'Falklands' Most Daring Raid'
reydelcastillo
Their was one series of stills from a Sea Harrier HUD camera that did show a Sidewinder being launched from a Sea Harrier and impacting on an Argentine aircraft (if memory serves it was a Skyhawk and the SHAR was from Hermes) published in a series of Magazines called Warplane which built up into a ten volume series of books back in the mid to late 1980s (I'll have a dig for it next time I'm at home), plus Jerry Pooks book has some HUD camera stills from a low level GR 3 attack on the Airfield at Stanley. Other than that most of the video footage that was released by the British MOD that invovled aircraft came from the warships. Some of the best of it came from the Sea Wolf TV tracker on one of the Type 22 Frigtes in Falkland Sound on the 21 May and can be found on You tube on this clip starting at 4.15 into the clip.
The aircraft hit by a Missile at low level was a Groupo 6 Dagger which was hit by a Sea Wolf from HMS Broadsword killing the pilot.
Their was one series of stills from a Sea Harrier HUD camera that did show a Sidewinder being launched from a Sea Harrier and impacting on an Argentine aircraft (if memory serves it was a Skyhawk and the SHAR was from Hermes) published in a series of Magazines called Warplane which built up into a ten volume series of books back in the mid to late 1980s (I'll have a dig for it next time I'm at home), plus Jerry Pooks book has some HUD camera stills from a low level GR 3 attack on the Airfield at Stanley. Other than that most of the video footage that was released by the British MOD that invovled aircraft came from the warships. Some of the best of it came from the Sea Wolf TV tracker on one of the Type 22 Frigtes in Falkland Sound on the 21 May and can be found on You tube on this clip starting at 4.15 into the clip.
The aircraft hit by a Missile at low level was a Groupo 6 Dagger which was hit by a Sea Wolf from HMS Broadsword killing the pilot.
500N,
First of all, nobody in Argentina is thinking about retaking the islands using our military force.
Second, the political situation in South America is totally different from what we had at 1982.
We have the MERCOSUR and UNASUR, that's why UK colony flag ships can not enter to any port in South America...even UK war ships heading to or returning from the islands can not enter to South American ports.
So, don't expect Argentina to go for war, we are using diplomacy for claiming what we think belong to us.
First of all, nobody in Argentina is thinking about retaking the islands using our military force.
Second, the political situation in South America is totally different from what we had at 1982.
We have the MERCOSUR and UNASUR, that's why UK colony flag ships can not enter to any port in South America...even UK war ships heading to or returning from the islands can not enter to South American ports.
So, don't expect Argentina to go for war, we are using diplomacy for claiming what we think belong to us.
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Thank You MAINHAFAD .-
500 N : There were three very wrong assumptions that I don't yet understand how is it that they could not figure it out , Those were :
1) That United Kingdom would not react , that no force would be send to confront the Troops in the Islands .- I still can't figure out how is it that you plan a Military Action based in the asumption that the other will not react , and without a plan "B" just in case they actually react .-
2) How is it that you take for sure that USA will not support and help the United Kingdom , only a Dumb that has not read History could come to that conclusion .
3) Knowing that there is not a good relation with your neighbors ( Chile ) , knowing that in 1978 we almost went to war , we still think that they are going to support us or at least remain neutral .- Only an Idiot would come to this conclusion .-
-It was a shot in the dark , with the three main assumptions WRONG =
Only Planed for April 2nd , and there was nothing plan for April the 3rd and there on because all the assumptions were WRONG =
500 N : There were three very wrong assumptions that I don't yet understand how is it that they could not figure it out , Those were :
1) That United Kingdom would not react , that no force would be send to confront the Troops in the Islands .- I still can't figure out how is it that you plan a Military Action based in the asumption that the other will not react , and without a plan "B" just in case they actually react .-
2) How is it that you take for sure that USA will not support and help the United Kingdom , only a Dumb that has not read History could come to that conclusion .
3) Knowing that there is not a good relation with your neighbors ( Chile ) , knowing that in 1978 we almost went to war , we still think that they are going to support us or at least remain neutral .- Only an Idiot would come to this conclusion .-
-It was a shot in the dark , with the three main assumptions WRONG =
Only Planed for April 2nd , and there was nothing plan for April the 3rd and there on because all the assumptions were WRONG =
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Cosmic
Just because the assumption is that you are not planning military action
does not mean that you won't.
