MAA MILITARY AIR SAFETY CONFERENCE

[dragartist]

What do the MAA sign?

Rigga, I only left at Christmas, have they added another signature block to the front page of the GARP RTS? I saw many changes in my time, perhaps I took my eye off the ball during the last round where the DH focus came to the fore.

My last rant got me thinking. I picked up on this phrase "three strikes and your out" from one of you. I wonderd what role our professional body and the Engineering Council make take in this. Do they ever stike people off like the Medical Council do. perhaps I should have a word with the Chairman of our Professional Standards Board when I see him next.

I was not supported by my IPTL when I exposed the weakness of an individual who was providing us with Airworthiness Advice. I almost went to the Engineering Council to ensure this guy really was a C Eng. He had written enough stuff to hang himself. I would have had him struck off. The point is he is still around I was on my way out by then anyway. Anything for an easy life.

The point is that there are still people that are not taking this seriously and those with Authority to change things are not doing. They don't appear to have the juristiction to hire and fire people or firing people is too difficult. not the case at the BBC!!!

[tucumseh]

I almost went to the Engineering Council to ensure this guy really was a C Eng.

A CEng doesn't guarantee anything, as I'm sure you found out! As far as I recall, there isn't a requirement for integrity, honesty, objectivity, impartiality and efficiency to be awarded one. Any one of those attributes would have been sufficient to prevent the systemic failures. After all, one of the main perpetrators has FEng FIMechE after his name.

[Engines]

Guys,

I think there are important points here that could be usefully discussed.

The first is to get clarity over the role and functions of the MAA. Their website usefully gives the following statement:

Part of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the MAA is an independent and autonomous organization responsible for the regulation, surveillance, inspection and assurance of the Defence Air operating and technical domains. It ensures the safe design and use of military air systems. As the single regulatory authority responsible for regulating all aspects of Air Safety across Defence, the MAA has full oversight of all Defence aviation activity.

So, it regulates, surveys, inspects and assures. It also 'ensures' the safe design and use of military air systems. And it has full 'oversight'. So, if it is 'ensuring' safe design, and issuing Military Type Certificates (MTCs), then they are, by my reckoning, 'certifying' safe design - which must make them potentially accountable if a design is subsequently found to be deficient.

However, the MAA publications also state:

The MAA remains, however, independent of the acquisition, operation
and capability delivery areas of military aviation. This is achieved through the establishment and maintenance of an appropriate regulatory framework that is given effect by certification, approvals and inspection processes extending across the acquisition, operation and continuing airworthiness domains within the Military Air Environment. Independent surveillance of relevant departmental
planning and programming processes is also used to support the assurance process.

So, my take is that the MAA is treading a fine line between being a regulator, surveyor and assurance authority, and a full up 'certification and approvals authority'.

That means, I reckon, that organisations such as DE&S and the FLCs, acting as Duty Holders, still retain full accountability for their activities, and that is as it should be. But if MAA issue an MTC, or provide an approval for a modification (as their own regs require them to do for, say, armament systems, then they have to be accountable for that 'approval'.

It's also interesting that the term 'Air Safety' has been defined as follows:

Air Safety is the state of freedom from unacceptable risk of injury to persons, or damage, throughout the life cycle of military air systems. Its purview extends across all Defence Lines of Development and includes Airworthiness, Flight Safety, Policy, Regulation and the apportionment of Resources. It does not address survivability in a hostile environment.

The same publication also introduces a new definition of 'airworthiness'. It's interesting (and I think sensible) that Air Safety excludes operation in hostile environments. But the exclusion does open up some issues on how a design's 'fitness for purpose' is to be assessed. (Tuc makes excellent points on this one).

The hopeful thing that I draw from this lot is that the MAA is not taking over the world. PTs in the DE&S are still just as accountable as they ever were for their actions and their products. As I've posted before, in support of Tuc and others, the key to safe and effective air systems is professional delivery of projects to the front line. People need to do their jobs, drawing of collective experience, firm leadership and a good set of regulations.

That last one is where I do have some concerns. The MAA regulatory set is, in some important areas, deficient. In many areas, it is just a 'cut and paste' of what was already a badly damaged set of standards and regs, and there are some nasty gaps that need filling. The best way is for those that find them to let the MAA know as soon as possible. Hopefully, the chains of command can facilitate that.

For my part, I'd like to see the MAA aligned with other MoD Safety regulators, who have done a good job over the years, headed by a 2 star and reporting into the Defence Safety Board. I don't think this would damage their 'independence'. (For example, while Chief Inspector Naval Ordnance (CINO) was definitely part of the Navy, they always operated in an extremely independent way - the same went for the old Ordnance Board).

