New Falklands War Brewing
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The key to the oil in the Falklands is that the expensive recovery techniques are now economically viable and should turn a profit. There's oil buried deeply all over the place but it's only with the recent high market prices that it has become worth making the effort to bring it to the surface.
You do need to be careful though, as BP found out...
You do need to be careful though, as BP found out...
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this tells an interesting tale about the state of the Argentine armed forces
http://en.mercopress.com/2012/11/22/...nd-maintenance
If its true, their Navy and Air Force won't be invading anywhere soon.
"The corvettes ARA Spiro and ARA Gomez Roca and the destroyer Argentina experienced different breakdowns attributed to lack of maintenance and human error, according to sources from the Defence Committee of the Argentine Lower House.
Apparently naval experts believe that “the absence of conflict hypothesis and a scarce budget have led to a very week patrolling of the 200 miles economic exclusive zone, which impedes an active combat of illegal fishing”.
Three corvettes are deployed for that task, corvettes Drummond, Granville and Guerrico, which “hardly sail because of lack of resources for operational expenses”, added the sources.
Likewise these incidents are happening when the 2013 budget approved for the Navy means vessels will have lesser sailing time to patrol maritime and fluvial spaces. “Resources for next year are sufficient for 161 sailing and practice days compared to 329 days only two years ago”.
“It is clearly insufficient for the Navy’s 15 vessels that are currently on condition to operate” said lawmaker Julio Martinez from the opposition Radical party and member of the Defence Committee. Proper training demands at least 90 sailing days for each vessel, which means sufficient funds for “a period equivalent to 1.350 days sailing for the whole fleet”.
“The ARA Espora and the fellows on board would have avoided the bad moment they are going through in South Africa if the corvette Spiro, originally assigned for the Altasur naval exercise, had not suffered the accident of running into a sand bank when leaving Mar del Plata”, said Martinez. ARA Spiro has been on service since 1987 and was sent to the first Gulf War in 1990/91 by then president Carlos Menem.
Another vessel knocked out of action is the icebreaker Admiral Irizar when as a consequence of the 2007 fire in the engine room was virtually burnt down. The original timetable for her return has long gone by and now apparently she could be back towards the end of 2013. Over 100 million dollars have been spent on the vessel plus the cost of leasing the Russian icebreaker Vasily Golovnin for the annual three-month Antarctic campaigns at a monthly cost of 2 million dollars.
A similar situation is faced by the four destroyers: Almirante Brown, Heroína, La Argentina and Sarandí, with engine problems and they need spares, plus the fact all the ordnance has expired.
Of the six MEKO corvettes, ARA Parker and ARA Rosales are waiting for spares. ARA Gomez Roca and ARA Robinson are on duty for search and rescue operations, a duty sometimes passed on to the Coast Guard. Furthermore, two Fokker F-28s from the Navy are grounded since they have spares retained in Customs because of Argentine restrictions on imports.
However according to former Defence minister Horacio Jaunarena the situation is not different in the other services: the Mirage fighter-bombers are not flying since they are not safe enough for the pilots and in 2006 the Army informed then Defence minister Nilda Garré the force was in inferior conditions to neighbouring countries and thus “it was impossible to make compatible a common defence system in the region”.
Finally the submarine crews which operate from Mar del Plata need at least 190 days of immersion practice and in the last year only spent 19 hours submerged. Submarines Salta, Santa Cruz and San Juan have maintenance difficulties and “only few remember that in August 2010, Defence minister Nilda Garré announced Argentina was planning to build a nuclear submarine”, concluded lawmaker Martinez.
http://en.mercopress.com/2012/11/22/...nd-maintenance
If its true, their Navy and Air Force won't be invading anywhere soon.
"The corvettes ARA Spiro and ARA Gomez Roca and the destroyer Argentina experienced different breakdowns attributed to lack of maintenance and human error, according to sources from the Defence Committee of the Argentine Lower House.
Apparently naval experts believe that “the absence of conflict hypothesis and a scarce budget have led to a very week patrolling of the 200 miles economic exclusive zone, which impedes an active combat of illegal fishing”.
