FJ or Fighter Pilots HARD QUESTIONS
"Am I seriously suggesting the P-51D could roll faster or get a better initial or sustained turn than the 109G, and if so, which G model?"
Yes, I'm suggesting that the late Defence of the Reich Gs were sluggish old mules, a far cry from the Es and Fs, and that despite its vicious departure characteristics, the Mustang was better.
"You ask about the Battle of Britain. Aircraft performance was the deciding factor was it? If so, which types and why?"
Let's not get into the 'Hurricane was the real hero of the BoB' can of worms, but simply acknowledge that (except in negative g push-overs) the Spit I had an edge over the 109E-4. Or think about aircraft performance (especially agility) to explain the high loss rates of the Defiant and 110. Case proven, I'd have thought.
I'm not saying that aircraft agility is always the deciding factor, and didn't mention the Winter War (though I think that your claims of Finnish Air superiority are simplistic) or the Battle of Berlin.
You say that in the Pacific Japanese aircraft were highly manoeuvrable, yet lost in huge numbers?
Performance was a factor, though obviously other factors will always come into play. In the Pacific, aircraft manoeuvrability was an enormous factor in the early days (Zero vs Hurricane/P-40/Buffalo) and again later when the later, heavier Jap aircraft came up against the F6F Hellcat.
You claim that in the Korean War "the MIG-15 generally out performed the F-86E".
The handling problems and departure characteristics (to say nothing of the pilot quality, training and methods of operation) of the MiG-15 meant that it was effectively and functionally less agile than the Sabre, hard or slatted. NB that virtually every kill was a guns kill in a turning fight - go figure!
War over North Vietnam. US Air superiority. Yet VNAF aircraft have superior agility in most types they employed.
Hype apart, the VNAF performed extremely well against the USAF and the USN, until the skills of manoeuvring combat were taught to the USAF and USN. Overall, of course, the VNAF lost the war, but poor tactics and training, massive numerical inferiority etc. were the reasons. Had they had less agile aircraft, US attainment of air superiority would have been swifter and cheaper.
and as you say: "Same as above for Arab Israeli conflicts."
India - Pakistan. Pakistan gains a greater number of kills. Why? Aircraft type?
Any assessment of either Indo-Pak conflict is difficult, because all published works on the two wars rely over-heavily on over inflated PAF propaganda accounts which are of dubious veracity. However, it's noteworthy that in most engagements, the more agile aircraft usually won.
Falklands. FAA get consistent AA kills with no (?) AA losses. Why? Sea Harrier?
Sea Harrier certainly more agile than bomb- and fuel-laden Daggers and A-4s.
Your GENERAL conclusion - that the side with the FASTER aircraft TENDs to be the winning side bears little scrutiny, BTW - you need think only of the Luftwaffe at the end of the war, with 262s, 163s and Ta 152s, or the Falklands with Mach 2 Daggers against subsonic SHars.
Unless you can guarantee superiority in all other respects, giving away the advantage of better manoeuvrability is simply stupid. You say yourself that you are "not talking about individual encounters and combats", yet clearly any air campaign will be a summation of those individual combats. Go out and lose every time, and you'll lose the war. Go out in a less manoeuvrable (but otherwise equal) aircraft and you'll lose.
And in the future we can expect numerical parity (or even inferiority), enemy aircraft with superior performance, and, in some aspects superior weapons, while the growth of the upgrade market makes it entirely possible that enemy aircraft may have near-parity in sensor and systems performance. Aircraft like the Su-27 and MiG-29 may already enjoy superior very low speed high Alpha agility, so spending money to narrow that gap, and to give better manoeuvrability in other ares is essential.
Remember that when EF was being designed, the Russians had helmet-mounted cueing systems and large-angle off boresight weapons in service, while NATO did not. To have deliberately designed EF as an aircraft no more agile than the F-15 would have been short-sighted and criminally irresponsible. However, I suspect you've made up your mind....
Yes, I'm suggesting that the late Defence of the Reich Gs were sluggish old mules, a far cry from the Es and Fs, and that despite its vicious departure characteristics, the Mustang was better.
"You ask about the Battle of Britain. Aircraft performance was the deciding factor was it? If so, which types and why?"
Let's not get into the 'Hurricane was the real hero of the BoB' can of worms, but simply acknowledge that (except in negative g push-overs) the Spit I had an edge over the 109E-4. Or think about aircraft performance (especially agility) to explain the high loss rates of the Defiant and 110. Case proven, I'd have thought.
I'm not saying that aircraft agility is always the deciding factor, and didn't mention the Winter War (though I think that your claims of Finnish Air superiority are simplistic) or the Battle of Berlin.
You say that in the Pacific Japanese aircraft were highly manoeuvrable, yet lost in huge numbers?
Performance was a factor, though obviously other factors will always come into play. In the Pacific, aircraft manoeuvrability was an enormous factor in the early days (Zero vs Hurricane/P-40/Buffalo) and again later when the later, heavier Jap aircraft came up against the F6F Hellcat.
You claim that in the Korean War "the MIG-15 generally out performed the F-86E".
The handling problems and departure characteristics (to say nothing of the pilot quality, training and methods of operation) of the MiG-15 meant that it was effectively and functionally less agile than the Sabre, hard or slatted. NB that virtually every kill was a guns kill in a turning fight - go figure!
War over North Vietnam. US Air superiority. Yet VNAF aircraft have superior agility in most types they employed.
Hype apart, the VNAF performed extremely well against the USAF and the USN, until the skills of manoeuvring combat were taught to the USAF and USN. Overall, of course, the VNAF lost the war, but poor tactics and training, massive numerical inferiority etc. were the reasons. Had they had less agile aircraft, US attainment of air superiority would have been swifter and cheaper.
and as you say: "Same as above for Arab Israeli conflicts."
India - Pakistan. Pakistan gains a greater number of kills. Why? Aircraft type?
Any assessment of either Indo-Pak conflict is difficult, because all published works on the two wars rely over-heavily on over inflated PAF propaganda accounts which are of dubious veracity. However, it's noteworthy that in most engagements, the more agile aircraft usually won.
Falklands. FAA get consistent AA kills with no (?) AA losses. Why? Sea Harrier?
Sea Harrier certainly more agile than bomb- and fuel-laden Daggers and A-4s.
Your GENERAL conclusion - that the side with the FASTER aircraft TENDs to be the winning side bears little scrutiny, BTW - you need think only of the Luftwaffe at the end of the war, with 262s, 163s and Ta 152s, or the Falklands with Mach 2 Daggers against subsonic SHars.
Unless you can guarantee superiority in all other respects, giving away the advantage of better manoeuvrability is simply stupid. You say yourself that you are "not talking about individual encounters and combats", yet clearly any air campaign will be a summation of those individual combats. Go out and lose every time, and you'll lose the war. Go out in a less manoeuvrable (but otherwise equal) aircraft and you'll lose.
And in the future we can expect numerical parity (or even inferiority), enemy aircraft with superior performance, and, in some aspects superior weapons, while the growth of the upgrade market makes it entirely possible that enemy aircraft may have near-parity in sensor and systems performance. Aircraft like the Su-27 and MiG-29 may already enjoy superior very low speed high Alpha agility, so spending money to narrow that gap, and to give better manoeuvrability in other ares is essential.
Remember that when EF was being designed, the Russians had helmet-mounted cueing systems and large-angle off boresight weapons in service, while NATO did not. To have deliberately designed EF as an aircraft no more agile than the F-15 would have been short-sighted and criminally irresponsible. However, I suspect you've made up your mind....
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Jacko dear boy,
Your analysis based on the evidence you present and state is flawless. I salute you, Sir.
Your point about the EF development requirement is well made. I wonder who was responsible for fielding Tornado F-3, when it's known and expected opponent, at the time, was the MiG-29? Presumably we have learn't from that mistake.
I am of course sorry to discover that General Yeager and Eric Brown were wrong in their belief that the 109G was a more agile aircraft than the P-51D. I will now treat all my sources and interviewees with increased suspicion.
Finding my case disproven, I will, proceed on the basis, that it is agile fighters that define air superiority.
Of course if any one else has an opinion......
edited to produce a more agreeable/less confrontational tone. Nothing more unsightly than two rivet counters swinging handbags.
[ 18 August 2001: Message edited by: Low and Slow ]
Your analysis based on the evidence you present and state is flawless. I salute you, Sir.