The thing that, in my view, really hazards MAA's independence is by drawing their leaders from the same organisations that they also regulate. Having given this some thought, I think MAA should be headed by a suitably qualified (non-MoD) civilian, preferably from a safety related background.

I know that many will disagree with these ideas, but, hey, that's the idea of a forum.

Best Regards as ever,

Engines

[tucumseh]

Engines

Excellent, as ever.

One point I’d make is that MoD don’t approve designs, they accept them. This places huge emphasis on the selection and approval of Contractors who approve designs. Generally, this works fine. (e.g. the DAOS scheme).


But if we examine the criteria Contractors are examined against before being approved, MoD is actually responsible for providing important services, or facilitating them. For example (I’m quoting from the regs that were issued after the Crown Proceedings Act Sect 10 was repealed);


12 e. “The ability to investigate and remedy design defects or service faults”.



A Contractor may be perfectly capable of doing this; it was seldom, if ever, the problem. I came across one example (on Secondary Transponders) and promptly sacked the PDSO at the company. (Oh yes, MoD have that power, but seldom use it and, anyway, have scrapped the Def Stan that outlines it. Believe me, it is – or was – a powerful weapon). The problem was that the RAF Chief Engineer decided, in 1991, to slash the funding for the necessary contracts and instructed Engineering Authorities that, under pain of death, they SHALL NOT raise MF760As (request for Fault Investigation). And, MoD Technical Agencies (named MoD individual responsible for delivering maintained build standard, safety case etc) shall NOT waste money on investigations. The result, of course, was while Contractors were desperate to do this work and avoid accidents, MoD was seen to be actively preventing them from doing so. This is not unrelated to BAeS's performance on the Nimrod Safety Case. The fact is, if you're not contracted to do something, you'll soon go bankrupt if you carry on doing it.



This “defect” and “fault” business also raises the concept of integrity, honesty, etc I mentioned above. Very few in MoD know the difference between a defect and a fault. From MoD’s viewpoint, a Fault Investigation is essentially a technical process. But to MoD a Defect Investigation is essentially a commercial exercise, but requiring the Technical Agency or Quality Assurance Officer to act as front man. MoD don’t “do” TAs or QAOs (especially Resident officers) these days.



The practical test of a good Contractor is his performance when conducting a Defect Investigation, when by definition he is being asked to criticise his own design or workmanship.



Shades of Chinook ZA721 again! (DASH Actuator and Aft LCT). Crap Quality Control at Contractors, but conveniently ignored to avoid upsetting them. (Evidence raised, but not explored, at the ZD576 BoI). The resultant recommended design changes had still not been implemented in October 1993, which was one reason why Boscombe stated the Mk1 and Mk2 were not airworthy.


As I’ve said, the system, it’s regulations, processes, procedures and their implementation were all perfectly adequate (although in need of updating) – until a small cadre of VSOs decided to ignore them. Nothing the MAA is doing would have prevented the latter culture.

[threeputt]

Just had this emailed to me. I retired 7 years ago after a 40 year career in the RAF aviation industry; never ejected, crashed or f****d up. Am I the right man for the job, what do you think?


LinkedIn Following

· Group: RAF Officers
· Subject: Safety Manager required for Abbey Wood. Must have experience managing military safety cases in an Air environment, and a good understanding of Airworthiness. Contact Sarah for more details 01515487026
Sarah Dixon posted a job: Safety Manager required for Abbey Wood. Must have experience managing military safety cases in an Air environment, and a good understanding of Airworthiness. Contact Sarah for more details 01515487026
Go see this job post »
Don't want to get activity notifications: Change your following people settings »
Learn more about following people's activity

This email was intended for Jerry Gegg (Seniors Captain and Kit Manager at Wiltshire County Golf Union). Learn why we included this. © 2012, LinkedIn Corporation. 2029 Stierlin Ct. Mountain View, CA 94043, USA

3P

[Engines]

Tuc,

Yes, absolutely right - it's the DA who 'approve' designs, MoD accepts - my apologies for any confusion.

The supervision and control of contractors is a key point, and you are right to raise it. Current PMs have had their hands tied by the sort of stuff you describe, but at the end of the day, they chair the PDRs and CDRs and have the power to call the contractor to account. The problem is that to do so you need be be technically well equipped.

On my recent project in was lucky - I had an absolutely outstanding Chief Tech who acted as my Tech lead and worked with the contractor to get the design right. I was also helped by a good set of requirements, thanks to valuable help from Dstl and QinetiQ.

