MAA MILITARY AIR SAFETY CONFERENCE

[Engines]

MG,

Thanks for the response. I understand where you are coming from, but let me explain more clearly what I am getting at.

Back 'in the day', the RN had a system where the Engineering Authority (DGA(N)) took the CA Release from the PE, and turned it into an RTS. DGA(N) was the RTSA. The job of creating the RTS was given to the engineers, working with the pilots in the Operating Authority (in those days FONAC). DGA(N) (2 star engineer) signed off and authorised the RTS. This was a system that, generally, worked well and delivered good results. (I know this not because I think so, but because the FAA RTSs all went through independent audit in the late 90s with good results. A number of RAF RTSs had a worse time)

Now look at the situation. The PT (mainly engineers) are doing the PE and a bit of the EA job, building the RTSR (RTS Request) submission. Any half sane PT gets BIG input from the RTSA while building the RTSR. That RTSR is signed off by the PT leader (can be a one star) and then passed to the RTSA. RTSA (ACAS) then accepts the RTSR by releasing an RTS, which it builds from the RTSR. That's the rest of the old RN EA task.

The problem (in my view) is that building a decent RTS should be an integral part of the RTSR. If the PT haven't got it right, the RTSA must refuse the RTSR submission and get it reworked. All the RTSA SHOULD be doing is reassembling RTSR evidence into the RTS. My view (and I accept that others will disagree) is that the job of building (and maintaining) a decent RTS is essentially a systems engineering task best done by engineers, with pilots.

Honestly, from what I have seen, ACAS staffs are no more insulated from operational pressures than FLC staffs. You could argue that they are even more exposed. Horses for courses, and in my view, not the key issue. The key is a properly built and evidenced (is that a word?) RTS that the Front Line can use WITHOUT any amendment. That's exactly what DGA(N) did for years (and, I must add, with far less personnel than the current system). I have seen (and keep seeing) the current system delivering some less than sparkling RTSs, when the right course of action would have been 'no RTS at all'. And if pilots are unhappy about that, well, it's the job of the PT PMs to deliver the products, sack them if they don't perform.

At the risk of incurring the wrath of some distinguished contributors, I do think that asking for RAF VSOs to be criticised and 'named and shamed' is a) not going to happen - that's the British establishment way and b) probably not what the system needs now to move forward.

I will be fascinated to see what the MAA finally coughs up on RTSA roles and responsibilities. (I'd place a decent bet that there is already a big pile of anguished correspondence between RAF VSO on this one). It also makes selection of the current ACAS as the next Head of the MAA a questionable decision. I'm afraid that I have to predict an 'RAF VSO friendly' outcome. That's not necessarily bad, but I honestly don't think it will be optimal from a safety management point of view.

By the way, i don't recommend a 'rebuild' of the old RN RTS system - too much 'joint' water has passed under the bridge for that. But I'd love to see an impartial analysis of the 'pros and cons' for the various options.

But this is a forum - opposing views are insanely great!

Best Regards as ever to all those draining swamps and wrestling alligators,

Engines

[tucumseh]

Engines

-re VSOs. Under almost any other circumstance I would agree wholeheartedly about there being nothing to gain from naming and shaming.

But in this particular case (the series of avoidable deaths, commencing with Chinook ZD576, if not before) these VSOs have not only made gross mistakes (which is excusable in anyone) but have compounded their actions by seeking to blame innocent staffs (not just the RAF pilots, but civilian staffs on other accidents) and withholding evidence (to protect themselves).

It is not a one-off. It has been a systematic subverting of the regulations and their legal duty of care, amounting to gross misconduct in public office; which current staffs perpetuate despite the formation of the MAA. They have demonstrably lied to their own junior staffs, to Ministers, a Sheriff, the Church, Coroners, Houses of Commons & Lords committees, the Public Accounts Committee and more. Last, but by no means least, they have shamefully lied to the relatives of deceased aircrew and passengers.

