Puma Crash Sentence
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backwards since my time on Puma SH almost twenty years ago.
To compound the issue, the days of career Flt Lts were also gone and replaced by 'career focused individuals' who assume that Sqn Ldr and beyond is a right. The SLUT (Sqn Ldr Under Training) was born; and it is the nemesis to Flight Safety and to a point +Morale. I have known awesome pilots change into right plonkers with an illuminated career caption.
Finally the Puma accident rate in which the Fuel Control Unit played its part cannot be swept under the carpet. In short, the situation we find ourselves in is a great many ducks falling into line; and individual personalities are the minority. The 'system' contributed to the downfall far more then most will admit.
Last edited by Tiger_mate; 23rd Dec 2011 at 15:09.
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The point I am getting at is that the sage advice of the old and bold is absent in todays military and without this the logical errors erased in a bygone era are being repeated. Dont get me wrong; the days of old had some horror stories born of arrogance and culture; but the good bits were essential and are now missing. ....also that (in my opinion,) learning to fly (& operate) the aeroplane efficiently and with finesse are more important than jumping through the next promotion hoop or brown nosing the CoC.
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Finally the Puma accident rate in which the Fuel Control Unit played its part cannot be swept under the carpet. In short, the situation we find ourselves in is a great many ducks falling into line; and individual personalities are the minority. The 'system' contributed to the downfall far more then most will admit.
Other known problems were the high C of G / narrow track undercarriage, wrong pedal take off issue, the yaw roll divergence tendency. We emphasised them all on the OCU. And my own "gotcha", demonstrating how the baralt hold would drop out when reducing below 80kts, whereupon the old girl would nod her head very slightly then slyly descend into the ground if left to her own devices.
A great shame if any of this "hard learned" teaching didn't continue later on perhaps with quite the same emphasis.
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This observation is so true in all walks of life:
However we would be fooling everyone if we tried to say that show-boating to a reckless level is extremely rare!! Rare YES, but by no means extremely rare. There are any number of links on this forum that may or may not show aircraft being flown in what might be described in a reckless manner?
Would we describe this as reckless?
No doubt the authorities will try to locate the pilot but how many times has this been performed BEFORE it was filmed? Has anyone that was present at this event complained? I would suggest no and that would probably apply to all the other footage that has been filmed,
I am NOT trying to take this thread off topic, I am trying to suggest all nations have examples of this type of behaviour even in multi-crewed aircraft and I would suggest this problem is not specific to any one service. The B-52 at Fairchild may be considered the most horrific example but is it? (Youtube link deliberately NOT applied) This example is possibly a far worse example EA-6B Prowler Hind sight is a useless gift and with the above two examples the pilots were not angels but no one ever made an official complaint!!!
This is NOT an RAF issue and the RAF are certainly not behind the ball when it comes to trying to eradicate this type of behaviour. The pilot show boating over the soldier was lucky, that he was not facing a manslaughter or even a murder charge!! Was that act any less serious than that of the Puma apart from the consequences?
Was it a real video clip?
To suggest the RAF lags behind in any type of CRM training is wrong and very unfair to the very highly trained, highly respected personnel that both fly and crew that aircraft. Respect to all members of the 'Light Blue' and respect to all those that have been effected by this tragic event.
Merry Christmas everyone,
John
There will always be the odd poor apple on both sides, as I have said, and I think that some of the comments on previous posts reflect that, but please do not get the impression that we are that far behind, nor, probably more importantly, that the civilian world is significantly better.
Would we describe this as reckless?
No doubt the authorities will try to locate the pilot but how many times has this been performed BEFORE it was filmed? Has anyone that was present at this event complained? I would suggest no and that would probably apply to all the other footage that has been filmed,
I am NOT trying to take this thread off topic, I am trying to suggest all nations have examples of this type of behaviour even in multi-crewed aircraft and I would suggest this problem is not specific to any one service. The B-52 at Fairchild may be considered the most horrific example but is it? (Youtube link deliberately NOT applied) This example is possibly a far worse example EA-6B Prowler Hind sight is a useless gift and with the above two examples the pilots were not angels but no one ever made an official complaint!!!