At the end of the day, you need the confidence (and mutual trust) to work with the contractor to get the right result. Again, I was lucky, I had an excellent prime - Agusta Westland. They don't get the credit they should at times. And I had an equally excellent system integrator - Selex. Again, British and excellent.

Your points about defect and fault investigations are again well made - the new MAA occurrence reporting system hasn't really helped much, and as ever the onus is on the PMs to make sure that any faults are properly reported, assigned the proper hazard assessment and then worked through the system. I do have concerns that the 'organisational trauma' that Haddon-Cave did a good job of exposing is still happening, especially at the 'safety coal face'. There is a tendency to look to 'the Safety Manager' to do a lot of the stuff that a standard Engineering Authority SO2 used to do.

Safety should be an integral part of everything that aviation people do. It should be as natural as breathing and walking around. It should be happening all the time. The MAA is doing what it can to reinforce that culture, but at the end of the day, my own view is that a successful safety culture will only take root when managers at the 'coal face' level, and by that I mean SO1 and SO2, take charge and drive their staffs accordingly.

Best Regards as ever to all those out there trying to do the right things,

Engines

Best Regards as ever

Engines

[tucumseh]

3P


If you take up the post you'll soon be

4P

[thefodfather]

The question of defect and fault investigations is an interesting one and in many cases something that started off being reported as an Occurrence Report would historically have then been upgraded. This of course assumes that the reporting culture exists for the reports to be raised in the first place, investigated correctly and then escalted accordingly.

Having been away for a few days, I'll quickly come to my earlier discussion with Chug. Whilst I see totally see your point of view concerning independance (and the fundamental nature of the chicken vs egg scenario), I worry that the independance argument sometimes takes over the point on what the MAA actual does. The MAA is organisational where it is and the debate about what it can achieve given its current organisational situation is interesting in itself.

As for the point about being out of date, that wasn't my point. Only by merging the experience/ lessons learnt from the past with some modern approaches to SMS etc can the best future be achieved. We are both right, and the best bits of both our thoughts would be the best of both worlds.

[Just This Once...]

threeputt:

Just had this emailed to me. I retired 7 years ago after a 40 year career in the RAF aviation industry; never ejected, crashed or f****d up. Am I the right man for the job, what do you think?

I've known you for a number of years so you would get my vote!

[dragartist]

Thanx Tuc, So my observation was about right.There does not appear to be much Honesty and integrity around the bazars anymore. let us hope that the people who really need to take the temperature of the water read this forum and consider their positions and actions a little more seriously.

Don't get me going on F760s, Faults and Defects on this thread. My Prime wanted me done for treason almost when I started getting other agencies to invesigate his faults. You see it was a good income stream to him and employed a full time staff against my PDS budget. Absolutly no incentive to get it right as more often than not they would get paid again for investigating the fault, devising a fix and rolling out a mod. My Commercial team just rolled over and let them tickle their tums. The arguments I had over liability for design faults!!!

Pleased to hear of the good experiences with Agusta Westland and Selex but it really would be good if we could bring back the AEDITs in the original form before they became the subsitute SRIM design agencies.

I really am enjoying some of the articles on here and being amongst like minded people

[tucumseh]

dragartist

You see it was a good income stream to him and employed a full time staff against my PDS budget.

Your PDS Officer (PDSO) at the Design Authority is an MoD appointee. The Company propose him to you (or the TA), you approve the appointment. If he ***** up, or otherwise tries it on, you withdraw the appointment.

The main reason for this unique situation is that PDSOs are granted financial delegation to commit MoD money, up to a stated limit, to initiate fault investigations; thus avoiding the admin lead time. The underlying reason is safety. You have to be able to trust PDSOs implicitly.

It sounds like your commercial people have been brainwashed by the oft stated nonsense that only commercial can commit MoD to contract. Point the above out to them and tell them to wind it in.

All the best

[Chugalug2]

Fodfather:

Chug. Whilst I see totally see your point of view concerning independance (and the fundamental nature of the chicken vs egg scenario), I worry that the independance argument sometimes takes over the point on what the MAA actual does. The MAA is organisational where it is and the debate about what it can achieve given its current organisational situation is interesting in itself.

Interesting perhaps, tff, but aren't we about something rather more than interesting? 62 people have died in airworthiness related fatal accidents featured in this forum alone. Proof positive has been published in the link posted above by tuc of unlawful interference in the airworthiness process by RAF VSOs preceding those deaths. That unlawful interference was possible because the airworthiness regulations were subject to their subversion. No matter how strenuously the MAA proclaims itself to be independent, while it is part of the MOD it is still prone to such interference. I see no point in rearranging the deck chairs while the helm can still be accessed by those with a fatal attraction for icebergs. Independence is the sine qua non if we wish to truly avoid needless loss of life and materiel. Then and only then should the interesting ways of how to go about that be entered upon and, make no mistake, I agree that process of complete reform is long overdue.

