Puma Crash Sentence

[Fareastdriver]

But when it came to the F-4, we simply didn't know what we were doing.

As a brand new offshore helicopter pilot flying an AS330J in 1978; my licence had been issued on the basis of the 2,000hrs I had got on the AS330C (RAF Puma). I was flying, at night, between the 37/4 and the 36/22 enroute from the Ekofisk field to Teeside when I was advised by a radar service that I was being intercepted by Air Defence aircraft. In front of me on my weather radar were the returns of innumerable trawlers, (this was in the days when we had a fishing fleet), so I dived down to 100,ft radalt and circled until the threat had departed.
I did that three times in that month.

I fear that some folks are perhaps demanding, or at the very least expecting a flight deck to be a democracy where a newly qualified, inexperienced pilot can criticise the flying of someone who may be an extremely qualified person.

That really sums up the whole point of this thread.

[Courtney Mil]

If your tactic worked, they must have been Lightnings, then. Mind you, if you were getting near Teeside, they must have tanked to get there.

[Fareastdriver]

Naw, they must have been Tombs; the Lightnings had all crashed.

[BEagle]

But when it came to the F-4, we simply didn't know what we were doing.

Although I thought it would have been blindingly obvious, what I actually meant was 'when it came to defending ourselves against the F-4, we simply didn't know what we were doing.'

There were indeed target misidents though. As the Yuk-air F-27 crews inbound to Narr'ch via the Bravo / Charlie Juliets would no doubt attest. Or the C-130 / HH-53 AAR formation Bluntishead once vectored us onto during some 2v2...... The odd airliner was tapped during Coffee Charlies - but probably never knew!

Back to the topic of rules, low level visidents against lights out targets at night (phase 3 VIDs) required very specific rules. Probably some of the most tricky (and sphincter-puckering) intercept work we did, but statistically quite safe. No-one would have dreamt of ignoring the rules for phase 3 VIDs, for to have done so would probably have caused a mid-air.

[Courtney Mil]

Phase 3 VIDs were indeed a challenge. Two reasons not to break the rules:

1. If you didn't follow the sequence, including the stabilize/break-lock/relock, you could smack into the target.

2. They were all filmed on the KD41.

The Lightnings actually had it worse because with no PD they had to fly below their lights out, low level, night time target, flying the jet and looking into their B Scope. Good job the old Soviets had a copy of the (then) 11 Gp ASOs so that they knew not to evade!

Courtney

[BEagle]

Courtney, old horseman, I presume you mean the initial intercept caused the Lightnings more grief without PD? Shirley even the most god-like MCS fightergator wouldn't have used stern PD for phase 3 VIDs....???

Most times we just widened from battle, then in-place 90 port and clear close for VID in the heart of the envelope. Repeat as oft as ye shall have need, then home for tea and medals. But there was the odd (very) keenie who expected each run to include a full PI, terminating in a VID. One such was the infamous 'Thrombo' (aka 'AWF' - Avocado With Feet) who you might have encountered in the early days at Stanley? He gave my long-suffering nav and I one Ph3 VID at about 450 KIAS and 1000ft, the next at FL lots and stupidly low IAS....

[Courtney Mil]

Correct. My bad (I hate that expression). Unless you wanted a really fast VID (not for me at night, even lights on) the Vc would have lost the target in the MBC notch (edited because of stupidity error) - NO, F0 NOTCH. So the WIWOLs had to run their intercept from low enough to be able to separate their target return from the surface reteurns (not necessarily from below). But being below the target in the stern meant that didn't have to spend so much time worrying about scanner elevation to break it out from the waves.

But didn't we do PD search sterns? And didn't the navs love man track 1 and 2? If I ver got grief for my tanking/landings/doggers (which would have totally unjustified, obviously) I would always offer the opportunity to prove their worth in that tricky little activity.

What was this thread about again? Sorry everyone.

Courtney

[Wwyvern]

BEagle,

Check your PMs

[jayteeto]

Back on thread, I find it difficult to blame the Nav here. Ok, he had a responsibility to speak up, but as a new boy (LCR?) he may not have had the experience to know what to do. Ultimately the captain is where the buck stops. Whatever encouragement he is offered, he must be the one to say no. That is why he is made a CR Captain for gods sake!

[Mach Two]

Jay,

You are right in theory and, in an ideal world, practically. You are, more than likely, right in this case - I don't know enough about it to comment. But I would say that this is not always the case when it comes to the crunch. There are times when the captain isn't always given the last say - or, prhaps, doesn't feel like he/she has the last say. Examples might be a young fg off pilot with his flight commander in the back seat. The heady days of the mighty Nimrod where the captaincy sat otherwhere than the front left seat. Make up more of your own scenarios.

I don't think I can fault your logic in this case (from what I've read here), but what I'm saying is that it isn't always that simple. And I'm not even daring to takle "cross-cockpit gradient".

M2 signing off.

[BEagle]

The heady days of the mighty Nimrod where the captaincy sat otherwhere than the front left seat.

A weird coastal aberration. No doubt the fisher-folk will be along shortly to justify their alien concept.