I appreciate it is perhaps not the MAA's job to do the naming. But it is most certainly obliged to acknowledge the truth that these failures go back long before the 1998 baseline Haddon-Cave inexplicably arrived at, despite irrefutable evidence to the contrary. In fact, Haddon-Cave's actions are in some respects highly questionable and I believe only the fact his report was prepared on behalf of the Secy of State protects him from legal action. I know my own evidence to both he and Lord Philip was meticulously supported by written supporting evidence - in fact, Lord Philip was given 400MB of supporting papers to both prove the audit trail and demonstrate MoD had lied over many significant components of the case (the criticality of FADEC software being a good example).

I don't disagree with you, I just have my own view based on personal experiences.

[Engines]

Tuc,

I absolutely appreciate your well made points. I fully agree that if there has been gross misconduct in public office then it should be pursued, probably most effectively via the legal system. The MAA is not really in a position to do that, given its remit.

My concern is that RAF VSOs have an almost unbreakable hold on the political establishment where 'air matters' are concerned. The long battle to get the MoD (and the Government) to release key documents shows how effectively the VSOs are able to fight their corner. I don't think it's right, nor do I think it serves the nation especially well, but that's how I think it is. The law is really the only option left. But, let me be clear - if there is ever anything I can do to help get legal redress, any evidence I might be able to offer, just call and I'll be there.

Where I was coming from (and I apologise for not being clearer) is that fixing the airworthiness system will not now, in my view, be helped much by any such legal action, as justified as it is. What needs to happen now is a concerted move forward to a coherent, organised and competent system that delivers airworthy systems and keeps them that way. The main target area has to be, again my view, DE&S and the new Duty Holders in the FLCs.

I hope this addressees your well made points - I have too much respect for you to want to be seen to disputing your point of view.

Best Regards as ever to all those fighting the good fights

Engines

[tucumseh]

Thanks Engines.

The point you make about DE&S is absolutely key to this issue. It highlights that failures occurred far earlier in the process (as well as earlier in time) than MoD/MAA are prepared to admit. By “attacking” 1st and 2nd Line activities, they are misleading all concerned into thinking that is where the problem lies, while perpetuating the notion that airworthiness and serviceability is the same thing. In doing so, they are hiding the truth and defending the VSOs. And, I hasten to add, the civilian staffs (both engineers and administrators) who instructed their juniors to knowingly render aircraft unairworthy.



The MAA don’t mention this, primarily because I believe it is they who continue to brief Ministers that past VSOs/CSs were correct to take disciplinary action against staffs who refused to obey these orders. They can say all they want in the media, but the simple fact remains that a Director Internal Audit report was commissioned in January 1993 with the sole purpose of gathering evidence to protect the jobs of those under threat of dismissal by AMSO’s DGSM (an AVM). DIA reported to PUS that the civilian staffs acted correctly and the immediate threat reduced. But it didn’t go away, and was repeated in 1998-on, when 2-4 Stars were specifically warned about safety failings and made similar threats. These facts were actively withheld from subsequent Coroners’ Inquests.



The day the MAA acknowledge the above is the day I’ll put my feet up.



Going back to our mutual boss, Ron Holley, I recall precisely what his reaction was if any of his staff identified such a problem, or financial waste. You were invited to the 5th Floor for a glass of (very nice) sherry and a pat on the back. Contrast this with a few years later and being threatened with your jotters.

[1.3VStall]

If there is anyone from the MAA reading this thread, could they please print off the last two pages and present them to the DG, while expressing their deep concern and asking for his considered opinion?

[thefodfather]

Whilst I wholeheartedly agree with much, if not all that has been written on this subject, perhaps it is time to look to the future. The golden age that is discussed by many is fading into the distance fast and there will be few left in today's military who can remember it. Whilst there was a great deal about this period that was good in terms of Airworthiness, the same cannot necessarily be said about some of the cultural and human factors aspects of flight safety. Safety in civilian aviation is done very differently now compared to even 20 years ago and one of the challenges for the MAA is how to look to the future given the baggage of the past.

