RAF Rivet Joint
Challenger blew up because engineers, giving a warning based on a known defect for the specific conditions of that specific launch, were ignored in that case.
This is exactly what happened on a number of the accidents discussed here. The causes or contributory factors, on Nimrod, Chinook, Sea King ASaC, Tornado/Patriot, Hercules and others were predictable, predicted and notified by engineers; and, as you say, ignored. The most damning part is they were ignored by other engineers (and those who pretended to be engineers). Just as you describe on Challenger.
But as Chug has pointed out, Haddon-Cave actively protected those who ignored the above. Much of his report is good stuff – primarily the bits he simply copies from evidence submitted to him but lets the reader infer he uncovered it all himself. But much of his analysis and opinion is very flawed and he proved himself untrustworthy and sycophantic. And then he got his gong.
Good points above about COTS. No, RJ cannot in any way be described as a COTS procurement. And, while ACM Bollom may have been mentioned in the press release, perhaps one should look a little lower and ask if there is any (a) staff and (b) procedural failure commonality between Nimrod and RJ. Neither bothered much about airworthiness, ignoring advice and instructions and abandoning it to try to save time and money. Maybe one day we’ll see the audit report that spells all this out, and perhaps the MAA will come forth with the truth about what action they took, instead of the sanitised version we’re getting now – again, protecting those responsible. That report makes it clear all the RJ problems were known years ago.
If something (in this case a seal or gasket) has a temp spec that is incompatible with conditions one experiences at launch or during flight, then to me that is a design defect that MUST be rectified before approval to fly in ANY conditions.
IF we followed that policy nothing would ever fly again.And as for:
Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation aren't safe anywhere near the MOD.
RP:_
No Roland, by MOD I mean the VSOs presently in post who are aware of the previous suborning of personnel involved in airworthiness provision and air accident investigation and maintain the covering up of it. I mean the Senior Civil Servants that state that such suborning is proper and that to disobey instructions to subvert the regulations is a disciplinary offence. I mean VSOs that overturn the findings of:-
and substitute their own arbitrary and bizarre findings in their place and yes, I am aware of the CAS's role in a previous life. I mean the MAA that is responsible for airworthiness provision to the MB Mk10 seat for example, whose DG loftily congratulates the MAAIB on the accident report into the death of Sean Cunningham that found that far from having been airworthy it entirely lacked a Safety Case. It might have been more fitting for the MAA to have been cited for dereliction, but of course the MAAIB is nested within the MAA so best not, eh?
I repeat, Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation aren't safe anywhere near the MOD. If that's a slight, so be it. The job of an Air Regulator and an Air Accident Investigator is to avoid avoidable accidents and needless deaths, not to continuously have to review them. The only way that works is for the Regulator and Investigator to be independent of the Operator and of each other.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!
One assumes by MOD you mean all of those personnel who work hard on accident investigations, doing their best to find causes and recommend improvements for the future. Bit of a slight for all those who have been involved in numerous perfectly acceptable accident investigations over the years!!
all of those personnel who work hard on accident investigations, doing their best to find causes and recommend improvements for the future.
I repeat, Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation aren't safe anywhere near the MOD. If that's a slight, so be it. The job of an Air Regulator and an Air Accident Investigator is to avoid avoidable accidents and needless deaths, not to continuously have to review them. The only way that works is for the Regulator and Investigator to be independent of the Operator and of each other.
Self Regulation Doesn't Work and in Aviation It Kills!
I repeat, Airworthiness Regulation and Air Accident Investigation aren't safe anywhere near the MOD
If that's a slight
Well I don't apologise for expressing my opinions, that is surely what discussion is all about. That we are divided by our respective opinions is what arguing our case is all about. Of course repetition doesn't justify, it merely emphasises that faced with your counter argument I am still standing by my case.
That case is that no matter how tirelessly and responsibly those in UK Military Airworthiness Provision and Air Accident Investigation strive, their efforts are undermined by the very organisations for which they work, which are demonstrably at the whim of VSOs and SCSs. As a result, illegal RTS's, grossly unairworthy fleets and dysfunctional accident investigations have resulted. That diminishes our national security and causes unnecessary grief and suffering to the families of those who die as a result.
