Latest Future Brize 'hiccups'
Champagne anyone...?
One can try and dress this up in a myriad of ways and attach as many HFs you like but this all boils down to one basic, fundamental issue: the inexplicable efforts to maintain too many crews on an aircraft type that is down to it's last few hours on it's last couple of airframes. Crews bounce between currencies and this is the end result - I'm just glad it was something as trivial as a wheels up landing...
The RAF continue to quote the existence of a fleet of 14 K aircraft and the world in general continues to believe them. Similar accounting would render the RAF a fleet of about 30 Phantom Air Defence Aircraft - I'll start you with the 2 FGR2s at Akrotiri and North Luffenham. Not a dig, just a statement of fact. I guess if enough people say it's true then it becomes true - the Emperor's New Air Force perhaps.....?
Stories abound of the mythical hangar at Marshalls crammed full of delivery-hours Ks just getting their final polish before being delivered back to Lyneham or of the imminent plan to purchase a fleet of a 164 C130H AMPs that will be lifed to 2112. Ain't going to happen and in the meantime the soon to be fatigued-to-death J fleet struggles to get enough hangar space, engineers, Marshalls space or money to keep it thrashing along at the pace it's having to maintain. This will all culminate in the last K dying in 2012 just as the J fleet all goes into major life extension work. Hilarious. I could give you a list as long as my arm of ways to ameliorate it but to be honest it's more fun selling front row tickets to the impending 2012 train wreck (pun intended).
BEags - there is nothing "specialist" about asymmetric training as it should be done on the K. And before you respond I'll refer you back to my first paragraph. If you aren't getting the hours then just strapping in becomes "specialist".
The RAF continue to quote the existence of a fleet of 14 K aircraft and the world in general continues to believe them. Similar accounting would render the RAF a fleet of about 30 Phantom Air Defence Aircraft - I'll start you with the 2 FGR2s at Akrotiri and North Luffenham. Not a dig, just a statement of fact. I guess if enough people say it's true then it becomes true - the Emperor's New Air Force perhaps.....?
Stories abound of the mythical hangar at Marshalls crammed full of delivery-hours Ks just getting their final polish before being delivered back to Lyneham or of the imminent plan to purchase a fleet of a 164 C130H AMPs that will be lifed to 2112. Ain't going to happen and in the meantime the soon to be fatigued-to-death J fleet struggles to get enough hangar space, engineers, Marshalls space or money to keep it thrashing along at the pace it's having to maintain. This will all culminate in the last K dying in 2012 just as the J fleet all goes into major life extension work. Hilarious. I could give you a list as long as my arm of ways to ameliorate it but to be honest it's more fun selling front row tickets to the impending 2012 train wreck (pun intended).
BEags - there is nothing "specialist" about asymmetric training as it should be done on the K. And before you respond I'll refer you back to my first paragraph. If you aren't getting the hours then just strapping in becomes "specialist".
True words indeed, Stoppers!
I've also learned (from another source) how truly dire things have become.......
By the way, isn't there another FGR2 at Base Aerea Gringo? Or has it been replaced by a fag-chariot now?
I've also learned (from another source) how truly dire things have become.......
By the way, isn't there another FGR2 at Base Aerea Gringo? Or has it been replaced by a fag-chariot now?
This incident bears certain parallels with the recent F3 accident.
A fleet close to it's OSD, poor aircraft serviceability/availability, inadequete training hours provision and an uncertain future transition to a new type.
I would bet that all of these factors were known about at Sqn (or perhaps even Station) level but became increasingly diluted higher up the command chain.
A fleet close to it's OSD, poor aircraft serviceability/availability, inadequete training hours provision and an uncertain future transition to a new type.
I would bet that all of these factors were known about at Sqn (or perhaps even Station) level but became increasingly diluted higher up the command chain.
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120class,
I very much doubt it based upon the attention all bases have got post haddon-cave...
They knew alright, far too much in terms of politics of maintaning the imaginary K fleet to allow a sensible decision.
I very much doubt it based upon the attention all bases have got post haddon-cave...
They knew alright, far too much in terms of politics of maintaning the imaginary K fleet to allow a sensible decision.
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Hi, read the thread with interest. As one who left military aviation a long time ago (wessex V were still on coastal sar duty) and is now involved in risk management in in civil air ops, I have long been mystified at the future plans for the AT fleet and Brize. I join those who are happy no serious injury or worse occured in the accident, but in a world where the military is comitted so far and wide making transport a high priority, where government tells us of great threats facing the country, I can not for the life of me see any sense in this decision. I can only hope that the flaws do not come home to roost.
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I do remember the Instructor Pilot stressing the importance of not missing wheels. 
PS. BEagle, go careful. The gentleman concerned is the closest thing we have to a Hercules version of your good self.
PS. BEagle, go careful. The gentleman concerned is the closest thing we have to a Hercules version of your good self.
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Sim asymmetric appch / overshoots - warning horn is linked to throttle position. CB is often pulled when doing the above to stop the horn constantly going on and off since the horn trigger point in throttle travel sits right around the throttle position that corresponds to Zero Torque, used to simulate a feathered prop. Common practice on the fleet.
