F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
I was particularly impressed with Glad Rag's last quoted article New F-35 Fighter Jet is vulnerable to cyber-attacks - Cyberwarzone
For instance,
and even better
Obviously a highly literate publication.
airsound
For instance,
the F-35 Figther Jet
The United States Armed Forces are developed a New F-35 Fighter Jet
airsound
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Strawman abound however.
Oh btw, is there anyone here who is old enough to remember the "fun and games" involved when SEMA first came online on the Tornado units???
Despite that electronic system, the paper based 700's were retained as primary reference, now is this the case with this F-35 aircraft???
Oh btw, is there anyone here who is old enough to remember the "fun and games" involved when SEMA first came online on the Tornado units???
Despite that electronic system, the paper based 700's were retained as primary reference, now is this the case with this F-35 aircraft???
Last edited by glad rag; 27th Dec 2015 at 18:52.
I think you'll find the S in SLOC stands for Source, not Software. Development software will typically extend over more lines due to readability for future revisions.
In the final "software", the term "Line" doesn't really have much meaning.
To get up to 24 million lines you'd have to count a lot of off board code as well as the internal aircraft systems.
In the final "software", the term "Line" doesn't really have much meaning.
To get up to 24 million lines you'd have to count a lot of off board code as well as the internal aircraft systems.
Originally Posted by LO
Yes, but that's only a CSG - no comparison to the mighty firepower and range of six AV-8Bs.
BTW this part of the quoted article suggests that was a CVN free period:
In October, the last naval aviation missions in support of OIR were conducted from USS Essex (LHD 2).
Hence my point about the value of shipborne STOVL stands.
Also VMM? Thought USMC Harrier units were VMFA?
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I am, I freely admit, not particularly computer savvy, so I went and asked my brother who just happens to be a reasonably well known in the industry white hat hacker or "pentester" as the article put it.
What he said was "You can set up connections that an attacker cannot piggy back on, yes - data-only information pathways - however if the system is set up like that, an attacker could still........."
I won't tell you what he thought they might be able to do in case it gives anybody ideas, but essentially, the idea that a hacker could make the aircraft fall out of the sky is bogus with an even moderately well set up system, however they could possibly cause havoc with the logistical system on the ground if they got entry.
The thrust of the overly dramatic article suggesting that F35 is going to be falling out of the sky due to hackers targeting ALIS is, as I stated earlier, b@llocks.
He finished by saying "But one of the core ways to check that you have implemented it correctly is to use penetrating testing :-)"
But then he would say that, wouldn't he.
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Tourist, did you actually read the article? The only bit of drama seems to be coming from you. It is quite clear the issue under threat is the logistics system, not the software that controls the ac (although that threat level may rise in future).
The point is as LO has said, you don't need to have a hack to bring aircraft down whilst flying, you just don't allow them to fly in the first place.
The point is as LO has said, you don't need to have a hack to bring aircraft down whilst flying, you just don't allow them to fly in the first place.
WE Branch Fanatic
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Yes, but that's only a CSG - no comparison to the mighty firepower and range of six AV-8Bs.
US amphibious ships can carry up to twenty jets in a secondary strike role. Why do you think she (Kearsarge) only has six embarked?
BTW this part of the quoted article suggests that was a CVN free period:
In October, the last naval aviation missions in support of OIR were conducted from USS Essex (LHD 2).
Hence my point about the value of shipborne STOVL stands.
Also VMM? Thought USMC Harrier units were VMFA?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Yes, but that's only a CSG - no comparison to the mighty firepower and range of six AV-8Bs.
US amphibious ships can carry up to twenty jets in a secondary strike role. Why do you think she (Kearsarge) only has six embarked?
BTW this part of the quoted article suggests that was a CVN free period:
In October, the last naval aviation missions in support of OIR were conducted from USS Essex (LHD 2).
Hence my point about the value of shipborne STOVL stands.
Also VMM? Thought USMC Harrier units were VMFA?
WE, the Kearsage is a part of a Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) with a Marine Expiditionary Unit (MEU) emparked. The normal complement of the MEU airwing will include Harriers, MV-22, CH-53's, UH-1, and AH-1 aboard the LHD and on the other ships in the ARG. Usually 6 Harriers will be deployed.
