Do we need an Independant Nuclear Deterrant?
Deterrence is based on the existence of a credible threat.
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What has to be considered under this scenario is that if the UK were hit by Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, they would respond on Russia with a Polaris launch (Moscow Option). Not being able to distinguish this from a US launch and possible decapitation first strike, the Soviets would have to launch - triggering a full scale exchange.
It;s a good thing all UK Polaris and Trident missiles have an electronics module installed installed that allows the CIA to disable all those missiles, even if the UK missile submarines are far out at sea and submerged.
It;s a good thing all UK Polaris and Trident missiles have an electronics module installed installed that allows the CIA to disable all those missiles, even if the UK missile submarines are far out at sea and submerged.
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Re post 184
Bwahh ha hah ha ha ha ha ha ha ha. Um, yeah ok George! and next on the conspiracy theory -Bob Lazar, actually did all he says and there is a plot to discredit him...
Elmo - please return to being tickled. go and play with Big Bird.
Bwahh ha hah ha ha ha ha ha ha ha. Um, yeah ok George! and next on the conspiracy theory -Bob Lazar, actually did all he says and there is a plot to discredit him...
Elmo - please return to being tickled. go and play with Big Bird.
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However ORAC.......
Whilst I agree with your theories, you forgot to mention the final Clancy scenario, where the god dam Brits become such a Pain in the Ass to US foreign policy our boat suddenly ends up being stalked by it's former allies.
Happened to SH remember........
Happened to SH remember........
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Basically, the UK had the possibility of triggering a full scale exchange, therefore both major powers had an incentive to, at worst, stay non-nuclear and, as it turned out, not fight at all.
No, that didn't change a damned thing, nothing at all.
The basic American Coid War attitude was to be prepared for nuclear war, full stop, period.
Furthermore, you're saying the UK might launch nukes before the USA does so? Never happen, tday's Britons are much too civilized for that,. and everybody knows it.
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Try this:
"Basically, the USA has the possibility of triggering a full scale exchange, it's hard to tell an American missile launch from a UK missile, therefore Britain has an incentive to, at worst, stay non-nuclear and, as it may turn out, not fight at all."
No, that didn't change a damned thing, nothing at all.
The basic American Coid War attitude was to be prepared for nuclear war, full stop, period.
Furthermore, you're saying the UK might launch nukes before the USA does so? Never happen, tday's Britons are much too civilized for that,. and everybody knows it.
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Try this:
"Basically, the USA has the possibility of triggering a full scale exchange, it's hard to tell an American missile launch from a UK missile, therefore Britain has an incentive to, at worst, stay non-nuclear and, as it may turn out, not fight at all."
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Just addressing those 2 points.
Deterrence is based on the existence of a credible threat.
There is no point in threatening retaliation with our orbital mass-driver because we don't have one and everybody knows we don't have one. It isn't a credible threat.
While we do have nuclear weapons, I believe that the majority of nations and organisations feel that we would be extremely unlikely to use them, therefore the threat is not credible unless we demonstrate our willingness.
The use of our conventional forces is credible and their effectiveness and our willingness to use them has been demonstrated regularly over a long period of time. I don't know how effective a deterrent it is though and we may never know.
Deterrence is based on the existence of a credible threat.
There is no point in threatening retaliation with our orbital mass-driver because we don't have one and everybody knows we don't have one. It isn't a credible threat.
While we do have nuclear weapons, I believe that the majority of nations and organisations feel that we would be extremely unlikely to use them, therefore the threat is not credible unless we demonstrate our willingness.
The use of our conventional forces is credible and their effectiveness and our willingness to use them has been demonstrated regularly over a long period of time. I don't know how effective a deterrent it is though and we may never know.
Exactly - if we're not prepared to use it (and I very much doubt that we would) then Trident is an expensive white elephant. Its replacement will be just as white and even more expensive.
A bit like these people that go in the Lion enclosure at the zoo, they doubt the lion will attack, but can you be sure it won't?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Denis Healey said he would never have authorised launch, but he was only the Minster of Defence. His prime minister said he would and no doubt CinC Strike would have as well.
For you and I it may be unconscionable to use nuclear weapons but for our ultimate leader - who knows.
Do you doubt that the Davids or Nick would use it? Nick maybe not but the Davids?
