MAA MILITARY AIR SAFETY CONFERENCE

[1.3VStall]

Does anyone have any feedback from the first day of the event?

[salad-dodger]

well it's lunchtime on the second day now so the conference should be over. This was organised as a one day conference spread over two days - first day PM and second day AM - for some reason (p!ss up perhaps).

S-D

[NorthernKestrel]

Report on the highlights of the conference now up on the RAeS site...

Empowering military air safety | Aerospace | The Royal Aeronautical Society


Seems the wording of the Duty Holder role is quite motivating...

“It scared the life out of my wife, and anything that scares the life out of her I attend to.”

[tucumseh]

A form of synergy here, given the latest correspondence received from the Crown Prosecution Service regarding the Nimrod XV230 case and the attempt to scapegoat Gp Capt Baber and Wg Cdr Eagles. It would seem Duty Holders have nothing to fear because the CPS have confirmed they were aware during the deliberations over Baber and Eagles that;

1. MoD staffs had been routinely instructed to make false written declarations about airworthiness and financial probity since 13th January 1988.
2. Refusal to obey this order has been deemed a disciplinary offence since 16th December 1992; but issuing the order is not.
3. That this ruling had been upheld and reaffirmed on numerous occasions in 2000-02 by MoD’s Director General Air Systems 2 (Nimrod, Chinook etc), Chief of Defence Procurement and Director of Personnel, Resources and Development (Fauset, Walmsley and Baker respectively).
4. Similarly, between 2003 and 2007 by various PUSs and successive Ministers for the Armed Forces (Moonie, Caplin, Ingram, Ainsworth). In his ruling of 23rd April 2003, PUS specifically cited CDP’s ruling of 19th November 2001, advising MoD staffs to heed it.
5. On 15th February 2007 PUS ruled that no action would be taken against staffs who breached, for example, the Air Force Act or the Civil Service Code, if they “have either moved on or retired”.

And that they, the CPS, are content with all of the above. Interestingly, they used the old MoD line from Mull of Kintyre - “Only if new evidence is found” would they entertain further representations or formal complaint.

So, on one hand it would seem I must apologise to either the RAF Provost Marshal or Thames Valley Police, who it would seem indeed passed this evidence on to the CPS. (I suspect the former, because TVP have taken the CPS’s line, although their wording is rather vague).
But on the other hand, it reaffirms Haddon-Cave (and the MAA) knew of these facts and declined to put them in the Nimrod Review. That means the MAA’s Terms of Reference are based on the false premise that the failures commenced in 1998 (repeated on the RAeS’s website); and that they know this but do nothing about it.
So, to repeat the lesson that has been common knowledge in MoD for nearly 25 years. Duty Holders – Delay signing anything until your last day in post. Shoot off home quickly, because in a few hours you are immune from prosecution; in fact you will gain the everlasting gratitude of VSOs because the delay will save MoD billions. Never mind that our aircraft may not be safe, it doesn’t matter. To repeat DGAS2’s ruling, when asked on 6th December 2000 “What is the greater offence, issuing the illegal order or refusing to obey it?” On 2nd February 2001 he confirmed that there was only one offence; the refusal.

The day the MAA acknowledge the above and state they disagree with these rulings is the day I’ll gracefully withdraw!

[Just This Once...]

Hi Tuc,

PUS ruling in 2007 has been overtaken by the Armed Forces Act (enacted Oct 2009). Not only are the offences pertaining to airworthiness more clearly defined, the decision to prosecute or not is outside of the chain of command and the sphere of influence of PUS.

Of course, this does put serving and ex-serving personnel (yep, ex-service can be prosecuted even after leaving if deemed in the public interest) at more risk of prosecution than their civil service counterparts.

Oh, and you do not need an accident to be prosecuted under the revised Armed Forces Act.

[tucumseh]

Thanks JTO. The context here is a formal complaint to TVP and CPS; both have declined to investigate saying the matter is closed and no offences were committed.