Many amazing people have lost their lives in military aviation for many different reasons and the vast majority involved in flight safety, past and present, do the job with the memories of lost friends in their hearts and the best of intentions. However, in an organisation with posting cycles etc it is always going to be difficult to gain the right skills to do safety/ airworthiness properly. Perhaps there is a need for a Safety Branch (or maybe a Safety stream for specific branches) with a career path from junior SFSO through Duty Holder offices, PTs, RTSAs and finally the MAA or MAAIB where a career of safety management gives them the knowledge they really need. The level of experience in civilian regulators is mind boggling when compared to the military equivalents.

So much has already been achieved compared to the system of 10+ years ago when my first safety job as an SO3 led to redicule by my peers as a dead end job with no likelihood of promotion. There is much to be encouraged about, certainly in some areas anyway. But of course, safety is a journey that never ends and to complete the clichés, it's everyone's responsibility (or was that FOD?)

[Chugalug2]

Such excellent posts above by those united in their wish to see UK Military Airworthiness Provision ensured and protected that I hesitate to put in my twopenneth. But do so I will (of course :-), so here goes:

Engines, you want to see a system that is not dominated by the RAF.

Tucumseh, you feel that those VSOs (all RAF?) responsible for the subversion of the regulations, resultant fatal accidents, and the shameful decades long cover up since, should be held legally responsible.

FodFather, you think that those serving who are involved in Flight Safety at a junior level could opt to specialise in it, rising through the various levels until becoming Inspectors or Investigators in the MAA and MAAIB respectively.

These are all laudable aims and in my view are all possible, but only if the MAA and the MAAIB are made truly independent of the MOD, and importantly of each other.
The MAA would not be, and would be keen to demonstrate itself not to be, the creature of the MOD, the RAF, or anyone else. We have already noted that the DG should be a civilian, or ex Service, or shortly to be ex-Service. Those who are still serving, at lower levels, would be answerable to the DG and not their parent Service. It sounds tricky, but the rot was never at these levels but at the top. That is why the independence has to be for real and not simply a word in a bullet point.

So, Engines, a truly independent MAA, of the RAF, the FAA, the AAC, the MOD, even of PPRuNe.

Tucumseh, an independent MAA should have no difficulty in receiving and acting upon evidence submitted to it of the systemic suborning of Airworthiness Regulations as a result of illegal orders issued by RAF VSOs aimed at subverting the Airworthiness Process. Indeed, that would be their very first test. If they won't do that then they in turn will have reneged on their duty. Assuming though that is not the case, then investigation and prosecution of the culprits should follow.

FodFather, If your aspiring Military Inspectors and Investigators want to ensure airworthy aircraft for the UK Military, and all military air accidents professionally and properly investigated to avoid recurrences, then I propose that only truly independent bodies can assure that. It is for that very reason that the CAA and AAIB are independent, including of each other. Much safety work is done by the operators but they are checked by and accountable to the Authority and their accidents investigated by the Board.

This will not be an easy solution, effective ones rarely are, but it will save lives. For that reason alone it needs to happen and happen soon.

Self Regulation Does Not Work and in Aviation It Kills!

[tucumseh]

Tucumseh, you feel that those VSOs (all RAF?)

No experience of the Army doing this.

One senior RN Captain, but he'd been lied to by a civilian non-engineer who had granted himself airworthiness delegation, and quickly withdrew the disciplinary action when told I'd been "done" for ignoring an order to commit fraud. But he wouldn't condemn the others actions. Similarly, one Commodore, but he simply couldn't grasp the concept of anyone knowingly making an aircraft unsafe, so satisfied himself with ordering the (same) civilian non-engineer to reconsider his actions. Non-eng refused, and was supported by 2 Star (DGAS2 - Nimrod, Chinook etc) and CDP. As I said, the MoD have consistently upheld this action, as have Ministers. Since the formation of the MAA, I understand all such briefings on airworthiness to Ministers come from them.

