Puma Crash Sentence

[charliegolf]

TH

What was the damage to the cab?

I'm reminded of the ocu film reel of (?) Paul Meyer doing pfls to the runway at idle power. Is that film on line?

CG

[ShyTorque]

CG, Paul Meyer....do you mean Martin?

It's probably twenty years or so since I saw it, but the later film (plastic blader trials at Boscombe Down) also showed the tail stinger touching the ground, iirc. And doing the usual thing to the tail rotor...

I don't know the full story but recall that the "Portugal incident" Puma was being taken back home for repair when someone fire-bombed it.

[Airborne Aircrew]

Shy:

I was on 33 when this occurred... The EOL was good but not good enough. The tail boom broke at the point where it joins the fuselage. I saw a photo of it on the parade square once... I don't believe the tail rotor contacted the ground because, IIRC, the boom landed on the "hockey stick" and remained upright.

For the record I flew with that pilot often, (I think I came through Shawbury with him too but I'd have to check my logbook for that). I always found him to be a deliberate, reserved captain who always remained well within the auth. I still cannot fathom this aberration on his part. It struck me back then and I still believe it to have been utterly out of character.

I knew the Nav/Crewman quite well too, (spent a tour in Belize with him too). He was of equal rank to the captain and was also many years older. He was generally not particularly excitable... His actions that day do not surprise me though...

[glojo]

Good afternoon Big Pistons,
I fear you are taking me far too literally and no matter what we say, our words can be dissected and given a completely different meaning. There have been examples on this thread of idiotic flying that have quite correctly been criticised, no defending the guilty and certainly no votes for their crass behaviour.

I think it also points to the well documented fact that the vast majority who serve are not inherently reckless, yet will step up to the plate when it matters on real world ops, including taking risks that would be unacceptable in a peacetime training scenario.

How will this pilot know they can do what is being demanded of them? It is way outside of any situation they have experienced?

Thinks back to Aden when asking for support one service says 'No' conditions too dangerous and yet within the hour a different service save the day!

100% agree with your reckless comment

Reckless: utterly unconcerned about the consequences of some action; without caution

I have ALWAYS made it abundantly clear I would NEVER condone stupidity or 'idiotic' flying but.... I stand by all my statements, if you have a pilot that has never contravened a single regulation in their life and in an extremely stressful, life or death environment, you then ask this person to do a type of flying they have never done before, never experienced before, and perhaps strongly objected to, then may I respectfully suggest they just might be way, way outside their comfort zone?

I have also tried suggesting that what one person defines as dangerous another would be perfectly happy with, and again I will stand by that.

To legislate where every single pilot has an equal ability and dismiss those that cross a line, is possibly wrong.

Who here has volunteered for a position\squadron. and been turned down or failed because their flying does not reach the required level for that specific duty?

I think care needs to be made when looking at WW2 practices. Since more pilots were killed in training crashes then in combat I am not sure there is a lot to be learned when compared to todays aircrew training challenges.

Not sure of your point here as we can never compare their training or with that of the 21st century.... 'There's your Spitfire son, jump in and take it away'... No two seater training in that type, no modern simulator just get up there and fly. Those magnificent men deserve the UTMOST of respect and I would NEVER, EVER criticise or compare their war time training conditions to those we have now. I would however like to think that we will always have characters that have a certain type of je ne sais quoi

My own very personal opinion regarding training.........

It should ALWAYS be evolving.

There should always be continuation training for operational\experienced pilots and every situation experienced in combat should be considered to see if it is suitable for inclusion during this advanced training.

Hopefully this is where we are and there is this type of ongoing training which should take place regularly through an operational pilot's career.

BUT this training MUST always be evolving. Has history shown that we sadly tend to train for the last war and not the next!! We should be stretching our experienced personnel and never, ever believe we have a given right to be the best! Young pilots fresh from combat MUST be listened to, their thoughts, their observations treated with the respect they deserve.

After listening to these valuable of inputs the officer in of training should consider if training programs need to be adjusted, modified or improved.

