Aussie MRH-90
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Hi slow-n-low; your Post #263 was enlightening and you raised some very interesting points.
A recent 3 man investigation into the dire situation regarding RAN ship maintenance revealed that a prime cause was the Navy's 'can do' culture. Apparently, warships have often been withdrawn from scheduled maintenance/refits to comply with political requirements resulting in snowballing deficiencies and deteriorating operational functionality. According to a serving member source, some vessels on which millions of dollars are now being spent might not see further service.
I was fortunate to serve in an era when many Officers at the operating level (Wing Commander downwards) had significant operational experience and were quite prepared to question the actions of higher authority, if they thought directions imprudent. Seldom did situations emerge where maintenance schedules and planned flying rates of effort were ignored to achieve unwise rates of effort. That was just sensible management of air resources.
These days, the ADF culture seems to be one of career ending sanctions if anybody dares question directions of higher authority. A 'can do' syndrome may have been a reason for instances post-1989 when Army Aviation appreciably overflew planned maintenance capacity resulting in rows of aircraft just pushed aside at times gathering bird****.
A 'just make it work' mantra for Tiger and MRH90 in particular is unlikely to yield adequate levels of capability, as the Air Force proved with the CH-47C despite the comprehensive RAAF engineering resources then existing. The Charlie model Chinook was really a technical dog that ultimately had extensive systems redesign and power plant enhancements in later models.
An aspect of concern with new platforms is the bent of DoD/DMO to involve in hugely costly whole of life maintenance support contracts which might greatly limit ADF flexibility regarding force structure variations for unforeseen reasons. For example, if the MRH90 proves such an expensive dog that it is not worth keeping in service, might there be contractual cost penalties regarding maintenance support no longer required?
I am with you on spending money in the right direction to assure adequate capabilities that can do the job, ergo my advocating progressive optimisation of proven platforms at modest cost. Maintaining adequate and credible military preparedness ought to be the primary goal, enabling of course enough flying to keep all the boys and girls sufficiently proficient for operational employment.
A recent 3 man investigation into the dire situation regarding RAN ship maintenance revealed that a prime cause was the Navy's 'can do' culture. Apparently, warships have often been withdrawn from scheduled maintenance/refits to comply with political requirements resulting in snowballing deficiencies and deteriorating operational functionality. According to a serving member source, some vessels on which millions of dollars are now being spent might not see further service.
I was fortunate to serve in an era when many Officers at the operating level (Wing Commander downwards) had significant operational experience and were quite prepared to question the actions of higher authority, if they thought directions imprudent. Seldom did situations emerge where maintenance schedules and planned flying rates of effort were ignored to achieve unwise rates of effort. That was just sensible management of air resources.
These days, the ADF culture seems to be one of career ending sanctions if anybody dares question directions of higher authority. A 'can do' syndrome may have been a reason for instances post-1989 when Army Aviation appreciably overflew planned maintenance capacity resulting in rows of aircraft just pushed aside at times gathering bird****.
A 'just make it work' mantra for Tiger and MRH90 in particular is unlikely to yield adequate levels of capability, as the Air Force proved with the CH-47C despite the comprehensive RAAF engineering resources then existing. The Charlie model Chinook was really a technical dog that ultimately had extensive systems redesign and power plant enhancements in later models.
An aspect of concern with new platforms is the bent of DoD/DMO to involve in hugely costly whole of life maintenance support contracts which might greatly limit ADF flexibility regarding force structure variations for unforeseen reasons. For example, if the MRH90 proves such an expensive dog that it is not worth keeping in service, might there be contractual cost penalties regarding maintenance support no longer required?
I am with you on spending money in the right direction to assure adequate capabilities that can do the job, ergo my advocating progressive optimisation of proven platforms at modest cost. Maintaining adequate and credible military preparedness ought to be the primary goal, enabling of course enough flying to keep all the boys and girls sufficiently proficient for operational employment.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 6th Aug 2012 at 12:05. Reason: spelling
I served as an Infantry officer in the Battalions during and after the switch of rotary wing assets to the Army.
The Air Force seemed to have little understanding of an Infantry units operational needs. They were not readily available and didnt seem particularly interested in staging close to where they were needed. Their participation in air assault appeared to lack any tactical sense, or vigor. Straight and level at 1000 feet, then back to the officers mess or hotel.
The Army Aviation pilots at the time had all been through Duntroon, either solely or after ADFA. They had excellent tactical sense and knew what the Commander needed. They also understood how long it takes to walk 1 kilometer in primary jungle with 40kg on your back ........ After being dropped in the wrong place
Ask the customer who they'd want providing fire support from a Tiger. I think you'll find the answer is Army Aviation.