So yes, in the main RAF and civilian non-engineers; and of course senior engineers who lose the plot after becoming political animals. But invariably either suppliers (who, in 1991 were granted control over all engineering matters by the Chief Engineer) and the CE's immediate subordinate (DGSM) and three Air Cdres immediately below him, who I think were all Suppliers. They certainly toppled with blank looks when I mentioned functional safety. I cannot conceive DGSM acting in this way without his boss, Chief Engineer, knowing. You'd need serious top cover to travel down to London, gather 8 civilians in a room and threaten dismissal for refusing to commit fraud. And then, when an independent audit ruled against you, escape censure altogether and be allowed to maintain your stance.

[Engines]

Chug,

What I really want is a system that works and delivers safe and effective aircraft to the front line on time. Domination by RAF VSO aircrew is a hindrance to achieving that aim, in my view.

Conversely, if RAF VSO aircrew could be induced to hand over key aspects of safety management to their engineers, who are better 'SQEP'd' to do the job, I would be happy with the current system.

It's not colour of uniform - it's the quality of the job done.

I agree with you that the MAA is not sufficiently independent - but conversely I'd prefer to see it headed up by a two star and made to report to the Defence Safety Board like the weapons and nuclear guys (who have just as significant risks (perhaps more significant) to regulate and manage). That would, in my view, give the MAA a better 'steer' on how to do its business, and stop it being a 'one colour' shop.

Independence would be best handled, I think, by a truly independent oversight panel reporting to Sof S - but not one headed up by yet another RAF VSO (retired).

Best Regards as ever

Engines

[Chugalug2]

Engines, that would be fine if all of this scandal could be laid solely at the feet of RAF Aircrew VSOs but as tuc has pointed out the key man, who in theory was the long stop and the professional guardian of the airworthiness process, was an engineer, indeed the Chief Engineer, albeit an RAF VSO one, who presided over the demolition of it and the replacement of the very engineers that you call for by unqualified and inexperienced suppliers.

The problem here, as has already been pointed out, is that the system could be fatally compromised by individuals, very senior ones of course, but the badges and rank that they carried is incidental to the fact that they did what they did because they could. Why they did it is equally incidental. The lesson is plain however, it must never be allowed to happen again. With all respect (and that isn't just a throw away phrase), I cannot see how your solution can do that. It might be argued that neither can mine, but I would contend that it is less likely to, just as the CAA or MAAIB are unlikely to collude with operators or manufacturers to allow unsafe practise or to cover up gross negligence, being independent of both and each other.

Perhaps the contrast with Airworthiness versus Nuclear and Weapons Safety is that the latter two are clearly capable of immediate and overwhelming disaster if not properly handled. Airworthiness is a far more amorphous concept. Many here still confuse it with serviceability, others point to allegedly unairworthy aircraft operating for years without apparent problems. Those whose job it is to ensure airworthiness is provided for are forever having to defend not it but themselves, for delaying programmes and adding unnecessarily to their cost. The connection between some troublesome code in a FADEC and the possibility of a total loss, of aircraft and occupants, can only be seen in retrospect and even then not, if the operator does not want to see it. That code should be ensured by a totally independent regulator, that possible connection by a totally independent investigator. Independence, like pregnancy, does not really allow of a degree of condition. It either is or isn't. Neither the present MAA or MAAIB are.

[dragartist]

Time to weed out the dross

It is no good bashingthe MAA They don’t make decisions or sign anything off. They will not be before any BoI to answer toany failings. The formation of the MAA post CH-C certainly raised awareness inthe whole community. This can only be seen as a good thing. Unfortunately westill have “operators” that do not have the appropriate knowledge andexperience. Yet they sign themselves up as SQEPs. – Yes I have first handexperience of this on many occasions. Some laughable!

Flipster is spot onabout those who “can do airworthiness properly” not being around any longer.This was the findings of the Public Accounts Committee (if I was clever likesome I would include the link to report 80 on the Govt web). Even the JuniorDefence Minister for DE&S tried to defend this until I wrote to him tellinghim that he could not defend the indefensible. He was good enough to write backto acknowledge his error. But this was never corrected publicly.