Train hard, fight easy.

Just like most of us I come from an environment where we had ongoing refresher training and this training was hopefully as close to the real thing as possible, could this type of refresher training help wheedle out the reckless, the idiot, the dangerous?

The most competent will still shine, will still out perform us mere mortals, but they will not perform outside their comfort zone, nor will they ever be reckless.

Instructors that raise flags about the performance of their pupils during continuation training have to be listened to and their recommendations respected.

Who here has applied to join a specialist department\squadron that required a different style of flying? A department that may require you to learn new skills where in the first stages the palms of the hands are swimming in a sea of sweat, your suits soak up the copious amounts of body fluid as you try to master skills that are completely alien??.... As the hours of tuition go by the things that at first appeared impossible, start to become second nature; but for some this transition just does not happen. They are competent pilots, they are highly skilled, highly motivated pilots but that step into an area of expertise is a step too far. My point being that the only way they know it was a step too far was when they volunteered for the course, plus their is no one standard fits all.

This might well apply to the pilot asked to perform something in combat they have never attempted in training and yes a thousand times yes that may well still arise for even the most experienced pilot, but at least they will have experiences beyond Mr Plod who is going to be in pastures new.

The commanding officer of the Blue Angels was clearly a highly experienced, dedicated officer but was he trying to go that one step beyond his ability?

This is his words, they are not from a different era, but are from the here and now:

"With deep personal regret … I will be voluntarily leaving the greatest flight demonstration team. I performed a maneuver that had an unacceptably low minimum altitude. This maneuver, combined with other instances of not meeting the airborne standard that makes the Blue Angels the exceptional organization that it is, led to my decision to step down."

PLEASE, please a thousand times please, please do NOT think I am being critical of this officer but thank God there were no casualties as a result of what this man had done. He clearly thought he was good enough for the role he volunteered for and more to the point his log book justified consideration for the appointment.

Final and hopefully last point... As a freshly qualified pilot who here has been in awe of their more senior colleagues and perhaps muttered, 'I could NEVER do that!'

Are we expecting these young officers to criticise pilots for making them feel uncomfortable?

It is such a fine line to walk and I FULLY accept reckless will always be reckless but I say again one person's view on danger is another person's view of 'occupational hazard'


Whewww More beer

Apologies for my Tolstoy type posts and if they are getting OTT then please feel free to speak up.

What we MUST ALL remember is we have highly skilled, highly motivated pilots and sadly this time it was the turn of the RAF to come under the spotlight.... Next time it may well be another service.

Respect to all our highly professional service personnel no matter the colour of uniform.

Train hard and make the fight easier

[ShyTorque]

I was on 33 when this occurred... The EOL was good but not good enough. The tail boom broke at the point where it joins the fuselage. I saw a photo of it on the parade square once... I don't believe the tail rotor contacted the ground because, IIRC, the boom landed on the "hockey stick" and remained upright.

AA, My reference to CG's post and the tail strike was about the film made of the Boscombe trial EOLs.

Regarding the Portugal EOL, the pilot was one of my students (Gazelle, early '84) and I agree with your observations about him; I was very surprised the incident occurred in the way it did. I was told the tale first hand from JH, the Nav/crewman. He did mention the fireaxe.

[Mach Two]

glojo,

Originally Posted by glogo

Apologies for my Tolstoy type posts and if they are getting OTT then please feel free to speak up.

I would like to speak up because I think you are utterly wrong. In fact you couldn't be more wrong. Your posts are NOT OTT and you speak a great deal of sense. You concepts of aircrew training are, to my mind, completely valid. If that's Tolstoy, I may have been misunderstanding my history.

Mach.

[Fareastdriver]

Soon after the very first trials with Zero Zero EOLS for the Puma; I believe the pilot got the AFC for it; I was shown the technique by the squadron QHI. This was on the old metal blades so I am sure, having flown both types that present day aircraft would not react in the same way so DO NOT TRY THIS AT HOME.

