Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Atlantic Cowboy, I'm not 'ranting and raving' but asking YOU for the sixth time (see 5584 for last attempt)
Why is this important?
can you enlighten us if there was a separate document drawn up that recorded the airworthiness audit trail as part of the investigation and if such a document exists has it (to your knowledge) been made publicly available
- The content of such a document will answer many of the questions placed on this thread concerning STIs, FADEC, Contol Pallets etc etc.
- If such a document does not exist it would indicate that the original investigation was less than thorough.
Atlantic Cowboy
On numerous occasions you have regaled us with tales of you briefing Ministers on this accident.
You will therefore be familiar with this phrase, which adorns all Ministerial correspondence;
…..suggesting you agree it was flawed, as you have gone one step further and apportioned sole blame.
So, have successive Ministers been briefed truthfully?
8-15’s question is of course directly related to this. As you know, what he asks for
On numerous occasions you have regaled us with tales of you briefing Ministers on this accident.
You will therefore be familiar with this phrase, which adorns all Ministerial correspondence;
“The crash of Chinook ZD576 is the most extensively examined accident in the history of UK military aviation”.
Yet at #5770 you say…
“If the Mull BoI was flawed it must surely be as a result of the failure to seek information by the President”.
So, have successive Ministers been briefed truthfully?
8-15’s question is of course directly related to this. As you know, what he asks for
"is not to be destroyed until at least 5 years after the aircraft is out of service”.
Perhaps I should put you out of your misery and say MoD have on many occasions been unable to produce crucial extracts from this body of work. In fact, they have confirmed in writing that they do not comply with the regulations requiring them to maintain an audit trail (a fact even they cannot deny as it has been stated in official audit reports too numerous to mention). Perhaps you prepared that draft?
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flipster
Re your post #5763
Very nice photographs - but as they were not taken on 2nd June 1994 they are indicative but not strictly relevant. What is relevant is the Finding of the Investigating Board contained at para 16e of their report that "The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre".
As that Finding was made by experienced Chinook Pilots in respect of exactly the same forecast as the Pilots of ZD576 had received; it is clear that they should, once clear of the North Antrim coast, have climbed to a suitable level at or above Safety Altitude until they were unequivocally certain that the weather on the Mull and in the surrounding area was suitable for low level VFR flight. "Suck it and see" at low level was not an acceptable option.
The following is an extract from a letter written by Sqn Ldr DG Kinch DFM (a very experienced Maritime Patrol Aircraft Captain and Examiner who was awarded the Pike Trophy by the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators in 1992) to the Editor of the Daily Telegraph which was published 13th December 2000.
"In light winds and high relative humidity, layers of fog and low cloud form adjacent to the Mull to obscure the high ground completely. There are occasions when a relatively calm sea and a grey sky of similar hue merge, so that in otherwise good visibility a Pilot flying in accordance with VFR may be unaware he is about to enter a fog bank".
Finally, the following is a quote from an article by the Aviation Historian Arthur Helsby:-
"For some time now the coastline of Kintyre, and in particular the area around the Mull, has been known to pilots as a dangerous area to fly at low level because of the freak weather conditions that frequently affect the coastline. The first recorded military air accident on the Mull was in 1941 when an Armstrong Whitworth Whitley from 502 Sqn crashed on the west slope of Beinn na Lice. Since then there have been nineteen recorded air accidents in the vicinity of the Mull and over a hundred and twenty lives have been lost in this remote corner of Scotland."
Re your post #5763
Very nice photographs - but as they were not taken on 2nd June 1994 they are indicative but not strictly relevant. What is relevant is the Finding of the Investigating Board contained at para 16e of their report that "The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre".
As that Finding was made by experienced Chinook Pilots in respect of exactly the same forecast as the Pilots of ZD576 had received; it is clear that they should, once clear of the North Antrim coast, have climbed to a suitable level at or above Safety Altitude until they were unequivocally certain that the weather on the Mull and in the surrounding area was suitable for low level VFR flight. "Suck it and see" at low level was not an acceptable option.
The following is an extract from a letter written by Sqn Ldr DG Kinch DFM (a very experienced Maritime Patrol Aircraft Captain and Examiner who was awarded the Pike Trophy by the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators in 1992) to the Editor of the Daily Telegraph which was published 13th December 2000.
"In light winds and high relative humidity, layers of fog and low cloud form adjacent to the Mull to obscure the high ground completely. There are occasions when a relatively calm sea and a grey sky of similar hue merge, so that in otherwise good visibility a Pilot flying in accordance with VFR may be unaware he is about to enter a fog bank".