This is NOT an RAF issue and the RAF are certainly not behind the ball when it comes to trying to eradicate this type of behaviour. The pilot show boating over the soldier was lucky, that he was not facing a manslaughter or even a murder charge!! Was that act any less serious than that of the Puma apart from the consequences?
Was it a real video clip?
To suggest the RAF lags behind in any type of CRM training is wrong and very unfair to the very highly trained, highly respected personnel that both fly and crew that aircraft. Respect to all members of the 'Light Blue' and respect to all those that have been effected by this tragic event.
Merry Christmas everyone,
John
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Glojo
I dont think that the younger members of the RAF are lagging behind the civil aviation in CRM culture but some of the older upper management are far less inclined to enbrace the culture.
Rather than have an open investigation into an inccident there is still rush to find someone to blame and pretend that nailing someone with a lower pay grade to the wall will make the situation go away.
In a civilan airline that I worked for one (ex RAF) pilot made a mistake, this was not seen by the management as requiring any more than a little extra training aimed at adressing the issue. Unfortunatly the pilot in the face of overwelming evidence would not admit that he had made an error, this left the airline managment with no option but to dismiss him.
I think this guys refusal to admit to the error was partly due to his background and coming from a culture were admitting to the error would have him put on a charge.
The RAF is not yet free from the blame culture but the faster the culture changes and admits that pepole make honest mistakes the better for all involved, with wise oversight it will be clear were an honest mistake stops and negligence starts so I see no problems for those who might see this to clash with maintaning military diciplinery system.
Rather than have an open investigation into an inccident there is still rush to find someone to blame and pretend that nailing someone with a lower pay grade to the wall will make the situation go away.
In a civilan airline that I worked for one (ex RAF) pilot made a mistake, this was not seen by the management as requiring any more than a little extra training aimed at adressing the issue. Unfortunatly the pilot in the face of overwelming evidence would not admit that he had made an error, this left the airline managment with no option but to dismiss him.
I think this guys refusal to admit to the error was partly due to his background and coming from a culture were admitting to the error would have him put on a charge.
The RAF is not yet free from the blame culture but the faster the culture changes and admits that pepole make honest mistakes the better for all involved, with wise oversight it will be clear were an honest mistake stops and negligence starts so I see no problems for those who might see this to clash with maintaning military diciplinery system.
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A and C the civil sector isn't as transparent as you make out, if it was we wouldn't have the Whistleblower, Chirps and confidential reporting.... to protects oneself is Human nature....... Especially in this day and age where the world operates a blame culture and there is no such thing as an accident. Dismissing crews or engineers who have had an incident also in my eyes can have a negative effect, knowing that one blot on another wise squeaky clean career can destroy it and your future employment just serves to make those involved clam up. what do we learn from that, we don't because those involved are less likely to report any incident for fear of retribution, hence the reporting systems mentioned above.
I have read through the whole thread and one cannot help feeling sorry for all those involved, in a way it reminds me of the Puma incident out in Zimbabwe.
My feelings are that where is the public interest in prosecuting the guy for not speaking up..... where is the justice in that? did he set out to Kill anyone? NO.. Is he suffering because of this incident A definite YES, and I should imagine he will be reliving this tragedy for the rest of his life ..
Can one hand on heart say he never intended not to say something about it on landing, but never got the opportunity, a lot of people have talked about people having discussed with flight commanders etc after flights about concerns..... you appear to have been the lucky ones as you got that far, and it was post flight.....
A headstrong personality can be a damn difficult thing to speak up against in all walks of life, I had one cock up in the RAF, brought totally about by peer pressure and being rushed to complete a task by the pilot, and I learnt from it, did I report it afterwards? NO, simply because I knew that rather than the RAF seeing it for what it was and learning from it, I would probably have been tech charged (I left a drop tank pin in, ( which had no flag on it) It was also missed by the final check man too. ) I never allowed a Pilot to ever put me or themselves in that position again.