For you and I it may be unconscionable to use nuclear weapons but for our ultimate leader - who knows.
Do you doubt that the Davids or Nick would use it? Nick maybe not but the Davids?
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Basically, the UK had the possibility of triggering a full scale exchange, therefore both major powers had an incentive to, at worst, stay non-nuclear and, as it turned out, not fight at all.
No, sorry, I don't follow your logic there. Are you saying that ithe UK and its nu-kleer weapons deterred both the USSR and the USA from going to war?
I thought you might be trying to say that if non-nuklur war started in --where did the cliche always say? -- the Fulda Gap --and NATO was getting the worst of it, then Britain might be the first to use tactical nukes and thereby compel the USA to "escalate" the war, or maybe do the opposite of escalate, whichever you prefer?
Were you tying to say something like that? I can't discern what you mean.
Was there a British back-up plan -- the "Angry Rabbit" concept? -- that envisioned NATO failing to hold and British forces pilling back into defensive pockets or "islands"? Maybe somewhere in France by then, but not quite as far as Dunkirk ...
Harriers, perhaps operating from highways within these "islands" instead of established airfields, would drop tactical atomic bombs on the enemy to try to stop the Red tide from reaching the Channel. I suppose the Harriers were the Angry Rabbits.
...
...
20 Squadron reformed again in late 1970 at RAF Wildenrath, Germany, operating the Harrier Jump Jet.
In 1977 at RAF Bruggen the squadron re-equipped with twelve SEPECAT Jaguar strike aircraft, various weapons for the squadron's conventional strike role of support for ground forces in repelling a Soviet attack in Europe, and eight WE.177 tactical nuclear bombs for use if a conflict escalated to the nuclear phase.* The apparent mismatch between eight nuclear bombs and twelve aircraft was because RAF staff planners expected up to one third attrition in the conventional phase, with sufficient aircraft held back in reserve to deliver the full stock of nuclear weapons to targets beyond the forward edge of the battlefield, deep into the enemy's rear areas. *The squadron was assigned to SACEUR for operational and targeting purposes, although political control over release of the British-owned WE.177 weapons was retained by the British government in London.[2
...
n.wikipedia.org/wiki/No._20_Squadron_RAF
* And who would be initiating the escalating?
** Lame excuse for meager inventory of bombs.
No, sorry, I don't follow your logic there. Are you saying that ithe UK and its nu-kleer weapons deterred both the USSR and the USA from going to war?
I thought you might be trying to say that if non-nuklur war started in --where did the cliche always say? -- the Fulda Gap --and NATO was getting the worst of it, then Britain might be the first to use tactical nukes and thereby compel the USA to "escalate" the war, or maybe do the opposite of escalate, whichever you prefer?
Were you tying to say something like that? I can't discern what you mean.
Was there a British back-up plan -- the "Angry Rabbit" concept? -- that envisioned NATO failing to hold and British forces pilling back into defensive pockets or "islands"? Maybe somewhere in France by then, but not quite as far as Dunkirk ...
Harriers, perhaps operating from highways within these "islands" instead of established airfields, would drop tactical atomic bombs on the enemy to try to stop the Red tide from reaching the Channel. I suppose the Harriers were the Angry Rabbits.
...
...
20 Squadron reformed again in late 1970 at RAF Wildenrath, Germany, operating the Harrier Jump Jet.
In 1977 at RAF Bruggen the squadron re-equipped with twelve SEPECAT Jaguar strike aircraft, various weapons for the squadron's conventional strike role of support for ground forces in repelling a Soviet attack in Europe, and eight WE.177 tactical nuclear bombs for use if a conflict escalated to the nuclear phase.* The apparent mismatch between eight nuclear bombs and twelve aircraft was because RAF staff planners expected up to one third attrition in the conventional phase, with sufficient aircraft held back in reserve to deliver the full stock of nuclear weapons to targets beyond the forward edge of the battlefield, deep into the enemy's rear areas. *The squadron was assigned to SACEUR for operational and targeting purposes, although political control over release of the British-owned WE.177 weapons was retained by the British government in London.[2
...
n.wikipedia.org/wiki/No._20_Squadron_RAF
* And who would be initiating the escalating?