Your point about the EF development requirement is well made. I wonder who was responsible for fielding Tornado F-3, when it's known and expected opponent, at the time, was the MiG-29? Presumably we have learn't from that mistake.
I am of course sorry to discover that General Yeager and Eric Brown were wrong in their belief that the 109G was a more agile aircraft than the P-51D. I will now treat all my sources and interviewees with increased suspicion.
Finding my case disproven, I will, proceed on the basis, that it is agile fighters that define air superiority.
Of course if any one else has an opinion......
edited to produce a more agreeable/less confrontational tone. Nothing more unsightly than two rivet counters swinging handbags.
[ 18 August 2001: Message edited by: Low and Slow ]
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Low 'n Slow
Jackonicko
A fascinating thread (only wish I could understand all the abbreviations!) Only two points:
Surely we were committed to the F3 (remember MRCA?) in the late '60s - long before Mig 29 was a gleam in Mikoyan's eye. Was not Mig-29 an '80s aircraft?
Was not Dagger at such extreme range over E Falklands that it could hardly accelerate supersonic AND make it home? Anyway, is it not true that, after the first Vulcan raid and "Beetham's Bomb", the Daggers stayed at home to guard Mum?
I heard a story that a Dagger tried to land flame-out back at base, couln't make it, tried to bang out but the seat didn't fire because the cartridges were timex. The Argies blamed the Brits for being unsporting over the supply of cartridges from Martin Baker! (Or something like that)
Jackonicko
A fascinating thread (only wish I could understand all the abbreviations!) Only two points:
Surely we were committed to the F3 (remember MRCA?) in the late '60s - long before Mig 29 was a gleam in Mikoyan's eye. Was not Mig-29 an '80s aircraft?
Was not Dagger at such extreme range over E Falklands that it could hardly accelerate supersonic AND make it home? Anyway, is it not true that, after the first Vulcan raid and "Beetham's Bomb", the Daggers stayed at home to guard Mum?
I heard a story that a Dagger tried to land flame-out back at base, couln't make it, tried to bang out but the seat didn't fire because the cartridges were timex. The Argies blamed the Brits for being unsporting over the supply of cartridges from Martin Baker! (Or something like that)
Confrontational? I'm sorry you feel that way - I'd taken your questions at face value and was trying to answer as best I could. My answers, by the way, are based on much more than the evidence I state, but yours was a nice bit of sarcasm, so for that, I salute you back! My own comment about your having appeared to have made up your mind may have been a bit harsh - if so, I apologise, but you have had it from the horse's mouth (Stillin seems to be a current AD practitioner) who seems broadly representative of the frontline view as I've heard it. Agility is still considered important - look back at the EF gun removal thread, for example.
I'm not a fighter or FJ pilot, but I've interviewed many, including participants from almost all of the wars which you list , and often participants from both sides (No Finns!). By challenging me on the Bf 109G vs Mustang you focused in on the one area where I was least confident - since both aircraft had pretty major problems as 'dogfighters'.
However, having had a chat with a couple of folk who've flown both types, and having re-acquainted myself with the writings of the great Eric Brown, I see that: "The Mustang could steadily outdive the Bf109G-6 and had no difficulty out-turning it" (Wings of the Luftwaffe). This was a comment based on a trial flown with an early G (a G-6 without external fuel and I believe with underwing cannon gondolas removed) which might have been expected to be as agile as any 109 variant, against a rather tired Mustang III (some way short of a late-war P-51D or K), which might be expected to be less agile than a typical 'stang. Despite this, the only advantage Brown claimed for the 109G was in climb-rate below 20,000 ft.
He made a great deal of the 'heaviness' of the Gs controls at high speeds, and the effect of the auto-slats, which caused aileron snatching in any high g manoeuvres. He also listed the cramped cockpit, poor quality of the glass and perspex, poor harmonisation of the controls, the over-light rudder and ailerons and the very heavy elevator as being weak points. And this, remember, was a G-6, he'd have found a late G or a K even less impressive against a P-51.
Many former Mustang drivers will describe their aircraft in glowing terms, but I believe that serious examination (there was a marvellous paper in the SETP journal comparing four US WWII fighters) gives a the Mustang a less glowing report, not least because of its tendency to depart, rather violently. There is no doubt, however, that it was agile, with a phenomenal rate of roll (described by Brown as being 'only slightly inferior to the Fw 190.... which set the standard for fighter rate of roll').
With regard to General Yeager, I'd personally be slightly cautious in accepting his value judgements about any aeroplane. Undeniably a great fighter pilot, he was also a great self publicist. Talking up the quality of his opponents makes his already impressive achievements look even more remarkable. He is, incidentally, the man who said of the Northrop X-4 that after he'd flown it and had such problems they 'junked it then and there'. In fact the X-4 flew on for many more flights, albeit in the hands of modest, publicity-shy and unassuming TPs, who would never have been his equal as a combat fighter pilot, but who perhaps had better 'hands'.
There are a whole bunch of guys who've recently flown both types (as warbirds) and while I'm cautious about the representativeness of a restored Bf 109G (with an engine which may be much less than its wartime best - or much better) it's worth noting that no-one I've spoken to felt that the G-6 was anywhere near to being a match for the Mustang. But that's pretty subjective, and may be unreliable.
I don't claim that agility defines air combat success - like many of your other respondents, I was merely cautioning you against the apparent belief that it was entirely irrelevant, and the claim that it always has been.
You are quite right in questioning whether for one Air Force to gain Air Superiority over another, it necessarily has to operate the more manoeuvrable airframes. In some cases, victory is possible without, and other factors, (Pilot quality and training, MMI, sensor and weapons performance, SA, etc. C3I) will sometimes be more important.
But when the margin is narrow (as it often is in air combat) then manoeuvrability is not an advantage to be given away lightly. This is perhaps more true now than ever before, when avoidance of casualties has assumed so great an importance. There is a real imperative to keep our fighter pilots safe, and exchange rates which may have been acceptable in WWII (where winning the battle was more important than comparative losses) or Korea would no longer be tolerated today.
Don't feel I'm having a go, please. But it's always worth re-thinking one's most cherished notions, if only so that you can back them up with more powerful evidence, and dismantle your critics with even more force!. Good luck with the book, BTW, who's the publisher?
Edited to answer Flatus:
MiG-29 entered service after F3's conception, but was probably known to be 'on the horizon' from soon after its first flight when it was spotted at Zhukhovskii (Ramenskoye) by satellite. I wouldn't want to be too harsh on those who failed to realise how agile it was going to turn out to be - that first Farnborough appearance with the tailslide and the amazingly tight (non FBW) turns took everyone by surprise!
The AD Mirages in the Falklands were 'kept back' but the Daggers flew FGA from start to finish, BTW.
[ 18 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]
I'm not a fighter or FJ pilot, but I've interviewed many, including participants from almost all of the wars which you list , and often participants from both sides (No Finns!). By challenging me on the Bf 109G vs Mustang you focused in on the one area where I was least confident - since both aircraft had pretty major problems as 'dogfighters'.
However, having had a chat with a couple of folk who've flown both types, and having re-acquainted myself with the writings of the great Eric Brown, I see that: "The Mustang could steadily outdive the Bf109G-6 and had no difficulty out-turning it" (Wings of the Luftwaffe). This was a comment based on a trial flown with an early G (a G-6 without external fuel and I believe with underwing cannon gondolas removed) which might have been expected to be as agile as any 109 variant, against a rather tired Mustang III (some way short of a late-war P-51D or K), which might be expected to be less agile than a typical 'stang. Despite this, the only advantage Brown claimed for the 109G was in climb-rate below 20,000 ft.
He made a great deal of the 'heaviness' of the Gs controls at high speeds, and the effect of the auto-slats, which caused aileron snatching in any high g manoeuvres. He also listed the cramped cockpit, poor quality of the glass and perspex, poor harmonisation of the controls, the over-light rudder and ailerons and the very heavy elevator as being weak points. And this, remember, was a G-6, he'd have found a late G or a K even less impressive against a P-51.
Many former Mustang drivers will describe their aircraft in glowing terms, but I believe that serious examination (there was a marvellous paper in the SETP journal comparing four US WWII fighters) gives a the Mustang a less glowing report, not least because of its tendency to depart, rather violently. There is no doubt, however, that it was agile, with a phenomenal rate of roll (described by Brown as being 'only slightly inferior to the Fw 190.... which set the standard for fighter rate of roll').