I have read through the whole thread and one cannot help feeling sorry for all those involved, in a way it reminds me of the Puma incident out in Zimbabwe.
My feelings are that where is the public interest in prosecuting the guy for not speaking up..... where is the justice in that? did he set out to Kill anyone? NO.. Is he suffering because of this incident A definite YES, and I should imagine he will be reliving this tragedy for the rest of his life ..
Can one hand on heart say he never intended not to say something about it on landing, but never got the opportunity, a lot of people have talked about people having discussed with flight commanders etc after flights about concerns..... you appear to have been the lucky ones as you got that far, and it was post flight.....
A headstrong personality can be a damn difficult thing to speak up against in all walks of life, I had one cock up in the RAF, brought totally about by peer pressure and being rushed to complete a task by the pilot, and I learnt from it, did I report it afterwards? NO, simply because I knew that rather than the RAF seeing it for what it was and learning from it, I would probably have been tech charged (I left a drop tank pin in, ( which had no flag on it) It was also missed by the final check man too. ) I never allowed a Pilot to ever put me or themselves in that position again.
Last edited by NutLoose; 23rd Dec 2011 at 18:22.
My feelings are that where is the public interest in prosecuting the guy for not speaking up.....
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Nutloose
I have seen the civil system from the inside of six company's the best of these had no CRM problem with the policy overseen by a very good Chief pilot ( who ironically in terms of this thread was ex RAF)
The other five company's have failed to to meet these high standards, some by a small amount and others .............well by a bit more.
The other five company's have failed to to meet these high standards, some by a small amount and others .............well by a bit more.
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I have a question...
From the "bottom of the pile"... Crew only... No Captains allow to respond please - the thread has done well so far in sticking to the subject, this question is crucial to the debate.
How was it at the bottom of the crew "pecking order"? How easy was it to "pipe up" and tell the boss he was screwing up? Were some Captains easier to talk to while with others you felt it was impossible? If you did express apprehension were you listened to, ignored, ridiculed or what?
Please answer any or all of the above questions...
I'll start by saying that on the one occasion I expressed discomfort the Captain pulled up to a more comfortable height and the issue was never discussed. We flew on numerous other occasions, we flew low and fast and close to my point of discomfort, (note that when I complained I was sat in an open door facing backwards, very low over water - only crewmen are likely to understand the difference between being in the cockpit and facing backwards), and I was never again put in the position of having to express discomfort. I have the greatest of respect for that Captain.
From the "bottom of the pile"... Crew only... No Captains allow to respond please - the thread has done well so far in sticking to the subject, this question is crucial to the debate.
How was it at the bottom of the crew "pecking order"? How easy was it to "pipe up" and tell the boss he was screwing up? Were some Captains easier to talk to while with others you felt it was impossible? If you did express apprehension were you listened to, ignored, ridiculed or what?
Please answer any or all of the above questions...
I'll start by saying that on the one occasion I expressed discomfort the Captain pulled up to a more comfortable height and the issue was never discussed. We flew on numerous other occasions, we flew low and fast and close to my point of discomfort, (note that when I complained I was sat in an open door facing backwards, very low over water - only crewmen are likely to understand the difference between being in the cockpit and facing backwards), and I was never again put in the position of having to express discomfort. I have the greatest of respect for that Captain.
Is there any difference in attitudes to CRM in the other services?
In the British civvy world the BMI Kegworth accident is generally held to be the moment moderm CRM was embraced as a credible concept which can "catch" errors in an error chain.
It is regularly discussed at annual recurrents and lessons are always learnt as the numerous errors are pointed out to less experienced crews.
The outcome is always a feeling of empowerment and determination to never let such a sad thing happen again.The net result in a modern airline is that ALL people involved in the day to day operation are completely at ease to report ANYTHING they feel uneasy about without fear or embarassment or nervousness.