Finally, the following is a quote from an article by the Aviation Historian Arthur Helsby:-
"For some time now the coastline of Kintyre, and in particular the area around the Mull, has been known to pilots as a dangerous area to fly at low level because of the freak weather conditions that frequently affect the coastline. The first recorded military air accident on the Mull was in 1941 when an Armstrong Whitworth Whitley from 502 Sqn crashed on the west slope of Beinn na Lice. Since then there have been nineteen recorded air accidents in the vicinity of the Mull and over a hundred and twenty lives have been lost in this remote corner of Scotland."
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Originally Posted by Cazatou returns!
it is clear that they should, once clear of the North Antrim coast, have climbed to a suitable level at or above Safety Altitude until they were unequivocally certain that the weather on the Mull and in the surrounding area was suitable for low level VFR flight.
The 'MULL' is no different to any other southwest or west facing promontory on the west coast. Those weather conditions are 'text book' for that sort of terrain and every low-level pilot will know that. I would venture to state that not a single low-level qualified pilot would have climbed to SA once off the coast in those conditions, and certainly not an operationally qualified crew like that. This crew would have had to abort the sortie had they done so in view of the exstant icing limitations and would not even have departed base.
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Cazatou
<<Very nice photographs - but as they were not taken on 2nd June 1994 they are indicative but not strictly relevant. >>
The full set of such photographs I posted some time ago were indeed not taken on 2nd June 1994 – they were meant to be indicative – coupled with a vist to the area in the Summer when a strong wind is forecast, those interested in this case could perhaps have an understanding of those very typical local conditions that are very relevent to this case – as I have tried so many times to convey to you all.
I have over several years spent a lot of time at sea along the NW coast of Scotland and am familiar with the appearance of the headlands under different met conditions – the conditions I expected to have been existent on the Mull that day with the given forecast were supported by the yachtsman's fuller statement and by none other than the procurator fiscal himself (a local) who was at the site that evening.
Briefly, the lower slopes were not in thick, orographic cloud but had an irregular layer of mist running up the ground (as I have tried to describe in detail in many previous posts) – from a distance, the presence of the ground would be obvious but the blurring of detail would have made judgement of range to go very difficult visually as it would precise positioning – it would not have been a problem for en route nav but would have been difficult if they had (for whatever reason) to closely approach the landmass.
It's like flogging a dead horse.
Flipster
havn't you checked your PMs or was the question asking too much?
<<Very nice photographs - but as they were not taken on 2nd June 1994 they are indicative but not strictly relevant. >>
The full set of such photographs I posted some time ago were indeed not taken on 2nd June 1994 – they were meant to be indicative – coupled with a vist to the area in the Summer when a strong wind is forecast, those interested in this case could perhaps have an understanding of those very typical local conditions that are very relevent to this case – as I have tried so many times to convey to you all.
I have over several years spent a lot of time at sea along the NW coast of Scotland and am familiar with the appearance of the headlands under different met conditions – the conditions I expected to have been existent on the Mull that day with the given forecast were supported by the yachtsman's fuller statement and by none other than the procurator fiscal himself (a local) who was at the site that evening.
Briefly, the lower slopes were not in thick, orographic cloud but had an irregular layer of mist running up the ground (as I have tried to describe in detail in many previous posts) – from a distance, the presence of the ground would be obvious but the blurring of detail would have made judgement of range to go very difficult visually as it would precise positioning – it would not have been a problem for en route nav but would have been difficult if they had (for whatever reason) to closely approach the landmass.
It's like flogging a dead horse.
Flipster
havn't you checked your PMs or was the question asking too much?
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Ignore the Real Questions
Shy Torque,
Re your 5760 - how right you were! Ignore the questions you don't like and repeat the same mantra - just like on TV every night! I wonder what part of "Adieu" I didn't understand.
JB
Re your 5760 - how right you were! Ignore the questions you don't like and repeat the same mantra - just like on TV every night! I wonder what part of "Adieu" I didn't understand.
JB
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pulse1
You asked what I thought were straightforward, pertinent questions - funny no answers.
You imply that you are a civil pilot - as I would have thought, there is enough info from the instrument settings, etc for anyone with any aviation experience to attempt to understand and interpret their intentions - but zilch from these military chaps who are supposed to have the standing of their lost colleagues at heart.