The very people that you claim that I slight could be more effective in avoiding avoidable accidents and needless deaths if they were no longer subject to possible improper pressures from VSOs. You seem happy that all such pressure that has been applied is known of, is in the past, and will not be repeated. I do not share that view in any way. You seem happy that every BoI and SI has been effective in determining the cause of its accident and preventing a recurrence,
Given the known cases of interference and subversion in that process, how can you be so sure?
This isn't a time to fight change for the sake of it, anymore than it is to change for the sake of change. The Royal Air Force, for one, has to face up to what has been done in its name, to face up to what continues to be done in its name, and then to do the right thing. Its very raison d'etre is at stake here; to carry the Air War to its enemies. If it does not have airworthy aircraft to do that, its prospects are not good.
That case is that no matter how tirelessly and responsibly those in UK Military Airworthiness Provision and Air Accident Investigation strive, their efforts are undermined by the very organisations for which they work, which are demonstrably at the whim of VSOs and SCSs. As a result, illegal RTS's, grossly unairworthy fleets and dysfunctional accident investigations have resulted. That diminishes our national security and causes unnecessary grief and suffering to the families of those who die as a result.
The very people that you claim that I slight could be more effective in avoiding avoidable accidents and needless deaths if they were no longer subject to possible improper pressures from VSOs. You seem happy that all such pressure that has been applied is known of, is in the past, and will not be repeated. I do not share that view in any way. You seem happy that every BoI and SI has been effective in determining the cause of its accident and preventing a recurrence,
(other than in a small number of high profile contentious "arbitrary and bizarre" cases)
This isn't a time to fight change for the sake of it, anymore than it is to change for the sake of change. The Royal Air Force, for one, has to face up to what has been done in its name, to face up to what continues to be done in its name, and then to do the right thing. Its very raison d'etre is at stake here; to carry the Air War to its enemies. If it does not have airworthy aircraft to do that, its prospects are not good.
Oh dear. IF we followed that policy nothing would ever fly again
IF we followed that policy nothing would ever fly again
On the vast majority of examples cited here, the aircraft would have been compliant, safe and available for service use far earlier had mandated policies been implemented up front, instead of taking short cuts and then having to regress. Case in point - Rivet Joint.
JIV
RTSs are not published, although MoD usually satisfies requests under FoI.
Aircraft like RJ will have a significant "Classified" section, which is often withheld even from aircrew and those responsible for day to day maintaining of airworthiness. MoD will never release that - if they have remembered to include it!
But you ask a good question, and SS's is an excellent and very pointed reply! I very much doubt if MoD will satisfy a request in this case. I doubt if the MAA or ACAS will even let other aircraft project teams see it, because it will illustrate just how far the bar has been lowered in order to cover up what they (MAA) have known on RJ for at least 3 years - and just when the Secy of State was first told of the need for a waiver. One thing is for sure; he'll be furious if it is within the last 2 years, and he'll be even more furious at being misled before that. To me, this illustrates just how serious the MAA must believe the failures - they have been well known for upwards of 3 years, yet could not be fixed in that time. It reminds me of Nimrod MRA4 in the late 90s. The project leaders lying to senior staffs and withholding details of slippage and cost escalation. And when senior staffs found out, misleading politicians. As mentioned above; Hammond should be studying old papers to identify the common denominators and names.
RTSs are not published, although MoD usually satisfies requests under FoI.
Aircraft like RJ will have a significant "Classified" section, which is often withheld even from aircrew and those responsible for day to day maintaining of airworthiness. MoD will never release that - if they have remembered to include it!