The Air Force seemed to have little understanding of an Infantry units operational needs. They were not readily available and didnt seem particularly interested in staging close to where they were needed. Their participation in air assault appeared to lack any tactical sense, or vigor. Straight and level at 1000 feet, then back to the officers mess or hotel.
The Army Aviation pilots at the time had all been through Duntroon, either solely or after ADFA. They had excellent tactical sense and knew what the Commander needed. They also understood how long it takes to walk 1 kilometer in primary jungle with 40kg on your back ........ After being dropped in the wrong place
Ask the customer who they'd want providing fire support from a Tiger. I think you'll find the answer is Army Aviation.
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RAAF/Army Relations
Hello JPJP; with respect, you seem under-informed re RAAF/Army Relations. There is comprehensive discussion thereof on this PPRuNe thread: http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...history-2.htm. See my posts #16, 20, 31 in particular for some enlightenment.
It was always Army who decided which of their units would get Air Force air support and not the RAAF. Herewith self-explanatory extracts from post # 31 of that thread:
Regarding your Tiger comment. The primary activity for 9SQN during 2,000 days of Vietnam War operations was trooping for infantry battalions and they also did 900 days of gunship combat support compared with Army Aviation nil to date. I would argue an AAH designed principally for armour busting cannot adequately do the same intimate close air support job as more versatile utility platforms, like the Iroquois Bushranger, USMC UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey) and the US Army UH-60L DAP. There is good discussion re that on another thread.
It was always Army who decided which of their units would get Air Force air support and not the RAAF. Herewith self-explanatory extracts from post # 31 of that thread:
Before creation of a thinly-veiled unified ADF, the Army had multiple smallish units scattered all around the Sydney region in particular. The HQOC HOPS cell worked hand-in-glove with co-located HQ 1 GL Group which was the agency controlling utilisation of helicopter flying hours allocated for Army support and they decided which units would get support. The when bit was decided jointly to make cost-effective use of helo resources which had to be deployed to support Army units all around the nation, in the neighbouring archipelago and sometimes NZ.
When RAAF helos were assigned to support a particular unit, part of the tasking process involved HQ 1GL Group determining whether that unit could accommodate and feed the Air Force elements. Except for larger Army units and formations, the answer was mostly negative. Living accommodation was often limited and the Army rationing system was quite inflexible being rigidly based on numbers on unit strength. Where accommodation and catering was available at larger units/formations, it was generally availed.
Army did not then have the catering flexibility of Air Force and Navy with lesser staffing for that purpose and this also became a problem in some scenarios as feeding for flying elements often had to be at random hours to get the job done, so it was usually simpler to provide a degree of own rationing. As mentioned earlier, Air Force helo elements began enhancing field deployment capabilities post-Vietnam.
When RAAF helos were assigned to support a particular unit, part of the tasking process involved HQ 1GL Group determining whether that unit could accommodate and feed the Air Force elements. Except for larger Army units and formations, the answer was mostly negative. Living accommodation was often limited and the Army rationing system was quite inflexible being rigidly based on numbers on unit strength. Where accommodation and catering was available at larger units/formations, it was generally availed.
Army did not then have the catering flexibility of Air Force and Navy with lesser staffing for that purpose and this also became a problem in some scenarios as feeding for flying elements often had to be at random hours to get the job done, so it was usually simpler to provide a degree of own rationing. As mentioned earlier, Air Force helo elements began enhancing field deployment capabilities post-Vietnam.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 6th Aug 2012 at 21:12. Reason: grammar
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Hit the nail on the head there. The RAAF considered the Huey too valuable an asset to risk by having it exposed to unsecured areas of operation in Vietnam. Though they did do good work with the SAS.
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Make Do
BR71,
I am interested in your comments that 'Can Do' and 'Make it Work' are inadvisable attitudes and realms of endeavour.
Your contribution to the ADF, the creation of the 'Bushranger' gunship was an excellent example of 'Making it Work'. You were supplied with a piece of equipment that did not do what you wanted it to, and the readily available, US-engineered alternatives were rejected. You and your team assembled and tested an indigenous gunship configuration for Huey, and then allowed the system to catch up later with certification and AAP amendments. Can Do? I think so.
I believe what slow n low is after is a bit of that aggressive engineering approach where the ADF makes decisions to hasten capability outcomes without necessarily requesting permission from the manufacturer (and waiting, and paying).