I say again, if it can be established that they were involved in a special task/demo/trial that has thus far not been disclosed then the pilots must surely be cleared - with the bonus that it gives the civil authorities a real starting point to investigate just how this team was lost and who was responsible for the wrecking of the anti-terror effort in NI for which so many had given their lives - now in vain.
You asked what I thought were straightforward, pertinent questions - funny no answers.
You imply that you are a civil pilot - as I would have thought, there is enough info from the instrument settings, etc for anyone with any aviation experience to attempt to understand and interpret their intentions - but zilch from these military chaps who are supposed to have the standing of their lost colleagues at heart.
I say again, if it can be established that they were involved in a special task/demo/trial that has thus far not been disclosed then the pilots must surely be cleared - with the bonus that it gives the civil authorities a real starting point to investigate just how this team was lost and who was responsible for the wrecking of the anti-terror effort in NI for which so many had given their lives - now in vain.
cazatou,
Needle still stuck in the groove? Same old mantra repeated ad infinitum, and never answering, with any vigour or detail, the questions put to you.
On 15th Oct 2009 you posted:
Can't even adhere to your own statements. Until such time as you can bring your self to actually answer reasonable questions, then do us all a favour and stay away.
Needle still stuck in the groove? Same old mantra repeated ad infinitum, and never answering, with any vigour or detail, the questions put to you.
On 15th Oct 2009 you posted:
I find it sad that you should replace debate with denigration.
It is with regret, therefore, that I bid you all:-
"ADIEU"
It is with regret, therefore, that I bid you all:-
"ADIEU"
Actually caz's view of the point where gross negligence occurred may be changing. It now appears to be moving back towards the Antrim coast.
Maybe he will eventually move back far enough to agree that the definite, no doubt whatsoever, point at which gross negligence occurred is when someone agreed, and even insisted, that it was OK to use an aircraft which was not airworthy for this flight.
Maybe he will eventually move back far enough to agree that the definite, no doubt whatsoever, point at which gross negligence occurred is when someone agreed, and even insisted, that it was OK to use an aircraft which was not airworthy for this flight.
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Yes - reverse time travel it is. Could we even yet see him saying the a/c was not even fit to be released to service and therefore the 'gross negligence' lay.................
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The Missing Link
Many of you have focused on the chain of responsibility for airworthiness of the a/c but so little has been discussed about who actually put the sortie together.
Flt Lt Tapper must have had fair warning to have had the time to request a Mk1 Chinook for it.
Someone on this thread some time back let it slip that it was the intention to use a Chinook some weeks prior to the fateful day.
The idea that a piece of paper just landed on an Ops room desk and the task was dished out on an ad hoc basis just doesn't ring true for what would surely have been an important task to get all of the team safely and timely to their meeting – someone higher up than the SH detachment commander would surely have been watchful of preparations and perhaps have been very specific about how it was to be done.
Who was this?
Who initiated the task? - whose name was on the warning order?
Were they at any of the inquiries?
Many of you have focused on the chain of responsibility for airworthiness of the a/c but so little has been discussed about who actually put the sortie together.
Flt Lt Tapper must have had fair warning to have had the time to request a Mk1 Chinook for it.
Someone on this thread some time back let it slip that it was the intention to use a Chinook some weeks prior to the fateful day.
The idea that a piece of paper just landed on an Ops room desk and the task was dished out on an ad hoc basis just doesn't ring true for what would surely have been an important task to get all of the team safely and timely to their meeting – someone higher up than the SH detachment commander would surely have been watchful of preparations and perhaps have been very specific about how it was to be done.
Who was this?
Who initiated the task? - whose name was on the warning order?
Were they at any of the inquiries?
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Where was the negligence?
Walter,
You raise a very important point and although I cannot comment on what the Ops staff would or would not have done with the tasking request, I believe the general answer is the same as it is for all the other issues that were missed by a flawed and inadequate investigation, that neither the BoI nor the Reviewing Officers properly covered – either because they didn’t know (and didn’t want to know given the starting assumption of pilot error) or the BoI decided not to investigate them because, by the BOI’s own words: “ Nevertheless, there was sufficient evidence to eliminate as possible causes: major technical malfunction or structural failure of the aircraft prior to impact; …… Therefore the Inquiry focused on the crew’s handling and operation of the aircraft.”
