Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers".
flipflopman RB199/romeo bravo/4mastacker
Thanks for that. Perhaps the spares issue explains the disagreement here?
Neartheend
Banter - is that all the RN has left?
Anyway, back on topic properly - did HM Government think of the effects on the UK's international influence? Was there a strategy? This evidence given to the Defence Commitee may make you wonder: THE SDSR AND THE NSS
Vice-Admiral Blackham:...On the matter of the Harrier, I think it is much more complicated. It is important to understand - I fear that some of my naval colleagues have slightly confused this issue - that we are talking about an RAF aeroplane, not a naval one. This is the aircraft procured by the RAF for close air support, now the GR9. Interestingly, the Americans off Libya have used the AV-8B, which is the equivalent aircraft, as the aircraft of choice in preference for the work that they are doing in Libya. They have a ship - the Kearsarge - between 50 and 100 miles off Libya and able, therefore, to generate a sortie rate, as the professor has said, which is vastly in excess of anything that can be generated either from the UK or, indeed, from the airbases ashore in Europe, which are rather further away than that.
By removing that capability, we have removed our ability to get up close and dirty and do things at a high sortie rate, which is a pity. I understand - it is common ground in the Ministry of Defence - that the decision to get rid of the Harrier and retain the Tornado, which was a reversal of a previous position in the early days of the SDSR, costs about £5 billion across 10 years. That by itself is not the only argument for reversing the decision, but it certainly makes your eyes water. I cannot compare the capability of the two aircraft; I am sure that Andrew Brookes can do that much better than I. All I would say is that we need to remember that the Harrier was procured for precisely the purpose of giving close air support to troops on the ground, as the aircraft of choice for that purpose.
More importantly, the loss of the Harrier means that there is now no fixed-wing aviation going off aircraft carriers in the United Kingdom. There will not now be until the Joint Strike Fighter arrives, unless we buy another aircraft. So there is going to be a gap of between 12 and 14 years, when there will be no aviation off decks at sea.
We also need to understand that the CVF - the future carrier - is on a wholly different scale of operation from that conducted by the Invincible class. The last time we did this sort of thing was in 1978, with the previous Ark Royal. Rather than be retained, the range of skills would have to be generated from scratch. The use of steam catapults and all that implies would have to be generated from scratch and all this is with a 10 or 14-year gap, when everybody who knows anything about it will have left the Navy. Indeed, they are leaving now.
If we wish to maintain carrier aviation - there are strong arguments either way and you will not be surprised to hear that, on the whole, I agree with the professor about its value - we are setting about it in a very curious way and making it extremely difficult. It certainly means that it will take longer to do than we currently envisage. I do not follow the logic of that.
If we think that an aircraft carrier is a strategic requirement for the United Kingdom - which is what the SDSR says on page 23 and it then explains what it can do in the world in 2023, which the NSS tells us we cannot possibly predict - how on earth do we not need to maintain the skills now, first to deploy the same sort of capability at a lower level, and secondly to maintain the ability to generate it when the time comes? I think we have given ourselves an enormous problem for a Navy that may well have only 20,000 or 21,000 people by then. Remember that 7,000 or 8,000 of the numbers given are Royal Marines. This is a terrific burden to put on top of a small force at a time when it will have lost the skills. So I think if we really intend to maintain carrier aviation, we are setting about it in a very curious way.
Q499 Mr Havard: Do you think that it was perhaps unwise to get rid of all the Harriers all at once-maybe retain some of them that operate off the amphibious ships to help plug this capability gap in between? Do you think that that is a recoverable thing?
Vice-Admiral Blackham: We have Illustrious, which has just come out of refit this week, I think, and will be able to be in service for quite a long time yet, if we wanted to do that. So it would have been possible to keep a ship that was prepared, ready and able. Temporary detachments to other ships work, but they are not the real thing. It would be very difficult to maintain the skills that way. What I am saying is that we have allowed short-term considerations - because the SDSR is dominated by short-term considerations - to undermine our long-term vision. That seems to me to be anything but strategic.
Thanks for that. Perhaps the spares issue explains the disagreement here?