On the squadron we had a CAAP (Componants Accelerated Aging Program) aircarft that required 100 hrs (shock, horror) a month flying to advance the gearbox and others bits overhaul life past 800 hrs. It was fitted with two internal full overload tanks and off we went.

An early Puma would not autorate properly so there was always some input from the engines unless you were heavy; ie two overload tanks. This gave us at 80 knots about 275 Rrpm. At 80ft on the radalt the cyclic was pulled hard back and held to bleed off the speed. The aircraft actually stopped quite well and as you came to about 20ft you levelled the aircraft at about zero airspeed.

You had one pull at the lever. For the benefit of the exercise we didn't land it; just brought it into a low hover and let the engines recover. Everything would go well until just before the aircraft stopped descending. That was when the Rrpm decayed through 240; that was when the alternators tripped off; that is when one found the the autopilot was no longer keeping the aircraft straight; and that was when one discovered that the Yaw/Collective interlock had belted on full right yaw input.
To overcome these slight variables one had to apply full left pedal as the lever was raised to cancel out all the things that were going to happen. This would normally result in a fully controlled hover.

The two Turmo IIIC4s would then wake up and crank the RPM back up to normal. Torqumeters weren't fitted but experience with Pumas that did have them indicated that there was nothing astronomical.

Some people would describe this as reckless flying. I know that if I was forced to land without engines in a confined space I would have a chance of getting away with it because I had done it before.

[Brewster Buffalo]

Just a thought that someone may be able to answer.

In the Catterick accident there were automatic "low height" warnings given just as in the C-17 Alaska accident there was a stall warning given.

When these warning are sounded are they logged electronically allowing post flight analysis of why they were given? If not would it be a good idea, in terms of flight safety. for them to be recorded?

[ShyTorque]

The "Low Height" warning is triggered by the aircraft descending below the radar altimeter height, as set by the pilot. It wouldn't prove much to record it unless the bug setting was also recorded.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

Big Pistons and CG (post #114),

Hear hear - I couldn't put it better myself so I won't try!

Glojo,

I agree with much of what you say, but a couple of thoughts:

How will this pilot know they can do what is being demanded of them? It is way outside of any situation they have experienced?

They may well not know if they can do it, because the situation may be well outside what they have experienced. But that's where flexibility and skill come in! Seeing as you can't prepare for every situation that may crop up in times of war, even if you got rid of all the training rules/restrictions, the best way to win the war is to make sure your people actually get there in the first place ie don't let them come a cropper in training.

This might well apply to the pilot asked to perform something in combat they have never attempted in training and yes a thousand times yes that may well still arise for even the most experienced pilot, but at least they will have experiences beyond Mr Plod who is going to be in pastures new.

Fair enough - but I, perhaps naively, tend to regard training rules and regs as being written by people older and wiser than myself and being intended to preserve me, my colleagues and the aircraft, rather than just to spoil our fun! Therefore I don't think it's for me, as a junior scrote, to choose to ignore the rules and regs just because I think my ability might allow me to do so! Which I don't, as it happens...maybe I am in fact your Mr Plod, but at least I and those who put their lives in my hands when airborne are more likely to survive the sortie than if I award myself Lord Flasheart status and kill us all by wazzing around outside the rules "because we might have to do this on ops" (or just because I think it's fun).

To legislate where every single pilot has an equal ability and dismiss those that cross a line, is possibly wrong.

With respect, this is too much of a generalisation: there would need to be analysis of why a pilot crossed the line into indisciplined/illegal flying. If it was through lack of skill and/or awareness, then give them guidance and extra training if appropriate, but if it was done for the sole reason of showing off and thrill-seeking then I would say that yes, they need to be dismissed. This may seem unpalatable to many, but the alternative is more tragic episodes like the one we're discussing.

Are we expecting these young officers to criticise pilots for making them feel uncomfortable?

Bluntly, yes - but in the interests of good CRM, one would start (unless in immediate danger) by 'gently raising one's concerns', and 'criticising' would only come later if one's concerns had been ignored. In this case, both pilots were of similar age and the same rank anyway, which somewhat negates - in this instance - your point about an awestruck FNG being afraid to say anything to a supposedly godlike senior colleague.