[thefodfather]

Again, I do see your point. But at the moment, and for the forseeable future, it isn't independent. Given that to be the case, how can the deckchairs be re-arranged to achieve the best possible outcome. Despite the failings of the past, I hope (and believe) that the situation is very different now and that such a situation could not occur in the same way again. Surely what matters is to do the right thing, not to appear to do the right thing.

By that I mean that physical independance for an authority or an investigation body can be achieved without actually happening in reality.

[tucumseh]

Fodfather


I’m afraid the reality, based on what was said at the MAA conference and in formal briefings to Ministers (which became official answers to PQs), the MAA (and D/Air Staffs and their retired predecessors in particular, which some would say is essentially the same thing at a senior level) remain in a state of denial over key points.


In summary, they perpetuate the notion that XV230 was a one-off (i.e. there were no systemic failures) and that this failure had its root in something (unspecified) that occurred in 1998. In maintaining this stance, they completely ignore verified and irrefutable evidence that has not only been submitted to inquiries and published, but was literally stuck under their nose by one Minister. Given the officer in question at that meeting is well known for his integrity and competence, I can only imagine the conflicts that exist within the MAA and MoD. I sincerely hope the appointment of ACM North brings an openness and honesty which has hitherto obviously been frowned upon.

[Engines]

Tuc and Others,

What I'm going to say here might attract some flak, but the point of this forum is to air a range of views for people to think about and comment on on. So here goes....

First, let me be clear. If personnel (senior, junior, or of any colour uniform) have acted in a way so as to cause the deaths of serving personnel, they should be pursued in all ways possible - as I've said before, the law may be the only recourse. The 'court of public opinion' is not sufficiently bothered, and the 'court of political opinion' is sewn up by the same people who may have been party to those same actions.

But I am becoming less convinced that pursuing those who made those errors before 1998 is an essential precondition to achieving a safe and effective 'Air Safety environment' to use the MAA term. Let me repeat - they should be exposed and if necessary prosecuted. What I think the 'system' (and by that I mean the key players - FLCs, Duty Holders, DE&S, contractors, and the MAA) must do now is move to a solid and sensible set of regulations backed up by a good assurance system, which are then fully implemented and used by all the players.

My first concern that the current MAA regulations are not sufficiently 'right', given the time and expense incurred in preparing them. There are too many gaps, errors and omissions, (e.g. duties of the RTSA) while in some areas there is a proliferation of 'process' at the expense of common sense. That can be fixed, but the MAA need to realise that it needs doing.

My second concern is that organisations like DE&S have been too badly 'hollowed out' of experience and leadership (not, by the way, resources) to reliably implement a good regulation set. They've lost a lot of experienced people (like Tuc) and also lost a lot of their 'shared corporate memory' that helps younger PMs to avoid going wrong. This one can't be easily fixed, and I'm coming round to the idea that a 'GOCO' (Govt Owned Contractor Operated) model ( as being pursued by Hammond) may be the only real way forward.

My final concern is that a culture of 'schedule first and schedule only' has taken root in some areas, so that PMs who want to do the right thing are bullied (and I use that term with some care and deliberation) into doing things that are plain wrong. Tuc has provided many examples of this, and I'm sorry to say that it is still around. (Happens in industry too by the way). Brave leadership at the middle levels is needed here.

I have said in clear that I think an MoD owned MAA is probably the best way forward, in that the MoD has a duty to properly regulate and oversee its safety management organisations, and it needs something like the MAA to do that. (Sorry, Chug) The MAA should, however, be aligned with other MoD safety management organisations (Nuclear, DOSG) and cut down to a two star head so that it doesn't go off and become a very senior staffed self licking lollipop.

Finally, I think that the current systems for oversight of the MAA are too cosy, in that too many of the people concerned are of one service, and have shared cultures, aims and objectives, not to say backgrounds. That is where I'd aim to add in some true 'independence' by use of a truly 'outside' body to moderate and examine the MAA on a regular basis.

Again, for the avoidance of doubt. I absolutely support bringing those who deliberately broke the rules to book. But I think that the time may have come to separate that from the effort now needed to move forward and build the system that our people at the front line deserve.

And with that, I think I'm done - but happy to respond (via PMs or the thread) if anyone thinks these comments worth discussion.

Never forgetting the young and quite excellent people actually doing the business day and night out there

Engines

[Chugalug2]

TFF:

Surely what matters is to do the right thing, not to appear to do the right thing.
By that I mean that physical independance for an authority or an investigation body can be achieved without actually happening in reality.