Neartheend
Banter - is that all the RN has left?
Anyway, back on topic properly - did HM Government think of the effects on the UK's international influence? Was there a strategy? This evidence given to the Defence Commitee may make you wonder: THE SDSR AND THE NSS
Vice-Admiral Blackham:...On the matter of the Harrier, I think it is much more complicated. It is important to understand - I fear that some of my naval colleagues have slightly confused this issue - that we are talking about an RAF aeroplane, not a naval one. This is the aircraft procured by the RAF for close air support, now the GR9. Interestingly, the Americans off Libya have used the AV-8B, which is the equivalent aircraft, as the aircraft of choice in preference for the work that they are doing in Libya. They have a ship - the Kearsarge - between 50 and 100 miles off Libya and able, therefore, to generate a sortie rate, as the professor has said, which is vastly in excess of anything that can be generated either from the UK or, indeed, from the airbases ashore in Europe, which are rather further away than that.
By removing that capability, we have removed our ability to get up close and dirty and do things at a high sortie rate, which is a pity. I understand - it is common ground in the Ministry of Defence - that the decision to get rid of the Harrier and retain the Tornado, which was a reversal of a previous position in the early days of the SDSR, costs about £5 billion across 10 years. That by itself is not the only argument for reversing the decision, but it certainly makes your eyes water. I cannot compare the capability of the two aircraft; I am sure that Andrew Brookes can do that much better than I. All I would say is that we need to remember that the Harrier was procured for precisely the purpose of giving close air support to troops on the ground, as the aircraft of choice for that purpose.
More importantly, the loss of the Harrier means that there is now no fixed-wing aviation going off aircraft carriers in the United Kingdom. There will not now be until the Joint Strike Fighter arrives, unless we buy another aircraft. So there is going to be a gap of between 12 and 14 years, when there will be no aviation off decks at sea.
We also need to understand that the CVF - the future carrier - is on a wholly different scale of operation from that conducted by the Invincible class. The last time we did this sort of thing was in 1978, with the previous Ark Royal. Rather than be retained, the range of skills would have to be generated from scratch. The use of steam catapults and all that implies would have to be generated from scratch and all this is with a 10 or 14-year gap, when everybody who knows anything about it will have left the Navy. Indeed, they are leaving now.
If we wish to maintain carrier aviation - there are strong arguments either way and you will not be surprised to hear that, on the whole, I agree with the professor about its value - we are setting about it in a very curious way and making it extremely difficult. It certainly means that it will take longer to do than we currently envisage. I do not follow the logic of that.
If we think that an aircraft carrier is a strategic requirement for the United Kingdom - which is what the SDSR says on page 23 and it then explains what it can do in the world in 2023, which the NSS tells us we cannot possibly predict - how on earth do we not need to maintain the skills now, first to deploy the same sort of capability at a lower level, and secondly to maintain the ability to generate it when the time comes? I think we have given ourselves an enormous problem for a Navy that may well have only 20,000 or 21,000 people by then. Remember that 7,000 or 8,000 of the numbers given are Royal Marines. This is a terrific burden to put on top of a small force at a time when it will have lost the skills. So I think if we really intend to maintain carrier aviation, we are setting about it in a very curious way.
Q499 Mr Havard: Do you think that it was perhaps unwise to get rid of all the Harriers all at once-maybe retain some of them that operate off the amphibious ships to help plug this capability gap in between? Do you think that that is a recoverable thing?
Vice-Admiral Blackham: We have Illustrious, which has just come out of refit this week, I think, and will be able to be in service for quite a long time yet, if we wanted to do that. So it would have been possible to keep a ship that was prepared, ready and able. Temporary detachments to other ships work, but they are not the real thing. It would be very difficult to maintain the skills that way. What I am saying is that we have allowed short-term considerations - because the SDSR is dominated by short-term considerations - to undermine our long-term vision. That seems to me to be anything but strategic.