My own view is that these "offences" have always existed; the new Act changes little. The repeal of Sect 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act (1947) meant Crown Servants could be prosecuted for failure to implement, for example, JSP 318 and CA Instructions. The resultant change in the airworthiness regs was promulgated in DCI/Gen/89/93, and subsumed within 318 and CAI.


When our letters of delegation were changed to reflect this, we pointed out that a conflict existed, because the Chief Engineer's immediate subordinate (DGSM) had been threatening staffs with dismissal for disobeying orders to knowingly breach these regs.


It is that conflict / contradiction which we sought to resolve over many years. MoD has a formal 3-tier process, but the regs say PUS is the final arbiter (although I know of one case that went to the Cabinet Secretary). The consistent rulings, some dated AFTER the Armed Forces Act became law, was to uphold the original ruling of December 1992.

The only change today is that there is a different Act. The "offences" remain the same, although some are articulated better. My point is that the CPS has stated that the "offences" I mention are not offences at all - reaffirming the above rulings. They acknowldge that, despite all the irrefutable evidence presented to them, there were no grounds to proceed against those named during the two inquiries.


It would indeed be an interesting day in court when someone charged with such an offence simply cited precedent and MoD, Ministerial and CPS rulings! But history suggests it will never come to that.

[Chugalug2]

Thank you as always tuc for spelling out the real world to us, as against the sunny uplands featured in the RAeS blog. Here is a corrupt system just as existed in the German Wehrmacht when it went to war in 1939. Theoretically it too had its equivalent of the Armed Forces Act. Much was made of the Military Honour Code that those commissioned in it truly believed in. Yet we now know that it was encouraged to commit atrocities on an industrial scale from the very outset, that those who committed them flourished and those who opposed them punished, often paying with their lives.
That is the path that the MOD and its subsidiaries, the MAA and the MAAIB seem to be setting out on, to knowingly base their policies and actions on the falsehoods espoused by Haddon-Cave instead of facing up to the reality of a High Command policy dating from the late 80's of subverting the Regulations, ordering those responsible for implementing them to suborn them instead, and of punishing those who would not comply. The MOD should note the angst being suffered by the BBC who similarly had a policy of covering up past "indiscretions". Like Saville those who are being protected will eventually be outed. The longer it takes the more lives it will cost because protecting them means that the MAA and MAAIB will have to continue to be based on lies. So much for independence!
Self Regulation Does Not Work and in Aviation it Kills!

[vascodegama]

Didn't the war crimes trials in Nuremburg establish the principle that issuing an illegal order was in itself a crime?

[Chugalug2]

It didn't need Nuremburg to establish that vasco, it has always been an offence under Military Law (or for our purposes, Air Force Law) to issue an illegal order or to obey it.
Catch 22 is of course that if you do your duty and report it instead you would expect the CoC to invoke Military Law and prosecute the offender(s). Like it says in the Nationwide Ad though, it doesn't work like that in the case of the Royal Air Force. CS are instead deemed to have committed an offence by not obeying such orders, deceased JOs made to carry the can for 17 years, and the VSO's who issued the orders protected even at the cost of compromising the foundations of the MAA and MAAIB on a lie that goes on costing lives.

[tucumseh]

It is worth repeating that many of those whose decisions led directly to airworthiness related fatal accidents were not subject to the Armed Forces Act or general Military discipline, but the Civil Service Code.


Most commentators talk about "RAF" failings when, in fact, what they mean is "MoD". This is unfair to the vast majority of RAF personnel, and really only applies to a few VSOs and some of their hangers-on who filled their posts upon retirement.

However, the myth is perpetuated by, for example, the majority of Service posts in the MAA being RAF. Why? The logical thing would be to staff the MAA with people with a good track record (which MoD's own internal auditors say are few and far between, and MoD themselves say is only one man). If the MAA staff are so experienced, I've one question to ask. When, and to whom, did you report the systemic airworthiness failings you MUST have been aware of these past 25 years? If you didn't report them, you are part of the problem and have committed an offence. If you didn't know of them, then your gross inexperience means you have no place in the MAA. As it stands, there are a lot of hypocrites filling posts and we can have no confidence they are going to openly criticise their own past actions.