I grew up inairworthiness terms over my 35 years. I was not very proud of some of thestatements I signed off in the early days but by 1992 I had come a long way inmy understanding of my responsibility. By 1999 I saw myself as a disciple of aformer Technical Director of the MAA as he had the confidence to detach me to” Sleaford Tech” to spread themessage of the good work we were doing in motors. This work was a forerunner toCassandra. (Frankly I was not an advocate of Cassandra. I saw it to be thedomain of safety managers rather than those truly accountable)

I had many battles,particularly the last 10 years with folks that were operating outside theirperformance bracket. Due to circumstances these folks remain a menace to ourForces who continue to put themselves in harms way today. Ether flying in ordependent upon air assets.

I was prompted to jointhis forum by reading Trish Knights book. It reinforced my thoughts that Iworked in a broken organisation for so long, with so many ostriches. I hadgreat hopes for the post CH-C era. It was not to be. Under the terms of my LOAI brought concerns over the blatant breach of regulations to my seniors. Mostwere ignored. At some units JSP 553 was used to prop open the crew-room door.As for 543D, these folks who set themselves up as experts in generating SOPsand APs were not even aware of its existence. To this day, publications arebeing amended without a properly authorised F765. It is this culture the MAAwas to change. The systemic failures still remain. When the small basic thingspail into insignificance the bigger things can fall through the cracks.

I am enjoying readingthe comments from Tuc, Engines, Just this once and Chug. I must know some ofyou folks.

One of my mentors whotaught me so much (still around and doing good things) had a saying about “lean”.If we lean too far we fall over”. Have we reached that stage? I think so. On thedemise of the Harrier, Jaguar and Nimrod I expected some of the experiencedguys to be redeployed to help me out in my team that was becoming stretched. Theynever showed. Their skills and experience evaporated. There is another tread on here about staffing,or lack of.

I do believe CH-Cshould be invited back to undertake a follow up audit. Not sure what the termsshould be but we really need to root out those who continue to flout theregulations and those not even aware of the regulations because they have nothad the exposure or pre deployment training to undertake the responsibilitiesof the jobs they are posted into. Worst of all are the non aviation peopleposted into aviation jobs. Yes this happens to uniformed posts as well ascivilian posts. I wish I could exposethese folks and perhaps prevent another devastated family. Some of my funnystories are not funny at all. Perhaps I should start a misplaced humour thread.Let’s start with the PJI who was trying to inform the writing of the RTS and2Gp GASO for a large 4 engine tactical transport aircraft by suggesting thatthe limit for depressurising the aircraft to chuck things out is different atnight and day because when it is dark there is less oxygen in the air. Clearlyhe did not listen to the lectures at RAFCAM but signs himself up as competent.
By the way I don’t really dress up in women’sclothes.

[thefodfather]

Chug, whilst I support your sentiment, I still don't know how a totally independent MAA could be staffed or operated without being lacking in credibility or the skills to regulate military aviation. Over time you could build a team of enough civilians perhaps but where would the real life operational experience come from in such an organisation.

In terms of the MAAIB, given that both the Chinook and Nimrod accidents were investigated by the "independent" AAIB, I'm not sure this is the holy grail either.

For me it is more about generating a culture of safety and as a follow on from that, a bigger group of experienced safety professionals that we have already. Then, once they have the experience, there needs to be a structure that gets the most out of that experience for the good of military aviation. From what I have seen and heard, things are certainly going in the right direction. It's even cool to get an MAA job out of staff college.

[Extg3]

MLAs

Gents,
I am reading this thread with great interest, but I struggle with the proliferation of MLAs. is there an online dictionary that will explain these to an interested but struggling reader.

[Chugalug2]

TFF:

In terms of the MAAIB, given that both the Chinook and Nimrod accidents were investigated by the "independent" AAIB, I'm not sure this is the holy grail either.

You are right, FodFather, there is definitely no holy grail, nor will there ever be. The MAA and the MAAIB that I seek will leave much to be desired. They will be the cause of dissatisfaction and complaint, no doubt. What they will not be though, I fervently hope, is to be at the beck and call of superiors with an agenda of their own. Such was the relationship that the AAIB had with the various Boards of Inquiry such as the two you instance. The AAIB did not investigate those accidents, their respective Boards did, "assisted" by the AAIB in only those areas requested by the Board. I do not think that Mr Cable of the AAIB felt that he ever had a free hand to investigate the loss of Chinook HC2 ZD576, for example.