As we now know there was plenty of evidence which they did have questioning the airworthiness and serviceability of the aircraft had they looked for it and properly analysed it, and there was a great deal more evidence that may have been withheld from them, and because they had already made their minds up they did not bother to” lift some of the stones”, eg on basic questions such as the BD position and what the RAF operating and RTS authority (DD/Mar & Hels) had done to safeguard the safety of Chinook Mk2 operations after the vital 25 May meeting where ZD 576 itself was the subject of one of 4 in-service incidents of 15 which were considered by BD to have serious implications (not flight test incidents as the Minister incorrectly told Parliament) that led to the BD “grounding” decision.
You properly raise the issue of why Tapper’s request for a Mk1 (which had been in NI until just a few days before) was not agreed – clearly the operators at Odiham would have known all the issues relating to the RTS and the incidents that had already taken place. Presumably they also knew what was happening at BD – and if they didn’t DD/ Mar & Hels (who was represented at the 25 May meeting) in Main Building should certainly have told them. They clearly did not think of the issues of the suitability of the Chinook Mk2 for this non-essential “passenger” flight (but Tapper did – which is why he asked to keep the Mk1 – in my view a truly telling point that the BoI failed properly to grasp). The issue was, I suggest, much wider though - why did S Eng O 7 Sqn and even OC Eng Wg at Odiham select ZD 576 for this mission? Nobody asked them. Certainly S Eng O 7 Sqn would have known the recent history of ZD 576 including the control restriction just days before that had led to him issuing an “every flight” inspection – he would also have know that they had replaced the engine from ZD 576’s incident on 19 May with a “no fault found” engine from ZA 704’s incident on 8 March – the first of the 4 BD felt had the “serious implications”. Did they even think these issues through? If not was their decision making negligent?
This failure to provide “transparency” continued after the BoI – for example, DHP the main action addressee of the BD letter of 6 June (issued after the 25 May meeting), did not, as far as I can see, mention its existence to even the MoD legal team for the Sherriff’s FAI – I cannot believe he had forgotten it, but IHMO perhaps the need to provide it to the “other side” with all the questions that it might have raised on the safety of the verdict, was a consideration – especially as it had not been provided to the BoI either! As far as I can see, although the BD position was investigated by the HofL Select Committee they did not see the 6 June letter either, but perhaps I have missed this.
The bottom line for me as a simple, basic flying trained, engineer is the question the BoI failed to answer – namely why, if they wanted to climb over the Mull (against all of their flight planning and certainly against, as far as the crew knew, the RTS limitations), did they change waypoints and then fail to change course? Every pilot I have spoken to, and indeed MoD in a letter to Lord Jacobs, accepts that having changed the waypoint they would have expected a course change to follow immediately – instead of which the BoI suggests (against the views of the Odiham Stn Cdr before his comments were “brought into line” and against all their training and experience as well as common sense) that they deliberately flew towards the Mull and then selected an inappropriate ROC. If they did the Gross Negligence verdict would be justified. But nobody knows, and the BoI came nowhere near fully investigating this accident and its potential underlying causes - so in my view, and that of many more eminent and better qualified people than me, it isn’t! That remains the “bottom line” of this thread.
JB
You raise a very important point and although I cannot comment on what the Ops staff would or would not have done with the tasking request, I believe the general answer is the same as it is for all the other issues that were missed by a flawed and inadequate investigation, that neither the BoI nor the Reviewing Officers properly covered – either because they didn’t know (and didn’t want to know given the starting assumption of pilot error) or the BoI decided not to investigate them because, by the BOI’s own words: “ Nevertheless, there was sufficient evidence to eliminate as possible causes: major technical malfunction or structural failure of the aircraft prior to impact; …… Therefore the Inquiry focused on the crew’s handling and operation of the aircraft.”
As we now know there was plenty of evidence which they did have questioning the airworthiness and serviceability of the aircraft had they looked for it and properly analysed it, and there was a great deal more evidence that may have been withheld from them, and because they had already made their minds up they did not bother to” lift some of the stones”, eg on basic questions such as the BD position and what the RAF operating and RTS authority (DD/Mar & Hels) had done to safeguard the safety of Chinook Mk2 operations after the vital 25 May meeting where ZD 576 itself was the subject of one of 4 in-service incidents of 15 which were considered by BD to have serious implications (not flight test incidents as the Minister incorrectly told Parliament) that led to the BD “grounding” decision.