Three corvettes are deployed for that task, corvettes Drummond, Granville and Guerrico, which “hardly sail because of lack of resources for operational expenses”, added the sources.
Likewise these incidents are happening when the 2013 budget approved for the Navy means vessels will have lesser sailing time to patrol maritime and fluvial spaces. “Resources for next year are sufficient for 161 sailing and practice days compared to 329 days only two years ago”.
“It is clearly insufficient for the Navy’s 15 vessels that are currently on condition to operate” said lawmaker Julio Martinez from the opposition Radical party and member of the Defence Committee. Proper training demands at least 90 sailing days for each vessel, which means sufficient funds for “a period equivalent to 1.350 days sailing for the whole fleet”.
“The ARA Espora and the fellows on board would have avoided the bad moment they are going through in South Africa if the corvette Spiro, originally assigned for the Altasur naval exercise, had not suffered the accident of running into a sand bank when leaving Mar del Plata”, said Martinez. ARA Spiro has been on service since 1987 and was sent to the first Gulf War in 1990/91 by then president Carlos Menem.
Another vessel knocked out of action is the icebreaker Admiral Irizar when as a consequence of the 2007 fire in the engine room was virtually burnt down. The original timetable for her return has long gone by and now apparently she could be back towards the end of 2013. Over 100 million dollars have been spent on the vessel plus the cost of leasing the Russian icebreaker Vasily Golovnin for the annual three-month Antarctic campaigns at a monthly cost of 2 million dollars.
A similar situation is faced by the four destroyers: Almirante Brown, Heroína, La Argentina and Sarandí, with engine problems and they need spares, plus the fact all the ordnance has expired.
Of the six MEKO corvettes, ARA Parker and ARA Rosales are waiting for spares. ARA Gomez Roca and ARA Robinson are on duty for search and rescue operations, a duty sometimes passed on to the Coast Guard. Furthermore, two Fokker F-28s from the Navy are grounded since they have spares retained in Customs because of Argentine restrictions on imports.
However according to former Defence minister Horacio Jaunarena the situation is not different in the other services: the Mirage fighter-bombers are not flying since they are not safe enough for the pilots and in 2006 the Army informed then Defence minister Nilda Garré the force was in inferior conditions to neighbouring countries and thus “it was impossible to make compatible a common defence system in the region”.
Finally the submarine crews which operate from Mar del Plata need at least 190 days of immersion practice and in the last year only spent 19 hours submerged. Submarines Salta, Santa Cruz and San Juan have maintenance difficulties and “only few remember that in August 2010, Defence minister Nilda Garré announced Argentina was planning to build a nuclear submarine”, concluded lawmaker Martinez.
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Totally agree with White Ovies and we should also consider the fact that there are still huge areas of our North Sea that would be FAR cheaper to develop.
It is so easy to suggest these conflicts are all about oil but by crikey it will be an expensive operation to recover it.
Reassuring to read that the Argentine Navy is in a worse state than our own reduced force.
It is so easy to suggest these conflicts are all about oil but by crikey it will be an expensive operation to recover it.
Reassuring to read that the Argentine Navy is in a worse state than our own reduced force.
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Pot-kettle-black
"Another vessel knocked out of action is the icebreaker Admiral Irizar when as a consequence of the 2007 fire in the engine room was virtually burnt down. The original timetable for her return has long gone by and now apparently she could be back towards the end of 2013. Over 100 million dollars have been spent on the vessel plus the cost of leasing the Russian icebreaker Vasily Golovnin for the annual three-month Antarctic campaigns at a monthly cost of 2 million dollars."
"In December 2008, while on an 18-month deployment, Endurance suffered extensive flooding to her lower deck resulting in the near loss of the ship.[6] A serious engine room flood left her without power or propulsion,[7] and she was towed to Punta Arenas by a Chilean tug. After an extensive survey was completed, the estimates to refit the ship were put at around £30M.[8] On 8 April 2009 Endurance arrived off Portsmouth, on the semi-submersible transporter ship MV Target.[9]
]
On 22 March 2011 it was announced that the Royal Navy intended to hire MV Polarbjorn, to be renamed HMS Protector, for three years whilst a final decision on whether to repair or scrap Endurance is made."