When it comes to safety there is no authority gradient on my aircraft.Everybodies opinion/input is valid and is duly noted.
Perhaps this sad sad Puma event should become the Services watershed moment.
It is regularly discussed at annual recurrents and lessons are always learnt as the numerous errors are pointed out to less experienced crews.
The outcome is always a feeling of empowerment and determination to never let such a sad thing happen again.The net result in a modern airline is that ALL people involved in the day to day operation are completely at ease to report ANYTHING they feel uneasy about without fear or embarassment or nervousness.
When it comes to safety there is no authority gradient on my aircraft.Everybodies opinion/input is valid and is duly noted.
Perhaps this sad sad Puma event should become the Services watershed moment.
Last edited by charlies angel; 24th Dec 2011 at 13:30. Reason: to add British cos Shell Management has stuck his pedants nose in!!!
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
AA,
The answer is it depends. Some individuals were planks on the ground as well as in the air and impossible to strike up a rapport.
I flew a crew check on one individual and have full confidence in the following tale. (I have names).
The Nav called the Captain with a major heading change in two minutes. He was told to be quiet as the Captain was trying to think. At the turn point some distance to the north west of the Hebrides he called the turn. The Captain exploded, told him he had been told to shut up and went back in to his study.
The Nav duly shut up. Some while later the Captain asked reasonably what the Nav had wanted. "Nothing much, just wanted to give you the new heading." He then told him the heading was no use now. When asked where they were the answer was Iceland. They just had sufficient fuel for a direct recovery to base.
I don't recall the ultimate outcome but I don't think that Captain progressed much further.
If your Captain is a good egg then you will feel less inhibited in speaking out.
PS, they were both flt lt but one was a selected member of the 2-winged master race.
The answer is it depends. Some individuals were planks on the ground as well as in the air and impossible to strike up a rapport.
I flew a crew check on one individual and have full confidence in the following tale. (I have names).
The Nav called the Captain with a major heading change in two minutes. He was told to be quiet as the Captain was trying to think. At the turn point some distance to the north west of the Hebrides he called the turn. The Captain exploded, told him he had been told to shut up and went back in to his study.
The Nav duly shut up. Some while later the Captain asked reasonably what the Nav had wanted. "Nothing much, just wanted to give you the new heading." He then told him the heading was no use now. When asked where they were the answer was Iceland. They just had sufficient fuel for a direct recovery to base.
I don't recall the ultimate outcome but I don't think that Captain progressed much further.
If your Captain is a good egg then you will feel less inhibited in speaking out.
PS, they were both flt lt but one was a selected member of the 2-winged master race.
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Let us be honest here..... The Puma, Wessex and Chinook Forces had their fair share of Wazzers. In the 90's you could put everyone in isolation and ask them to make a list of the pilots who would do exactly this type of thing. I would put my wages on the lists all having the same few names. Some people were just d##kheads when away from base. However the difference is.... why are we having these accidents now? And why does history seem to show Puma Puma Puma?
The simple answer does not require a £million study by experts. The Puma bites the unwary and when it bites it is a bitch to recover. I remember a role disposal board at Shawbury sending a bloke to Puma because he was a weak candidate and SK/Wessex/Chinook would have been too difficult for him!! Sorry about upsetting egos, but the Puma required the best candidates. I did just ok at Shawbury and really struggled to make the grade on the OCU/Sqn. My first year was definitely probation, I got through with the help of the crewmen and a select few old and bold instructors. Jack R/AJ/Geoff Young/Al Bishop/Billy Kidd. This was because the pure handling of the helicopter demanded much more than other types. Engine response and divergance gotchas were SO SO easy to discover on a daily basis. Just look at how many ex 72 wessex pilots on 2nd tours screwed up........
