PPRuNe Forums - View Single Post - Do we need an Independant Nuclear Deterrant?
Old 18th Oct 2010, 23:13
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I think that the key point was that if the Soviets tried to convince the US not to hit the USSR itself, they couldn't make the same bargin with the UK - or for that matter France. Therefore, the hotheads on both sides would be less tempted to start anything as they would not be immune. So the issue wasn't so much the weapons, but fact that they were under the control of different Governments.

See: The Polaris Partnership

It is important to note that British Polaris submarines did, however, carry two sets of targeting tapes. The primary tapes supported NATO targeting data and strategy, while the second set was strictly of British origin and development under the "Moscow Criterion"—the ability of the UK to strike the Moscow area to destroy Soviet leadership. Although the United Kingdom's SSBNs carried targeting tapes that benefited British national nuclear strategy, under the Polaris Sales Agreement, they were only to be used in an absolute dire national emergency. Thus, the missiles and targeting tapes themselves were primarily used in support of NATO strategy.

By having targets from its target list designated and assigned to NATO forces, in particular British Polaris missiles, the United States gained additional coverage of Soviet targets without expending its own funds. A British launching platform created an additional military and intelligence dilemma for the Soviet Union, forcing it to exhaust further resources trying to combat two Polaris forces. Finally, the sale of Polaris strengthened Anglo-American political relations, and, ultimately, contributed greatly toward combating the Soviet threat and winning the Cold War.


I think ORAC explained it far better than I can. Wasn't there supposedly a chain from the guy in the foxhole to the guy in a Minuteman hole?

In 1995 there was a programme on BB2 called The Moscow Criterion, a secret (sic) history of Britain's nuclear weapons. Much of the above is discussed - including the Chevaline upgrade and decision to upgrade Polaris ourselves instead of opting for the Poseidon/MIRV route, then the decision to acquire Trident (worth noting that the Nott cuts of 1981 were largely for paying for Trident) and finally a bit about post Cold War stuff. The late Lord Lewin made the comment nobody has any real idea about how the world will look in x years time. He also said that in the late 1970s the service chiefs persuaded the politicians to consider three questions:

1. Do we (the UK) need a deterrent?
2. What should it do to deter?
3. What should it be - based on 1 and 2?

The result from these studies was the decision to acqiure Trident. The option of nuclear armed cruise missiles (TLAM-N?) was ruled out because of the chance of the missiles getting past Soviet SAM defences was not high, and the limited range of the weapons would have severely restricted the patrol areas. Additionally, there was no vertically launched Tomahawk back then, and firing a salvo of them would have taken time.

When the Americans first developed Polaris, they took several SSNs and fitted a missile compartment amidships.Likewise, the Resolution class SSBN was based on the Valiant class SSNs. When Trident came along, it was a much larger missile and so a new design was needed.

This leads us to where we are now:

a. The Trident missiles can have their lives extended, by the Vanguard boats need replacing.
b. It has been suggested that the Vanguard boats could have a life extension, but this would be costly - and technically difficult. I have no knowledge of nuclear physics/engineering but I think that the reactors would need replacing - something to do with the effects of neutrons on steel and other metals? It has been suggested that the upside is that to stop losing skill fade at Barrow, the Navy would get all eight Astutes. Actually the 1998 SDR said we should have ten, but someone called Geoff (who?) changed this to eight. Then someone changed it to seven.
c. If we developed a new class to take Trident, what happens if the US replaces the Trident missile with an even larger one? Would we be forced to undertake a Chevaline type self upgrade?

In my local paper, my local MP (and MinAF - and the recipient of several defence related missives (mostly about the mighty Sea Harrier) from yours truely) has stated his own opposition (and that of his party) to a "like for like" replacement for Trident. But what does that actually mean? No ballistic missile? No submarine based system? Less missiles/warheads? A reduction in the CASD posture? Or simply less expensive?

My personal view is that we should have a minimal survivable deterrent.

If the Vanguards can be SLEPed then perhaps they should, if the RN got another SSN then that would be a good thing. A stretched version of the Astute design could take a smaller number of missile tubes - four or six perhaps?

This of course would depend on two things - the Vanguard life extension being feasible and not prohibitively expensive, and the next US SLBM design not being so massive that it will not fit. I have no idea about either of these questions. However, it would be cheaper without compromising survivability.

More immediately, there is a chance that SDSR (or the continued announcements in the coming months) will result in a watering down of the Continuous At Sea Deterrence posture. Whilst supporting the deterrent is a task for frigates, SSNs, and Nimrods for x% of the time, a less rugged CASD posture may be used to justify cuts. Of course none of these things are exclusively dedicated to supporting the deterrent but we know how bean counters think.
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