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WEBF - Why is it that that any post that doesn't fit in with your rhetoric gets dismissed as not being properly on topic. Anyway, what my factual but tongue in cheek post was trying to highlight was how low the FAA is going to to try and save themselves. My reliable sources tell me, god now I sound like Mr Ward, it went well beyond banter. Sad that thats the best the FAA can do!! Surprisingly, the more mature AEOs are now recognising that it wasn't the RAF that did for them, but their very own senior, war canoe focused, management.
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Nearthend
"it went well beyond banter"
What did they say?
ps when you cut and paste a word like "rhetoric" to make sure you get the spelling correct, it is usually best to check the font/size/colour........
"it went well beyond banter"
What did they say?
ps when you cut and paste a word like "rhetoric" to make sure you get the spelling correct, it is usually best to check the font/size/colour........
Nevermind the spelling/font/colour - why did you dismiss all of Vice Admiral Blackham's comments as rhetoric? Do you not think that when retired RN bods speak of the process of getting CVF into service as being made much harder by a ten year gap. they might have a point (along these lines)?
As for Libya: is NATO blinking first? The author of this article from Reuters seems to think so:
"The elephant in the room is the imminent departure of the French carrier, given it has been flying 30-40 percent of all NATO strike sorties," said Tim Ripley, of Jane's Defense Weekly.
"It's a looming problem, so sustaining this operation, particularly if it's going to grind past September or October, is going to be a problem."
In the absence of other allies coming forward with strike aircraft that could be flown from land bases -- which would necessitate a fleet of refueling tankers only the United States could provide -- one radical solution would be for Britain to redeploy decommissioned Harrier aircraft to its carrier HMS Illustrious, which was designated for conversion into a helicopter ship in Britain's defense review.
However, even if such a tricky political decision were taken by British Prime Minister David Cameron, it would be up to four months before the ship was ready for action, Ripley said.
A senior NATO commander conceded the extent of the worry on Tuesday. French General Stephane Abrial said the Libyan crisis had come as "a surprise" and if it were to last a long time "the resources issue will become critical."
Even the Guardian gets it: Defence review: a foresight saga
Consider Libya. The evacuation of UK citizens relied on a frigate that was due to be scrapped. The government was forced to extend the life of two Nimrods despite repeated assurances that such surveillance capability was unnecessary. Operations have involved Tornado jets, whose numbers are set to be reduced. France has a carrier off the coast of Libya, ours is on sale online. Contradicting the defence secretary, the head of the navy has said that deploying a carrier in Libya would have made the operation more reactive and cheaper.
The defence review did not plan for two missions exceeding six months. As service chiefs have warned, if Libya lasts beyond September, capabilities may have to be redeployed from standing commitments. All this as we prepare for another, perhaps sharper, round of cuts.
And...
A full assessment of the impact of the Arab spring on UK security, the resultant threats we face, our response at home and abroad and the capabilities required should form a new chapter to the defence review. This is not about looking backwards, but about turning hindsight into foresight.
If the crisis in Libya had happened before the SDSR, would the outcomes have been the same? Is the refusal to look at SDSR again compatible with the desire to make MOD more responsive? Ever heard of the OODA cycle?
On a more positive note, HMS Liverpool has once again used her 4.5 inch gun sucessfully.
As for Libya: is NATO blinking first? The author of this article from Reuters seems to think so:
"The elephant in the room is the imminent departure of the French carrier, given it has been flying 30-40 percent of all NATO strike sorties," said Tim Ripley, of Jane's Defense Weekly.
"It's a looming problem, so sustaining this operation, particularly if it's going to grind past September or October, is going to be a problem."
In the absence of other allies coming forward with strike aircraft that could be flown from land bases -- which would necessitate a fleet of refueling tankers only the United States could provide -- one radical solution would be for Britain to redeploy decommissioned Harrier aircraft to its carrier HMS Illustrious, which was designated for conversion into a helicopter ship in Britain's defense review.
However, even if such a tricky political decision were taken by British Prime Minister David Cameron, it would be up to four months before the ship was ready for action, Ripley said.
A senior NATO commander conceded the extent of the worry on Tuesday. French General Stephane Abrial said the Libyan crisis had come as "a surprise" and if it were to last a long time "the resources issue will become critical."