The lack of mentorship, experienced crews and operational tempo have all added to the problem. Commanders are scared to get rid of wazzers because they would not get a replacement in the short term, overloading those left behind. Traditionally, supervision is difficult when your pilots are spread all over the world. These problems are common to all types, but it seems to be Pumas that keep on crashing. Commanders..... Look at the aircraft before you condemn the aircrews. The upgrade is a step forward 30 years too late.
I will stick my neck out and say that this accident might not have happened in a more forgiving aircraft??????????????????????
The simple answer does not require a £million study by experts. The Puma bites the unwary and when it bites it is a bitch to recover. I remember a role disposal board at Shawbury sending a bloke to Puma because he was a weak candidate and SK/Wessex/Chinook would have been too difficult for him!! Sorry about upsetting egos, but the Puma required the best candidates. I did just ok at Shawbury and really struggled to make the grade on the OCU/Sqn. My first year was definitely probation, I got through with the help of the crewmen and a select few old and bold instructors. Jack R/AJ/Geoff Young/Al Bishop/Billy Kidd. This was because the pure handling of the helicopter demanded much more than other types. Engine response and divergance gotchas were SO SO easy to discover on a daily basis. Just look at how many ex 72 wessex pilots on 2nd tours screwed up........
The lack of mentorship, experienced crews and operational tempo have all added to the problem. Commanders are scared to get rid of wazzers because they would not get a replacement in the short term, overloading those left behind. Traditionally, supervision is difficult when your pilots are spread all over the world. These problems are common to all types, but it seems to be Pumas that keep on crashing. Commanders..... Look at the aircraft before you condemn the aircrews. The upgrade is a step forward 30 years too late.
I will stick my neck out and say that this accident might not have happened in a more forgiving aircraft??????????????????????
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I had a similar tale to that (PN post) when Low Level in Wales. The front crew were the OC of the OCU that I was a student crewman on. (operating solo on a pilots training navex) The student pilot was a highly respected member of the Royal Navy (Stds) embarking on an exchange tour with the RAF. Several miles after overshooting a turn point we went off my map, at which stage I folded the said map and enjoyed the view. We had plenty of fuel and my Nav inputs had fallen on deaf ears.
At a beer call at the end of the day, the OC stood up in front of everybody and recited the tale, with a most public apology and a statement that everybody should learn from 'our' story.
Respect to both front enders. For the curious; the OC was GC and the RN exchange officer Fred. (circa 1986)
I must be quite lucky for in 5000 rotary hours including flying with such (notorious) icons as the late George B, I have never been ignored by any Driver Airframe since para 1 above.
AL1: JT - All comments seconded.
Earlier in the thread, Yozzer said:
That was me. 1987 in Portugal. Unmarked wires strung between two vertical cliffs (canyon) with no pylons above surface to indicate potential disaster; and having crossed a dam moments earlier, we (2 crew) were looking for wires.
At a beer call at the end of the day, the OC stood up in front of everybody and recited the tale, with a most public apology and a statement that everybody should learn from 'our' story.
Respect to both front enders. For the curious; the OC was GC and the RN exchange officer Fred. (circa 1986)
I must be quite lucky for in 5000 rotary hours including flying with such (notorious) icons as the late George B, I have never been ignored by any Driver Airframe since para 1 above.
AL1: JT - All comments seconded.
Earlier in the thread, Yozzer said:
I know of another with similar tales who does not know if the aircraft went over or under HT wires whilst overseas!
Last edited by Tiger_mate; 24th Dec 2011 at 11:21.
In my short RAF flying career I experienced both sides of speaking up.
In the Herc there was a single ADF with 2 control boxes; one at the nav' table and one on the consol between the drivers. There was a takeover button on the middle of the box.
While on the OCU (as a very green 20yr old Plt Off) we were about to get airborne from Thorney to carry out an NDB letdown at Tangmere. If I performed OK the nav instructor would get out back at Thorney and I would be solo.
