There is a fair bit of apprehension in many forums re supposed vulnerability/survivability of helicopters during combat operations and perhaps some questionable thinking generally re the merits of armed helicopter escort.
Consider this extract from the previously referenced US Army study on Vietnam War operations: ‘Statistics on relative vulnerability (of helicopters) reveal that out of 1,147 sorties, one aircraft would be hit by enemy fire, one aircraft was shot down per 13,461 sorties, and only one aircraft was shot down and lost per 21,194 sorties. Used properly, the helicopter was not the fragile target some doom-forecasters had predicted.’ Some of these statistics resulted from the dubious merit practice of attempting to land troops right on to known enemy held positions via so-called combat air assault.
No. 9 Squadron RAAF operated Iroquois more prudently during 5.5 years of Vietnam involvement flying 237,808 sorties with only 25 aircraft being hit (1:9,512 probability), 3 aircraft shot down (1:79,270) and only 1 lost to ground-fire (1:237,808). Although RPG-style weaponry in particular has improved over the past 40 years, the risk of being hit is still very low depending somewhat on helo operating techniques.
The only aircraft lost by 9SQN to enemy ground-fire was when attempting winching of a Vietnamese soldier who had both legs blown off by a mine. The fighting was still ongoing among rocky outcrops in mountainous terrain when an enemy soldier stepped out from behind an adjacent boulder firing a burst directly into the engine of the hovering Huey. The aircraft fell on to some on the ground beneath and 2 Australians and 1 American perished in the inferno. Bushranger gunships were also involved but could not prevent the shoot-down. Incredibly, the disabled Vietnamese soldier managed to crawl away and is still living.
Another anecdote in the opposite sense. A gentle straight-in approach toward the treeline of a 100 metre diameter clearing to deposit a SAS patrol; virtually stationary and touching down when 4 enemy popped up from behind fallen timber in the middle of the clearing and began engaging us with AK-47s. Swift collective response from our crewman with his M60, SAS on board and supporting US Army charlie model gunships clobbered the opposition. The 4 enemy fired maybe 100 rounds all up at a stationary aircraft, side-on and in clear view at 50 metres range; but amazingly, we did not take a single hit. It is much more difficult to hit a moving aircraft due to a continually changing aiming picture and especially when adrenalin is pumping.
During 4,360 sorties and involvement in 50 engagement scenarios with the opposition, my aircraft was only hit twice; once by a 12.7mm fluke shot when flying at !,500 feet over jungle and by 2 x 7.62mm rounds in another instance during a ground level close-quarters contest.
Some contend the threats in Afghanistan differ from Vietnam. The proliferation of 7.62, 12.7mm and RPGs is similar, but there is a greater MANPAD risk in Afghanistan causing some losses. The necessity in that scenario is of course adjustment of operating practices. Over years, many have said that AC-130 gunships would not survive, but they have done so in multiple theatres against much stronger anti-aircraft threats incurring only minimal losses and they are still one of the most valuable firepower assets in the USAF inventory with the USMC also moving in that direction. War-fighting is a dangerous and risky business and some losses just have to be considered acceptable – it is all part of the warrior game.
Army Aviation generally contends that higher speed attack helos are necessary to escort other battlefield helos like Chinook, but the value of this requirement is overstated. Would escort deter launch of missilery targeting a Chinook or whatever by some doped-up fanatic hoping to be glorified at meeting Allah? Highly unlikely, although the launch site if detected could be belatedly suppressed but not before an aircraft might be downed.
Escort of RAAF Iroquois by gunships in Vietnam mainly applied to special operations roles and the principal value of gunships in troop insertion situations was having them loiter for immediate response to ground actions. Most single aircraft operations were conducted unescorted and battlefield survivability was more about operating methods. I could also enumerate mutliple instances where utility helo door-guns knocked the opposition around appreciably.
Finally; responding to ARH Tiger post #63. Mate; the principal reason Chinooks are being used in Afghanistan for utility helo roles is hot and high performance. If sufficient up-engined Blackhawks and Huey II were available, then much of this very costly effort would not be necessary.
Futuristically, the ADF might at best have 4 of 7 CH-47F available continually to provide for whole of Army's heavy lift needs. We already know that the US Army removed Longbow radar on Apaches so they could carry enough ammunition and the ADF Tiger was accepted with deficient engine performance; so is anybody aware of what operating limitations have been revealed by belated French trialling of the Tiger in Afghanistan? On present indications, both Tiger and MRH90 will be seriously deficient regarding hot and high performance, let alone operating cost penalties.
There are multiple reasons why it would be wise to upgrade all the Iroquois to Huey II or even just leave them stored until the serious operational limitations and cost penalties of the envisaged new ADF helo fleet become glaringly obvious. Army Aviation will likely be very seriously embarrassed through lack of capability downstream if this prudent action is not taken. They should appeal to Minister Combet to exercise commonsense.
Apologies for the hefty post, but I hope it promotes some beneficial discussion.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 16th Jul 2010 at 08:45.