[Just This Once...]

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

[tucumseh]

JTO

Easier said than done if the MAA is not independent!

[Chugalug2]

JTO, In my view the answer to your question is, "themselves". Given that I am forever railing against self regulation that might be seen as a contradiction and somewhat ironic one at that, but if this scandal has shown us anything it is that you can have all the procedures and regulations in place but if malevolently minded people are bent on circumventing them it requires determined and decently minded ones to resist them, or they will succeed. That is why the guardians of airworthiness and accident investigation must be independent to resist such attempts succeeding yet again.
I pay tribute to all those who have stood firm in the past and to those who stand firm now. Doing the right thing is never easy at the time, but that is the point, for in the fullness of time you will be able to look back and can be at peace with yourself. There must be many who cannot do that now. Given the cost of such moral ambivalence I cannot pity them.

[tucumseh]

Short summary of Backslapping Fest 2012.


BoI and Inquest not mentioned.

Prior warnings by MoD staff of systemic failings, dating to January 1988, not mentioned.

Evidence of above to Haddon-Cave not mentioned.

Therefore, the uninitiated (Press, MoD etc) would think Haddon-Cave spotted failings, initiated a Review and his findings came as a complete surprise to MoD.

A complete re-write of history, which the MAA leadership should be ashamed of. From the very start (AMSO policy of June 1987) this has been about one thing. Protecting senior staffs who made the deliberate decision to waste money in the interests of short term efficiency, and then rob the airworthiness pot to compensate. Timo Anderson et al; successive AMSOs, AMLs and CEs from the 80s/90s will be proud of you. If you were truly independent, you'd simply tell the truth.

Oh, and despite stating airworthiness, Haddon-Cave etc was none of their business, the RAeS hierarchy turned up.

[Antrim Kate]

Good point Chugalug, but it doesn't take malevolence to create a conflict of interest - if you're ACAS one week and MAA DG the next (as Anderson was, and North will be) or you're MAA Tech. Director now (and responsible for overseeing the introduction of Airseeker) but were Head of Air ISTAR last year (and responsible for procuring Airseeker) then, with the best will in the world, there could be problems.

On the other hand an assurance organisation does need both independence and credibility, and MAA do acknowledge that there is a trade-off in this respect. Is there a way (and this is a genuine question) that both can be achieved, or a better balance obtained, in this instance?

[Rigga]

"Is there a way (and this is a genuine question) that both can be achieved, or a better balance obtained, in this instance? "

Being right and being consistent against the opposition to change.

[thefodfather]

I do find it hard to contemplate how a regulator could be totally independent from the military yet not immediately seek to stop military flying immediately. Without the right military experience regulation would be impossible. The relevance of the skills of civilian flight ops inspectors are frequently called into question by those who they regulate.

If the MAA was actually independent in the manner many suggest, how would it be manned. Practical answers on a postcard please.

[Mandator]

The RAeS has published a report on the conference:

Empowering military air safety | Aerospace | The Royal Aeronautical Society

[4Greens]

Does the MAA include Army and Naval aviation?

[tucumseh]

One method of achieving independence was outlined on another thread. First, one needs to break down the process. In simple terms;


(1) Attaining airworthiness.
MoD tend to do this pretty well, as the process is largely managed by the Contractor and Boscombe Down. The regs are simple. Follow them and an airworthy aircraft will be delivered. The problem today (and for 20 years) is that MoD do not train their staffs to understand what the Contractor is up to and how he achieves his goal. This causes fatal knock-on effects when it comes to.....

(2) Maintaining airworthiness.
This is the component that broke down so badly on all the examples we discuss. If you take Chinook HC Mk2 as an example, the baseline for the upgrade programme (Mk1 to M2) was flawed, as the Mk1 had been allowed to deteriorate. (In fact, the deterioration had been ordered by senior RAF staffs). Therefore, the Mk2 was grossly unairworthy, as outlined in detailed evidence to Lord Philip, which he accepted. That evidence (here) https://sites.google.com/site/militaryairworthiness/ explains how much of the process DID work well on that occasion, but the good work (by Boscombe in the main) was undone by the actions of senior RAF officers; especially ACAS, CAS and Chief Engineer.