I tuned the TG NDB ( 401 IIRC) , idented the beacon and off we went. This involved flying the standard departure toward Selsey Bill and then turning left to the TG Hold. There was a strong NW wind and I didn't twig we were flying about 15degrees further left than was expected. WE had been in cloud since passing through about 1000'. While in the descent on the inbound leg of the procedure Thorney ATC suddenly yelled what is your position? We have an unknown contact on your heading just E of the Thorney NDB. ( This was on the Southdowns and in line with 19 at Thorney). We of course immediately climbed to safety altitude, I received a thump in the head from the instructor, I relistened to the ADF and it was coding TI - the Thorney NDB.
It was established that the co-pilot had selected the TI after take-off, without telling anyone he pressed the takeover button.
We went back to base and filled in a report and were complimented by higher authority for our honesty. This young man learnt a lot about that:-1. From then on I insisted that only I would operate the ADF, and
2. Whatever letdown we were doing,I had the aural button selected and listened to the ident, even for an ILS, until we had safely landed. Something I knew no other nav, to my knowledge, did.
A year or so later on 48 we flew from Changi to Hong Kong, tasked for a turnround that involved picking up a load of troops, and then straight back to Changi. Having dip' clearance for S Vietnam we would fly the airways in both directions, feeling smug that we were miles above the war going on below
On the way up we experienced problems with the pressurisation system, which meant unless it was fixed at HK we would have to return not above 10,000', because of our pax. The captain insisted we would not stop at HK, ok I said I'll redraw the route to avoid the mainland. No, he said, we'll go back down the airway at FL100. We can't do that I said, one, that level is below the RAF Safety Altitude and two, pointing at the RAF en-route chart, it quite clearly states flying at less than 7,000' above ground level is not advised due to the risk of ground fire.
He insisted that we would fly as he proposed, the co-pilot kept out of the argument and I was in a dilemma.So off we went. 2 or 3 years later, with much more experience and even better, the benefit of Flt Lt rank, I would have said you're going without me, and found someone senior at Kai Tak to report the situation to.
This particular captain was an exWW2 bomber pilot, a complete loose cannon ( I have several other stories to back this assertion) and regarded me as a coward because we had once argued about the Vietnam War, which he supported and I said was a complete waste of American lives.
To think he later became a Training Captain with Malaysian!
In the Herc there was a single ADF with 2 control boxes; one at the nav' table and one on the consol between the drivers. There was a takeover button on the middle of the box.
While on the OCU (as a very green 20yr old Plt Off) we were about to get airborne from Thorney to carry out an NDB letdown at Tangmere. If I performed OK the nav instructor would get out back at Thorney and I would be solo.
I tuned the TG NDB ( 401 IIRC) , idented the beacon and off we went. This involved flying the standard departure toward Selsey Bill and then turning left to the TG Hold. There was a strong NW wind and I didn't twig we were flying about 15degrees further left than was expected. WE had been in cloud since passing through about 1000'. While in the descent on the inbound leg of the procedure Thorney ATC suddenly yelled what is your position? We have an unknown contact on your heading just E of the Thorney NDB. ( This was on the Southdowns and in line with 19 at Thorney). We of course immediately climbed to safety altitude, I received a thump in the head from the instructor, I relistened to the ADF and it was coding TI - the Thorney NDB.
It was established that the co-pilot had selected the TI after take-off, without telling anyone he pressed the takeover button.
We went back to base and filled in a report and were complimented by higher authority for our honesty. This young man learnt a lot about that:-1. From then on I insisted that only I would operate the ADF, and
2. Whatever letdown we were doing,I had the aural button selected and listened to the ident, even for an ILS, until we had safely landed. Something I knew no other nav, to my knowledge, did.