I completely agree with your first sentence,FF, but am completely mystified by the second. Could you please expand on that as I'm sure that we would all like to know how such a seemingly contradictory idea could ever work. When I was a Squadron FSO I drew comfort from the oft repeated notion that the FS system was entirely separate from the CoC. What a false sense of security that was, given the disasters that beset it in later years.
You are possibly right when you say:

...that such a situation could not occur in the same way again.

Unfortunately though it is still possible for it to happen again, just not in exactly the same way. Evolution is the key to survival. If UK Military Airworthiness is to survive it needs to change to avoid unlawful interference. It needs to be independent. What happened in the past has to be faced up to. If it is not, then the MAA is based on a lie and still subject to subversion. Scarcely the basis for starting out:

to do the right thing, not to appear to do the right thing.

[tucumseh]

Engines

But I am becoming less convinced that pursuing those who made those errors before 1998 is an essential precondition to achieving a safe and effective 'Air Safety environment' to use the MAA term. Let me repeat - they should be exposed and if necessary prosecuted.

I totally agree. What concerns me most is the mentality of those VSOs who, despite knowing that the failures commenced over 10 years previously, supported Haddon-Cave to knowingly name and shame the wrong (MoD) people and said nothing. And continue to do so.

Furthermore, the same serving and retired VSOs permitted and perpetuated vindictive and false accusations against both Service pilots and civilian staffs.


In the interests of natural justice, I’d like to see them publicly exposed; but more importantly the wrongly accused publicly exonerated. MoD HAS to get rid of this culture, and that MUST mean identifying the weeds and killing them off. But, as you say, this should not distract the MAA.


But the problem we face is that the MAA/MoD and Haddon-Cave publicly support the guilty, and they cite this support at every turn. They are not “honourable men”, as Liam Fox was briefed to say. They are despicable and utterly dishonourable. It is not a case of them not being named, while other guilty men were.


General Sir Sam Cowan, for example, was 100% innocent of the charges laid against him. Haddon-Cave had irrefutable evidence, in the form of both external and internal reports, that Cowan’s predecessors (especially the 4 AMSOs/AMLs from 1985-96) were actually guilty of the charges laid against Cowan, to a degree unimaginable to the layman. (Read the critique of the HEART report. The quite deliberate waste, of hundreds of millions in a year or so, was criminal). That is, Cowan was criticised for allegedly cutting support funding by 5% per year for 4 years; but no evidence was presented this affected airworthiness in any way. Yet, Haddon-Cave refused to publish the evidence that AMSOs made 28% cuts per year for 3 years, directly targeting airworthiness. And that these cuts were cited in internal MoD audit reports in 1992 and 1996 as savings at the expense of safety. Haddon-Cave used the catchphrase, but protected the guilty.

I think it absolutely essential the MAA acknowledge these facts. THAT is an essential precondition to them moving forward effectively. I would cite two main reasons. First, MAA staff MUST understand what it is they are trying to correct. Some may know what they are trying to achieve in simple terms, but they need to know how they got where they are in order to truly understand. Secondly, the systematic rundown of airworthiness means, by definition, legacy aircraft fleets are, to a greater or lesser extent, lacking. Regression is necessary to plug the gaps in, for example, Safety Case audit trails. How far are the MAA regressing? 14 years it seems, to 1998. The problem is that leaves (at least) an 11 year gap from 1987 to 1998. They are totally ignoring, for example, the Chief of Defence Procurement’s own admission to the Public Accounts Committee in 1999 that the systemic failures (i.e. not just Chinook) noted in the 1992 CHART report remain extant. If they don’t get that baseline right, then how can they bid for sufficient funding?

[thefodfather]

Sorry Chug, I should have been clearer with my last statement. It wasn't a suggestion, more a warning that physical independence does not guarantee anything. By that I mean that Accident investigation bodies and Authorities should be independent of operators. But being organizationally independent and acting independently is another thing.

[tucumseh]

But being organizationally independent and acting independently is another thing.

This is true, but you have to ask what is making the MAA/MoD lie, deceive and mislead.

In the case of ACM North, even before he's taken over the MAA he read out at Conference what was probably a prepared presentation, that perpetuated the MoD's lies. That shows his briefers (the MAA) are not organisationally independent.

If he'd even glanced at the evidence, he'd have known he was being misled. If he hasn't read the evidence, he'd better have a look. Otherwise, his first act as MAA DG will be to demonstrate he will not act independently.

[Extg3]

Thank you for posting that link, I shall read and keep handy for referring to about the flurry ov acroynyms flying about this thread.