I do not envisage an MAA or MAAIB staffed purely by Civilians. There will be a need in both for the operational knowledge and expertise as well as the ethos of the Armed Forces that can only come from those still serving. It seems to me that if such personnel can serve in the Armed Forces of Allies, they can certainly serve in UK bodies dedicated to the safety of our military airfleets. All it needs is the will to succeed.

I'm glad to hear that the MAA is now considered cool by those looking for a career as a senior officer, but that is not its purpose is it? If it can't be relied upon to fulfil that purpose, its reputation within the "tribe" is irrelevant. It has to ensure that our aircraft are airworthy, and I am convinced that it can only do that without of the MOD. That may not be popular, that may not be cool, but it will save lives and material. We cannot afford the unnecessary loss of either. Ditto as ever with the MAAIB.

To answer your point, we had a culture of safety, the RAF Flight Safety system was the envy of the Western Allies. It was effectively shut down by a handful of malevolent old men. No point in rebuilding it for the same thing to happen yet again is it? To lose one Flight Safety system may be regarded as a misfortune, to lose another looks like carelessness, or even Gross Negligence...?

[thefodfather]

Chug

As always I agree with much of what you say. A regulator should always provide the very checks and balances you suggest and should certainly not be at the beck and call of anyone. As you say the goal is not to be "cool", but if the right attitude to safety becomes the natural mindset of the future VSOs then that can only be a positive thing.

I do feel that it is what the MAA does and the culture in which it exists that is important rather than purely whether it is independent or not. I would prefer to allow the MAA to focus on doing the right thing rather than continually face arguments about the level of its independence. Approaches to safety have changed a great deal since the days when the system was the envy of others and I would rather the MAA prepare to meet the challenges of the future than try and emulate the past.

Either way, I'm sure what we seek is the same although we might differ in how that might be achieved.

[Chugalug2]

I don't want to unnecessarily perpetuate this dialogue when others wish to make their points,TFF, but the issue that divides us is so fundamental as to require emphasising.

You say that cultivating a safety culture is the important thing rather than continual arguments about the independence of the MAA. I'm afraid I see that as a cart before the horse argument. The very first requirement of any regulator is to be completely independent of those that it regulates.

We have seen tremendous problems recently emanating from the British love affair with self regulation; the IPPC, the PPC, even the BBC, have all been shown to have feet of clay. In the main the cost is in reputations rather than lives, though lives have indeed been lost under many of these quangos.

Aviation professionals know, or bloody well should do, that fond hopes and optimism is harshly punished in the sky. The present system of military airworthiness provision is fatally flawed, and goodwill and hoping for the best wont change that.

You say that:

Approaches to safety have changed a great deal since the days when the system was the envy of others and I would rather the MAA prepare to meet the challenges of the future than try and emulate the past.

If that is a polite way of saying that I'm out of date and the next generation are in charge now, point taken. Otherwise I don't understand what you are saying.

Of course things move on, Flight Safety included, but to succeed it must evolve. The "Year Zero" approach taken by the MAA is as doomed as Pol Pot's was. I would suggest that the best thing to do is indeed to go back, to find Terra Firma. The only guaranteed firm ground on which to build an MAA is with its foundations set in the hard rock of independence. Presently it is built on sand, and shifting sand at that. No amount of safety culture will protect it from more malevolent old men, only independence will. I'm afraid that I will go on arguing that "continually".

[tucumseh]

In terms of the MAAIB, given that both the Chinook and Nimrod accidents were investigated by the "independent" AAIB, I'm not sure this is the holy grail either.

If I could just reiterate what Chug said. I have spoken to the principals on a number of occasions and the AAIB was most certainly not given a free hand to investigate ZD576, or indeed the preceding Chinook accidents caused by airworthiness failures (e.g. ZA721 in 1987). MoD actively obstructed the investigations, withholding vital information at every turn. The obvious question is, will the same happen to the MAAIB and what authority do they have if it does?