** Lame excuse for meager inventory of bombs.
Last edited by Modern Elmo; 14th Oct 2010 at 03:45.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Elmo,
Any war in the Central Region was expected to go nuclear with tactical weapons. The sheer number from mines, artillery, Long Johns up to SS-20s made it almost inevitable. The normal exercise/TACEVAL last 3 days with nuclear exchanges on the 3rd day as Red forces approached the channel.
The British aim, unsurprisingly, would have been to limit use to the european mainland, with no use against the UK itself.
Presuming the aim of the USA and USSR would be to limit the war to Europe, including the UK, requirement was therefore to couple the use of any such weapon against the UK to the initiation of a general exchange including the USA and USSR.
The USA might not be willing to launch against the USSR just because London took an SS-20. But if the USSR hit London, the UK had the ability to hit Moscow (the purpose of the Chevaline upgrade to maintain the Moscow Option). And a Polaris launch against Moscow from mid-Atlantic would inevitably force the USSR to launch against the USA and the inevitable retaliation.
Both the USSR and USA therefore had a sizeable incentive to ensure no nuclear weapons were ever launched against the UK, and that drove up the risk of starting a war in the first place.
Flexible Response might have replaced Tripwire as NATO policy - but the UK still had it's own wire in place*.
*As described, the strategy of flexible response did "not specify the precise nature of NATO's reaction to a particular attack. It [had] been argued that the ambiguity enhance[d] deterrence by complicating Warsaw Pact planning."4 Ambiguity was also needed in strategy so that the US and Europeans could interpret the strategy to suit their own views. This difference of views within NATO was concentrated primarily on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons. In general, US strategists saw a deliberate and prolonged conventional defense in Europe. Further, they saw the use of tactical nuclear weapons as a way to keep a conflict from becoming a strategic nuclear exchange between the US and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, European strategists desired to see a brief conventional defense phase and viewed the use of tactical "nukes" as a means of coupling US strategic nuclear weapons to the defense of Europe. This coupling would preclude only Europe from becoming a nuclear battlefield.
Any war in the Central Region was expected to go nuclear with tactical weapons. The sheer number from mines, artillery, Long Johns up to SS-20s made it almost inevitable. The normal exercise/TACEVAL last 3 days with nuclear exchanges on the 3rd day as Red forces approached the channel.
The British aim, unsurprisingly, would have been to limit use to the european mainland, with no use against the UK itself.
Presuming the aim of the USA and USSR would be to limit the war to Europe, including the UK, requirement was therefore to couple the use of any such weapon against the UK to the initiation of a general exchange including the USA and USSR.
The USA might not be willing to launch against the USSR just because London took an SS-20. But if the USSR hit London, the UK had the ability to hit Moscow (the purpose of the Chevaline upgrade to maintain the Moscow Option). And a Polaris launch against Moscow from mid-Atlantic would inevitably force the USSR to launch against the USA and the inevitable retaliation.
Both the USSR and USA therefore had a sizeable incentive to ensure no nuclear weapons were ever launched against the UK, and that drove up the risk of starting a war in the first place.
Flexible Response might have replaced Tripwire as NATO policy - but the UK still had it's own wire in place*.
*As described, the strategy of flexible response did "not specify the precise nature of NATO's reaction to a particular attack. It [had] been argued that the ambiguity enhance[d] deterrence by complicating Warsaw Pact planning."4 Ambiguity was also needed in strategy so that the US and Europeans could interpret the strategy to suit their own views. This difference of views within NATO was concentrated primarily on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons. In general, US strategists saw a deliberate and prolonged conventional defense in Europe. Further, they saw the use of tactical nuclear weapons as a way to keep a conflict from becoming a strategic nuclear exchange between the US and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, European strategists desired to see a brief conventional defense phase and viewed the use of tactical "nukes" as a means of coupling US strategic nuclear weapons to the defense of Europe. This coupling would preclude only Europe from becoming a nuclear battlefield.
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What has to be considered under this scenario is that if the UK were hit by Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, they would respond on Russia with a Polaris launch (Moscow Option). Not being able to distinguish this from a US launch and possible decapitation first strike, the Soviets would have to launch - triggering a full scale exchange.
True!