With regard to General Yeager, I'd personally be slightly cautious in accepting his value judgements about any aeroplane. Undeniably a great fighter pilot, he was also a great self publicist. Talking up the quality of his opponents makes his already impressive achievements look even more remarkable. He is, incidentally, the man who said of the Northrop X-4 that after he'd flown it and had such problems they 'junked it then and there'. In fact the X-4 flew on for many more flights, albeit in the hands of modest, publicity-shy and unassuming TPs, who would never have been his equal as a combat fighter pilot, but who perhaps had better 'hands'.
There are a whole bunch of guys who've recently flown both types (as warbirds) and while I'm cautious about the representativeness of a restored Bf 109G (with an engine which may be much less than its wartime best - or much better) it's worth noting that no-one I've spoken to felt that the G-6 was anywhere near to being a match for the Mustang. But that's pretty subjective, and may be unreliable.
I don't claim that agility defines air combat success - like many of your other respondents, I was merely cautioning you against the apparent belief that it was entirely irrelevant, and the claim that it always has been.
You are quite right in questioning whether for one Air Force to gain Air Superiority over another, it necessarily has to operate the more manoeuvrable airframes. In some cases, victory is possible without, and other factors, (Pilot quality and training, MMI, sensor and weapons performance, SA, etc. C3I) will sometimes be more important.
But when the margin is narrow (as it often is in air combat) then manoeuvrability is not an advantage to be given away lightly. This is perhaps more true now than ever before, when avoidance of casualties has assumed so great an importance. There is a real imperative to keep our fighter pilots safe, and exchange rates which may have been acceptable in WWII (where winning the battle was more important than comparative losses) or Korea would no longer be tolerated today.
Don't feel I'm having a go, please. But it's always worth re-thinking one's most cherished notions, if only so that you can back them up with more powerful evidence, and dismantle your critics with even more force!. Good luck with the book, BTW, who's the publisher?
Edited to answer Flatus:
MiG-29 entered service after F3's conception, but was probably known to be 'on the horizon' from soon after its first flight when it was spotted at Zhukhovskii (Ramenskoye) by satellite. I wouldn't want to be too harsh on those who failed to realise how agile it was going to turn out to be - that first Farnborough appearance with the tailslide and the amazingly tight (non FBW) turns took everyone by surprise!
The AD Mirages in the Falklands were 'kept back' but the Daggers flew FGA from start to finish, BTW.
[ 18 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]
FV - surely the universally-despised Tornado 'ADV' was intended to be just a forward area beyond visual range Backfire-plinker, never to mix it with air superiority fighters? Hence the feeble little engines and dismal 'knife fight in a phone box' performance??
I remember seeing 'certain information' about aircraft referred to as the Ram-J, -K and -L a while ago in JDW; didn't they eventually emerge as the Fulcrum, Flanker and Frogfoot?
Did you ever, as I did, have fun doing max rate turns in the Vulcan at FL 500+ knowing that none of our so-called air defence aircraft had a cat in hells' chance of getting a missile kill.......??
Training, tactics, agility, weapons....and luck!
As a footnote, I flew the first ever 'mission' against a couple of MiG 29s coming into the UK FIR for that Farnborough Air Show in the mighty Vickers Funbus. We were told to keep it v. quiet - which we did. Even the boss didn't know (which is just as well as he'd only have pinched the trip!). All went well and we met our 'Aeroflot' callsign MiGs as advertised - the F3s with us were a pain in the ar$e and wanted to be all aggressive, having struggled to do the 'intercept' all they then did was to get in the b£oody way of most of our camera shots, but the journos in the back got what they wanted and the piccies appeared on that night's 6-o'clock news on ITN and BBC. The journos with their conventional cameras got the best shots - Janice from Flight in particular. We felt a bit sorry for the poor $od from TASS with his Siberian pig-iron Zenit cameras though!
[ 20 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
I remember seeing 'certain information' about aircraft referred to as the Ram-J, -K and -L a while ago in JDW; didn't they eventually emerge as the Fulcrum, Flanker and Frogfoot?
Did you ever, as I did, have fun doing max rate turns in the Vulcan at FL 500+ knowing that none of our so-called air defence aircraft had a cat in hells' chance of getting a missile kill.......??
Training, tactics, agility, weapons....and luck!
As a footnote, I flew the first ever 'mission' against a couple of MiG 29s coming into the UK FIR for that Farnborough Air Show in the mighty Vickers Funbus. We were told to keep it v. quiet - which we did. Even the boss didn't know (which is just as well as he'd only have pinched the trip!). All went well and we met our 'Aeroflot' callsign MiGs as advertised - the F3s with us were a pain in the ar$e and wanted to be all aggressive, having struggled to do the 'intercept' all they then did was to get in the b£oody way of most of our camera shots, but the journos in the back got what they wanted and the piccies appeared on that night's 6-o'clock news on ITN and BBC. The journos with their conventional cameras got the best shots - Janice from Flight in particular. We felt a bit sorry for the poor $od from TASS with his Siberian pig-iron Zenit cameras though!
[ 20 August 2001: Message edited by: BEagle ]
L&S,
At the risk of repeating others, my four penn'orth, based purely on my interpretation of the historical examples (former victims of Air SCP, Swindonshire, groan inwardly and ignore the rest of this posting).
Your question is a good 'un. I think you've probably found out, though, that the answer usually can't be found in a single factor: for manoeuvre alone to be the decisive factor is rare. It presupposes that we take two fighter pilots of absolutely equal quality - ranging from experience, training, ability, getting out of the right side of bed, not having momentary brain fade that passes the advantage to the opponent, etc - in aircraft with similar weapons systems (i.e. visual range only), with similar fuel states so neither's thinking 'time to go home...'
Then, if all these improbable criteria are met, having your MiG-29 against an F-4, let's say, means one successful MiG pilot. As I'm certain you've discovered, examples of this are rare. I'd contend that the whole point of manouevre is that it gives the pilot of the more manoeuvrable aircraft an advantage. This may be the ability to disengage rather than press home the fight.
Tweo examples: 1917, Royal Naval Air Service Sopwith Triplanes versus Albatros series. The manoeuvrability of the Triplane enabled RNAS units to gain an advantage. When the RFC/RNAS had aircraft (e.g. FE8, BE 12) which were easily outmanoeuvred, the German Air Service gained air superiority. When the Triplane, followed by the Camel and SE 5a came along, their enhanced power of manoeuvre - amongst other things - altered the balance. In the case of the Camel and the Triplane, manoeuvre was arguably the key factor. That said, the dear old Red Baron et al were still able to rely on skill, cunning, experience, training, tactics, etc to make a fight of it.
Battle of Britain (sorry). Hurricane/Spit vs. Me109 can be debated for ages - but my view is the Hurri/Spit vs. Me110 is the better illustration. Goering (never the greatest judge) thought that the 110 would clear the skies - but, despite heavy armament, good pilots, etc, it didn't. The manoeuvre capability of the Hurri and Spit meant that it was at a disadvantage; given the Luftwaffe force structure, so was the Luftwaffe. Although not fighter v fighter, argubaly the most accurate bomber in the German arsenal, the Stuka, was withdrawn because it was slaughtered by more manoeuvrable aircraft.
OK, a word on the 109 - again, I'd argue that manouevre was a factor. The Hurricane was largely disadvantaged, but a case could be made to say that its ability to out-turn the 109, and thereby stand a chance of surviving was important. This was more so with the Spitfire. Not overwhelming decisive factors in the campaign, but important contributors, I'd say.
Post WW2, with BVR, IR, and a whole host of clever devices, the question isn't easy to answer. BEagle's right, though. The F3 was designed to splash bombers. The fancy manoeuvring on the central front would be done by USAFE F-15s, a whole array of F-16s and...er... 19 and 92 with FGR 2s.
It comes down, I think, to two points:
1. In certain circumstances, having the power to outmanoeuvre an opponent within visual range can offer an advantage. Since 'there are no prizes for coming second' (or other suitable axiom/cliche), it's worthwhile having enhanced power of manoeuvre.
2. Given that we can never be certain that zapping the enemy from BVR will be in the ROE, it helps to have the advantage described in (1).
But overall, I would contend that the record shows manoeuvre to be one of the 'have to have' features for any aircraft meant to go head to head with enemy fighters, even if, in practice, that quality is not often used. The factors of pilot quality, weapons systems superiority and so on can negate it, and there is much evidence of this (Vietnam, etc). But why risk it and not have it? The USN would have ended up with the F-111B or even the straight-winged F6D Missiler, which wouldn't have cut it over the Gulf of Sirte...