Contingency planning should be part of every countries set up and these plans modified as the situation changes. Look at Gulf War 1, Central command, they were running a huge war gaming exercise which was based around Iran just as Iraq invaded Kuwait. You can bet that some of the exercise lessons learnt - logistics for one - would have at least helped not so many stuff ups occuring when the US started sending gear that direction.
Just because the assumption is that you are not planning military action
does not mean that you won't.
Contingency planning should be part of every countries set up and these plans modified as the situation changes. Look at Gulf War 1, Central command, they were running a huge war gaming exercise which was based around Iran just as Iraq invaded Kuwait. You can bet that some of the exercise lessons learnt - logistics for one - would have at least helped not so many stuff ups occuring when the US started sending gear that direction.
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reydel
Many armies have been defeated - or nearly - because of wrong assumptions.
Isn't that why some Generals win and some lose - good or bad decision making ?
Many armies have been defeated - or nearly - because of wrong assumptions.
Isn't that why some Generals win and some lose - good or bad decision making ?
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I Agree with you 500 N , but don't you think that these three assumptions were so basic that a 5th grader could have answere them .- You can make a wrong decision from the Tactical point of view , but these are Strategic Decisions based on totally wrong assumptions.-
I still can't understand how is it that a thinking person could come out with this assumptions .- It's basic A,B.C -
I still can't understand how is it that a thinking person could come out with this assumptions .- It's basic A,B.C -
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reydel
To any person who hasn't had or is interested in military, it is hard but
anyone who has half a brain and is trained, then yes, they should.
Regardless of whether they thought Britain would send a force to retake them, someone should have at least planned on it happening - I find it hard to believe they didn't or they Junta really were useless - or you had the situation in
these types of dictatorships where everyone except the top few are so **** scared of doing anything without orders from up high that noting gets done.
Re B - the US - agree, although I think it might be different now.
Re C - if they expected Chile to remain neutral, that was a major mistake IMHO.
I still think contingency planning needs to happen regardless of current Argie intentions - Contingency planning that in A above you clearly say that your Junta didn't do !!! LOL
To any person who hasn't had or is interested in military, it is hard but
anyone who has half a brain and is trained, then yes, they should.
Regardless of whether they thought Britain would send a force to retake them, someone should have at least planned on it happening - I find it hard to believe they didn't or they Junta really were useless - or you had the situation in
these types of dictatorships where everyone except the top few are so **** scared of doing anything without orders from up high that noting gets done.
Re B - the US - agree, although I think it might be different now.
Re C - if they expected Chile to remain neutral, that was a major mistake IMHO.
I still think contingency planning needs to happen regardless of current Argie intentions - Contingency planning that in A above you clearly say that your Junta didn't do !!! LOL
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Reydel,
The British view (as taught at Dratmouth at least) has always been that we actually gave you all the signals that we didn't care. The three clues were (supposedly):
1. British Nationality Act (1981) differentiated between British citizens and British Overseas Territory Citizens.
2. We were going to scrap HMS Endurance.
3. We were selling HMS Invincible to the Australians.
The deduction was 'they don't really want the Falklands - they consider the inhabitants to be less British, they don't care about the South Atlantic, they're no longer interested in fighting overseas'.
There are compelling reasons for thinking that you were right on all three counts. But, the military occupation of the islands was enough to create a completely new political landscape.
Even then it has been recounted that Mrs Thatcher was advised by some that we couldn't or shouldn't do anything. I think First Sea Lord gets the lion's share of the praise for saying that we could and should mount a military operation and Mrs Thatcher leapt at the chance.
The British view (as taught at Dratmouth at least) has always been that we actually gave you all the signals that we didn't care. The three clues were (supposedly):
1. British Nationality Act (1981) differentiated between British citizens and British Overseas Territory Citizens.
2. We were going to scrap HMS Endurance.
3. We were selling HMS Invincible to the Australians.
The deduction was 'they don't really want the Falklands - they consider the inhabitants to be less British, they don't care about the South Atlantic, they're no longer interested in fighting overseas'.
There are compelling reasons for thinking that you were right on all three counts. But, the military occupation of the islands was enough to create a completely new political landscape.