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And a Polaris launch against Moscow from mid-Atlantic would inevitably force the USSR to launch against the USA and the inevitable retaliation.
Double true!
You fellows seem to be congratulating your clever British selves for a stratagem that compelled the 'Mericans to do nuclear gamesmanship your way. But you only fool yourselves. Very obviously, the Reds would have been unable to distinguish a Polaris, etc. launch from a UK sub from a Polaris, etc. launch from a US sub.
The point is, when the USA shared Polaris/Poseidon/Trident with the UK, everybody except maybe some excessively clever Brits could see that the USA was giving Britain the means to start a maxi-size nuclear war/End of the World as We Know It general action between the USA and the USSR.
Some comments about the Wikipedia Chevaline link:
Chevaline - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Soviets were confirmed as working on an ABM system in 1961 when they made their first successful exo-atmospheric interception of an ICBM.
I don't think that successful 1961 intercept actually happened. The ckaim was Red propaganda. Has anybody got any evidence for this intercept?
And the definition of "intecept" in this context: both the Soviet missile interceptors and the American Nike Zeus used atomic bomb warheads, which were supposed to disable incoming warheads with radiation.
...
However it was not until 1970 that serious efforts to explore the ABM problem started in earnest. By this point the US and USSR had agreed in the ABM Treaty to deploy up to 100 ABMs at only two sites. MIRVs had so seriously upset the balance between ABM and ICBM that both parties agreed to limit ABM deployment largely as a way of avoiding a massive buildup of new ICBMs.
I don't agree with the spin of that paragraph. There wasn't a balance between ABM and ICBM deployment in that era. Instead, both sides realized that the Anti-Ballistic missile systems of that era were more show than go. Both sides liked to emit arms limitation propaganda, so why not agree to a treaty limiting wepaons that weren't working well on either side?
True!
/////////////////////
And a Polaris launch against Moscow from mid-Atlantic would inevitably force the USSR to launch against the USA and the inevitable retaliation.
Double true!
You fellows seem to be congratulating your clever British selves for a stratagem that compelled the 'Mericans to do nuclear gamesmanship your way. But you only fool yourselves. Very obviously, the Reds would have been unable to distinguish a Polaris, etc. launch from a UK sub from a Polaris, etc. launch from a US sub.
The point is, when the USA shared Polaris/Poseidon/Trident with the UK, everybody except maybe some excessively clever Brits could see that the USA was giving Britain the means to start a maxi-size nuclear war/End of the World as We Know It general action between the USA and the USSR.
Some comments about the Wikipedia Chevaline link:
Chevaline - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Soviets were confirmed as working on an ABM system in 1961 when they made their first successful exo-atmospheric interception of an ICBM.
I don't think that successful 1961 intercept actually happened. The ckaim was Red propaganda. Has anybody got any evidence for this intercept?
And the definition of "intecept" in this context: both the Soviet missile interceptors and the American Nike Zeus used atomic bomb warheads, which were supposed to disable incoming warheads with radiation.
...
However it was not until 1970 that serious efforts to explore the ABM problem started in earnest. By this point the US and USSR had agreed in the ABM Treaty to deploy up to 100 ABMs at only two sites. MIRVs had so seriously upset the balance between ABM and ICBM that both parties agreed to limit ABM deployment largely as a way of avoiding a massive buildup of new ICBMs.
I don't agree with the spin of that paragraph. There wasn't a balance between ABM and ICBM deployment in that era. Instead, both sides realized that the Anti-Ballistic missile systems of that era were more show than go. Both sides liked to emit arms limitation propaganda, so why not agree to a treaty limiting wepaons that weren't working well on either side?
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Many to whom the paper was circulated would have been involved in the atmospheric weapons tests not as scientists but as aircrew and ground crew, it was their experiences that were being sought. No doubt similar questions were asked of USAF crews.
Only later were more definitive papers published but the initial hare was undoubtedly started with the exo-atmospheric tests.
High-altitude nuclear explosion - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
I don't think that successful 1961 intercept actually happened. The ckaim was Red propaganda. Has anybody got any evidence for this intercept?
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The high altitude explosion Wikipedia link is worth looking at.
When I say that I doubt the 1961 Soviet missile intercept happened, here is what i think happened: The Reds may have launched an anti-missile missile that passed within a rather wide radius of a descending target missile's terminal stage, and the inerceptor's atomic bomb may have exploded in the ionosphere upon radio command from its ground radar tracking station.