A colleague once described a trip they'd flown back to Kinloss in rotten weather after several hours of eating and throwing sonobuoys out of the beast. They'd had a fleeting glimpse of the lights as they went around from the first approach, so then had another stab. This time they saw absolutely nothing, so went around for a second time. Up spoke some coffee-sipping wireless operator from the back, the so-called 'captain', who asked "Couldn't you go a bit lower next time?".....

A flurry of straps and fury from the left hand seat was then followed by a comment of "The seat's all yours then, Captain!"....

Needless to say, they diverted!

[jayteeto]

Quite correct of course, I meant the aircraft captain (pilot), not the mission captain or whatever the terminology is.

[Tankertrashnav]

I remember as a brand new navigator doing a low level course on JPs we were transiting to a low level area (remember them?) and pointing out to my pilot that he had descended below safety altitude in IMC. The situation was not remotely as dangerous as the events which are being discussed in this thread. The pilot, a very experienced and respected QFI immediately thanked me for pointing out his error and climbed back above safety altitude. Not everyone in his position would have taken kindly to being corrected by a sprog navigator, but its the difference between a professional pilot and a cowboy in my book.

[charliegolf]

There's a lot of tortuous scenario-spinning going into this thread! Would the sentence be the same if the co had said, on tape, "ok mate, tht's too much. Let's calm it down eh."

On the kipper front: I was told by a flt eng on nimrods, and have no reason to disbelieve him, that he once called PNR, or PLE or somesuch off intercom. A few minutes later he tried again. The third time, he went on intercom (and cvr) and called it pointedly, "PLE plus ten, captain". Skipper narked, eng still alive.

So might Pte Tait be eh?

CG

[Airborne Aircrew]

but its the difference between a professional pilot and a cowboy in my book.

... and probably the reason he was a QFI...

[woptb]

'Rules is rules’, is counterproductive. If rules aren’t fit for purpose there must be a means to effect change. As someone already commented, bad rules breed rule breakers.
Inherently if a procedure is fit for purpose & you don't follow it, you’re increasing risk. There are very obvious risks in training & operational flying; although I doubt you'd be carpeted for overstressing an airframe, whilst avoiding something nasty approaching you at high speed!
If the raw material was well selected, the training appropriate & people are still behaving like dicks; you must look to the culture. Some hard calls need to be made. Military maintainers have had their epiphany & are making great strides in embedding an open reporting culture & a fair & just culture to allow this to function.
Unfortunately civil law is nether fair or just. If you have an organisational culture in which people can speak out & concerns are listened to (& very importantly are addressed professionally), fewer people may find themselves in the Puma crew member’s terrible situation.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Originally Posted by glojo

Train hard, fight easy..

As an aside what type of reaction would there have been from someone like Guy Gibson if his co-pilot were to criticise his flying during a TRAINING exercise? Words similar to..... ''There's the door, get out and leave your parachute on the seat!" come to mind!

I would hate to think we are trying to get rid of the characters that I so loved and admired.

I think care needs to be made when looking at WW2 practices. Since more pilots were killed in training crashes then in combat I am not sure there is a lot to be learned when compared to todays aircrew training challenges.

I think a more relevant example is air ops during the Falklands war. There were many examples where quite appalling risks were taken in order to get the job done. The difference between those risks and what the Puma crew did was Operational Necessity. From my reading (I was not there) the crews in general knew very well the increased risks they were taking and made a conscious choice to accept them. None of that applied to the situation the Puma crew was in.

I think it also points to the well documented fact that the vast majority who serve are not inherently reckless, yet will step up to the plate when it matters on real world ops, including taking risks that would be unacceptable in a peacetime training scenario.

[Spot 4]

The significant difference between your Falklands scenario and the peacetime Rodeo is forethought.

The Falklands tasking that you mention would have been pre meditated and calculated. Most are confident that MSD & MSC can be reduced when the option is to wear a SAM up your chuff.

The Rodeo antics is/was/will be spontaneous. Human nature, especially when applied to the type of people we recruit (Failed Aviator DVD) pretty much mandates that when we 'get away with it' we push a little further next time. The buffers usually come from when you scare yourself or in this case kill yourself. I am quite sure the Wright brothers were exactly the same.

No excuses offered; simply my take on an explanation. FWIW I believe that in a three man crew, the LHS is 33% responsible, the Crewman likewise, and the Captain 34% unless protests are made at which point individual responsibilty is handed over to the Captain.

Puma in Portugal off on a sight seeing tour with insufficient fuel. (2 man crew) The Nav/Crewman had protested, even leaned on the collective, before transmitting to the world on HF that when the aircraft eventually crashes, he was having nothing to do with it. The aircraft did crash (albeit an impressive engine off onto a parade square) and the Nav was true to his word in the BoI afterwards. I believe the Captain now sells insurance.

[teeteringhead]

And (allegedly!) Spot 4, said Nav very nearly attacked the pilot with the fire axe after the EOL .......

[Fareastdriver]

Sitting there watching somebody do a Zero Zero EOL with a Puma into a parade square was probably the last straw.