Even then it has been recounted that Mrs Thatcher was advised by some that we couldn't or shouldn't do anything. I think First Sea Lord gets the lion's share of the praise for saying that we could and should mount a military operation and Mrs Thatcher leapt at the chance.
Military Dictatorships under pressure have historically not usually been associated sound strategic planning. One of the Junta's miscalculations was that the failure to appreciate that the UK's Conservative government was also deeply unpopular and would relish the risk to gain credibility, even though it would cost British Servicemen's lives.
The war was also a battle to stay in power. Thatcher stayed. Galtieri went.
The war was also a battle to stay in power. Thatcher stayed. Galtieri went.
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Dan
Agree - although I think Maggie said something about being British - I don't think she went to war to get back her popularity but that was a side benefit ?
The way I remember the UK, Thatcher was unpopular, unions still trying to maintain power, everyone on strike, economy not that good.
War started, everyone worked flat out to get things going - ship conversions etc - war ended, the UK went back to what it was !!!
Just the way I remember it.
Agree - although I think Maggie said something about being British - I don't think she went to war to get back her popularity but that was a side benefit ?
The way I remember the UK, Thatcher was unpopular, unions still trying to maintain power, everyone on strike, economy not that good.
War started, everyone worked flat out to get things going - ship conversions etc - war ended, the UK went back to what it was !!!
Just the way I remember it.
A contemporaneous Argentine joke was;
"Why doesn't Maragret Thatcher wear mini skirts?".
"Because she's afraid her balls will show!"
I bought a copy of "The Iron Lady" last night. Am looking forward to watching it.
"Why doesn't Maragret Thatcher wear mini skirts?".
"Because she's afraid her balls will show!"
I bought a copy of "The Iron Lady" last night. Am looking forward to watching it.
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British airplanes in Chile during Falklands Campaign
Do we know any details of what aircraft were actually used in the Falklands Camaign and from which Chilean bases. Have there been any written accounts?
So, don't expect Argentina to go for war, we are using diplomacy for claiming what we think belong to us.
, feel free to visit my Islands any day cosmicomet and discover what the real history of the place is. Don't believe everything you read in your own history books, at least not those published from the 1950's onwards
.
When CMetO STC rang me on the morning of/after the invasion [I was PMetO 1 Group] he told me "the bastards have invaded" and I asked "what are we going to do about it" [being bright eyed and bushy tailed] and he said he had come straight from crisis HOBs meet and the received opinion was "Nothing" ........... this did not last very long!
Planning the Falklands Invasion
Reydel,
Many, many thanks for your unique contribution to this thread - keep it coming!
What do you think of this quote from the book RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands?
"Very fortunately for us the Argentinians had made an irrecoverable strategic balls-up in starting the war when they did. If only they had waited a few more weeks until they had bought a few dozen more Exocets from France - and given their pilots more time to train in the use of them - then they would have made mincemeat of our shipping from Day One. "
Many, many thanks for your unique contribution to this thread - keep it coming!
What do you think of this quote from the book RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands?
"Very fortunately for us the Argentinians had made an irrecoverable strategic balls-up in starting the war when they did. If only they had waited a few more weeks until they had bought a few dozen more Exocets from France - and given their pilots more time to train in the use of them - then they would have made mincemeat of our shipping from Day One. "
Regarding the involvement of Chile, I was going through Cranwell late '82/early '83, and I have vague memories of a visit from a party of special VIPs. Allegedly, it was General Pinochet, or some of his senior military staff, being given a tour as a "thank you" for discrete support during the war.
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Falkands - C-130 suicide mission
The secret Falklands 'suicide mission' - Telegraph
Bit of thread drift but on the theme of taking the war to Argentina. What was contemplated here seems like it would have been something of a last role of the dice. The diplomatic implications presumably catastrophic.
What of the Exocet codes forced out of the French and suggestion of Russian subterfuge? I haven't seen reference to this elsewhere on pprune unless it has been discussed on previous threads.
Bit of thread drift but on the theme of taking the war to Argentina. What was contemplated here seems like it would have been something of a last role of the dice. The diplomatic implications presumably catastrophic.
What of the Exocet codes forced out of the French and suggestion of Russian subterfuge? I haven't seen reference to this elsewhere on pprune unless it has been discussed on previous threads.
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Comments have been made that we can ALWAYS rely on US support whenever we engage in hostilities..... Are our memories that short? Think Suez
Exocet
Would they? Would they really have made 'mincemeat' of our shipping from day one?