However, that so-called "intercept" was an unimpressive technological event, even back in 1961.
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So here was the plan, as I interpret it from some PeePruners: Suppose the Next Big War got started in mitttel Europa, and things weren't going well for the good guys. On the thrid day of this, British decision makers would be wanting to let go with tactical nukes, but the USA might be reluctant to do so.
Then UK Prime Minister would call up the White House and say,
"Terribly sorry to have to bring this up, but if you Americans won't join with us striking the Reds on the Continent in Germany or - er, are they in France now? with our smaller tactical nuclear weapons .... if you won't agree ...
... We'll launch our Polaris missiles now! "
Was that the strategem?
When I say that I doubt the 1961 Soviet missile intercept happened, here is what i think happened: The Reds may have launched an anti-missile missile that passed within a rather wide radius of a descending target missile's terminal stage, and the inerceptor's atomic bomb may have exploded in the ionosphere upon radio command from its ground radar tracking station.
However, that so-called "intercept" was an unimpressive technological event, even back in 1961.
///////////////
So here was the plan, as I interpret it from some PeePruners: Suppose the Next Big War got started in mitttel Europa, and things weren't going well for the good guys. On the thrid day of this, British decision makers would be wanting to let go with tactical nukes, but the USA might be reluctant to do so.
Then UK Prime Minister would call up the White House and say,
"Terribly sorry to have to bring this up, but if you Americans won't join with us striking the Reds on the Continent in Germany or - er, are they in France now? with our smaller tactical nuclear weapons .... if you won't agree ...
... We'll launch our Polaris missiles now! "
Was that the strategem?
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
No, the expectation was that tactical nukes would have been used extensively in continental Europe as the Red Army advanced. The UK intention was that that they didn't get the idea of dropping them on the UK as well, either to take out the UK air bases (that "unsinkable aircraft carrier is I believe the US termed it) or defences.
(As an Air Defender sitting in one of the 3 bunkers thought to be on the first target list I heartily agreed with that idea)
So the tacit presumption was that if the Red Army used nukes against the UK, the UK would respond against Russia itself, with the only weapon it had guaranteed to be able to reach Moscow - Polaris. Which would inevitably lead to a full exchange of strategic weapons by the USSR and USA.
That being known, it could reasonably be expected that the gains of using nukes against the UK would be far outweighed by the consequences, and they would never be used.
The above was not some cunning ruse which the UK "put over" on the USA, Elmo. They had as little wish to lose their bases in the UK as the British. Call it a mutual agreement and one of the advantages of being both a very close ally and a nuclear power.
(As an Air Defender sitting in one of the 3 bunkers thought to be on the first target list I heartily agreed with that idea)
So the tacit presumption was that if the Red Army used nukes against the UK, the UK would respond against Russia itself, with the only weapon it had guaranteed to be able to reach Moscow - Polaris. Which would inevitably lead to a full exchange of strategic weapons by the USSR and USA.
That being known, it could reasonably be expected that the gains of using nukes against the UK would be far outweighed by the consequences, and they would never be used.
The above was not some cunning ruse which the UK "put over" on the USA, Elmo. They had as little wish to lose their bases in the UK as the British. Call it a mutual agreement and one of the advantages of being both a very close ally and a nuclear power.
I think that the key point was that if the Soviets tried to convince the US not to hit the USSR itself, they couldn't make the same bargin with the UK - or for that matter France. Therefore, the hotheads on both sides would be less tempted to start anything as they would not be immune. So the issue wasn't so much the weapons, but fact that they were under the control of different Governments.
See: The Polaris Partnership
It is important to note that British Polaris submarines did, however, carry two sets of targeting tapes. The primary tapes supported NATO targeting data and strategy, while the second set was strictly of British origin and development under the "Moscow Criterion"—the ability of the UK to strike the Moscow area to destroy Soviet leadership. Although the United Kingdom's SSBNs carried targeting tapes that benefited British national nuclear strategy, under the Polaris Sales Agreement, they were only to be used in an absolute dire national emergency. Thus, the missiles and targeting tapes themselves were primarily used in support of NATO strategy.