"Another vessel knocked out of action is the icebreaker Admiral Irizar when as a consequence of the 2007 fire in the engine room was virtually burnt down. The original timetable for her return has long gone by and now apparently she could be back towards the end of 2013. Over 100 million dollars have been spent on the vessel plus the cost of leasing the Russian icebreaker Vasily Golovnin for the annual three-month Antarctic campaigns at a monthly cost of 2 million dollars."
"In December 2008, while on an 18-month deployment, Endurance suffered extensive flooding to her lower deck resulting in the near loss of the ship.[6] A serious engine room flood left her without power or propulsion,[7] and she was towed to Punta Arenas by a Chilean tug. After an extensive survey was completed, the estimates to refit the ship were put at around £30M.[8] On 8 April 2009 Endurance arrived off Portsmouth, on the semi-submersible transporter ship MV Target.[9]
]
On 22 March 2011 it was announced that the Royal Navy intended to hire MV Polarbjorn, to be renamed HMS Protector, for three years whilst a final decision on whether to repair or scrap Endurance is made."
HH
What are you on about? At least we have got an icebreaker (not withstanding the limitations, such as lack of an embarked helicopter).
On which note, has a decision been made about the future of Endurance? Surely that role demands a ship with a flight?
What are you on about? At least we have got an icebreaker (not withstanding the limitations, such as lack of an embarked helicopter).
On which note, has a decision been made about the future of Endurance? Surely that role demands a ship with a flight?
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The Endurance replacement would need two helos to provide mutual SAR. With the demise of the Mk 3 Lynx the organic aviation task could not be executed by the military. The Navy don't have enough Mk 8 SRU Lynx to man the Grey Fleet, Merlin is too big and expensive for the Ice Patrol task and with Seaking going in 2016 that would only leave Wildcat and the Navy is unlikely to use any of their allocated 28 in that role. No helos in Antartica has a massive effect on British Antarctic Survey tasking and ultimately a lack of influence in Antarctica.
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WEBF -we're in the same situation as the Argies in the deep south - both of us have a specific vessel for use in the area, both of them are buggered and will cost too much to fix
both of us have hired (at some cost) a temporary icebreaker or ice capable vessel from third parties to keep up the fig leaf that we have capability
Actually there is no reason why the BAS couldn't hire commercial helicopters for resupply use
both of us have hired (at some cost) a temporary icebreaker or ice capable vessel from third parties to keep up the fig leaf that we have capability
Actually there is no reason why the BAS couldn't hire commercial helicopters for resupply use
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They dont need any of that stuff to take the Islands.
All they need to do is take MPA.
And for that, all you need is one or two ships, dont even have to be armed.
One or two other military aircraft with good endurance, dont have to be armed.
And, two Hercs, at most three, or similar aircraft of similar size, packed with their best commandos and pilots who are capable of flying at very low level.
And reasonably reliable intel about where significant elements of the RIC are.
Thats all it would take.
One surprise commando raid on MPA and Mare Harbour.
And, when you've secured the airfield, you bring in a couple of airliners with reinforcements. The British government hasnt even got the stomach to expel Abu Qatada let alone shoot down a 707 or two packed with Argentine troops.
Once disembarked, the troops fan out and mop up any resistance from the FIDF and RIC in the field. As soon as the situation is clearly lost, there is no way that COBRA will demand a suicide mission from those that are left. The order would go out to surrender.
Woodward and Thompson both concur and are on record to that effect. You dont need subs, you dont need destroyers, you dont need aircraft carriers, you dont even need Mirages.
If we lose MPA, we lose the Islands. End of.
We are absolutely in no position whatsoever to retake the islands by force - we dont have the tools, we dont have the people, we dont have the leaders or the national will and it'll take probably about 10 years of re-arming & retraining of capabilities that have been lost, by which time 90% of the sheeple will have forgotten about where the Falklands are and will find it very difficult to give a f**k.