The CHART report of 1992 outlines a host of systemic failures by MoD, yet on the Chief Engineer’s instructions did not even go near the part of MoD which provides the basic foundations. This one report (among many) reveals the lie perpetrated by MoD as recently as last week that the failures commenced in 1998. It has been written out of history, but if you don’t understand the history, you cannot hope to correct the failures.


What can the MAA do to overcome these failures? It could achieve much, but has shown no will to do so. The common behavioural trait it has with its predecessors is the overwhelming desire to protect the guilty. If it’s DGs are former ACASs, there is a cultural tendency to protect their predecessors, who perhaps have been instrumental in guiding careers. (The Civil Service is the same!) If Baz North would just come out and say “Our remit and Terms of Reference are fatally flawed as they are based on incorrect conclusions by Haddon-Cave”, then I’d be a lot happier. But the blind adherence to the Haddon-Cave Bible is their worst flaw. If the MAA truly believe all that H-C said is right, then it truly is the blind leading the blind.


These two components of airworthiness can be made truly independent of MoD. Much of it already is, but we need to negate the main risk – that of career minded sycophants making savings and acting corruptly at the expense of safety. Forward of (1) and (2) is an important control boundary.....

(3) The component which causes most angst, the concept of “Fitness for Purpose” or Operational Airworthiness. Not least because it is ill-defined, largely because it sits in conflict with other mandated regs.



For 20+ years, FFP has been construed as accepting operational risk by allowing a sub-airworthy aircraft to be flown operationally. (Ignore serviceability, it is facilitated by airworthiness). Needs must, and this aspect and the attendant risks are reasonably well understood and managed. But what many don’t accept or understand is that an aircraft often needs to be enhanced to be FFP. C130/ESF was a good example, and in court the IPTL claimed he didn’t know how this process worked. (I accept he did not, because most IPTLs are not selected for their knowledge or practical experience of the procurement system – although common sense says they should be. But he should have known the question was coming and that naivety illustrates MoD’s failings as much as anything).



Another is IFF. In the early-mid 90s, aircraft IFF systems were routinely left unintegrated, so functionally unsafe, because airworthiness was a “peacetime” concept, so IFF systems (esp. Mode 4) didn’t have to actually work. (See Tornado/Patriot shootdown discussion in above link). I think this whole argument fatally flawed, not least because the transition from “peacetime” to “warfighting” can be necessarily short, and there is no time to buy, trial, fit and train on the new system. The need to train negates this whole argument entirely! The IFF office didn’t even bother modifying simulators. The basic “peacetime” Build Standard must be fit for purpose, and that purpose is warfighting. (I accept one cannot cater for all eventualities, but there exists the Minimum Equipment List concept, and that should include, for example, a working and safe IFF). Boscombe and knowledgeable project managers in MoD have railed against this nonsense for decades, but the MoD hierarchy has ruled that aircraft delivered to the Services need not be functionally safe. This whole aspect needs revamping. This is where the “Savings at the expense of Safety” is most visible to Users. Unscrupulous PMs (but primarily their seniors) hell bent on being seen to complete their project, have routinely signed off on contracts knowing the aircraft does not meet the Aircraft specification and is functionally unsafe. Against this baseline, front line commanders cannot hope to achieve FFP.



If this requirement, that Operators/Users somehow make their aircraft FFP without any resources, could be taken out of their hands and transferred to (1) and (2) above, then (3) can be readily managed by MoD. It doesn’t need to be independent, and shouldn’t be. In other words, give them the proper (airworthy) tools and let them make operational decisions. The basic failure is in this proper provision in the first place.



So, a boundary exists, and like all boundaries it needs to be defined and controlled. The Operators who control (3) should have a say in what (1) and (2) do. Likewise, (1) and (2) should have to demonstrate they have catered for the needs of (3). A small MAA can police this boundary, but for goodness sake don’t let them control what happens either side.