The reason why Army overflew maintenance capacity in the early 90's was mainly because the underlying support wasn't there. RAAF may well have fallen into the same situation, and may or may not have curtailed rate of effort. As you say, they didn't manage it with CH-47C, and arguably also mismanaged F-111 towards its end of life, if hours and availability are any measure.
You continue to make mis-statements about the aims of Air 9000. MRH90 is a direct replacement for Black Hawk and Sea King. It lifts about the same, it carries about the same number of people, and is meant to do the same thing. It is a Utility Helicopter, the same as a Black Hawk. Chinook is our medium lifter.
You are on the money about light utility though, getting rid of Huey was not smart.
I am interested in your comments that 'Can Do' and 'Make it Work' are inadvisable attitudes and realms of endeavour.
Your contribution to the ADF, the creation of the 'Bushranger' gunship was an excellent example of 'Making it Work'. You were supplied with a piece of equipment that did not do what you wanted it to, and the readily available, US-engineered alternatives were rejected. You and your team assembled and tested an indigenous gunship configuration for Huey, and then allowed the system to catch up later with certification and AAP amendments. Can Do? I think so.
I believe what slow n low is after is a bit of that aggressive engineering approach where the ADF makes decisions to hasten capability outcomes without necessarily requesting permission from the manufacturer (and waiting, and paying).
The reason why Army overflew maintenance capacity in the early 90's was mainly because the underlying support wasn't there. RAAF may well have fallen into the same situation, and may or may not have curtailed rate of effort. As you say, they didn't manage it with CH-47C, and arguably also mismanaged F-111 towards its end of life, if hours and availability are any measure.
You continue to make mis-statements about the aims of Air 9000. MRH90 is a direct replacement for Black Hawk and Sea King. It lifts about the same, it carries about the same number of people, and is meant to do the same thing. It is a Utility Helicopter, the same as a Black Hawk. Chinook is our medium lifter.
You are on the money about light utility though, getting rid of Huey was not smart.
Straight and level at 1000 feet, then back to the officers mess or hotel.
A BTN or BDE level exercise involved deploying to the bush, living in hutchies or 2 man tents, digging shell scrapes, standing to and all the rest of it.
An airmobile assault was typically a four- or eight-ship split tac nav at 50 feet to RV on time and run in to an insertion, having been planned face-to-face with the ground commander to fit in with his intentions and meet his objectives and, strangely enough, with a full awareness of the appropriate intel factors.
Not readily available? We probably did more bush time than you, supporting numerous units. Funny old thing that a single unit might feel that they weren't getting their helicopters on tap when they were spread around.
I'm sure you found every company commander had a squadron of fully operational helicopters sitting around waiting for his call after the transfer to Army happened, did you? No, I thought not.
Good wind-up, if that's what you were doing! If not, you're talking rubbish.
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In a disappointing but utterly predictable twist, we are again trading barbs about RAAF vs Army Aviation.
Service is irrelevant. The same AW regs apply to all three services; the same basic training, the same underpinning skills and knowledge, the same document management system, the same sustainment organisation, and the same HQ when deployed. CAF is the AW authority, and CA (and CN) answers to him a minimum of once a year for each type at an AW Board. DMO manages sustainment for all three services.
There is no doubt that 5, 9 and 35 Sqn did great things with their RW assets. We should be able to accept that A, B, C, 161, 162 , and 171 Sqn are similarly professional and do a job of which we can be similarly proud. Likewise 816, 817, 808 and 723 Sqns.
Accusing Army of maintaining and flying helos 'like trucks' is baseless and inaccurate. Likewise, accusing RAAF crews of staying in hotels and not caring about tactical outcomes is childish and inaccurate.
A bit of mutual respect might be in order.
Service is irrelevant. The same AW regs apply to all three services; the same basic training, the same underpinning skills and knowledge, the same document management system, the same sustainment organisation, and the same HQ when deployed. CAF is the AW authority, and CA (and CN) answers to him a minimum of once a year for each type at an AW Board. DMO manages sustainment for all three services.
There is no doubt that 5, 9 and 35 Sqn did great things with their RW assets. We should be able to accept that A, B, C, 161, 162 , and 171 Sqn are similarly professional and do a job of which we can be similarly proud. Likewise 816, 817, 808 and 723 Sqns.
Accusing Army of maintaining and flying helos 'like trucks' is baseless and inaccurate. Likewise, accusing RAAF crews of staying in hotels and not caring about tactical outcomes is childish and inaccurate.
A bit of mutual respect might be in order.
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Hello again Emergov.
I was not implying any criticism of slow-n-low as he raised some interesting points, but we have perhaps got involved in a semantics discussion because I could have expressed myself better in post #281.