It would be an interesting exercise to map actual (as in real life asy apps & o'shoots) occurrences of these situations versus the benefit of practicing in a live asset rather than a simulator. I don't just mean on the Herc fleet, perhaps across the wider Defence Aviation community we need to start looking at using less expensive (both in materiel terms as well as human terms) assets like simulators. I can't recall the last time I went on holiday with Mrs SFO and Speedbird 40 PA'd that we would be landing late due to the crew practicing a simulated asy o'shoot.
And just think of all the fatigue life we could save with fewer gear cycles, ground/air/ground transitions, reduced engine wear, reduced maintenance due to reduced FI usage..................Might even improve the availability rate and, perhaps perversly, the serviceability rate due to reduced maintenance activity.
Just a mad thought which I'm sure will never catch on....except with civvy fleets that have operated in this manner for the last 30 years or so.
Finally, rather than pulling the CB, did anyone ask the Herc Requirements Manager to get an alert that could be cancelled. At least then the crew would get protection provided by the system and still have the ability to cancel the audio each time (could be automatically reset after each approach by any number of conditions - change in flap/gear/altitude increase through...etc).
It would be an interesting exercise to map actual (as in real life asy apps & o'shoots) occurrences of these situations versus the benefit of practicing in a live asset rather than a simulator. I don't just mean on the Herc fleet, perhaps across the wider Defence Aviation community we need to start looking at using less expensive (both in materiel terms as well as human terms) assets like simulators. I can't recall the last time I went on holiday with Mrs SFO and Speedbird 40 PA'd that we would be landing late due to the crew practicing a simulated asy o'shoot.
And just think of all the fatigue life we could save with fewer gear cycles, ground/air/ground transitions, reduced engine wear, reduced maintenance due to reduced FI usage..................Might even improve the availability rate and, perhaps perversly, the serviceability rate due to reduced maintenance activity.
Just a mad thought which I'm sure will never catch on....except with civvy fleets that have operated in this manner for the last 30 years or so.
Finally, rather than pulling the CB, did anyone ask the Herc Requirements Manager to get an alert that could be cancelled. At least then the crew would get protection provided by the system and still have the ability to cancel the audio each time (could be automatically reset after each approach by any number of conditions - change in flap/gear/altitude increase through...etc).
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Again - the gear horn warning CB is only tripped during Tac AT sorties.
If it happened to be tripped during this incident then it wasn't intentional.
The C130K fleet should, and would have, been scrapped years ago if the RAF/MOD had got it's act together with the C130J EP.
Can you actually believe we are only just getting the correct radios, external tanks(
) and the clearances to drop certain loads 5 years after the decision was made to replace the C130K in certain roles.
We'd have all been much better off if she'd been retired gracefully at the top of her game as opposed to going out with a wimper after an incident caused by our lords and masters ignorance of the paucity of front-line training
If it happened to be tripped during this incident then it wasn't intentional.
The C130K fleet should, and would have, been scrapped years ago if the RAF/MOD had got it's act together with the C130J EP.
Can you actually believe we are only just getting the correct radios, external tanks(
) and the clearances to drop certain loads 5 years after the decision was made to replace the C130K in certain roles.We'd have all been much better off if she'd been retired gracefully at the top of her game as opposed to going out with a wimper after an incident caused by our lords and masters ignorance of the paucity of front-line training
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ShortFatOne.
Oh how I agree with you, we made a decision some 15 years ago on the VC10, which I trust is still true, to only practice asymetric in the simulator. I appreciate a fan driven aircraft may be a little more difficult to make real but but it would still seem to be true that there is more danger in practice than in reality. History with the Meteor and Canberra proved that.
Oh how I agree with you, we made a decision some 15 years ago on the VC10, which I trust is still true, to only practice asymetric in the simulator. I appreciate a fan driven aircraft may be a little more difficult to make real but but it would still seem to be true that there is more danger in practice than in reality. History with the Meteor and Canberra proved that.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Art, and Vulcan and IIRC Victor. And a Valetta in 1962 that went in to Badminton.
That was on a trap, sorry check, ride and one engine was feathered. The crew then, I believe, shut down the other with predictable consequences.
There is a lot to be said for 'if it ain't broke leave it well alone.'
That was on a trap, sorry check, ride and one engine was feathered. The crew then, I believe, shut down the other with predictable consequences.
There is a lot to be said for 'if it ain't broke leave it well alone.'
Pukers:
Why the sarcasm? Poor morale was identified as a contributory factor in the Catterick Puma crash.
And can you put forward any other suggestions for the RAF's appalling record of incompetence over the past two or three years? The RAF would have their AOC withdrawn if they were subject to the same level of accountability as commercial operators.
Are these really just isolated incidents? Or are they symptomatic of wider malaise in the RAF system?
Trim Stab,
You've hit the nail on the head:
Quote:
Or is it poor morale?