Many, many apologies for the length of the post.
At the risk of repeating others, my four penn'orth, based purely on my interpretation of the historical examples (former victims of Air SCP, Swindonshire, groan inwardly and ignore the rest of this posting).
Your question is a good 'un. I think you've probably found out, though, that the answer usually can't be found in a single factor: for manoeuvre alone to be the decisive factor is rare. It presupposes that we take two fighter pilots of absolutely equal quality - ranging from experience, training, ability, getting out of the right side of bed, not having momentary brain fade that passes the advantage to the opponent, etc - in aircraft with similar weapons systems (i.e. visual range only), with similar fuel states so neither's thinking 'time to go home...'
Then, if all these improbable criteria are met, having your MiG-29 against an F-4, let's say, means one successful MiG pilot. As I'm certain you've discovered, examples of this are rare. I'd contend that the whole point of manouevre is that it gives the pilot of the more manoeuvrable aircraft an advantage. This may be the ability to disengage rather than press home the fight.
Tweo examples: 1917, Royal Naval Air Service Sopwith Triplanes versus Albatros series. The manoeuvrability of the Triplane enabled RNAS units to gain an advantage. When the RFC/RNAS had aircraft (e.g. FE8, BE 12) which were easily outmanoeuvred, the German Air Service gained air superiority. When the Triplane, followed by the Camel and SE 5a came along, their enhanced power of manoeuvre - amongst other things - altered the balance. In the case of the Camel and the Triplane, manoeuvre was arguably the key factor. That said, the dear old Red Baron et al were still able to rely on skill, cunning, experience, training, tactics, etc to make a fight of it.
Battle of Britain (sorry). Hurricane/Spit vs. Me109 can be debated for ages - but my view is the Hurri/Spit vs. Me110 is the better illustration. Goering (never the greatest judge) thought that the 110 would clear the skies - but, despite heavy armament, good pilots, etc, it didn't. The manoeuvre capability of the Hurri and Spit meant that it was at a disadvantage; given the Luftwaffe force structure, so was the Luftwaffe. Although not fighter v fighter, argubaly the most accurate bomber in the German arsenal, the Stuka, was withdrawn because it was slaughtered by more manoeuvrable aircraft.
OK, a word on the 109 - again, I'd argue that manouevre was a factor. The Hurricane was largely disadvantaged, but a case could be made to say that its ability to out-turn the 109, and thereby stand a chance of surviving was important. This was more so with the Spitfire. Not overwhelming decisive factors in the campaign, but important contributors, I'd say.
Post WW2, with BVR, IR, and a whole host of clever devices, the question isn't easy to answer. BEagle's right, though. The F3 was designed to splash bombers. The fancy manoeuvring on the central front would be done by USAFE F-15s, a whole array of F-16s and...er... 19 and 92 with FGR 2s.
It comes down, I think, to two points:
1. In certain circumstances, having the power to outmanoeuvre an opponent within visual range can offer an advantage. Since 'there are no prizes for coming second' (or other suitable axiom/cliche), it's worthwhile having enhanced power of manoeuvre.
2. Given that we can never be certain that zapping the enemy from BVR will be in the ROE, it helps to have the advantage described in (1).
But overall, I would contend that the record shows manoeuvre to be one of the 'have to have' features for any aircraft meant to go head to head with enemy fighters, even if, in practice, that quality is not often used. The factors of pilot quality, weapons systems superiority and so on can negate it, and there is much evidence of this (Vietnam, etc). But why risk it and not have it? The USN would have ended up with the F-111B or even the straight-winged F6D Missiler, which wouldn't have cut it over the Gulf of Sirte...
Many, many apologies for the length of the post.
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Jacko, It was I who was being confrontational. Not you. Apologies and salutations accepted, nuff said.
Now some useful stuff,
1. Yes, you are absolutely right. Eric Brown does say the Mustang III easily out turned the 109G-6. I had that wrong in my notes. I can't find any reference to the P-51's rate of roll though. Please forward me this reference. I have been trying to find the original AFDU tests at the PRO for some time. If you know the file name, please e-mail me.
2. Using an algorithm sent to me by a US aerodynamicist, the calculations seems to indicate, (and my maths is pants) the 109 G at a weight of some 6,500lbs out turning the P-51D at 9,000lbs or there abouts. I set pressure alt to 10,000ft. Bear in mind the G-6 had slats.
3. Personally, I agree the P-51D was a better fighter. No contest, but I would still want to explore the issue of the sustained turn.
Everyone else (and yes Jacko as well, J ) thanks for insightful and useful observations.
So here are my main points re-stated for discussion purposes.
a. I haven't defined manoeuvrability very well. I am mainly referring to sustained turn, rate of roll and climb. The relevance of any or all of these are debateable, and of differing relevance when looking at Jet or piston engine combat. There are also a few other vital ones I haven't mentioned. I would welcome some thoughts.
b. The F-3 and Mig 29 were near enough concurrent, and represent two differing views, and /or missions, but basically the aim was the same. - TO WIT, the question has to be asked, WHAT OPERATONAL analysis gave birth to the F-3 and what to Mig-29?
c. The point about designing in features that "WE MUST HAVE" but "WE USE RARELY" is absolutely the basis for my subject. EG. Lets have good sustained turn, but NO GUN??
d. History is full of fighters that have been designed for the wrong conflict or mission, and have had to be adapted, or modified, some times with great success, some times not. All most every successful fighter was a compromise or adaptation. Why do we think we are any better at it today then we were historically, when History shows us to have got wrong fairly consistently, and the saving grace is nearly always, non airframe factors.
edited cos I mizzpleedd MiGG-29
[ 19 August 2001: Message edited by: Low and Slow ]
Now some useful stuff,
1. Yes, you are absolutely right. Eric Brown does say the Mustang III easily out turned the 109G-6. I had that wrong in my notes. I can't find any reference to the P-51's rate of roll though. Please forward me this reference. I have been trying to find the original AFDU tests at the PRO for some time. If you know the file name, please e-mail me.
2. Using an algorithm sent to me by a US aerodynamicist, the calculations seems to indicate, (and my maths is pants) the 109 G at a weight of some 6,500lbs out turning the P-51D at 9,000lbs or there abouts. I set pressure alt to 10,000ft. Bear in mind the G-6 had slats.
3. Personally, I agree the P-51D was a better fighter. No contest, but I would still want to explore the issue of the sustained turn.
Everyone else (and yes Jacko as well, J ) thanks for insightful and useful observations.
So here are my main points re-stated for discussion purposes.
a. I haven't defined manoeuvrability very well. I am mainly referring to sustained turn, rate of roll and climb. The relevance of any or all of these are debateable, and of differing relevance when looking at Jet or piston engine combat. There are also a few other vital ones I haven't mentioned. I would welcome some thoughts.
b. The F-3 and Mig 29 were near enough concurrent, and represent two differing views, and /or missions, but basically the aim was the same. - TO WIT, the question has to be asked, WHAT OPERATONAL analysis gave birth to the F-3 and what to Mig-29?
c. The point about designing in features that "WE MUST HAVE" but "WE USE RARELY" is absolutely the basis for my subject. EG. Lets have good sustained turn, but NO GUN??
d. History is full of fighters that have been designed for the wrong conflict or mission, and have had to be adapted, or modified, some times with great success, some times not. All most every successful fighter was a compromise or adaptation. Why do we think we are any better at it today then we were historically, when History shows us to have got wrong fairly consistently, and the saving grace is nearly always, non airframe factors.
edited cos I mizzpleedd MiGG-29
[ 19 August 2001: Message edited by: Low and Slow ]
Without looking it up (always fatal) I'd say that your 109G weight may be on the light side for a fully-armed Defence of the Reich aircraft. Also, the uneven and unpredictable opening of the 109s slats were more of a hindrance than a help, making it a poor gun platform. With regard to roll rates, see Brown (Wings of Luftwaffe and Wings of the Weird and Wonderful parts 1 and 2 on the aircraft types discussed - 109G 190A Mustang). I remember seeing something more detailed (perhaps with parametrics in an Alf Price book (World War II fighter conflict/combat, if memory serves) but can't find it on the shelves.
With regard to the ORs of Tornado and MiG-29, my understanding is as BEags stated, that ADV was entirely optimised as a Northern Q, long range, high endurance BVR interceptor, intended primarily to stop enemy bombers and missile carriers steaming down through the GIUK gap. At that time, no-one expected the possibility of a 'Flanker' escort......