But you ask a good question, and SS's is an excellent and very pointed reply! I very much doubt if MoD will satisfy a request in this case. I doubt if the MAA or ACAS will even let other aircraft project teams see it, because it will illustrate just how far the bar has been lowered in order to cover up what they (MAA) have known on RJ for at least 3 years - and just when the Secy of State was first told of the need for a waiver. One thing is for sure; he'll be furious if it is within the last 2 years, and he'll be even more furious at being misled before that. To me, this illustrates just how serious the MAA must believe the failures - they have been well known for upwards of 3 years, yet could not be fixed in that time. It reminds me of Nimrod MRA4 in the late 90s. The project leaders lying to senior staffs and withholding details of slippage and cost escalation. And when senior staffs found out, misleading politicians. As mentioned above; Hammond should be studying old papers to identify the common denominators and names.
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UK Rivet Joint flight restores key RAF capability - 5/29/2014 - Flight Global
Personnel from the UK Royal Air Force’s 51 Sqn have begun performing training flights using the unit’s first RC-135W Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft, following the receipt of initial release to service approval....
“The RC-135W has been cleared by the RAF’s release to service authority, to fly to an initial release to service [and] to a flight envelope that meets the current operational requirement,” the Ministry of Defence says. “Ongoing work will progressively refine this release as additional information becomes available and further analysis is conducted.”
“The RC-135W has been cleared by the RAF’s release to service authority, to fly to an initial release to service [and] to a flight envelope that meets the current operational requirement,” the Ministry of Defence says. “Ongoing work will progressively refine this release as additional information becomes available and further analysis is conducted.”
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intrAnet
I figure JIV was looking to see the RTS in the Public Domain.
Interestingly when I did a bit of work on the Chinook in 2010 the classified insert for the RTS including the SOP was openly published on the www for all to see. if you knew where to look and the DRTSA (RW) team pointed you in the direction you could find it. I just tried now and it has disappeared. In my little bit of the FW domain we used to distribute numbered hard copies. Not that good at Google but whilst searching I came across the link to Desider (The DE&S House rag) from Nov 2010. An article full of aspirations and some good pictures of RJ and also the R over Lincoln.
https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...1_Dec_2010.pdf
Interestingly when I did a bit of work on the Chinook in 2010 the classified insert for the RTS including the SOP was openly published on the www for all to see. if you knew where to look and the DRTSA (RW) team pointed you in the direction you could find it. I just tried now and it has disappeared. In my little bit of the FW domain we used to distribute numbered hard copies. Not that good at Google but whilst searching I came across the link to Desider (The DE&S House rag) from Nov 2010. An article full of aspirations and some good pictures of RJ and also the R over Lincoln.
https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...1_Dec_2010.pdf
All RTSs are viewable on the RAF Fixed Wing RTS MoD intranet web site, including Airseeker.
Certainly, when the complete Chinook RTS from 1993/4 was eventually obtained in 2011 it didn't seem to cross MoD's mind that, because it was around 95% non-compliant, it was rather handing the case on a plate to campaigners. (For those who haven't read the evidence, the RTS described an aircraft with little or no avionics, that was not permitted to fly). Similarly, for example, the Sea King ASaC one in 2003, which was more akin to an AEW Mk2 from about 1985 and certainly positively dangerous in places (to coin a phrase) if applied to a Mk7. The reason I use these examples is that both had "Interim" releases initially (Chinook until 1996 and ASaC until late 2002), which by definition means some or all of the aircraft could "not be relied upon in any way" - and Rivet Joint is the same.
So the real question is what does the "interim" caveat relate to - noting MoD still stand by their evidence from 1995 that there is no such thing as an "interim release"! Again, see ZD576 evidence. This is where you get the clues about the sheer scale of confusion in MoD. One department still stands by this policy, and another (MAA) knowingly contradicts it; yet no attempt is made to deconflict. It smacks of making these things up as they go along, which is why you have mandated regs.