By having targets from its target list designated and assigned to NATO forces, in particular British Polaris missiles, the United States gained additional coverage of Soviet targets without expending its own funds. A British launching platform created an additional military and intelligence dilemma for the Soviet Union, forcing it to exhaust further resources trying to combat two Polaris forces. Finally, the sale of Polaris strengthened Anglo-American political relations, and, ultimately, contributed greatly toward combating the Soviet threat and winning the Cold War.
I think ORAC explained it far better than I can. Wasn't there supposedly a chain from the guy in the foxhole to the guy in a Minuteman hole?
In 1995 there was a programme on BB2 called The Moscow Criterion, a secret (sic) history of Britain's nuclear weapons. Much of the above is discussed - including the Chevaline upgrade and decision to upgrade Polaris ourselves instead of opting for the Poseidon/MIRV route, then the decision to acquire Trident (worth noting that the Nott cuts of 1981 were largely for paying for Trident) and finally a bit about post Cold War stuff. The late Lord Lewin made the comment nobody has any real idea about how the world will look in x years time. He also said that in the late 1970s the service chiefs persuaded the politicians to consider three questions:
1. Do we (the UK) need a deterrent?
2. What should it do to deter?
3. What should it be - based on 1 and 2?
The result from these studies was the decision to acqiure Trident. The option of nuclear armed cruise missiles (TLAM-N?) was ruled out because of the chance of the missiles getting past Soviet SAM defences was not high, and the limited range of the weapons would have severely restricted the patrol areas. Additionally, there was no vertically launched Tomahawk back then, and firing a salvo of them would have taken time.
When the Americans first developed Polaris, they took several SSNs and fitted a missile compartment amidships.Likewise, the Resolution class SSBN was based on the Valiant class SSNs. When Trident came along, it was a much larger missile and so a new design was needed.
This leads us to where we are now:
a. The Trident missiles can have their lives extended, by the Vanguard boats need replacing.
b. It has been suggested that the Vanguard boats could have a life extension, but this would be costly - and technically difficult. I have no knowledge of nuclear physics/engineering but I think that the reactors would need replacing - something to do with the effects of neutrons on steel and other metals? It has been suggested that the upside is that to stop losing skill fade at Barrow, the Navy would get all eight Astutes. Actually the 1998 SDR said we should have ten, but someone called Geoff (who?) changed this to eight. Then someone changed it to seven.
c. If we developed a new class to take Trident, what happens if the US replaces the Trident missile with an even larger one? Would we be forced to undertake a Chevaline type self upgrade?
In my local paper, my local MP (and MinAF - and the recipient of several defence related missives (mostly about the mighty Sea Harrier) from yours truely) has stated his own opposition (and that of his party) to a "like for like" replacement for Trident. But what does that actually mean? No ballistic missile? No submarine based system? Less missiles/warheads? A reduction in the CASD posture? Or simply less expensive?
My personal view is that we should have a minimal survivable deterrent.
If the Vanguards can be SLEPed then perhaps they should, if the RN got another SSN then that would be a good thing. A stretched version of the Astute design could take a smaller number of missile tubes - four or six perhaps?
This of course would depend on two things - the Vanguard life extension being feasible and not prohibitively expensive, and the next US SLBM design not being so massive that it will not fit. I have no idea about either of these questions. However, it would be cheaper without compromising survivability.
More immediately, there is a chance that SDSR (or the continued announcements in the coming months) will result in a watering down of the Continuous At Sea Deterrence posture. Whilst supporting the deterrent is a task for frigates, SSNs, and Nimrods for x% of the time, a less rugged CASD posture may be used to justify cuts. Of course none of these things are exclusively dedicated to supporting the deterrent but we know how bean counters think.
See: The Polaris Partnership
It is important to note that British Polaris submarines did, however, carry two sets of targeting tapes. The primary tapes supported NATO targeting data and strategy, while the second set was strictly of British origin and development under the "Moscow Criterion"—the ability of the UK to strike the Moscow area to destroy Soviet leadership. Although the United Kingdom's SSBNs carried targeting tapes that benefited British national nuclear strategy, under the Polaris Sales Agreement, they were only to be used in an absolute dire national emergency. Thus, the missiles and targeting tapes themselves were primarily used in support of NATO strategy.