The clearest manifestation of this is the reports into the ZD576 SuperTANS and Trimble 8000 GPS.


The first was conducted by Racal themselves. The second by the AAIB. Why not Trimble? Or why not both by the AAIB? The two reports cannot be reconciled, with a glaring 34.2 second discrepancy regarding when SuperTANS was switched off. MoD chose to accept Racal’s explanation (which may be perfectly valid, it is just that it has never been independently validated) over that of the AAIB (that the Super TANS had been switched off prior to impact; say, 34.2 seconds before, about the time the Waypoint was accepted). It so happened the Racal explanation diverted attention from a system which had no operational clearance whatsoever (i.e. away from those who hid this fact from the pilots), to the alleged actions of the pilots.

MoD used Racal’s report into a single device to demonstrate the entire Nav system was both serviceable and accurate. This is ludicrous beyond words, compounded by the fact they withheld the rather important fact that their case against the pilots relied entirely on a system which the (mandated) CA Release said was not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever.
Worse, the Trimble report details at least 2 serious faults in the system (Power Supply and Time of Day) which a five year old would tell you cannot be reconciled with a claim the system was 100% serviceable. (If ToD was faulty, how can one rely on the timing “evidence”?)

In such a crucial investigation (in fact, ANY investigation), it is incumbent upon the MoD (in this case) to reconcile such conflicts. They didn’t. They consistently chose the path of least resistance that would allow them to blame the pilots. For that act alone, the only punishment is imprisonment.



Please don’t be fooled by MoD’s lies about the AAIB’s role. Mr Cable went to great lengths to clarify this with Lord Philip and other inquires, but MoD persisted in misrepresenting their role. When it suits, the AAIB either have primacy, or are a peripheral player. Which applies to the MAAIB?


Let us consider what would have occurred if a truly independent MAAIB or MAA had reported on ZD576. Fact #1 – There was no valid RTS. Fact #2 – The pilots were not permitted to rely on the entire Nav and Comms systems. If those two simple facts had been revealed up front, would anyone have dared blame the pilots in any way? Not a chance.



No apologies for using ZD576 as the prime example – it is the case where most evidence against MoD exists, and serves to emphasise the MAA are simply not addressing the true scale and scope of the failures. The only possible reason is to protect those responsible for the failings in the first place.

[Chugalug2]

Extg3:

I struggle with the proliferation of MLAs. is there an online dictionary that will explain these to an interested but struggling reader.

You and me both, Extg3. I'm sure that tuc will not mind me reminding him that I used to remonstrate with him many years ago to "de-gobbledegook" his posts. To his credit he has made great efforts to do so since, but often an exchange with others of a similar background to his soon starts to display this arcane graffiti, much as a similar exchange between pilots might, for instance.
I have long since tried instead to go with the flow of such posts. Even if such dictionaries as you suggest existed, and perhaps they do, they would soon be outdated as the MOD sheds one lot to grow another, rather like the exoskeletons shed by slimy creatures from the deep (a comparison made purely from the point of view of illustration you understand).
Instead of trying to dot every i and cross every t, you might wish to liken the systemic layout that these terms describe to the systems of an aircraft. Thus any dysfunction exhibited by some or all of these systems affects the viability, or airworthiness if you will, of the entire aircraft. It is then that you can see that the issue is not only to get those systems functioning correctly again but to ensure that they will keep on doing so.
That seems to me to be the big challenge confronting the MAA. They may just possibly be able to do the former, but I see no way that they can ensure the latter. We used to have a working system of Airworthiness Provision in my day, we even had such a system in tuc's day but all it took to stop all that was a group of malevolent old men. Why? Because they could. We have to put the system beyond their reach, which means putting the MAA beyond their reach, which means making it external to, and independent of, the MOD. Ditto with the MAAIB of course.
I think it pays not to be too closely involved in all the arcane detail of this and not get bogged down in every detail. A case perhaps of seeing the woods for the trees?
Oh, edited to add that the link posted by tuc leads to this pdf file. Go to p237, voila a dictionary, well of sorts!:-
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&p...YzlkMjlkOTBkNA

[tucumseh]

A simple mechanism I’d like to see in any Service Inquiry is them being required to answer a checklist of leading questions, key among them “Is the aircraft airworthy”.