This is a MEU deployment- not a "Harrier Carrier" deployment.
When the Harriers are deployed as part of a MEU they are attached to a medium helicopter/tiltwing squadron, thus the VMM designation in the article. The medium squadron is the largest squadron in the MEU and now consists of MV-22 (until recently it would have been the CH-46 sqaudron). The whole harrier squadron does not deploy, just a detachment of 6 jets and associated pilots and maintainers. They are adminstratively assigned to the larger helo/tiltwing squadron for the deployment. Sometimes you will see it noted as VMM (reinforced).
Last edited by sandiego89; 28th Dec 2015 at 13:43.
The "Harrier carrier" force on an LHA/LHD is imbalanced because the ship's primary/design mission, which is to carry an air+amphibious mobile force, is massively compromised by the offloading of helicopters. It's even worse on the new America and Tripoli, which (in a display of incredible stupidity) don't have well decks.
In the case of those ships, the well deck has been removed, and the innards arranged with more hangar space, and the ballast tanks associated with the well decks have been replaced with more aviation fuel - all because the V-22 and F-35B are larger than the aircraft they replace. But that leaves inadequate ship-to-shore capacity and later LHAs get the well deck back.
Increasingly, it appears that Marine doctrine is being driven by the need to justify the cost of the weapons, rather than the other way around.
In the case of those ships, the well deck has been removed, and the innards arranged with more hangar space, and the ballast tanks associated with the well decks have been replaced with more aviation fuel - all because the V-22 and F-35B are larger than the aircraft they replace. But that leaves inadequate ship-to-shore capacity and later LHAs get the well deck back.
Increasingly, it appears that Marine doctrine is being driven by the need to justify the cost of the weapons, rather than the other way around.
Last edited by LowObservable; 28th Dec 2015 at 14:53.
LowObservable The "Harrier carrier" force on an LHA/LHD is imbalanced because the ship's primary/design mission, which is to carry an air+amphibious mobile force, is massively compromised by the offloading of helicopters. It's even worse on the new America and Tripoli, which (in a display of incredible stupidity) don't have well decks.
In the case of those ships, the well deck has been removed, and the innards arranged with more hangar space, and the ballast tanks associated with the well decks have been replaced with more aviation fuel - all because the V-22 and F-35B are larger than the aircraft they replace. But that leaves inadequate ship-to-shore capacity and later LHAs get the well deck back.
Increasingly, it appears that Marine doctrine is being driven by the need to justify the cost of the weapons, rather than the other way around.
In the case of those ships, the well deck has been removed, and the innards arranged with more hangar space, and the ballast tanks associated with the well decks have been replaced with more aviation fuel - all because the V-22 and F-35B are larger than the aircraft they replace. But that leaves inadequate ship-to-shore capacity and later LHAs get the well deck back.
Increasingly, it appears that Marine doctrine is being driven by the need to justify the cost of the weapons, rather than the other way around.
It seems they realized the mistake, but I can see how they got there- with the emphasis on longer range maneuver doctrine the focus became more air heavy with the MV-22 and the F-35 being the main focus. Having a ship that could support more aircraft, and operate further away from contested waters made sense at the time to some- especially when there were "only" 10 CVN's in the mix. There have been fewer cases on needing to storm the beach in prior decades, and I think the manuever doctrine folks drank a bit too much kool-aid, and a more balanced approach has returned.
For a dedicated air heavy scenario she might have some utility, but she does seem to be a niche ship that will not be repeated.
The weapons driving the doctrine, or the other way around, is an interesting debate. The Marines have long championed manuever doctrine, and being able to go around or avoid a contested beach or LZ is still very much part of the mix. This helped drive the MV-22, the F-35 and the ultimately cancelled high speed amphibious personell carrrier.
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" Should an enemy hack the ALIS system successfully, they could disable F-35 systems in combat, cause disastrous crashes,"
Yes, I did read the article.
The above quote is pretty clear I thought, and not just over dramatic but b@llocks.
I have no expertise here except in computing but it does strike me that the aspect which would be interesting is how software updates are managed and uploaded. e.g. I have read that the Typhoon uses FPGAs as part of flight control. I can see how it would be tempting to treat software like any other component and manage it from a logistics system, so this means that an attack might e.g. compromise the program for an FPGA associated with the flight control system.
