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A very highly experienced naval aviator, Commodore Neill Thomas CBE DSC, has clear memories of this active combat embarkation: “I had the pleasure of briefing and leading the RAF on a familiarisation sortie. They had been briefed in depth on ship procedures etc. The task was simple – launch for a 1hr 10min sortie with a fixed recovery time. The sortie included a familiarisation of the area around the fleet, some simple ship controlled intercepts followed by a couple of practice air combat manoeuvring engagements. Fuel management which is critical at sea was strongly emphasised and briefed thoroughly. In spite of my careful briefing, I had to take the RAF Harriers back to the ship after just 40 minutes because one pilot in particular had allowed himself to run short of fuel – the others were not much better. And these were experienced Harrier pilots! As far as I remember, the attitude of the pilot concerned (supported to some extent by at least one of the others) was not one of wishing to integrate properly into the carrier weapon system but that ‘the Fleet Air Arm was allowing the ship to impose undesirable restrictions on their operations’. This is backed up by Squadron Leader Pook who stated rather naïvely in his book[8] that the FAA knew nothing about flying or operation from ships at sea and needed RAF input to improve.”
The Royal Navy ethos obviously did not suit Pook or his colleagues. In the synopsis to his book, he remarks: “Very soon after starting operations from the aircraft carrier HMS Hermes the squadron realised that they were considered as more or less expendable ordnance. The Harriers lacked the most basic self-protection aids and were up against 10,000 well-armed troops who put up an impressive weight of fire whenever attacked.” There were no such complaints from the Sea Harrier aircrew embarked in HMS Hermes. In total, they conducted many more ground attack missions than did the RAF Harrier and early on suffered the tragic loss of Lieutenant Nick Taylor at low level over Goose Green. This was an expected and inevitable result of engaging in combat operations and was something that the RAF pilots appeared to be ill-prepared for."
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