As such, the F2/F3 should perhaps be compared to the MiG-31, not the -29, which was conceived as a lightweight battlefield air defence/air superiority aircraft, operating from frontline strips (including roads) in good weather and with comprehensive GCI, and with a vital strike/attack capability (one squadron in every three squadron Regiment had a primary war role of nuclear strike using RN-40s, with the other regiments assigned to sweep and escort). It was the low element in a high:low mix of MFI and LFI (Su-27 and MiG-29), just as the F-16 was the low element in the FX:LWF mix.
Although Tornado, -29 and -27 entered service at much the same time, the development of the Russian types was quicker, and the two aircraft were not known about until they flew - five-six years before they entered frontline service.
The interesting allied MiG-29 counter would have been the aircraft which met AST409 (the RAFG FGR2 and Jag/Harrier replacement) - this eventually evolved into EF, of course, though without German prevarication and delays, and with off-the-shelf avionics (Blue Vixen and AMRAAM, perhaps, or APG-65) an aircraft could have been in service ten years ago. (Anyone remember the 'EAP?)
Archimedes' point about the 110 is an excellent one - in that aircraft you have one with superior SA (multi-crew), C3I (dedicated radio-op!) superior firepower, and well-trained, high quality crews (arguably the Luftwaffe's finest, since the Zerstorergruppen were Herman's pet project) with greater operational experience and better training. The aircraft was even fairly fast. But the more agile the opponent, the more of a 'sitter' it became.
With regard to the ORs of Tornado and MiG-29, my understanding is as BEags stated, that ADV was entirely optimised as a Northern Q, long range, high endurance BVR interceptor, intended primarily to stop enemy bombers and missile carriers steaming down through the GIUK gap. At that time, no-one expected the possibility of a 'Flanker' escort......
As such, the F2/F3 should perhaps be compared to the MiG-31, not the -29, which was conceived as a lightweight battlefield air defence/air superiority aircraft, operating from frontline strips (including roads) in good weather and with comprehensive GCI, and with a vital strike/attack capability (one squadron in every three squadron Regiment had a primary war role of nuclear strike using RN-40s, with the other regiments assigned to sweep and escort). It was the low element in a high:low mix of MFI and LFI (Su-27 and MiG-29), just as the F-16 was the low element in the FX:LWF mix.
Although Tornado, -29 and -27 entered service at much the same time, the development of the Russian types was quicker, and the two aircraft were not known about until they flew - five-six years before they entered frontline service.
The interesting allied MiG-29 counter would have been the aircraft which met AST409 (the RAFG FGR2 and Jag/Harrier replacement) - this eventually evolved into EF, of course, though without German prevarication and delays, and with off-the-shelf avionics (Blue Vixen and AMRAAM, perhaps, or APG-65) an aircraft could have been in service ten years ago. (Anyone remember the 'EAP?)
Archimedes' point about the 110 is an excellent one - in that aircraft you have one with superior SA (multi-crew), C3I (dedicated radio-op!) superior firepower, and well-trained, high quality crews (arguably the Luftwaffe's finest, since the Zerstorergruppen were Herman's pet project) with greater operational experience and better training. The aircraft was even fairly fast. But the more agile the opponent, the more of a 'sitter' it became.
Do a Hover - it avoids G
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Cor wot a good thread
I have nothing of significance to add to what has been said by my betters here but for those who are not sure about the desirability of very good manoeuvrability imagine how you would feel going out to do your duty in say an F3 when you knew they had MiG-29s.
This situation applied for real at the start of the Gulf War and there were some very unhappy chaps looking to speak to anybody who had flown a MiG-29.
L&S
Re the point that sustained turn rate rather than instantaneous is important I agree it can make a very great difference in a simple 1 v 1 situation when all else is similar. On a light note, when we started to deliver the Hawk to the RAF weapons trainers, we found their car parks full of bumper stickers saying Keep Hunter stamp out Hawk. Then a few weeks later (when they had started to collect new aircraft themselves) one of their arch Hunter fans (and a v. good operator indeed) took me aside in the Dunsfold coffee bar and remarked that all fights Hawk v Hawk finished up higher than where they started, unlike the Hunter ones that always ended up on the deck. He was clearly embarrassed in asking why this should be. P****, I said “What do you do when you can’t handle the G available any more?” “Climb” he said. “Think about it” I said.
In the 70’s to sit in a Hawk and realise it could be flown at low level on its G limit until it ran out of fuel was a novel experience. The RAF had not previously experienced the advantages of a low induced drag wing. And neither I suspect had the USAF. One day a USAF General got up my nose by declaring you could not fight a war unless the aerodrome was big enough to land a C5 to keep things going. As this was just before I was going to take him for a ride in G-VTOL, I excused myself, told the hangar to put the jump-jet back in the shed and wheel out G-HAWK instead. I asked Andy Jones to fly him at 6G until he requested him to stop and awaited events. At lunch the General turned on me and demanded to know why the Hawk had no induced drag “It was our first fixed price contract Sir, and we ran out of money” I replied. Our General Manager immediately coughed up a prawn but Mr USAF was too busy transmitting his next Logistics point to consider what I had said.
I have nothing of significance to add to what has been said by my betters here but for those who are not sure about the desirability of very good manoeuvrability imagine how you would feel going out to do your duty in say an F3 when you knew they had MiG-29s.
This situation applied for real at the start of the Gulf War and there were some very unhappy chaps looking to speak to anybody who had flown a MiG-29.
L&S
Re the point that sustained turn rate rather than instantaneous is important I agree it can make a very great difference in a simple 1 v 1 situation when all else is similar. On a light note, when we started to deliver the Hawk to the RAF weapons trainers, we found their car parks full of bumper stickers saying Keep Hunter stamp out Hawk. Then a few weeks later (when they had started to collect new aircraft themselves) one of their arch Hunter fans (and a v. good operator indeed) took me aside in the Dunsfold coffee bar and remarked that all fights Hawk v Hawk finished up higher than where they started, unlike the Hunter ones that always ended up on the deck. He was clearly embarrassed in asking why this should be. P****, I said “What do you do when you can’t handle the G available any more?” “Climb” he said. “Think about it” I said.
In the 70’s to sit in a Hawk and realise it could be flown at low level on its G limit until it ran out of fuel was a novel experience. The RAF had not previously experienced the advantages of a low induced drag wing. And neither I suspect had the USAF. One day a USAF General got up my nose by declaring you could not fight a war unless the aerodrome was big enough to land a C5 to keep things going. As this was just before I was going to take him for a ride in G-VTOL, I excused myself, told the hangar to put the jump-jet back in the shed and wheel out G-HAWK instead. I asked Andy Jones to fly him at 6G until he requested him to stop and awaited events. At lunch the General turned on me and demanded to know why the Hawk had no induced drag “It was our first fixed price contract Sir, and we ran out of money” I replied. Our General Manager immediately coughed up a prawn but Mr USAF was too busy transmitting his next Logistics point to consider what I had said.
Just re-read your point D (History is full of fighters that have been designed for the wrong conflict or mission, and have had to be adapted, or modified, some times with great success, some times not.)
Unless you think you know what every future war will bring, the only answer to this is to design fighters that can do anything and everything, and certainly not accept any compromise aircraft which can't for example "turn all that well, 'cos it didn't prove necessary over Iraq/Kosovo".
One of John Farley's many lower/lesser/worsers!
Unless you think you know what every future war will bring, the only answer to this is to design fighters that can do anything and everything, and certainly not accept any compromise aircraft which can't for example "turn all that well, 'cos it didn't prove necessary over Iraq/Kosovo".
One of John Farley's many lower/lesser/worsers!
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From tomorrow's edition of Aviation Week:
Extract from an interview with Vladimir Barkovsky,
Extract from an interview with Vladimir Barkovsky,
...first deputy general designer and director of MiG Russian Aircraft Corp.'s engineering center. He is a former star in Sukhoi's preliminary design department that was involved in early work on the experimental S-37.
...The amount of stealth built into the design will "always be a process of finding a compromise with flying characteristics, the capability of the sensors and the weapons," he said. "If we create a new aircraft that does not have stealth, we will waste the taxpayers' money." Barkovsky cited the British Avro Vulcan bomber of the 1950s as a low-radar-cross-section design that didn't require stealth materials and structures.
