Hello again Emergov.
I was not implying any criticism of slow-n-low as he raised some interesting points, but we have perhaps got involved in a semantics discussion because I could have expressed myself better in post #281.
My main point was a now former pilot/engineer colleague, who was part of the team that addressed RAN warship maintenance, indicated a root cause was putting ships back to sea before scheduled maintenance/refits were completed which inevitably had serious downstream consequences. It apparently seemed that the Admirals had a 'can do' culture of bowing to political or other pressures to make it appear that the Navy was shipshape.
In his post # 263 reactivating this thread, slow-n-low mentions 4 different modification states for the Blackhawk fleet which is alarming and really points to a problem at higher command levels. The question begged is why have the Service Chiefs not been focusing on having their in-service platforms maintained at best state of preparedness, before DoD seeks acquisition of new hardware?
The ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan seems to have had overriding precedence causing multiple capability gaps. Had progressive upgrading of the ADF helo fleet been accomplished, then more comprehensive helo support for Afghanistan operations for example may have been possible, assuming of course the politicians and military hierarchy wanted to go down that track.
Emergov; some brief clarification re the Bushranger gunship project. Army requested Air Force to develop a gunship capability if possible because the US Army, who generally provided 1ATF with good gunship support, had difficulty with resources at times placing some Task Force elements in potentially perilous situations. There was no likelihood then of acquiring the Hueycobra as the US Army was beginning its operational introduction in Vietnam and Australian Government funding was being directed toward expanding/upgrading the RAAF Iroquois fleet to cope with increasing Army support and training requirements in Australia.
The year long project was sensibly originated and managed in an operational theatre because that is where the necessary resources were located, but higher agencies in Australia were kept well-informed of progress via the continual trickle of staff visits. Once we had created a prototype, a MinDef visit resulted in approval of the princely sum of $94,000 to acquire some weapons system kits, in addition to those we had bartered for project development purposes.
People give me credit just because I devised a different weaponry configuration on a newer versatile UH-1H utility platform equipped with suitable hard points and stores mounts; but it was the hangar and equipment guys that made it all happen as my primary very busy role was as a squadron pilot. Although the Bushranger with a reconfigured XM-21 weapons system was unique in the world, it could have easily been further enhanced if the UH-1H were upgraded to Huey II.
Regarding the MRH90; see the following links referring to it as a medium lift helicopter. Internal carriage of light vehicles differentiates it somewhat from other platforms recognised as utility helos.
NH90, NH90 TTH, NH90 NFH, NH90 helicopter - NHIndustries - NH90, The New Reference for the Armed Forces
NH90 | AgustaWestland
Army technology: Overview - Defence Jobs Australia
ADF receives new MRH90 helicopter - Army Technology
Finally; I concur with your last sentiment in post #288.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 7th Aug 2012 at 22:43.
Reason: grammar