Absolutely. The crew were fed up with BOCS, JPA, Future Brize and decided to cheer themselves up by a nice fun wheels up landing.
You deserve a medal
You've hit the nail on the head:
Quote:
Or is it poor morale?
Absolutely. The crew were fed up with BOCS, JPA, Future Brize and decided to cheer themselves up by a nice fun wheels up landing.
You deserve a medal
And can you put forward any other suggestions for the RAF's appalling record of incompetence over the past two or three years? The RAF would have their AOC withdrawn if they were subject to the same level of accountability as commercial operators.
Are these really just isolated incidents? Or are they symptomatic of wider malaise in the RAF system?
As I recall on the VC10:
1. Practice asymmetric was only ever demo'd on Trip 1 in the aircraft, as it included a relight sequence for the Air Engineer.
2. Simulated asymmetric was flown only with a FI during check rides or during aircraft conversion. Or with a FI during civil IRs....
3. Simulated double asymmetric was flown only with a FI during aircraft conversion.
I'm sure that, as far as aircraft handling is concerned, the VC10 is far more benign when asymmetric or even double asymmetric than the C-130, so maintaining currency in asymmetric operation of the C-130 is probably more crucial than it was on the VC10.
If the simulator is truly representative of the aircraft, simulated asymmetric exercises should rarely be needed in the aircraft. I remember the days when, as a UAS student on summer camp at Thorney Island, observing an MCT sortie from the back of the flight deck included watching an outboard engine being 'T-handled' during a 4-engine roller.....
That took quite a bit of skill to cope with!
1. Practice asymmetric was only ever demo'd on Trip 1 in the aircraft, as it included a relight sequence for the Air Engineer.
2. Simulated asymmetric was flown only with a FI during check rides or during aircraft conversion. Or with a FI during civil IRs....
3. Simulated double asymmetric was flown only with a FI during aircraft conversion.
I'm sure that, as far as aircraft handling is concerned, the VC10 is far more benign when asymmetric or even double asymmetric than the C-130, so maintaining currency in asymmetric operation of the C-130 is probably more crucial than it was on the VC10.
If the simulator is truly representative of the aircraft, simulated asymmetric exercises should rarely be needed in the aircraft. I remember the days when, as a UAS student on summer camp at Thorney Island, observing an MCT sortie from the back of the flight deck included watching an outboard engine being 'T-handled' during a 4-engine roller.....
That took quite a bit of skill to cope with!
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Warning Horn Disabled
It's not the first time this has happened.
It was common practice on the Comet/Nimrod to pull the fuse for the gear warning whilst carrying out Flapless landings.
Comet G-ADPL was written off, at Newcastle, by a CAA Test Crew landing gear up for this exact reason.
ASN Aircraft accident de Havilland DH-106 Comet 4 G-APDL Newcastle Airport (NCL)
I've known at least one Nimrod overshoot at Kinloss whilst carrying out circuits after a call of GEAR from the tower.
(Comet G-ADPM was also damaged in a gear related incident, gear selected up before the aircraft had actually managed to get airborne)
It was common practice on the Comet/Nimrod to pull the fuse for the gear warning whilst carrying out Flapless landings.
Comet G-ADPL was written off, at Newcastle, by a CAA Test Crew landing gear up for this exact reason.
ASN Aircraft accident de Havilland DH-106 Comet 4 G-APDL Newcastle Airport (NCL)
I've known at least one Nimrod overshoot at Kinloss whilst carrying out circuits after a call of GEAR from the tower.
(Comet G-ADPM was also damaged in a gear related incident, gear selected up before the aircraft had actually managed to get airborne)
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Short Fat One.
Agree strongly. I love it when.........
a plan comes together,
I mean,
when someone talks sense on this site. Such a rare thing...
Agree strongly. I love it when.........
a plan comes together,
I mean,
when someone talks sense on this site. Such a rare thing...
Last edited by betty swallox; 12th May 2010 at 17:15.
A few years ago I was involved in the development of a twin-engine FADEC equipped aircraft.
We developed a simple logic system linked to the FADECs whereby if one engine was set to its position of transparence (as in a simulated asymmetric approach) the horn would not sound unless the other engine was reduced beyond a predetermined setting. This meant that asymmetric circuits and go-arounds could be undertaken without the horn blaring.
Unfortunately, although the system was completely reliable in all the tests we did, we could not convince the certifying authorities. The aircraft was eventually certified without the system, and cannot be flown asymmetrically without the horn blaring.
I have subsequently been involved in recovering two aircraft that landed wheels up in training incidents...
We developed a simple logic system linked to the FADECs whereby if one engine was set to its position of transparence (as in a simulated asymmetric approach) the horn would not sound unless the other engine was reduced beyond a predetermined setting. This meant that asymmetric circuits and go-arounds could be undertaken without the horn blaring.
Unfortunately, although the system was completely reliable in all the tests we did, we could not convince the certifying authorities. The aircraft was eventually certified without the system, and cannot be flown asymmetrically without the horn blaring.
I have subsequently been involved in recovering two aircraft that landed wheels up in training incidents...