...The amount of stealth built into the design will "always be a process of finding a compromise with flying characteristics, the capability of the sensors and the weapons," he said. "If we create a new aircraft that does not have stealth, we will waste the taxpayers' money." Barkovsky cited the British Avro Vulcan bomber of the 1950s as a low-radar-cross-section design that didn't require stealth materials and structures.
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BEagle
I hesitate to stick my oar in amongst all these fighter tactics and historical wizzes. Yes, we had much fun splashing Lightnings and F4s at Waddo and Mirages at Butterworth and Darwin! I have forgotten the "g" limit on the Vulcan (2.5?), but I used to get the co to chant the "g" while I craned my neck. If you inadvertently pulled a bit hard you could usually get the Crew Chief to square the accelerometer, put if you picked up someone's turbulence while pulling the limit, the nasty little fatigue recorder down the back went ape and OC Eng was on the blower PDQ. We had no pressure jerkins in my day, so FL450 was supposed to be the limit. But if you wanted to sort out the Mirages you had to go for it. Max continous cruise (wire locked thrust limiters) with luck gave you about FL550 if I remember rightly (as long as the rear crew did not moan too loudly!). "Splash one F4" on the Fighter Control frequency usually drew some ripe banter! At CFS Type Sqn in 57 I used to fly the ex-fighter jocks in the Canberra T4 and the ex-heavy guys had a go in the Hunters. Now that was an interesting experiment! The ex-heavies used to try and mix it and were a bit put out to find the Canberra in their "six".
I am a bit confused between "agility" and "performance". To me the former means sustained turning ability and rate of roll and the latter means acceleration, level and diving speed and rate of climb. In WW2 the P47 "Jug" (the archtypical flying brick) did good work (in the right hands)against the ME109s and FW190s. But the golden rule was one pass only and keep on going down hill. Same with the Meteor against the Vampire or Sea Hawk, although we always had suckers who would get into a turning match and get hammered by the No 2, if he knew his job. (The 14 Sqn Kiwis did and the FAA Sqns often did not).
The faith in the OR staff of those who say that F3 was "intended to be a BACKFIRE buster" and ask about the "Op Analysis on which it was based" is touching. But the reality was more like "we can only afford one airframe to do the strike/attack and AD jobs, so this is what you are going to get - shut up and think of how you can use it". At Strike in 70/71 some of us tried to push for an up-dated Buccaneer for the Strike/Attack job and on "off-the-shelf" American fighter. F16 or F18 seemed to be the favourites. I even took soundings on using spare Vulcans with an AI radar instead of H2S and with a battery AAMs as a long-endurance BVR bomber-buster. DO NOT ROCK THE BOAT was the response from on (very) high. The future of the British aerospace industry (and my post-retirement directorship) are at stake! By 1974 when I did the Air Warfare course the likely capability of the ADV (in comparison with the F14,15,16 and 18) was becoming pitifully clear and the fighter jocks on the course were complaining loudly (but not too loudly in the presence of high-ranking visitors). In 75/76 I was in the bit of OR which was sponsoring R&D into future FCSs, FBW, and unstable platforms. We used to ponder questions such as the degree of redundancy needed in the computers and the desirability of emergency overrides for the "g" and Alpha limiters. We consoled ourselves with the thought that the Sovs might be able to do good airframes, but they couldn't do the avionics to exploit them fully. I suspect very strongly, BEagle, that the RAM J,K and L designators were highly speculative projections of industrial capacity. When were FULCRUM and FLANKER identified, given given configurations and named ? I do know but I don't propose to say here. I also know that when FULCRUM was first displayed there were some red faces around Whitehall.
My opinion (which is worth bugger-all!): Performance and agility are both goodies. If you have to compromise, weight it in favour of performance, which gives you the initiative in engagement/disengagement. But I know little of the capabilities of current missiles, sensors and target acquisition kit (helmet-mounted thingies!)
(Edited for spealing by FV)
[ 19 August 2001: Message edited by: Flatus Veteranus ]
I hesitate to stick my oar in amongst all these fighter tactics and historical wizzes. Yes, we had much fun splashing Lightnings and F4s at Waddo and Mirages at Butterworth and Darwin! I have forgotten the "g" limit on the Vulcan (2.5?), but I used to get the co to chant the "g" while I craned my neck. If you inadvertently pulled a bit hard you could usually get the Crew Chief to square the accelerometer, put if you picked up someone's turbulence while pulling the limit, the nasty little fatigue recorder down the back went ape and OC Eng was on the blower PDQ. We had no pressure jerkins in my day, so FL450 was supposed to be the limit. But if you wanted to sort out the Mirages you had to go for it. Max continous cruise (wire locked thrust limiters) with luck gave you about FL550 if I remember rightly (as long as the rear crew did not moan too loudly!). "Splash one F4" on the Fighter Control frequency usually drew some ripe banter! At CFS Type Sqn in 57 I used to fly the ex-fighter jocks in the Canberra T4 and the ex-heavy guys had a go in the Hunters. Now that was an interesting experiment! The ex-heavies used to try and mix it and were a bit put out to find the Canberra in their "six".
I am a bit confused between "agility" and "performance". To me the former means sustained turning ability and rate of roll and the latter means acceleration, level and diving speed and rate of climb. In WW2 the P47 "Jug" (the archtypical flying brick) did good work (in the right hands)against the ME109s and FW190s. But the golden rule was one pass only and keep on going down hill. Same with the Meteor against the Vampire or Sea Hawk, although we always had suckers who would get into a turning match and get hammered by the No 2, if he knew his job. (The 14 Sqn Kiwis did and the FAA Sqns often did not).
The faith in the OR staff of those who say that F3 was "intended to be a BACKFIRE buster" and ask about the "Op Analysis on which it was based" is touching. But the reality was more like "we can only afford one airframe to do the strike/attack and AD jobs, so this is what you are going to get - shut up and think of how you can use it". At Strike in 70/71 some of us tried to push for an up-dated Buccaneer for the Strike/Attack job and on "off-the-shelf" American fighter. F16 or F18 seemed to be the favourites. I even took soundings on using spare Vulcans with an AI radar instead of H2S and with a battery AAMs as a long-endurance BVR bomber-buster. DO NOT ROCK THE BOAT was the response from on (very) high. The future of the British aerospace industry (and my post-retirement directorship) are at stake! By 1974 when I did the Air Warfare course the likely capability of the ADV (in comparison with the F14,15,16 and 18) was becoming pitifully clear and the fighter jocks on the course were complaining loudly (but not too loudly in the presence of high-ranking visitors). In 75/76 I was in the bit of OR which was sponsoring R&D into future FCSs, FBW, and unstable platforms. We used to ponder questions such as the degree of redundancy needed in the computers and the desirability of emergency overrides for the "g" and Alpha limiters. We consoled ourselves with the thought that the Sovs might be able to do good airframes, but they couldn't do the avionics to exploit them fully. I suspect very strongly, BEagle, that the RAM J,K and L designators were highly speculative projections of industrial capacity. When were FULCRUM and FLANKER identified, given given configurations and named ? I do know but I don't propose to say here. I also know that when FULCRUM was first displayed there were some red faces around Whitehall.
My opinion (which is worth bugger-all!): Performance and agility are both goodies. If you have to compromise, weight it in favour of performance, which gives you the initiative in engagement/disengagement. But I know little of the capabilities of current missiles, sensors and target acquisition kit (helmet-mounted thingies!)
(Edited for spealing by FV)
[ 19 August 2001: Message edited by: Flatus Veteranus ]
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Interesting stuff, but a couple of questions for Jacko or anyone who knows a bit about these things.
1) VNAF - my understanding was that the VNAF scored well against the US in the early days because they only attacked when everything was on their side, used very good tactics (basically the same thing!) and used their slow turning ability. When the US rediscovered high-energy manoeuvring and how to use it, the k/l ratio changed dramatically.
A point of manoeuvrability being better than agility?
2) In the BoB what were the actual 109 v Spit k/l figures? I could be very wrong but I seem to recall reading that the losses for both Spit and 109 during the battle were about equal, and as the 109 was being shot down by Hurricanes as well would actually give the 109 a better k/l ratio over the Spitfire.
L'n'S does have a point, though. There certainly are a great many occasions where speed and 'straight-line' performance have carried the day over agility - 109F v. I-16 in Russia being a classic case (at the time probably the world's fastest v. most agile). And just as the Zero's manoeuvrability made it completely ascendant in the early days in the Pacific, so surely it was the Hellcat's speed, strength and dive/climb performance which defeated the Zero, rather than its agility.