A year or so later on 48 we flew from Changi to Hong Kong, tasked for a turnround that involved picking up a load of troops, and then straight back to Changi. Having dip' clearance for S Vietnam we would fly the airways in both directions, feeling smug that we were miles above the war going on below
On the way up we experienced problems with the pressurisation system, which meant unless it was fixed at HK we would have to return not above 10,000', because of our pax. The captain insisted we would not stop at HK, ok I said I'll redraw the route to avoid the mainland. No, he said, we'll go back down the airway at FL100. We can't do that I said, one, that level is below the RAF Safety Altitude and two, pointing at the RAF en-route chart, it quite clearly states flying at less than 7,000' above ground level is not advised due to the risk of ground fire.
He insisted that we would fly as he proposed, the co-pilot kept out of the argument and I was in a dilemma.So off we went. 2 or 3 years later, with much more experience and even better, the benefit of Flt Lt rank, I would have said you're going without me, and found someone senior at Kai Tak to report the situation to.
This particular captain was an exWW2 bomber pilot, a complete loose cannon ( I have several other stories to back this assertion) and regarded me as a coward because we had once argued about the Vietnam War, which he supported and I said was a complete waste of American lives.
To think he later became a Training Captain with Malaysian!
Ideally the 'planks' should be filtered out during selection. A big part of selection in my present organisation (after initial hoop jumping), is the 'beer test', would you of your own volition want to socialise with this person. A bit rough & ready but it works, good bloke can mean different things, but generally someone you’re comfortable with.
Feeling comfortable communicating a concern is the nub, ether via choice expletives or more formal phraseology. Fostering a comfortable environment is a difficult trick, there can be no martinets. With those who choose an autocratic approach, education is the first avenue. If education does fail, then a more draconian approach is warranted. Would you want to fly with someone you consider reckless?
There should be no relearning of the wheel, whilst difficult to teach, experiences can be shared, documented & added to the ‘book’. There should never be an excuse for this loss of corporate knowledge; hopefully this is an area that the DAEMS should assist with.
Feeling comfortable communicating a concern is the nub, ether via choice expletives or more formal phraseology. Fostering a comfortable environment is a difficult trick, there can be no martinets. With those who choose an autocratic approach, education is the first avenue. If education does fail, then a more draconian approach is warranted. Would you want to fly with someone you consider reckless?
There should be no relearning of the wheel, whilst difficult to teach, experiences can be shared, documented & added to the ‘book’. There should never be an excuse for this loss of corporate knowledge; hopefully this is an area that the DAEMS should assist with.
Last edited by woptb; 24th Dec 2011 at 16:31.
Avoid imitations
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I spent two tours as a staff QHI on 240 OCU (with time off in between for good behaviour). The Puma can bite the careless or over confident very hard but as I said before, her bad habits have always been well documented.
Many of the pilots who did seem to have trouble adjusting to the Puma were ex-first tourist, NI Wessex.
They were used to a tailwheel aircraft which could be stood on its tail and stopped quickly when asked. The Wessex also had excellent engine response, and was far more capable when OEI. It was also relatively docile in a handling sense and considerably slower than the Puma. Not only that, the NI theatre, once learned, was flown largely on local knowledge and pilots became less adept at pure navigation, without realising it.
Also, having done a three year operational tour (albeit their first and only, some of it as co-pilot), some of them were slightly, how shall we put it... "cocky" with it. Nuff said, it could be a steep learning curve for some.
Tiger mate, We've flown together, I was on the staff when Fred went through (but I'm not GC!).
Many of the pilots who did seem to have trouble adjusting to the Puma were ex-first tourist, NI Wessex.
They were used to a tailwheel aircraft which could be stood on its tail and stopped quickly when asked. The Wessex also had excellent engine response, and was far more capable when OEI. It was also relatively docile in a handling sense and considerably slower than the Puma. Not only that, the NI theatre, once learned, was flown largely on local knowledge and pilots became less adept at pure navigation, without realising it.
Also, having done a three year operational tour (albeit their first and only, some of it as co-pilot), some of them were slightly, how shall we put it... "cocky" with it. Nuff said, it could be a steep learning curve for some.
Tiger mate, We've flown together, I was on the staff when Fred went through (but I'm not GC!).