It will bring down the UK Government of the day and whoever succeeds them will sweep the whole bloody lot under the carpet, not attempt to re-take the Islands (they cant - what would they do it with??) and will only drag out this reminder of national humiliation every now and again to remind the sheeple why their political opponents on whose watch it happened, why they are not fit to be elected again for a generation.
I reckon it'll happen sometime between 2015 and 2017. Just call it a gut feeling.
All they need to do is take MPA.
And for that, all you need is one or two ships, dont even have to be armed.
One or two other military aircraft with good endurance, dont have to be armed.
And, two Hercs, at most three, or similar aircraft of similar size, packed with their best commandos and pilots who are capable of flying at very low level.
And reasonably reliable intel about where significant elements of the RIC are.
Thats all it would take.
One surprise commando raid on MPA and Mare Harbour.
And, when you've secured the airfield, you bring in a couple of airliners with reinforcements. The British government hasnt even got the stomach to expel Abu Qatada let alone shoot down a 707 or two packed with Argentine troops.
Once disembarked, the troops fan out and mop up any resistance from the FIDF and RIC in the field. As soon as the situation is clearly lost, there is no way that COBRA will demand a suicide mission from those that are left. The order would go out to surrender.
Woodward and Thompson both concur and are on record to that effect. You dont need subs, you dont need destroyers, you dont need aircraft carriers, you dont even need Mirages.
If we lose MPA, we lose the Islands. End of.
We are absolutely in no position whatsoever to retake the islands by force - we dont have the tools, we dont have the people, we dont have the leaders or the national will and it'll take probably about 10 years of re-arming & retraining of capabilities that have been lost, by which time 90% of the sheeple will have forgotten about where the Falklands are and will find it very difficult to give a f**k.
It will bring down the UK Government of the day and whoever succeeds them will sweep the whole bloody lot under the carpet, not attempt to re-take the Islands (they cant - what would they do it with??) and will only drag out this reminder of national humiliation every now and again to remind the sheeple why their political opponents on whose watch it happened, why they are not fit to be elected again for a generation.
I reckon it'll happen sometime between 2015 and 2017. Just call it a gut feeling.
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So, following on, the two ships are seen by the submarine force in the area and warned off, they don't take any notice and are sunk. Everyone placed on high alert, first sign of aircraft approaching, Rapier, or other, missiles take them out, MPA remains secure and aircraft are launched.
707s turn back, invasion cancelled, street parties arranged to cover up yet another Argentinian SNAFU.
707s turn back, invasion cancelled, street parties arranged to cover up yet another Argentinian SNAFU.
while 'airline commando raid' scenario has some holes, lets not forget that there is not always an SSN on station. most of the time, yes, theres one somewhere south of Ascession, but that does not equate to there being an SSN 100 miles west of the FI 24/365 by a long shot. just because the Daily Mail says it, doesn't mean its true.
moreover, while plan 'A' may be a good plan, there is no - and without embarked fixed wing aviation - cannot be a plan 'B' if plan 'A' turns out to be not quite as well thought through as we thought. we aren't that clever, and we should remember that.
personally, i find the current status of their military, and as importantly, the political intelligence about the relationship between CFK and the military, and CFK's concerns about handing the Argentine military political rehabilitation by initiating military action, fairly comforting - however, i accept that despite having a brain the size of a planet, that i could be wrong, that views/circumstances may change, that the 'in their place' judgement call about risks and benefits to initiating action may be incorrect.
we should, imv, always remember that theirs is a political system the like of which is utterly foreign to us - it is not appropriate to use our system and our understanding of what is and is not politically wise to make judgements about what they might or might not do, and the risks they may or may not be prepared to run, and indeed to attempt to determine what they actually want to achieve.
such things mean that we should be very cautious about deciding that just because objectively our military capability in/around the Islands is some way ahead of their capability to attack the Islands, that they will take the same view, or that they would view glorious military defeat as political defeat.
moreover, while plan 'A' may be a good plan, there is no - and without embarked fixed wing aviation - cannot be a plan 'B' if plan 'A' turns out to be not quite as well thought through as we thought. we aren't that clever, and we should remember that.