Even the Guardian gets it: Defence review: a foresight saga
Consider Libya. The evacuation of UK citizens relied on a frigate that was due to be scrapped. The government was forced to extend the life of two Nimrods despite repeated assurances that such surveillance capability was unnecessary. Operations have involved Tornado jets, whose numbers are set to be reduced. France has a carrier off the coast of Libya, ours is on sale online. Contradicting the defence secretary, the head of the navy has said that deploying a carrier in Libya would have made the operation more reactive and cheaper.
The defence review did not plan for two missions exceeding six months. As service chiefs have warned, if Libya lasts beyond September, capabilities may have to be redeployed from standing commitments. All this as we prepare for another, perhaps sharper, round of cuts.
And...
A full assessment of the impact of the Arab spring on UK security, the resultant threats we face, our response at home and abroad and the capabilities required should form a new chapter to the defence review. This is not about looking backwards, but about turning hindsight into foresight.
If the crisis in Libya had happened before the SDSR, would the outcomes have been the same? Is the refusal to look at SDSR again compatible with the desire to make MOD more responsive? Ever heard of the OODA cycle?
On a more positive note, HMS Liverpool has once again used her 4.5 inch gun sucessfully.
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Decision to axe Harrier is "bonkers"
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On a more positive note, HMS Liverpool has once again used her 4.5 inch gun sucessfully.
So they missed then.
WELL DONE. <sarcasm on>
<and off>
"Several shots across the bow from the Portsmouth-based destroyer’s 4.5in gun sent the boats scurrying for the relative safety of harbour. "
So they missed then.
WELL DONE. <sarcasm on> <and off>
So they missed then.
WELL DONE. <sarcasm on>
<and off>
I had the dubious pleasure of attending TLP at Florrenes, Belgium in June 1991 where Mr Sharkey Ward & his "associates" arrived for just 2 days with their harriers. They proceeded to drain the bar of all alcohol, were loud & a total bunch of bragging loud-mouthed pratts.
Not an impressive man.....
Not an impressive man.....
I had the dubious pleasure of attending TLP at Florrenes, Belgium in June 1991 where Mr Sharkey Ward & his "associates" arrived for just 2 days with their harriers. They proceeded to drain the bar of all alcohol, were loud & a total bunch of bragging loud-mouthed pratts.
Not an impressive man.....
Not an impressive man.....
Q. How do you know there is a pilot at your party?
A. He'll tell you.
A. He'll tell you.
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Mr Wards name came up in conversation between 2 old and bold 'ship mates' of his from his Phantom/SHAR days. One commented 'the sad thing is that he wasn't a particularly good FJ pilot' another comment was that 'Sharkeys like a typical Harrier comms problem....Tx tends to be loud and garbled and theres not much in the way of Rx'.
Nothing like a bit of spiteful character assassination to perk up your day, is there?
(Especially when you disagree with the subject's views
)
(Especially when you disagree with the subject's views
)Wikipedia: Commander Nigel "Sharkey" Ward DSC, AFC, RN
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FOD Plod - Not sure how that was meant to be taken however you only have to look at Sharkeys website to see who the grand master of spiteful character assassination really is. People really can't have it both ways 
!!
!!
FOD Plod - Not sure how that was meant to be taken however you only have to look at Sharkeys website to see who the grand master of spiteful character assassination really is. People really can't have it both ways !!
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"
A very highly experienced naval aviator, Commodore Neill Thomas CBE DSC, has clear memories of this active combat embarkation: “I had the pleasure of briefing and leading the RAF on a familiarisation sortie. They had been briefed in depth on ship procedures etc. The task was simple – launch for a 1hr 10min sortie with a fixed recovery time. The sortie included a familiarisation of the area around the fleet, some simple ship controlled intercepts followed by a couple of practice air combat manoeuvring engagements. Fuel management which is critical at sea was strongly emphasised and briefed thoroughly. In spite of my careful briefing, I had to take the RAF Harriers back to the ship after just 40 minutes because one pilot in particular had allowed himself to run short of fuel – the others were not much better. And these were experienced Harrier pilots! As far as I remember, the attitude of the pilot concerned (supported to some extent by at least one of the others) was not one of wishing to integrate properly into the carrier weapon system but that ‘the Fleet Air Arm was allowing the ship to impose undesirable restrictions on their operations’. This is backed up by Squadron Leader Pook who stated rather naïvely in his book[8] that the FAA knew nothing about flying or operation from ships at sea and needed RAF input to improve.”