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The obvious one is that everyone (presumably!) prefers a positive statement of clearance, not an implied clearance. A less obvious and rather obscure one is the omission of the concept of an Aircrew Equipment Assembly also being a part of the avionic system (an LRU), with a certain build standard mandated along with complementary aircraft modification(s) and Full Fleet Fit. That is, safety is affected if the wrong AEA or a mixture of build standards is present in the aircraft. As I said, obscure (or it was in 1996 when first implemented), but failure to comply explained one of the contributory factors in a multi-fatality crash a few years ago; so you'd expect the MAA to take steps to avoid recurrence. Apologies, of course, if it is buried in another MAA document; but it should be an RTS issue.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
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AW&ST: (Behind their firewall) U.K. Rivet Joint Finally Flies
The U.K. Royal Air Force has finally begun training sorties with its first RC-135 Rivet Joint intelligence-gathering aircraft, seven months after it was delivered. The first flight with a British crew in late May was seen as a significant step forward for the $1 billion Airseeker program, an L-3 Communications conversion of three 1960s-vintage U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotankers into RC-135W signals intelligence-gathering aircraft, and the U.K.’s admittance into the U.S. Rivet Joint intelligence-gathering structure.
But the type’s introduction to flight operations has not been straightforward. Since its arrival at its home base of RAF Waddington, England, last November, the aircraft had not moved from its parking spot. Its entry into service was complicated by the changes in air safety governance and the regime of safety case and certification oversight introduced through the creation of the Military Aviation Authority (MAA), which was formed in April 2010 following the Haddon-Cave inquiry into the loss of an RAF Nimrod patrol aircraft over Afghanistan in 2006.
As a type new to the inventory, the Rivet Joint would have normally been taken through a six-part Military Aircraft Certification Process (MACP) to receive its release to service documentation that would clear it for flights by U.K. aircrews. But the lack of paperwork and documentation stretching back to when the aircraft was first built as a KC-135A Stratotanker meant that officials were not able to fulfill two elements of the MACP process: They could not establish and agree the Type Certification Basis (TCB) nor demonstrate the aircraft’s compliance with the TCB. That forced the U.K.’s procurement agency, Defense Equipment and Support (DE&S), to undertake a wide-scale examination of the aircraft, carry out structural and zonal analysis and complete audits to generate evidence and prove the aircraft’s safety. The MAA was brought in to examine DE&S’s work and give its own recommendations.
“We couldn’t follow our own regulation, . . . so what we elected to do is follow an alternative, an as-safe route that . . . demonstrates the requisite levels of safety have been achieved,” Air Marshal Richard Garwood, director general of the MAA, tells Aviation Week. “Because it couldn’t follow the six-part process, we got permission from the secretary of state to take a different course of action, an alternative approach,” Garwood notes. “We haven’t changed the rules, but we couldn’t apply our own either. Two of the six bases required for certification didn’t exist or compliance could not be proved. If you don’t have that, in order to make sure this is safe, you’ve got to—not reverse engineer, but collect that evidence by different methods such as zonal analysis and work backward.”
In the U.S., the Rivet Joint has essentially been given grandfather rights, so DE&S officials had little evidence to indicate how the U.S. flight-envelope clearances were obtained. The MAA and U.S. armed services are collaborating to understand one another’s certification practices. The MAA and U.S. Army completed their work last December with the signing of a mutual recognition certificate between the British authority and the Army’s Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center. Work with Naval Air Systems Command (Navair) is proceeding and expected to finish this year, while work with Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) is being conducted this year. MAA officials say that even if the AFMC recognition had been in place, it would not have been a “silver bullet.” Similar projects are underway with several military certification agencies in Europe as well. The MAA submitted its findings to the assistant chief of the Air Staff on April 23. He issued an initial release to service for the Rivet Joint on April 30, but technical issues with ground equipment delayed until May 23 plans to get the aircraft flying. A full release to service will be awarded at a later date.
The RAF is the first export customer for the Rivet Joint, which is considered to be one of the most complex Foreign Military Sales transactions ever completed between the U.S. and U.K. The RAF is due to declare an initial operating capability with a single RC-135 this October. New aircraft will then be delivered every two years, with a full operating capability expected in mid-2017.
The U.K. Royal Air Force has finally begun training sorties with its first RC-135 Rivet Joint intelligence-gathering aircraft, seven months after it was delivered. The first flight with a British crew in late May was seen as a significant step forward for the $1 billion Airseeker program, an L-3 Communications conversion of three 1960s-vintage U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotankers into RC-135W signals intelligence-gathering aircraft, and the U.K.’s admittance into the U.S. Rivet Joint intelligence-gathering structure.