But...there can't be many air battles where you can point to one decisive factor - there is too much else to consider such as pilot skill and training, tactics, defensive or offensive posture etc etc. Most outcomes will be decided by a combination of all the factors - agility being just one - and which side has the most in its favour.
If you can build a Eurofighter with rapid acceleration, long range radar and missiles, flown by well trained pilots etc etc etc, then there is certainly no harm making it manoeuvrable as well. As others have said, you never know if that might just be the decisive factor next time round...
1) VNAF - my understanding was that the VNAF scored well against the US in the early days because they only attacked when everything was on their side, used very good tactics (basically the same thing!) and used their slow turning ability. When the US rediscovered high-energy manoeuvring and how to use it, the k/l ratio changed dramatically.
A point of manoeuvrability being better than agility?
2) In the BoB what were the actual 109 v Spit k/l figures? I could be very wrong but I seem to recall reading that the losses for both Spit and 109 during the battle were about equal, and as the 109 was being shot down by Hurricanes as well would actually give the 109 a better k/l ratio over the Spitfire.
L'n'S does have a point, though. There certainly are a great many occasions where speed and 'straight-line' performance have carried the day over agility - 109F v. I-16 in Russia being a classic case (at the time probably the world's fastest v. most agile). And just as the Zero's manoeuvrability made it completely ascendant in the early days in the Pacific, so surely it was the Hellcat's speed, strength and dive/climb performance which defeated the Zero, rather than its agility.
But...there can't be many air battles where you can point to one decisive factor - there is too much else to consider such as pilot skill and training, tactics, defensive or offensive posture etc etc. Most outcomes will be decided by a combination of all the factors - agility being just one - and which side has the most in its favour.
If you can build a Eurofighter with rapid acceleration, long range radar and missiles, flown by well trained pilots etc etc etc, then there is certainly no harm making it manoeuvrable as well. As others have said, you never know if that might just be the decisive factor next time round...
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Some cracking good stuff guys. Thanks. Very interested in the Meter v. Vampire and Seahawk notes, as well the Vulcan Canberra, observations.
Jacko, yes you are absolutely right, that you should design for the next war. Every fighter I am aware of, pretty much has been. The problem is, that the next war always produces some fairly massive surprises and that has been were the problem lies. The P-51A / A-36, the Me-110 etc, etc, The F-12!!!!
And this is the crux of my point lies. Most good aerodynamicists/pilots can look at a threat platform and pretty much predict it's performance in comparison to their own. What they can't predict, (thought they can often guess) is Pilot training, C3I, logistics, yaddah yaddah yaddah…..
The Flatus point, that cost, not the OR is often the constraining factor is very germane, incisive, and obvious and I feel a prat for not having spotted it. Some has mentioned to me that the one of the factors as to why EFA took so much time to develop was because it was more OR driven than Cost and the OR was constantly changing. (Wonder why?)
Granted, since the last 30 years (design and service cycle) has seen something like a 45-50% reduction in the types of fighter and combat aircraft fielded. N.B.> Types not numbers, this is now becoming less of a challenge. Typhoon can pretty much predict it's future threat, better than the F-104, F-4 or F3 could.
Red Snow. IMO, you are just about correct in your analysis of the VNAF tactics, and I have been re-scrutinising the BoB losses you mention. I don’t think you are that wrong. The 109 certainly was a fearsome aircraft, especially in the armament stakes, but not as good a turner as the Spit.
Jacko, yes you are absolutely right, that you should design for the next war. Every fighter I am aware of, pretty much has been. The problem is, that the next war always produces some fairly massive surprises and that has been were the problem lies. The P-51A / A-36, the Me-110 etc, etc, The F-12!!!!
And this is the crux of my point lies. Most good aerodynamicists/pilots can look at a threat platform and pretty much predict it's performance in comparison to their own. What they can't predict, (thought they can often guess) is Pilot training, C3I, logistics, yaddah yaddah yaddah…..
The Flatus point, that cost, not the OR is often the constraining factor is very germane, incisive, and obvious and I feel a prat for not having spotted it. Some has mentioned to me that the one of the factors as to why EFA took so much time to develop was because it was more OR driven than Cost and the OR was constantly changing. (Wonder why?)
Granted, since the last 30 years (design and service cycle) has seen something like a 45-50% reduction in the types of fighter and combat aircraft fielded. N.B.> Types not numbers, this is now becoming less of a challenge. Typhoon can pretty much predict it's future threat, better than the F-104, F-4 or F3 could.
Red Snow. IMO, you are just about correct in your analysis of the VNAF tactics, and I have been re-scrutinising the BoB losses you mention. I don’t think you are that wrong. The 109 certainly was a fearsome aircraft, especially in the armament stakes, but not as good a turner as the Spit.
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Don't feel a prat, L'n S; or if you must, console yourself that you are of a mind with the Int and OR staffs. I don't know whether the busty ladies who adorn the Whitehall Gardens entrance to the Mad House will survive the current refurbishment (they are are relics of the building's Board of Trade days and are supposed to represent plenteouness). If they do there ought to be inscribed over the entrance "'Neath these Tits have passed some Bigger Ones". 
Some early VNAF kills were high speed slash attacks - they'd been trained to use guns (didn't have 'owt else), whereas the bulk of US fighters were missle only at the start of the war. They were prepared and equipped for the close-in turning fight (with the -17 at lower speeds, with the -21 at all).
Re BoB. There is no accurate source of kills and losses by type. Kill claims were grossly over-exaggerated (and in the RAF, the extent of exaggeration varied by unit - No.41 claimed kills on days when enemy aircraft were lost in that area, at the right time, while No.242, for instance claimed large numbers of enemy aircraft on days when the Germans lost nothing at all!) and losses were often ascribed to causes other than enemy action, even when enemy action was the cause - and vice versa. Trying to assess exactly what type achieved what is a minefield! But, generally speaking, the Spit seems to have done better (in expert or experienced hands) than the 109 - you shouldn't count the fresh units manned by 20 hr FOs, really - the Luftwaffe didn't have any!
Re Ram-designations.
Ram- is short for Ramenskoye, the town nearest to the LII test centre at Zhukhovskii. They were provisional reporting names (perhaps US, rather than NATO ASCC?) allocated to aircraft seen at 'Ramenskoye' (as we thought Zhuk was called) before a type entered service and thus became eligible for a 'proper' ASCC name.
The Ram-J, -K and -L designations dated from late '77 when the 9-12, T10 and T8 (MiG-29, Su-27 and Su-25 prototypes) were at Zhuk. for their initial flight trials. The MiG-29 entered frontline service in 1983, with three Regiments, one at Kubinka, one at Ros, and I can't remember the third. The 'Fulcrum' designation probably appeared when the first ones reached the GSFG (Group of Sov Forces in Germany).
109 vs I-16 is an interesting one, with a real contrast between Spain and Barbarossa. Maybe Stalin's purges, leaving the Red Air Force denuded of anyone remotely capable explains the one-sided result as much as the merits and de-merits of any aircraft type involved. I believe that even Hs 123 dive bombers got air-to-air kills in '41 on the Ostfront!
[ 20 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]
Re BoB. There is no accurate source of kills and losses by type. Kill claims were grossly over-exaggerated (and in the RAF, the extent of exaggeration varied by unit - No.41 claimed kills on days when enemy aircraft were lost in that area, at the right time, while No.242, for instance claimed large numbers of enemy aircraft on days when the Germans lost nothing at all!) and losses were often ascribed to causes other than enemy action, even when enemy action was the cause - and vice versa. Trying to assess exactly what type achieved what is a minefield! But, generally speaking, the Spit seems to have done better (in expert or experienced hands) than the 109 - you shouldn't count the fresh units manned by 20 hr FOs, really - the Luftwaffe didn't have any!
Re Ram-designations.
Ram- is short for Ramenskoye, the town nearest to the LII test centre at Zhukhovskii. They were provisional reporting names (perhaps US, rather than NATO ASCC?) allocated to aircraft seen at 'Ramenskoye' (as we thought Zhuk was called) before a type entered service and thus became eligible for a 'proper' ASCC name.