Do I have any bright ideas which will guarantee that more lives aren't lost in the same way in future? Sadly not. But the only thing worse than what has happened would be if something similar happens again in a few years, in the same way that the USAF are currently experiencing...one obvious way to help guard against a repetition is to use this example to highlight the importance of any crewmember (regardless of rank/trade/hours) raising their concerns if a pilot/the pilot appears to be taking unnecessary risks.

[Airborne Aircrew]

Bluntly, yes - but in the interests of good CRM, one would start (unless in immediate danger) by 'gently raising one's concerns', and 'criticising' would only come later if one's concerns had been ignored. In this case, both pilots were of similar age and the same rank anyway, which somewhat negates - in this instance - your point about an awestruck FNG being afraid to say anything to a supposedly godlike senior colleague.

Just out of interest how would/could good CRM work with a highly experienced Flt. Lt. pushing a Puma to it's limits, (safely), work with a Wg. Cdr, who is really on his first flight or two in a Puma? What would happen if the gradient went the other way? Can the captain ignore the Wg. Cdr. with a "watch this" or would a scared left seat trump the experienced captain?

[charliegolf]

The Winco might not be experienced on the Puma, but he will have a good deal of experience generally, and airmanship specifically. (He or she is aircrew, or it's not CRM!) When he or she says, "Mmm, that was a bit sporting....", the Flt Lt should:

get the message, or

say, "Not at all sir, let me walk you through it".

Either exchange should satisfy flight safety and honour/pride/pecker contest etc.

[ShyTorque]

Once had my Wg Cdr Boss (Wessex/Chinook pilot, with very few Puma hours) say first thing one morning:

"ShyT, I'm out of currency but I need to go to a very urgent meeting at Shawbury. I'll authorise the flight, I'll fly it as a low level navigation exercise, but you'll have to be captain. Btw, I haven't got time to plan the flight....just draw us a route and we'll be away."

En route the weather at Shawbury went well below instrument approach limits due to the sudden onset of unforecast fog (i.e. airfield weather went RED). As did our only reachable airfield diversion, and as it turned out, also the whole central part of England. The Puma was always short of fuel, even on takeoff so we had few options and none for an IFR climb. After a quick crew discussion, I took over the navigation (map crawling on a 50,000 local area map) and we finally got there "VFR" after an interesting last few miles of flying at hovertaxy speeds. I remember saying "We've got about two hundred yards to go, when you see the tall airfield approach light poles ahead, turn 90 degrees right and follow them to the runway".

We found the runway threshold and hover taxied along the runway but we had great difficulty finding dispersal after we landed because the fog got very thick indeed. ATC didn't see us go past the tower at all but gave us a spot number to park on. We had no chance of finding it so after we found a runway turn off we just shut down on the first spot we came to. After shutdown I went outside to see which one we were on, then rang ATC from Station Ops to let them know.

We worked as a crew, no rank gradient issues at all. Even so, had the unthinkable occurred the subsequent BOI would have been quite interesting...

In retrospect we should have just put it down in a field, found a phone box and asked for ground assistance.

[Tiger_mate]

I suspect that many if not all SH mates read that story and recite: Been there, done that.

My own version was a 2man crew (Me + Mr French fries joiner) on a VIP sortie from HQ RAFG to Laarbruch. Whilst crawling up from the south in identical (fog) weather conditions, the other 'member of the crew' the TANS said go right: T_M said "Go left ignore the TANS", Mr French fries said "Are you sure", I said yes (he turned left) and seconds later "That'll be Laarbruch then", VIPs happy and DCO without medals.

I do not think that anyone has mentioned the hours spent 'training' monthly for such events. Which raises the question; has the 'war(s) gone on for so long that academic flying which promotes finesse, and experience in a wide scope of scenarios and external factors, been degraded to the point that crews expertise is lacking in key areas. The rest of BritMil has become too Afghan centric rather then operationally capable in all environements. Would an AMF exercise be a total disaster? Are there more (logical) accidents in waiting because of 'progress'?