I dislike being critical of ANY of our brave personnel that fought in that conflict but apart from the Sheffield own goal and the suicidal arrogance by the commanding officer of Glamorgan.... Was the only successful attack by Exocet on a defenceless merchant ship? . What if and what might have been can be debated until those proverbial cows steer the correct course and I agree that more of anything would have or could have altered the outcome either way.
The mainly British made, British supplied dumb bombs were something else. If the majority had gone bang, then I would suggest it was possible that this conflict would have gone 'bang'.
Should we have held off the invasion until we had taken out far more of the Argentine Air power? Warships operating in coastal waters are always on the back foot and without dominance of the air space they are going to struggle to stay sunny side up. Away from the coastline the odds were completely stacked in the opposite direction with the Argentine forces taking significant losses.
To answer my own question I would suggest the big problem was the state of the Battle Groups. They had been at sea operating in atrocious conditions and most were in need of vital maintenance. Not liberating the islands when we did would see ships becoming non operational simply because of breakdowns, to attack early would see ships becoming 'non operational'. Damned if you do, damned if you don't!
Exocet was indeed a threat but it was always a controllable threat IF we fought as we trained.
Cometh the hour, cometh the Royal Navy.......
Admiral Leach was an AMAZING GENTLEMAN.... He had seen his fleet cannibalised. He had tried speaking to Margaret Thatcher but she had not even given him the courtesy of a meeting, but when push come to shove, he was the ONLY senior officer that had the courage to put his head on the chopping block.. It could have been so easy for this man to have said, 'I told you so!' but instead he got together a fleet of warships and as we know the rest is history. A truly great man.
We only need to look at how Baroness Margaret Thatcher showed her true qualities when she greeted that man when he was perhaps not quite so popular years after these events..
Exocet
a few dozen more Exocets from France - and given their pilots more time to train in the use of them - then they would have made mincemeat of our shipping from Day One.
I dislike being critical of ANY of our brave personnel that fought in that conflict but apart from the Sheffield own goal and the suicidal arrogance by the commanding officer of Glamorgan.... Was the only successful attack by Exocet on a defenceless merchant ship? . What if and what might have been can be debated until those proverbial cows steer the correct course and I agree that more of anything would have or could have altered the outcome either way.
The mainly British made, British supplied dumb bombs were something else. If the majority had gone bang, then I would suggest it was possible that this conflict would have gone 'bang'.
Should we have held off the invasion until we had taken out far more of the Argentine Air power? Warships operating in coastal waters are always on the back foot and without dominance of the air space they are going to struggle to stay sunny side up. Away from the coastline the odds were completely stacked in the opposite direction with the Argentine forces taking significant losses.
To answer my own question I would suggest the big problem was the state of the Battle Groups. They had been at sea operating in atrocious conditions and most were in need of vital maintenance. Not liberating the islands when we did would see ships becoming non operational simply because of breakdowns, to attack early would see ships becoming 'non operational'. Damned if you do, damned if you don't!
Exocet was indeed a threat but it was always a controllable threat IF we fought as we trained.
Originally Posted by Langley Baston
When CMetO STC rang me on the morning of/after the invasion [I was PMetO 1 Group] he told me "the bastards have invaded" and I asked "what are we going to do about it" [being bright eyed and bushy tailed] and he said he had come straight from crisis HOBs meet and the received opinion was "Nothing" ........... this did not last very long!
Admiral Leach was an AMAZING GENTLEMAN.... He had seen his fleet cannibalised. He had tried speaking to Margaret Thatcher but she had not even given him the courtesy of a meeting, but when push come to shove, he was the ONLY senior officer that had the courage to put his head on the chopping block.. It could have been so easy for this man to have said, 'I told you so!' but instead he got together a fleet of warships and as we know the rest is history. A truly great man.
Regarding the involvement of Chile, I was going through Cranwell late '82/early '83, and I have vague memories of a visit from a party of special VIPs. Allegedly, it was General Pinochet, or some of his senior military staff, being given a tour as a "thank you" for discrete support during the war.
Glogo, well said about Admiral Leach. I knew him when I was at school, his daughter was a good friend of mine there, and I've always watched him with great interest. I had the utmost admiration for his conduct in 1982. A great man indeed.