My main point was a now former pilot/engineer colleague, who was part of the team that addressed RAN warship maintenance, indicated a root cause was putting ships back to sea before scheduled maintenance/refits were completed which inevitably had serious downstream consequences. It apparently seemed that the Admirals had a 'can do' culture of bowing to political or other pressures to make it appear that the Navy was shipshape.
In his post # 263 reactivating this thread, slow-n-low mentions 4 different modification states for the Blackhawk fleet which is alarming and really points to a problem at higher command levels. The question begged is why have the Service Chiefs not been focusing on having their in-service platforms maintained at best state of preparedness, before DoD seeks acquisition of new hardware?
The ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan seems to have had overriding precedence causing multiple capability gaps. Had progressive upgrading of the ADF helo fleet been accomplished, then more comprehensive helo support for Afghanistan operations for example may have been possible, assuming of course the politicians and military hierarchy wanted to go down that track.
Emergov; some brief clarification re the Bushranger gunship project. Army requested Air Force to develop a gunship capability if possible because the US Army, who generally provided 1ATF with good gunship support, had difficulty with resources at times placing some Task Force elements in potentially perilous situations. There was no likelihood then of acquiring the Hueycobra as the US Army was beginning its operational introduction in Vietnam and Australian Government funding was being directed toward expanding/upgrading the RAAF Iroquois fleet to cope with increasing Army support and training requirements in Australia.
The year long project was sensibly originated and managed in an operational theatre because that is where the necessary resources were located, but higher agencies in Australia were kept well-informed of progress via the continual trickle of staff visits. Once we had created a prototype, a MinDef visit resulted in approval of the princely sum of $94,000 to acquire some weapons system kits, in addition to those we had bartered for project development purposes.
People give me credit just because I devised a different weaponry configuration on a newer versatile UH-1H utility platform equipped with suitable hard points and stores mounts; but it was the hangar and equipment guys that made it all happen as my primary very busy role was as a squadron pilot. Although the Bushranger with a reconfigured XM-21 weapons system was unique in the world, it could have easily been further enhanced if the UH-1H were upgraded to Huey II.
Regarding the MRH90; see the following links referring to it as a medium lift helicopter. Internal carriage of light vehicles differentiates it somewhat from other platforms recognised as utility helos.
NH90, NH90 TTH, NH90 NFH, NH90 helicopter - NHIndustries - NH90, The New Reference for the Armed Forces
NH90 | AgustaWestland
Army technology: Overview - Defence Jobs Australia
ADF receives new MRH90 helicopter - Army Technology
Finally; I concur with your last sentiment in post #288.
I was not implying any criticism of slow-n-low as he raised some interesting points, but we have perhaps got involved in a semantics discussion because I could have expressed myself better in post #281.
My main point was a now former pilot/engineer colleague, who was part of the team that addressed RAN warship maintenance, indicated a root cause was putting ships back to sea before scheduled maintenance/refits were completed which inevitably had serious downstream consequences. It apparently seemed that the Admirals had a 'can do' culture of bowing to political or other pressures to make it appear that the Navy was shipshape.
In his post # 263 reactivating this thread, slow-n-low mentions 4 different modification states for the Blackhawk fleet which is alarming and really points to a problem at higher command levels. The question begged is why have the Service Chiefs not been focusing on having their in-service platforms maintained at best state of preparedness, before DoD seeks acquisition of new hardware?
The ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan seems to have had overriding precedence causing multiple capability gaps. Had progressive upgrading of the ADF helo fleet been accomplished, then more comprehensive helo support for Afghanistan operations for example may have been possible, assuming of course the politicians and military hierarchy wanted to go down that track.
Emergov; some brief clarification re the Bushranger gunship project. Army requested Air Force to develop a gunship capability if possible because the US Army, who generally provided 1ATF with good gunship support, had difficulty with resources at times placing some Task Force elements in potentially perilous situations. There was no likelihood then of acquiring the Hueycobra as the US Army was beginning its operational introduction in Vietnam and Australian Government funding was being directed toward expanding/upgrading the RAAF Iroquois fleet to cope with increasing Army support and training requirements in Australia.
The year long project was sensibly originated and managed in an operational theatre because that is where the necessary resources were located, but higher agencies in Australia were kept well-informed of progress via the continual trickle of staff visits. Once we had created a prototype, a MinDef visit resulted in approval of the princely sum of $94,000 to acquire some weapons system kits, in addition to those we had bartered for project development purposes.