[PTT]

Originally Posted by TorqueOfTheDevil

I, perhaps naively, tend to regard training rules and regs as being written by people older and wiser than myself and being intended to preserve me, my colleagues and the aircraft, rather than just to spoil our fun!

That was once the case I am sure, but now I, perhaps cynically, tend to regard a number of the training rules and regs as being written by people who are covering their a**es and would rather we spend time doing paperwork or a random time-expired currency to ensure that, should the worst happen, they are absolved of blame rather than have us actually doing some useful training to try to prevent the worst happening in the first place.

That's not to say they should be ignored, more that they serve no useful purpose for actual flight safety.

[jayteeto]

Train hard/Fight easy......... What a get out statement for cowboys. On 33 Sqn we trained hard, very hard. None of your fly at exactly 1000'/100kts rubbish either. We hit multiple targets on time, with not ABOVE heights and with multiple scenario inputs. Aircraft advanced handling was encouraged, under supervision. To throw a Puma around at low-level (in balance) required large pedal inputs and was a real potential banana skin to the unwary. We did regular max AUW sorties with weights fitted to the cabin floor and I certainly experienced engine response scenarios. I scared myself once or twice, however the QHIs TAUGHT us the limits. Supervision, remember that? I have flown around Catterick many many times with young trainee soldiers on board. They experienced some pretty advanced low level manouvering as well . What they didn't get was the cockpit scenario we experienced here. This Nav was hard done by in my opinion, however I don't agree that we need to fly like this to be good at war. The problem is that every time we have an accident like this one, more rules and regs are put in place to make things even harder.
Gratuitous wazzing is not training hard

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

written by people who are covering their a**es

PTT,

You are absolutely right that there is an increasing amount of this creeping in (flooding in, some would say!), but there is still (to me at least) plenty of fun flying - and, more importantly, good training - to be had within the rules. Because of this, I stand by my point that, from my position on the shop floor, I'm not prepared to flout the training rules & regs without very good justification.

[glojo]

Good morning Torquay of the Devil,
I think we are possibly singing from roughly the same hymn sheet on a number of those issues you have raised and it is probably down to me to be more detailed in my explanations, although there may be a few points we disagree on but that is what discussions\debates are all about.

To jayteeto

Train hard/Fight easy......... What a get out statement for cowboys

I understand your point and there must never be a 'cop out' or 'get out'. NEVER do anything we are not happy about doing (poor wording again... happy = confident)

To me advanced training or refresher training call it what you will is all about making us more proficient and possibly pushing ourselves to improve our skills. That is what I mean by 'train hard' and DEFINITELY not about being silly, stupid or even reckless.

If this advanced training (for current operational squadron pilots) is simply flying off to a foreign land to perform the same old exercises, doing exactly the same old laid down procedures in exactly the same locations then what do we achieve apart from more flight hours plus a few beers and pleasant company.... When or if we ever have to go and fight for real then who will find it easier? (not the best of words)

Please do not take my examples too literally, I am merely trying to explain myself regarding train hard fight easy...... Should I say:

Train easy, the fighting will be harder?

None of us have more than one life and there are no second chances.

Apologies if this does not make much sense as I've been awake all night and my keyboard appears to have forgotten how to spell

Take care one and all and if you are too drunk to walk home, then do NOT try to fly home!!

[Courtney Mil]

To follow on from Glojo's post, the "Train hard, fight easy" statement has nothing to do with being a get out for cowboys and what Glojo has said about it is right. I would add that what it realy means is practising the really hard stuff in demanding conditions, making the training as hard as possible. That does not, necessarily, have anything to do with operating outside the rules or what is safe.

Courtney, gamekeeper or poacher? You work it out.

Happy New Year to you all.

[cazatou]

To put this in perspective, just before I left the RAF in 1996 I asked IFS how many Aircraft Accidents (Cat 3 or above) there had been in my 31 years in the RAF.

The answer was:- 764