The Ram-J, -K and -L designations dated from late '77 when the 9-12, T10 and T8 (MiG-29, Su-27 and Su-25 prototypes) were at Zhuk. for their initial flight trials. The MiG-29 entered frontline service in 1983, with three Regiments, one at Kubinka, one at Ros, and I can't remember the third. The 'Fulcrum' designation probably appeared when the first ones reached the GSFG (Group of Sov Forces in Germany).
109 vs I-16 is an interesting one, with a real contrast between Spain and Barbarossa. Maybe Stalin's purges, leaving the Red Air Force denuded of anyone remotely capable explains the one-sided result as much as the merits and de-merits of any aircraft type involved. I believe that even Hs 123 dive bombers got air-to-air kills in '41 on the Ostfront!
[ 20 August 2001: Message edited by: Jackonicko ]
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Here are some stats on the first 18 months of air-air combat in SE-ASIA, not including the C-123 T-28 shoot down in Feb 64
Apr-65 to Jul-66
VNAF downed 23 US Aircraft. Icluding one Drone
18 by Mig-17 - Cannon
1 by Mig 19 - Cannon
3 unknown, but at least one was Mig 21 - Mar 66
US losses, were by significant type were
6 - F-105D
6 - F4
2 - F-104
4 - F-8/RF-8
US downed 26 aircraft.
25 Mig 17
1 Mig 21
7 kills by cannon,
1 by manoeuvre
18 by missile
F-4' scored 16 kills
F-8' scored 4 kills
F-105 cored 3 kills
A-1 got 2
And F-100 got one
Yeah, yeah, I am sad Air power history geek! But judging by the 5 or 6 e-mails I have some people a re interested.
Apr-65 to Jul-66
VNAF downed 23 US Aircraft. Icluding one Drone
18 by Mig-17 - Cannon
1 by Mig 19 - Cannon
3 unknown, but at least one was Mig 21 - Mar 66
US losses, were by significant type were
6 - F-105D
6 - F4
2 - F-104
4 - F-8/RF-8
US downed 26 aircraft.
25 Mig 17
1 Mig 21
7 kills by cannon,
1 by manoeuvre
18 by missile
F-4' scored 16 kills
F-8' scored 4 kills
F-105 cored 3 kills
A-1 got 2
And F-100 got one
Yeah, yeah, I am sad Air power history geek! But judging by the 5 or 6 e-mails I have some people a re interested.
L&S
Lots of stuff in this thread but nobody has mentioned the pk of AAM's; it's got better over the years but despite the sales patter it's still fairly dire.
I had the pleasure of flying F4's for the best part of ten years and enjoyed several practice firings; despite carefully controlled conditions, lots of practice and well prepared systems the results were problematic - as far as I know aim9l's and seasplash are still in use.
So even with BVR and 'over your shoulder' the outcome is uncertain before countermeasures are considered. You may not plan on a knife fight in a telephone box but it can't be ignored. As I recall, during a 1v1 ( or worse! ) whilst a lot of effort was spent trying for a 'close in' missile or guns kill, at least half of what little brain power remained was looking for a way out. With a more manouvreable airplane than an F4 (not difficult) and no gun I think that all my effort would be directed towards fighting another day!
As a matter of interest, during TLP I had the unrepeatable experience of watching guns tracking film on an RCAF F18 taken by a GAF F104, 2 seconds on the back of the canopy - JAM THAT!
Be careful out there.
Lots of stuff in this thread but nobody has mentioned the pk of AAM's; it's got better over the years but despite the sales patter it's still fairly dire.
I had the pleasure of flying F4's for the best part of ten years and enjoyed several practice firings; despite carefully controlled conditions, lots of practice and well prepared systems the results were problematic - as far as I know aim9l's and seasplash are still in use.
So even with BVR and 'over your shoulder' the outcome is uncertain before countermeasures are considered. You may not plan on a knife fight in a telephone box but it can't be ignored. As I recall, during a 1v1 ( or worse! ) whilst a lot of effort was spent trying for a 'close in' missile or guns kill, at least half of what little brain power remained was looking for a way out. With a more manouvreable airplane than an F4 (not difficult) and no gun I think that all my effort would be directed towards fighting another day!
As a matter of interest, during TLP I had the unrepeatable experience of watching guns tracking film on an RCAF F18 taken by a GAF F104, 2 seconds on the back of the canopy - JAM THAT!
Be careful out there.
L&S and others,
Re Vietnam there are a couple of good boks covering the US perspective of the air war. Try 'Scream of Eagles' by Robert K. Wilcox (about the formation of Topgun) and 'On Yankee Station' by Cdr John B. Nichols and Barrett Tillman (about the USN air war). Another less known book which I found astounding in its analysis of the Vietnam air war is 'Clashes' by Marshall L. Mitchell III, printed in 1997 in the USA. The detailed (at times day-by-day) breakdown of combat results and changing tactics, along with political and man-management decisions in the U.S. corridors of power, explained a lot to me about the kill ratios between USA and NVNAF. You may find it a useful adjunct to your research. It's a clinical and analytical kind of'Thud Ridge' using declassified combat reports as its basis.
The most amazing ineptitude, in my mind, was the decision by USAF planners not to send anyone (except volunteers) for a second tour to the conflict until everyone had a 'combat tour'. This resulted in poorly trained (ie F-4 interceptor conversion with NO ACM!) ex-transport pilots being sent to strike Nth Vietnam with less than 100 hours on type! The book is riddled with accounts of aircraft losses and crew bailout/capture/death because they departed controlled flight in the first breakturn of an engagement. Couple these factors with the convoluted Rules of Engagement (ROE) applied by politcal masters and the whole story is another sobering lesson in how not to fight.
Maybe that's all obvious, but the best equipment/weapons and bravest of dedicated crews is no use if you are forced to play into the hands of the enemy, in this case largely by their own side!
As an ex-fighter pilot though, let me say that every fighter pilot, even a rookie, has one more thing in their favour if they have manoeuvrability AND all the rest...that lesson was reinforced me on more than one occasion! But it can still all come back to the old adage, 'I'd rather be lucky than good!'
ps good thread
Re Vietnam there are a couple of good boks covering the US perspective of the air war. Try 'Scream of Eagles' by Robert K. Wilcox (about the formation of Topgun) and 'On Yankee Station' by Cdr John B. Nichols and Barrett Tillman (about the USN air war). Another less known book which I found astounding in its analysis of the Vietnam air war is 'Clashes' by Marshall L. Mitchell III, printed in 1997 in the USA. The detailed (at times day-by-day) breakdown of combat results and changing tactics, along with political and man-management decisions in the U.S. corridors of power, explained a lot to me about the kill ratios between USA and NVNAF. You may find it a useful adjunct to your research. It's a clinical and analytical kind of'Thud Ridge' using declassified combat reports as its basis.
The most amazing ineptitude, in my mind, was the decision by USAF planners not to send anyone (except volunteers) for a second tour to the conflict until everyone had a 'combat tour'. This resulted in poorly trained (ie F-4 interceptor conversion with NO ACM!) ex-transport pilots being sent to strike Nth Vietnam with less than 100 hours on type! The book is riddled with accounts of aircraft losses and crew bailout/capture/death because they departed controlled flight in the first breakturn of an engagement. Couple these factors with the convoluted Rules of Engagement (ROE) applied by politcal masters and the whole story is another sobering lesson in how not to fight.
Maybe that's all obvious, but the best equipment/weapons and bravest of dedicated crews is no use if you are forced to play into the hands of the enemy, in this case largely by their own side!
As an ex-fighter pilot though, let me say that every fighter pilot, even a rookie, has one more thing in their favour if they have manoeuvrability AND all the rest...that lesson was reinforced me on more than one occasion! But it can still all come back to the old adage, 'I'd rather be lucky than good!'
ps good thread
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Top Thread - When John Farley agrees with Folks, you know you've hit the spot! Having flown whippy, turning, multi-role, Uncle Sam designed jets on exchange and then our Wasteofspace examples, I have to confess, I would rather go to war in our US cousins' machines. Having said that, I have recently done 'Ops' in the F3 and had no fears that despite the opposition having more manoeuvrable ac, I would whip their butts with my vastly superior weapons system.
Beags - As I've said before - hugely respect most of yer views, but I'm thinking you have a slight hangup against us F3 Dudes - Pray tell of yer switch fm F4's to gas station driver - no bad feelings there perchance?
Beags - As I've said before - hugely respect most of yer views, but I'm thinking you have a slight hangup against us F3 Dudes - Pray tell of yer switch fm F4's to gas station driver - no bad feelings there perchance?