It would be a silly way to attack since it would be discovered after a crash or two and then the usefulness would be at an end. It would obviously be better to introduce more subtle and random problems or even to simply get information about location and availability and not do anything at all.
How feasible? It's almost impossible to defend anything that is widely accessible - not 'forever' and not against 'everyone'. I saw a great lecture the other day about how passwords and cryptography are rarely attacked because there are so many ways around them that are easier. It's a bit like having a very fancy door and the thief enters by taking a couple of tiles off the roof or bribing the cleaner. To a certain extent it's a matter of how persistent and determined the thief is and whether you are the easiest target.
The degree of accessibility (how much of the system is directly or indirectly connected to one person) is the degree to which you have to assume things can go wrong. If they aren't testing it against attack as part of the development process then I assume it is full of holes because my general experience is that whatever isn't tested is definitely broken.
I'm not a security expert, but I am utterly cynical about software security because it's so complicated and difficult that I have never been in a software company that really truly took it seriously (apart from a lot of bull****ting) because if you got super-ultra serious you'd be using an abacus in a locked room underneath a mountain or something like that.
It would be a silly way to attack since it would be discovered after a crash or two and then the usefulness would be at an end. It would obviously be better to introduce more subtle and random problems or even to simply get information about location and availability and not do anything at all.
How feasible? It's almost impossible to defend anything that is widely accessible - not 'forever' and not against 'everyone'. I saw a great lecture the other day about how passwords and cryptography are rarely attacked because there are so many ways around them that are easier. It's a bit like having a very fancy door and the thief enters by taking a couple of tiles off the roof or bribing the cleaner. To a certain extent it's a matter of how persistent and determined the thief is and whether you are the easiest target.
The degree of accessibility (how much of the system is directly or indirectly connected to one person) is the degree to which you have to assume things can go wrong. If they aren't testing it against attack as part of the development process then I assume it is full of holes because my general experience is that whatever isn't tested is definitely broken.
I'm not a security expert, but I am utterly cynical about software security because it's so complicated and difficult that I have never been in a software company that really truly took it seriously (apart from a lot of bull****ting) because if you got super-ultra serious you'd be using an abacus in a locked room underneath a mountain or something like that.
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Radix, I suspect very few people on this forum have a true understanding of ALIS and how it integrates with F-35 at the component/network level.
I agree with the premise that any network is vulnerable to attack but getting into the software that is critical to flight safety and airworthiness is wholly far-fetched.
People forget that even though there is an A in ALIS (and it's Autonomic not Automatic), the thing will be operated and monitored by highly trained professionals who will almost certainly back the online stuff up with separate logistics tracking methods in the early days. Building confidence in the system is still ongoing as we're not at Milestone C and FRP yet. Regardless of the spin on both sides, there are genuinely a lot of dedicated people learning as I type this. I think sometimes that point is lost amongst the top trumps discussions and countless tenuous Dilbert contributions from posters/alter-egos.
I agree with the premise that any network is vulnerable to attack but getting into the software that is critical to flight safety and airworthiness is wholly far-fetched.
People forget that even though there is an A in ALIS (and it's Autonomic not Automatic), the thing will be operated and monitored by highly trained professionals who will almost certainly back the online stuff up with separate logistics tracking methods in the early days. Building confidence in the system is still ongoing as we're not at Milestone C and FRP yet. Regardless of the spin on both sides, there are genuinely a lot of dedicated people learning as I type this. I think sometimes that point is lost amongst the top trumps discussions and countless tenuous Dilbert contributions from posters/alter-egos.
Last edited by MSOCS; 29th Dec 2015 at 09:59.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
the thing will be operated and monitored by highly trained professionals........... I think sometimes that point is lost amongst the top trumps discussions and countless tenuous Dilbert contributions from posters/alter-egos.
F-22 Squadron Shot Down by the International Date Line
Software glitches leave Navy Smart Ship dead in the water
Contractor takes blame for math goof that crashed Mars probe
Oh, and after I left the RAF I worked for 15 years for one of the 3 main US "primes" on projects building military C4I software systems.
Last edited by ORAC; 29th Dec 2015 at 11:33.