The Royal Navy ethos obviously did not suit Pook or his colleagues. In the synopsis to his book, he remarks: “Very soon after starting operations from the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes the squadron realised that they were considered as more or less expendable ordnance. The Harriers lacked the most basic self-protection aids and were up against 10,000 well-armed troops who put up an impressive weight of fire whenever attacked.” There were no such complaints from the Sea Harrier aircrew embarked in HMS Hermes. In total, they conducted many more ground attack missions than did the RAF Harrier and early on suffered the tragic loss of Lieutenant Nick Taylor at low level over Goose Green. This was an expected and inevitable result of engaging in combat operations and was something that the RAF pilots appeared to be ill-prepared for."
Good enough? Or do you want some more................
A very highly experienced naval aviator, Commodore Neill Thomas CBE DSC, has clear memories of this active combat embarkation: “I had the pleasure of briefing and leading the RAF on a familiarisation sortie. They had been briefed in depth on ship procedures etc. The task was simple – launch for a 1hr 10min sortie with a fixed recovery time. The sortie included a familiarisation of the area around the fleet, some simple ship controlled intercepts followed by a couple of practice air combat manoeuvring engagements. Fuel management which is critical at sea was strongly emphasised and briefed thoroughly. In spite of my careful briefing, I had to take the RAF Harriers back to the ship after just 40 minutes because one pilot in particular had allowed himself to run short of fuel – the others were not much better. And these were experienced Harrier pilots! As far as I remember, the attitude of the pilot concerned (supported to some extent by at least one of the others) was not one of wishing to integrate properly into the carrier weapon system but that ‘the Fleet Air Arm was allowing the ship to impose undesirable restrictions on their operations’. This is backed up by Squadron Leader Pook who stated rather naïvely in his book[8] that the FAA knew nothing about flying or operation from ships at sea and needed RAF input to improve.”
The Royal Navy ethos obviously did not suit Pook or his colleagues. In the synopsis to his book, he remarks: “Very soon after starting operations from the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes the squadron realised that they were considered as more or less expendable ordnance. The Harriers lacked the most basic self-protection aids and were up against 10,000 well-armed troops who put up an impressive weight of fire whenever attacked.” There were no such complaints from the Sea Harrier aircrew embarked in HMS Hermes. In total, they conducted many more ground attack missions than did the RAF Harrier and early on suffered the tragic loss of Lieutenant Nick Taylor at low level over Goose Green. This was an expected and inevitable result of engaging in combat operations and was something that the RAF pilots appeared to be ill-prepared for."
Good enough? Or do you want some more................
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"These statements clearly showed that neither Air Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, KCB, AFC, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Equipment Capability) representing MoD, but advised presumably by RAF officers, nor Lord Bach had an operational understanding of naval air warfare in the Fleet and in the expeditionary task force operation arena. Nor did they speak honestly about the Sea Harrier operational capability. It was incorrect to say that “… in general terms it offers no protection against sea-skimming missiles… The real issue here is that Sea Harrier does not help against sea-skimming missiles from wherever they are launched.”
Facts rather than convictions had already demonstrated that the Sea Harrier with AMRAAM represented the only Fleet/UK weapon system that was specifically designed to counter the sea-skimming missile threat; and it was very capable of doing so with a probability of kill expected of close to 100%."
Slightly off topic - but he does slag Jock off when I wasn't aware AMRAAM could perform an anti-missile role, barring shooting down the a/c it was intended to be launched from. I remain confused. Written in 2002 when the threat would be supersonic ASM's.