At every other stage of the airworthiness process one is required to answer a similar question – that is, has materiel and financial provision been made to attain and maintain airworthiness?


What went wrong was the people who were required to answer this question had their posts cut. The Director Internal Audit report of June 1996 I speak of highlighted this failure to PUS. On MoD’s own admission, they ripped up the report in 2001 as it was marked “No Further Action”.



The reason why is very clear to me. From 1987-on (after the Services disbanded their sections which asked this question before seeking formal endorsement of any Requirement) the MoD(PE) project/programme manager, who hitherto had been a safety net for the odd slip up, became the final defence. This, of course, required him to have intimate knowledge of the Services’ requirements, which has not been a competence required of PMs since 1990. From 1989-on, AMSO staffs (suppliers) routinely sought disciplinary action against MoD(PE) staffs who tried to apply this mandated regulation (which has never been rescinded).



We ignored them as much as possible but the key event was AMSO subsuming these MoD(PE) airworthiness specialists in 1991, the same year AMSO became double hatted as RAF Chief Engineer (ACM Michael Alcock). By December 1992, his immediate subordinate had stopped seeking disciplinary action, and was applying it himself, threatening to dismiss civilian staffs who continued to implement this legal obligation.



(You’ll notice the timeframe – 1987 to 1993 was most definitely NOT the “golden period” described by Haddon-Cave).



In short order, it became the norm (a) not to conduct this Requirement Scrutiny and (b) not to see materiel and financial provision for most components of airworthiness. The latter meant, primarily, failure to maintain the Build Standard, which militates against physical and functional safety, a valid Safety Case and a valid RTS. Put another way, we (PMs) would be given money to buy something that we knew would not be fit for purpose, and that no funding would exist to make it so.



This failure manifests itself in many ways. At Front Line you won’t have spares, access to Design Authorities, fault investigations won’t happen (AMSO instructed they cease in 1992), tech pubs won’t be valid (ditto, 1991), obsolescence won’t be addressed (ditto, 1991). One knock-on effect is a proliferation of Service Engineered Mods which breach, in every way, the rules governing them. Another is unofficial repair schemes that cannot be verified. In other words, the system seems hostile to what you are trying to achieve, and you spend your valuable time chasing things that should be there for you, automatically. The root cause is failure to answer, honestly, one simple question. You won’t find the MAA lobbying for this systemic failure to be corrected, because any such request would be admitting WHO was to blame, and would implicate a series of Ministers as they have consistently ruled that DGSM’s threat of 1992 was perfectly in order.



The regs say you SHALL NOT proceed unless adequate provision is made. THAT is the reg we are so often instructed to ignore. Failure to implement it actually costs time and money. Getting it right, first time, was a basic competence one used to have to demonstrate before being promoted to the most junior MoD(PE) posts. Nowadays, there may, just, be a handful in DE&S who could explain this. But NONE could show you the policy directive or the mandated procedures one follows. Correct that, and extend it to SIs, and almost every accident we speak of would have been avoided.

[Rigga]

Dragartist said:
"It is no good bashing the MAA. They don’t make decisions or sign anything off. They will not be before any BoI to answer any failings."

Oh yes they will. And they should be covering the recent certification trials of A330 and any other introduction of new types into the MOD Fleets.

The Spanish MAA certified the A330 as a generic type, but it should now be re-certified to the UK specification and that (costly?) certification should be signed off by the UK MAA meaning that the type has met all the required UK specifications and is airworthy.

The MAA can't have a choice in this as they must meet (or exceed) EASA standards and requirements before operating the A330 in their full capacity (or, I assume, pay AirTanker penalty fees as failing to meet a deal/contract)