personally, i find the current status of their military, and as importantly, the political intelligence about the relationship between CFK and the military, and CFK's concerns about handing the Argentine military political rehabilitation by initiating military action, fairly comforting - however, i accept that despite having a brain the size of a planet, that i could be wrong, that views/circumstances may change, that the 'in their place' judgement call about risks and benefits to initiating action may be incorrect.
we should, imv, always remember that theirs is a political system the like of which is utterly foreign to us - it is not appropriate to use our system and our understanding of what is and is not politically wise to make judgements about what they might or might not do, and the risks they may or may not be prepared to run, and indeed to attempt to determine what they actually want to achieve.
such things mean that we should be very cautious about deciding that just because objectively our military capability in/around the Islands is some way ahead of their capability to attack the Islands, that they will take the same view, or that they would view glorious military defeat as political defeat.
Parabellum.
if you believe that a British PM would order an RN SSN to sink an Argentine civilian ship approaching the FI, outside a period of war, then you really need to check whether you're putting sugar on your cornflakes, and not crack cocaine.
my own view is that the airliner theory has the massive flaw of having to land at MPA or Stanley, both places where a landing aircraft can very quickly be surrounded by lots of men armed with belt-fed weapons. however a civilian rustbucket that lands a group of political activists and media at a remote bay on West Falkland and sets up a 'las Malvinas camp' would not only be far less likely to be interdicted whilst getting there/setting up, but would not justify being machine-gunned into the water, and would be a major propaganda victory for CFK, and a defeat for FIG because a) it would 'show' that the FI was empty of people (something of an accepted truth in Argentina), and b) that there aren't enough civil poliemen on the islands to enforce an eviction/arrest, and that they'd have to rely of hairy squaddies - all on live TV.
if you believe that a British PM would order an RN SSN to sink an Argentine civilian ship approaching the FI, outside a period of war, then you really need to check whether you're putting sugar on your cornflakes, and not crack cocaine.
my own view is that the airliner theory has the massive flaw of having to land at MPA or Stanley, both places where a landing aircraft can very quickly be surrounded by lots of men armed with belt-fed weapons. however a civilian rustbucket that lands a group of political activists and media at a remote bay on West Falkland and sets up a 'las Malvinas camp' would not only be far less likely to be interdicted whilst getting there/setting up, but would not justify being machine-gunned into the water, and would be a major propaganda victory for CFK, and a defeat for FIG because a) it would 'show' that the FI was empty of people (something of an accepted truth in Argentina), and b) that there aren't enough civil poliemen on the islands to enforce an eviction/arrest, and that they'd have to rely of hairy squaddies - all on live TV.
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civilian ship
Last edited by parabellum; 5th Dec 2012 at 21:48.
the point would be that against Typhoon, whatever the current APT(S) ship is, and possibly an SSN, that an Argentine naval vessel is effectively unarmed, and a civilian vessel has the advantage over a naval vessel that it won't be sunk.
two ships, same capability, one will be fired on, one won't - which would you use?
two ships, same capability, one will be fired on, one won't - which would you use?
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Arriving at MPA they are quite ready to shoot you for taking a picture of the old rustbucket VC-10 that is parked in the same place as it is on Google earth every day -
I just can't see how you can deplane enough people quickly from a commercial airliner to capture MPA - it's bloody enormous
and anything like a Herc would be spotted a longgg way away - they do have radar on the tops of the hills lads.........
I just can't see how you can deplane enough people quickly from a commercial airliner to capture MPA - it's bloody enormous
and anything like a Herc would be spotted a longgg way away - they do have radar on the tops of the hills lads.........
Originally Posted by Dwardy01
The Endurance replacement would need two helos to provide mutual SAR. With the demise of the Mk 3 Lynx the organic aviation task could not be executed by the military. The Navy don't have enough Mk 8 SRU Lynx to man the Grey Fleet, Merlin is too big and expensive for the Ice Patrol task and with Seaking going in 2016 that would only leave Wildcat and the Navy is unlikely to use any of their allocated 28 in that role. No helos in Antartica has a massive effect on British Antarctic Survey tasking and ultimately a lack of influence in Antarctica.