Facts rather than convictions had already demonstrated that the Sea Harrier with AMRAAM represented the only Fleet/UK weapon system that was specifically designed to counter the sea-skimming missile threat; and it was very capable of doing so with a probability of kill expected of close to 100%."
Slightly off topic - but he does slag Jock off when I wasn't aware AMRAAM could perform an anti-missile role, barring shooting down the a/c it was intended to be launched from. I remain confused. Written in 2002 when the threat would be supersonic ASM's.
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"After the runway-cratering bomblets have been fully dispensed from the JP233 pod under the Tornado during an attack run, the pod is automatically ejected from the aircraft. When this occurs at very high speed and low level as in a live attack, the aircraft is subjected to an involuntary and substantial upward force of at least 4g. Having no previous experience, the Tornado pilots who delivered JP233 against Iraqi airfields during the Kuwait crisis were not prepared for this. They also attacked at night. When the pod released, the nose of their aircraft was thrown sharply upwards and they were rapidly disoriented; subsequently losing control of their aircraft. Three Tornado crews ejected as a result of this – some presuming that they had been hit by enemy fire. Had the crews been able to experience the release characteristics of the JP233 in practice and by day, they should have survived and returned to base with their expensive aircraft.
These incidents and others reflect a lack of Air Warfare expertise and good management within the RAF system. It is understood from a privileged source that of the eight Tornado GR1/4s lost over Iraq, only one was lost to enemy fire. One of the other losses was the result of a stick of VT fused bombs[18] exploding under the delivery aircraft following release. This is known as the ’laddering effect’ and occurs when too short a ‘safe-arm timer setting’ is set on the bomb arming system. When the first bomb arms too early and the VT Fuse detects the following bomb, it thinks it is close to its target and it explodes. This explosion sets the other bombs off one by one all the way back up to the delivery aircraft. It is a phenomenon well known to Naval Air Warfare Instructors – the benefit of long term Fleet Air Arm air warfare knowledge and combat experience.
Following Kuwait, it was surprising that these unnecessary losses were not brought to the attention of Ministers. Instead, the Royal Air Force PR organisation misrepresented what actually happened and made heroes of the aircrew who went down."
Hey, slag off all RAF aircrew shot down in GW1. And tell lies about JP 233 missions, that have been consistently proven to be, ahem, b*llocks.......
I re-iterate, I respect his record, but he's getting on my nips the last few months......
These incidents and others reflect a lack of Air Warfare expertise and good management within the RAF system. It is understood from a privileged source that of the eight Tornado GR1/4s lost over Iraq, only one was lost to enemy fire. One of the other losses was the result of a stick of VT fused bombs[18] exploding under the delivery aircraft following release. This is known as the ’laddering effect’ and occurs when too short a ‘safe-arm timer setting’ is set on the bomb arming system. When the first bomb arms too early and the VT Fuse detects the following bomb, it thinks it is close to its target and it explodes. This explosion sets the other bombs off one by one all the way back up to the delivery aircraft. It is a phenomenon well known to Naval Air Warfare Instructors – the benefit of long term Fleet Air Arm air warfare knowledge and combat experience.
Following Kuwait, it was surprising that these unnecessary losses were not brought to the attention of Ministers. Instead, the Royal Air Force PR organisation misrepresented what actually happened and made heroes of the aircrew who went down."
Hey, slag off all RAF aircrew shot down in GW1. And tell lies about JP 233 missions, that have been consistently proven to be, ahem, b*llocks.......
I re-iterate, I respect his record, but he's getting on my nips the last few months......
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More fibs, this time about F3 Tornado:-
"Its radar, when finally made to work, remained incapable of directing its AMRAAM BVR weapon system. If a BVR attack was launched by a Tornado F3, it would present only low probability of success on a broadside-salvo basis with no control of the missile whilst in flight towards the target. This would present a serious risk of the missiles destroying friendly aircraft."
"Its radar, when finally made to work, remained incapable of directing its AMRAAM BVR weapon system. If a BVR attack was launched by a Tornado F3, it would present only low probability of success on a broadside-salvo basis with no control of the missile whilst in flight towards the target. This would present a serious risk of the missiles destroying friendly aircraft."