But the type’s introduction to flight operations has not been straightforward. Since its arrival at its home base of RAF Waddington, England, last November, the aircraft had not moved from its parking spot. Its entry into service was complicated by the changes in air safety governance and the regime of safety case and certification oversight introduced through the creation of the Military Aviation Authority (MAA), which was formed in April 2010 following the Haddon-Cave inquiry into the loss of an RAF Nimrod patrol aircraft over Afghanistan in 2006.
As a type new to the inventory, the Rivet Joint would have normally been taken through a six-part Military Aircraft Certification Process (MACP) to receive its release to service documentation that would clear it for flights by U.K. aircrews. But the lack of paperwork and documentation stretching back to when the aircraft was first built as a KC-135A Stratotanker meant that officials were not able to fulfill two elements of the MACP process: They could not establish and agree the Type Certification Basis (TCB) nor demonstrate the aircraft’s compliance with the TCB. That forced the U.K.’s procurement agency, Defense Equipment and Support (DE&S), to undertake a wide-scale examination of the aircraft, carry out structural and zonal analysis and complete audits to generate evidence and prove the aircraft’s safety. The MAA was brought in to examine DE&S’s work and give its own recommendations.
“We couldn’t follow our own regulation, . . . so what we elected to do is follow an alternative, an as-safe route that . . . demonstrates the requisite levels of safety have been achieved,” Air Marshal Richard Garwood, director general of the MAA, tells Aviation Week. “Because it couldn’t follow the six-part process, we got permission from the secretary of state to take a different course of action, an alternative approach,” Garwood notes. “We haven’t changed the rules, but we couldn’t apply our own either. Two of the six bases required for certification didn’t exist or compliance could not be proved. If you don’t have that, in order to make sure this is safe, you’ve got to—not reverse engineer, but collect that evidence by different methods such as zonal analysis and work backward.”
In the U.S., the Rivet Joint has essentially been given grandfather rights, so DE&S officials had little evidence to indicate how the U.S. flight-envelope clearances were obtained. The MAA and U.S. armed services are collaborating to understand one another’s certification practices. The MAA and U.S. Army completed their work last December with the signing of a mutual recognition certificate between the British authority and the Army’s Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center. Work with Naval Air Systems Command (Navair) is proceeding and expected to finish this year, while work with Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) is being conducted this year. MAA officials say that even if the AFMC recognition had been in place, it would not have been a “silver bullet.” Similar projects are underway with several military certification agencies in Europe as well. The MAA submitted its findings to the assistant chief of the Air Staff on April 23. He issued an initial release to service for the Rivet Joint on April 30, but technical issues with ground equipment delayed until May 23 plans to get the aircraft flying. A full release to service will be awarded at a later date.
The RAF is the first export customer for the Rivet Joint, which is considered to be one of the most complex Foreign Military Sales transactions ever completed between the U.S. and U.K. The RAF is due to declare an initial operating capability with a single RC-135 this October. New aircraft will then be delivered every two years, with a full operating capability expected in mid-2017.
In the U.S., the Rivet Joint has essentially been given grandfather rights
So once again the UK Military has been given a knowingly unairworthy aircraft to fly, a fact that has been known of since the inception of this project. I suppose one could say it will be in good company then, but wasn't the Haddon-Cave Report and its love child, the MAA, supposed to stop all that? No? Oh, how silly of me to forget that their purpose is to protect VSO's, not the poor sods in the aircraft.
Talking of silver bullets, perhaps the present DG might be minded to hand his predecessor a gun loaded with one, and then leave him alone with it....
Talking of silver bullets, perhaps the present DG might be minded to hand his predecessor a gun loaded with one, and then leave him alone with it....
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Or, we could just man up and fly the thing and accept that there is a risk that it might fall out of the sky occasionally due to unknown problems. We are the military after all.
Soldiers walk on untested terrain, sailors go out in storms and frankly sh1t happens.
Soldiers walk on untested terrain, sailors go out in storms and frankly sh1t happens.