You properly raise the issue of why Tapper’s request for a Mk1 (which had been in NI until just a few days before) was not agreed – clearly the operators at Odiham would have known all the issues relating to the RTS and the incidents that had already taken place. Presumably they also knew what was happening at BD – and if they didn’t DD/ Mar & Hels (who was represented at the 25 May meeting) in Main Building should certainly have told them. They clearly did not think of the issues of the suitability of the Chinook Mk2 for this non-essential “passenger” flight (but Tapper did – which is why he asked to keep the Mk1 – in my view a truly telling point that the BoI failed properly to grasp). The issue was, I suggest, much wider though - why did S Eng O 7 Sqn and even OC Eng Wg at Odiham select ZD 576 for this mission? Nobody asked them. Certainly S Eng O 7 Sqn would have known the recent history of ZD 576 including the control restriction just days before that had led to him issuing an “every flight” inspection – he would also have know that they had replaced the engine from ZD 576’s incident on 19 May with a “no fault found” engine from ZA 704’s incident on 8 March – the first of the 4 BD felt had the “serious implications”. Did they even think these issues through? If not was their decision making negligent?
This failure to provide “transparency” continued after the BoI – for example, DHP the main action addressee of the BD letter of 6 June (issued after the 25 May meeting), did not, as far as I can see, mention its existence to even the MoD legal team for the Sherriff’s FAI – I cannot believe he had forgotten it, but IHMO perhaps the need to provide it to the “other side” with all the questions that it might have raised on the safety of the verdict, was a consideration – especially as it had not been provided to the BoI either! As far as I can see, although the BD position was investigated by the HofL Select Committee they did not see the 6 June letter either, but perhaps I have missed this.
The bottom line for me as a simple, basic flying trained, engineer is the question the BoI failed to answer – namely why, if they wanted to climb over the Mull (against all of their flight planning and certainly against, as far as the crew knew, the RTS limitations), did they change waypoints and then fail to change course? Every pilot I have spoken to, and indeed MoD in a letter to Lord Jacobs, accepts that having changed the waypoint they would have expected a course change to follow immediately – instead of which the BoI suggests (against the views of the Odiham Stn Cdr before his comments were “brought into line” and against all their training and experience as well as common sense) that they deliberately flew towards the Mull and then selected an inappropriate ROC. If they did the Gross Negligence verdict would be justified. But nobody knows, and the BoI came nowhere near fully investigating this accident and its potential underlying causes - so in my view, and that of many more eminent and better qualified people than me, it isn’t! That remains the “bottom line” of this thread.
JB
Yes, great post indeed JB. Good points raised by you too Walter, with both posts asking more questions to be answered. Over to you now, Mr Haddon-Cave QC. Hopefully some of these i's and t's can expect some dots and crosses soon, Sir?
Last edited by Chugalug2; 23rd Oct 2009 at 20:15.
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JB Thank you for another good reply - it has helped but my inquiry was specifically on the planning aspect - I'll leave the airworthiness to you guys - both need pursuing, just a little bit more on the planning would be nice but I'm not holding my breath waiting for info - nav systems. planning absolutely taboo here I fear.
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From Orac's link to the Sunday Times 25 Oct on Nimrod Airworthiness
"The chairman of the review, Charles Haddon-Cave QC, has written to the families of those killed, saying he will name individuals and companies or organisations responsible for safety failings."
Interesting!
"The chairman of the review, Charles Haddon-Cave QC, has written to the families of those killed, saying he will name individuals and companies or organisations responsible for safety failings."
Interesting!
Haddon-Cave Nimrod Crash Review
At 587 pages, it's a bit of a 'monster' to read, but I'm sure it will prove enlightening. Perhaps therein we can find something that will give leverage to the Chinook case.
Nimrod Review
or here:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/h..._09_nimrod.pdf (4.62 Mb)
Nimrod Review
or here:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/h..._09_nimrod.pdf (4.62 Mb)
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APPROVED Lzs
Some of you seem reluctant to accept that the LZ I have described could have been used simply because it was not on any “approved” list (despite local opinion, etc) – well, thanks to the Royal pilot who landed a Chinook in someone's garden recently, the MOD made a statement that such helicopters frequently landed at sites that were not recognised air fields for training.
So prise those blimkers a little wider please gentlemen.
Some of you seem reluctant to accept that the LZ I have described could have been used simply because it was not on any “approved” list (despite local opinion, etc) – well, thanks to the Royal pilot who landed a Chinook in someone's garden recently, the MOD made a statement that such helicopters frequently landed at sites that were not recognised air fields for training.
So prise those blimkers a little wider please gentlemen.