By having targets from its target list designated and assigned to NATO forces, in particular British Polaris missiles, the United States gained additional coverage of Soviet targets without expending its own funds. A British launching platform created an additional military and intelligence dilemma for the Soviet Union, forcing it to exhaust further resources trying to combat two Polaris forces. Finally, the sale of Polaris strengthened Anglo-American political relations, and, ultimately, contributed greatly toward combating the Soviet threat and winning the Cold War.
I think ORAC explained it far better than I can. Wasn't there supposedly a chain from the guy in the foxhole to the guy in a Minuteman hole?
In 1995 there was a programme on BB2 called The Moscow Criterion, a secret (sic) history of Britain's nuclear weapons. Much of the above is discussed - including the Chevaline upgrade and decision to upgrade Polaris ourselves instead of opting for the Poseidon/MIRV route, then the decision to acquire Trident (worth noting that the Nott cuts of 1981 were largely for paying for Trident) and finally a bit about post Cold War stuff. The late Lord Lewin made the comment nobody has any real idea about how the world will look in x years time. He also said that in the late 1970s the service chiefs persuaded the politicians to consider three questions:
1. Do we (the UK) need a deterrent?
2. What should it do to deter?
3. What should it be - based on 1 and 2?
The result from these studies was the decision to acqiure Trident. The option of nuclear armed cruise missiles (TLAM-N?) was ruled out because of the chance of the missiles getting past Soviet SAM defences was not high, and the limited range of the weapons would have severely restricted the patrol areas. Additionally, there was no vertically launched Tomahawk back then, and firing a salvo of them would have taken time.
When the Americans first developed Polaris, they took several SSNs and fitted a missile compartment amidships.Likewise, the Resolution class SSBN was based on the Valiant class SSNs. When Trident came along, it was a much larger missile and so a new design was needed.
This leads us to where we are now:
a. The Trident missiles can have their lives extended, by the Vanguard boats need replacing.
b. It has been suggested that the Vanguard boats could have a life extension, but this would be costly - and technically difficult. I have no knowledge of nuclear physics/engineering but I think that the reactors would need replacing - something to do with the effects of neutrons on steel and other metals? It has been suggested that the upside is that to stop losing skill fade at Barrow, the Navy would get all eight Astutes. Actually the 1998 SDR said we should have ten, but someone called Geoff (who?) changed this to eight. Then someone changed it to seven.
c. If we developed a new class to take Trident, what happens if the US replaces the Trident missile with an even larger one? Would we be forced to undertake a Chevaline type self upgrade?
In my local paper, my local MP (and MinAF - and the recipient of several defence related missives (mostly about the mighty Sea Harrier) from yours truely) has stated his own opposition (and that of his party) to a "like for like" replacement for Trident. But what does that actually mean? No ballistic missile? No submarine based system? Less missiles/warheads? A reduction in the CASD posture? Or simply less expensive?
My personal view is that we should have a minimal survivable deterrent.
If the Vanguards can be SLEPed then perhaps they should, if the RN got another SSN then that would be a good thing. A stretched version of the Astute design could take a smaller number of missile tubes - four or six perhaps?
This of course would depend on two things - the Vanguard life extension being feasible and not prohibitively expensive, and the next US SLBM design not being so massive that it will not fit. I have no idea about either of these questions. However, it would be cheaper without compromising survivability.
More immediately, there is a chance that SDSR (or the continued announcements in the coming months) will result in a watering down of the Continuous At Sea Deterrence posture. Whilst supporting the deterrent is a task for frigates, SSNs, and Nimrods for x% of the time, a less rugged CASD posture may be used to justify cuts. Of course none of these things are exclusively dedicated to supporting the deterrent but we know how bean counters think.
Join Date: Aug 2007
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Two problems
1.
Answer. They stand ready to launch tied up? Ain't going to happen.
2.
Answer. We appear to be about to loose one of the defensive triad, unfortunately.
will result in a watering down of the Continuous At Sea Deterrence posture
2.
supporting the deterrent is a task for frigates, SSNs, and Nimrods for x%
Also isn't the plan for more nuclear cooperation with France in violation of the 1958 US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement and the Polaris Sales Agreement (which allows us access to Trident)?