbers of helicopters, command and control facilities, medical facilities, and others. I seem to remember that Illustrious made a high speed dash across the Atlantic, but had to wait for the slower Ocean to catch up.
In 2001, Illustrious once again deployed with both Harrier types embarked, for the SAIF SARREA II exercise in Oman. Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, she was retasked to act as a helicopter carrier (Ocean needed to return to the UK for maintenance) and disembarked her fixed wing aircraft (and grey Sea Kings?). No land based UK fast jets took part in the initial strikes against the Taliban either, although submarines did.
In 2003, Ark Royal acted as a LPH for the invasion of Iraq. The Iraqi air force was mostly dead and burried after over a decade of sanctions and a no fly zone, and Kuwaiti/Bahraini/Qatari airbses were used by the US/UK/Australians. Not that that stopped the US Navy from deploying FIVE carriers.
Since then, our main military involvement has been Iraq and Afghanistan. Apart from the lack of an opponent with an air force or navy, they both lack any length of coastline, Afghanistan being land locked, Iraq having only a tiny coastline - not that this prevents carrier based aircraft operating in both places. Yet we seem to have fallen into a trap, with many believing that:
a)All future operations will be in land locked places.
b)There will never be an enemy navy or air force to worry about.
For a large part of the 1990s, the main UK military effort was in Bosnia. A carrier was deployed continuously in the Adriatic for those years, with both Sea Harriers and Sea Kings doing all sorts of stuff, including enforcing the no fly zone over Bosnia, doing reece, and ground attack - the Sea Harrier participated in NATO air attacks against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995. On here, many have been dismissive of the small number of aircraft (six Sea Jets) embarked, but turn a blind eye to the fact that the RAF contributions ashore had similar numbers of aircaft, but without the mobility or swing role. The embarked ASW and AEW Sea Kings also contributed to operations. Remember, Yugoslavia did have an air force and a navy.
In the late 90s carriers took part in various other activities, including helping police the no fly zone over Southern Iraq and at least a couple of stand offs with Saddam Hussein. I think that RAF Harrier GR7s were embarked for the first time during one of these crises, hence the inclusion of the Joint Force Harrier concept in the 1998 SDR. After Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, HMS Invincible was sent to the Arabian Gulf as (so the media said) there was a missile threat to the RAF base in Kuwait and the UK wanted another option. On her way back to the UK, Invincible got diverted to the Adriatic to participate in the Kosovo operations.
In 2000, the UK intervention in Sierra Leone involved HMS Illustrious with both types of Harrier embarked, a fact that may not have registered with the UK commander ashore, Brigadier David Richards (now a Knight, a General, and CDS). The political and psychological messages sent by deploying large warships close to land should also be remembered, as well as constant presence, large numbers of helicopters, command and control facilities, medical facilities, and others. I seem to remember that Illustrious made a high speed dash across the Atlantic, but had to wait for the slower Ocean to catch up.
In 2001, Illustrious once again deployed with both Harrier types embarked, for the SAIF SARREA II exercise in Oman. Following the 9/11 attacks in the United States, she was retasked to act as a helicopter carrier (Ocean needed to return to the UK for maintenance) and disembarked her fixed wing aircraft (and grey Sea Kings?). No land based UK fast jets took part in the initial strikes against the Taliban either, although submarines did.
In 2003, Ark Royal acted as a LPH for the invasion of Iraq. The Iraqi air force was mostly dead and burried after over a decade of sanctions and a no fly zone, and Kuwaiti/Bahraini/Qatari airbses were used by the US/UK/Australians. Not that that stopped the US Navy from deploying FIVE carriers.
Since then, our main military involvement has been Iraq and Afghanistan. Apart from the lack of an opponent with an air force or navy, they both lack any length of coastline, Afghanistan being land locked, Iraq having only a tiny coastline - not that this prevents carrier based aircraft operating in both places. Yet we seem to have fallen into a trap, with many believing that:
a)All future operations will be in land locked places.
b)There will never be an enemy navy or air force to worry about.
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Don't tell anyone old chap but we're getting two massive carriers and an aircraft specifically bought for Maritime Strike.
The RAF is down to two fast jet types, of which one is going, it's handing its Merlin's to the RN. The RN are also getting Wildcat and are somewhere in amongst a ASW Merlin upgrade.
Best keep it all a secret for now, but at some point we might have to re-role the Fleet Air Arm from 'eternally put upon under dog' to 'not actually badly off considering'.
Mum's the word eh?
The RAF is down to two fast jet types, of which one is going, it's handing its Merlin's to the RN. The RN are also getting Wildcat and are somewhere in amongst a ASW Merlin upgrade.
Best keep it all a secret for now, but at some point we might have to re-role the Fleet Air Arm from 'eternally put upon under dog' to 'not actually badly off considering'.
Mum's the word eh?
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Again, the RN continues to hold my admiration for looking at the generation of big deck experience now; not in a few years, but right now. Their approach is consistent and the concept has thought and rigour attached to it - tip top! I'm not saying that the RAF isn't planning for F-35 btw (quite the opposite!) however, the preparation for maritime F-35 operations is quite rightly being led and owned by the FAA because the light blue doesn't have the capacity or expertise to do this right now imho.
Instead, it's much better to 'plug' into the 'socket' of maritime once we've:
a) produced the F-35 super base (Marham) and,
b) sorted out all the niggles associated with introducing a new type and generation of combat aircraft into service.
By that I mean training, equipping and forming a Squadron; transitioning that Squadron to the UK; proving that we can sustain it at range from the Prime (LM) and, finally, operating efficiently and effectively as a Combat Ready Lightning force.
Instead, it's much better to 'plug' into the 'socket' of maritime once we've:
a) produced the F-35 super base (Marham) and,
b) sorted out all the niggles associated with introducing a new type and generation of combat aircraft into service.
By that I mean training, equipping and forming a Squadron; transitioning that Squadron to the UK; proving that we can sustain it at range from the Prime (LM) and, finally, operating efficiently and effectively as a Combat Ready Lightning force.
orca
Actually I was thinking of one of your posts:
Actually I was thinking of one of your posts:
Originally Posted by orca
Let's have flexible forces? Couldn't agree more. Joint forces? Don't believe in them anymore myself. So which would you rather have and which is safer to assure? Maritime specialists who occasionally turn the anti skid on and operate from land or land based chaps who occasionally go to the boat? Why not copy JHC exactly and have the FAA FW as a self governing entity?
Does size matter?
MSOCS
Is the key thing that the (US) decks are big, or the fact that they actually have fixed wing aircraft embarked? Did pre SDSR plans involve sending aircraft handlers on exchange?
Is the key thing that the (US) decks are big, or the fact that they actually have fixed wing aircraft embarked? Did pre SDSR plans involve sending aircraft handlers on exchange?
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 10th Aug 2013 at 22:14.
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Andy P,
Your point is ad hominem:
"an argument made personally against an opponent instead of against their argument."
Play the ball, not the man. You're only one step up from name calling (according to the academics)
.
Your point is ad hominem:
"an argument made personally against an opponent instead of against their argument."
Play the ball, not the man. You're only one step up from name calling (according to the academics)
.