This is not a new concept. In fact, it used to be mandated. But then it fell apart when AMSOs and CE made savings at the expense of safety in the late 80s/early 90s, and ACAS went along with them and ignored his role. Chinook is the best known example. His role was to agree, in writing, with (1) and (2) (represented by Controller Aircraft) that he accepted the CA Release and would subsume it without amendment as Part 1 to his Release to Service. Part 2 (Service Deviations) is one manifestation of his FFP role; and this, too, was grossly mismanaged on Chinook, as were SEMs. Lord Philip obliquely criticised ACAS (AVM Bagnall) and his boss CAS (ACM Graydon), confirming ACAS was legally bound to accept the CAR without amendment (confirming the regulations, that this was “mandated”). However, Bagnall (and by extension, Graydon) had ignored this legal obligation and issued an operational release. MoD were unable to provide the evidence that Bagnall had discussed this with CA, Sir Donald Spiers. MoD did, however, confirm CA’s “Training and Familiarisation Only” release remained extant on the day of the crash; in fact, ACAS had sought an extension to it only the previous week (May 1994), a clear acknowledgment that the aircraft was neither airworthy nor FFP (the “purpose” of ZD576 being a pax transit). This systemic breakdown of October and November 1993, and the wasteful policies by AMSOs and the CE that lay behind these failures, is what the MAA needs to prevent happening again. As I’ve said, they show no will, and MoD as a whole has written the failures from history. (Good job we have the evidence they deny the existence of). Remember, faced with this irrefutable evidence during the Philip Inquiry, in a blind panic MoD actually denied RTSs existed in 1993/4, naming and blaming Sir Donald Spiers for the illegal release. What is the MAA doing to prevent that cultural corruption, maladministration and misconduct in a public office? Why, they join hands with the very body that has represented these senior staffs and protected them for 20 years by, for example, ordering its members to “burn” reports that contain the truth. The MAA should be actively distancing itself from the culprits, not glad handing them at bean fests.


As there are so many legal principles at stake here, I’d recommend a small body polices the MAA, headed by a legal person reporting direct to the Secretary of State. The recent bi-annual and supposedly independent audit by the HSE, which also blindly accepted the H-C report, is meaningless; not least because they are demonstrably too close to the MAA. Witness, none of the HSE panel members spoke about the root causes last week, despite being aware of the full facts. That makes them party to the collusion. Presumably, they wanted to be retained to write the next box ticking report. But it doesn’t even have the correct boxes.



The “MAA” would then be free to do the oversight role they’ve barely touched, even after 2 years. I have no objection to the MAA as a body; after all, it is merely a reorganisation of existing (and failed) bodies; the problem they share is failure to do the job properly. The MAA DG clearly has a key role. I accept the arguments that he should be an MoD man. But not necessarily an RAF officer, not least because the primary systemic failures were perpetrated by senior RAF officers. Because of this conflict, the MAA has never been focussed on the job, ignoring the root failures.



In summary, the MAA has a role, but it needs to be policed by a truly independent legal body. This does not have to smother the MAA, but merely “prod” them toward implementing legal obligations and mandated regulations, which is where the failures lay. And I suggest, again, that the boss of the MAA is appointed because he is nearing the end of his career and “has nothing left to lose” if he jumps on senior officers who would otherwise influence his career path. If you don’t acknowledge the truth, and actively rewrite history, then you are doomed to failure. That is a powerful type of independence.

Finally, a classic from the HSE report. The MAA are apparently “recalibrating” the airworthiness process. Now, I was in charge of a Calibration Lab in my younger days and one calibrates something against a known reference, traceable to national standards. We have the “national standards” in the form of mandated regs, but what is the MAA’s known reference? By denying the history I describe, they have no reference, and so proceed by trial and error. The audit trail is broken straight away. There have been too many errors and we can’t afford any more. May I suggest, the “known reference” is known by very few (MoD themselves claim only one person, but there are more), yet the MAA has not once sought to speak to anyone who successfully by-passed illegal orders and implemented the regs properly.