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Without the flood Endurance would have been available until 2015 and the 3 x Mk 3 ICE Lynx would have probably supported her until then on a stand alone maintenance support package, meaning the the last trained crews (air and ground) would have extented to see her out of service operating on the bespoke ICE release to service. After 2015 it was always going to be hard to justify the military/aviation ice patrol for the reasons stated above. The flood just shifted everything left.
Off topic the flight then moved onto the Carrier/Ocean as HDS support and flew a shed load of hours in that role. I'm not sure anybody has thought of how we are going to support that role when Wildcat arrives and the Seaking/Lynx has gone?
Off topic the flight then moved onto the Carrier/Ocean as HDS support and flew a shed load of hours in that role. I'm not sure anybody has thought of how we are going to support that role when Wildcat arrives and the Seaking/Lynx has gone?
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Dont count on it Harry. 
There are ways and means. Have seen our own Hercs do it on exercise down there often enough.
And remember, its not like Afghan.... not everyone at MPA is tooled up, all of the time.
There are ways and means. Have seen our own Hercs do it on exercise down there often enough.And remember, its not like Afghan.... not everyone at MPA is tooled up, all of the time.
Last edited by Jabba_TG12; 8th Dec 2012 at 17:58.
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The FFA has 5 C-130H - if they are all working, which I doubt , that's a total lift of circa 300 troops.
A company of infantry at MPA is circa 250 men plus another 1000 odds & sodds
I think it would be hide-and-seek for a couple of days but how would the FAA be resupplied?
A company of infantry at MPA is circa 250 men plus another 1000 odds & sodds
I think it would be hide-and-seek for a couple of days but how would the FAA be resupplied?
HH
I believe that when South Vietnam was being overrun by the North, and many South Vietnamese were fleeing for their lives, a South Vietnamese Hercules aircraft flew with about 300 people on board....
My point is, 60 people per aircraft is a standard load, if you're gambling and throwing the dice, why not overload aircraft that may well not be coming back anyway, or you already plan to disable on the runway to block it....
If you could put say 500 specialist armed troops, in one compact fighting unit rather than spread out, on MPA in one go, then you can have a considerable impact. Take the airfield, and hold it, or at least render it unusable, for say 48 hours, and you have immediate air superiority and time to follow up with amphibious landings opposed only by whatever the RN has left down there (probably one frigate).
That's not even taking into account any pre infiltrated SF units which might help your initial air assault succeed...
I haven't been to the Falklands for many years, so am only going on second hand information, but it is hardly "Fortress Falklands", no routine carriage of arms (no doubt all correctly locked up in armouries), accompanied tours, married quarters, etc. Is there a mind set down there still that it is potentially vulnerable, or is it another Singapore scenario?
An Argentine assault on the islands might work, it might not, but if you're a gambler maybe you have little to lose?
I believe that when South Vietnam was being overrun by the North, and many South Vietnamese were fleeing for their lives, a South Vietnamese Hercules aircraft flew with about 300 people on board....
My point is, 60 people per aircraft is a standard load, if you're gambling and throwing the dice, why not overload aircraft that may well not be coming back anyway, or you already plan to disable on the runway to block it....
If you could put say 500 specialist armed troops, in one compact fighting unit rather than spread out, on MPA in one go, then you can have a considerable impact. Take the airfield, and hold it, or at least render it unusable, for say 48 hours, and you have immediate air superiority and time to follow up with amphibious landings opposed only by whatever the RN has left down there (probably one frigate).
That's not even taking into account any pre infiltrated SF units which might help your initial air assault succeed...
I haven't been to the Falklands for many years, so am only going on second hand information, but it is hardly "Fortress Falklands", no routine carriage of arms (no doubt all correctly locked up in armouries), accompanied tours, married quarters, etc. Is there a mind set down there still that it is potentially vulnerable, or is it another Singapore scenario?
An Argentine assault on the islands might work, it might not, but if you're a gambler maybe you have little to lose?
Last edited by Biggus; 9th Dec 2012 at 09:53.