People give me credit just because I devised a different weaponry configuration on a newer versatile UH-1H utility platform equipped with suitable hard points and stores mounts; but it was the hangar and equipment guys that made it all happen as my primary very busy role was as a squadron pilot. Although the Bushranger with a reconfigured XM-21 weapons system was unique in the world, it could have easily been further enhanced if the UH-1H were upgraded to Huey II.
Regarding the MRH90; see the following links referring to it as a medium lift helicopter. Internal carriage of light vehicles differentiates it somewhat from other platforms recognised as utility helos.
NH90, NH90 TTH, NH90 NFH, NH90 helicopter - NHIndustries - NH90, The New Reference for the Armed Forces
NH90 | AgustaWestland
Army technology: Overview - Defence Jobs Australia
ADF receives new MRH90 helicopter - Army Technology
Finally; I concur with your last sentiment in post #288.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 7th Aug 2012 at 22:43. Reason: grammar
Thread Starter
B71.
All good and known points. We did order 11 x AH-1G's and cancelled them.
My question on the MRH90 project still remains. Your references are heading for a year old. There has been nothing that I'm aware of re deliveries or the project for months and months. Australian Aerospace still crows about delivering #15 last December!
All good and known points. We did order 11 x AH-1G's and cancelled them.
My question on the MRH90 project still remains. Your references are heading for a year old. There has been nothing that I'm aware of re deliveries or the project for months and months. Australian Aerospace still crows about delivering #15 last December!
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Hi TBM-L. The references in post # 292 were only provided to show that the MRH90 is generally categorised worldwide as a medium lift helicopter, despite what may be otherwise implied in the ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan.
MRH90 seems potentially a disastrous project akin to the JSF and some hard decisions need to be taken to assure retention of vital utility helo capability intended to be forfeited, which the MRH90 will not provide. Not just an Army Aviation consideration but also Navy. The MH-60R will be so stuffed full of gear it will not have adequate versatility for boarding party operations; so if the MRH90 project falls over, the Navy will be in even more bother.
It seems there has been some soul-searching going on within DoD for a while regarding organisation of the ADF helo fleet, whatever that means!
MRH90 seems potentially a disastrous project akin to the JSF and some hard decisions need to be taken to assure retention of vital utility helo capability intended to be forfeited, which the MRH90 will not provide. Not just an Army Aviation consideration but also Navy. The MH-60R will be so stuffed full of gear it will not have adequate versatility for boarding party operations; so if the MRH90 project falls over, the Navy will be in even more bother.
It seems there has been some soul-searching going on within DoD for a while regarding organisation of the ADF helo fleet, whatever that means!
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 8th Aug 2012 at 00:38.
Thread Starter
B71.
The US Navy uses the MH-60S not the MH-60R for Vertrep and other stuff running around the fleet. The aircraft is a hybrid using the R cockpit etc and a a M model fuselage. Good enough for Uncle Sam, good enough for us.
One problem put to me by the Navy with the MRH90 was the comms and a few other things that aren't compatible with all fleet ops. Ah well those in the ivory towers know best....
The US Navy uses the MH-60S not the MH-60R for Vertrep and other stuff running around the fleet. The aircraft is a hybrid using the R cockpit etc and a a M model fuselage. Good enough for Uncle Sam, good enough for us.
One problem put to me by the Navy with the MRH90 was the comms and a few other things that aren't compatible with all fleet ops. Ah well those in the ivory towers know best....
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Seems not all that many people are happy with the MRH90's external lift / underslung abilities either (lack thereof).
I'm sure that in time much will be ironed out, but really - how many years have we been hooking up a load beneath a RW aircraft? I know that the Brits do underslung - didn't the other NHIndustry partners value external lift?
I'm sure that in time much will be ironed out, but really - how many years have we been hooking up a load beneath a RW aircraft? I know that the Brits do underslung - didn't the other NHIndustry partners value external lift?
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MRH90 External Load Lift capability
This aircraft was procured with a good external load capability (we thought) - up to 4000Kg on a very smart hook that would measure the load and use this weight to recalculate your performance. Like most helicopters, it is actually incapable of lifting this ultimate weight. All Up Mass - Basic Mass is less than 4000 ! Anyway, as it turns out the hook is a bit too smart - the articulations in roll and pitch (via axles / beams) mean that no only is the hook incompatible with the RAN standard load lifting equipment, it is also moving too much for the airframe strength. Back to the drawing board NHI !
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MRH90 Load Lifting
While the MRH90 will eventually have a hook that works, the MH60R will never be a suitable utility aircraft. Another example of schedule and risk being more important than actual capability required.
