Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Hi BEags and Wolf1965.
The following is an extract from a letter to Andrew Hunter MP from Adam Ingram. It is dated 13 June 2001.
Mr (Brian's friend) particularly mentioned an unconfirned report that one of the passengers may have been using a "TETRA telephone". Terrestrial Trucked Radio (TETRA) is a standard for digital radio that started development in 1990 to meet the requirements of professional users including the emergency services.
Fielded TETRA systems did not begin to appear until 1997. Given the time-scale it is very unlikely that a telephone using the TETRA standard could have been on board Chinook ZD576. Certainly there was no evidence of such a telephone found in the wreckage.
However, I'm just about to send another letter to the MoD, so will include one or two more questions on this particular issue. As always, I'll let you know what comes back.
My regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
The following is an extract from a letter to Andrew Hunter MP from Adam Ingram. It is dated 13 June 2001.
Mr (Brian's friend) particularly mentioned an unconfirned report that one of the passengers may have been using a "TETRA telephone". Terrestrial Trucked Radio (TETRA) is a standard for digital radio that started development in 1990 to meet the requirements of professional users including the emergency services.
Fielded TETRA systems did not begin to appear until 1997. Given the time-scale it is very unlikely that a telephone using the TETRA standard could have been on board Chinook ZD576. Certainly there was no evidence of such a telephone found in the wreckage.
However, I'm just about to send another letter to the MoD, so will include one or two more questions on this particular issue. As always, I'll let you know what comes back.
My regards, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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It's a good point BEags.
I'll make sure that I include all your points in my next letter.
Updates as and when.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I'll make sure that I include all your points in my next letter.
Updates as and when.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
As an aside, many years ago before the advent of car phones, I had a CB radio in my car (Yes, sad I know - but it saved me getting stuck in traffic on many occasions!). One day I was re-tuning the aerial VSWR and noticed that whenever I keyed the transmitter on Ch1, a neighbour's radio-controlled car went nuts! The electric motor went to max RPM and the steering went hard over, so that the little car shot round in tight circles until I released the transmit key. The little devil in me waited for the owner to try to catch his car and pick it up, whereupon I pressed the tit again and it escaped from him! I kept this up for a good few minute pi$$ing myself with laughter until I finally relented and let him pick it up.
The point of this story? I was using a fully licensed radio system and it was causing massive interference to an electronic system 50 yards away. So perhaps it's not unreasonable to speculate on the effect of a Plod pocketfone on a FADEC a few inches away.......
The point of this story? I was using a fully licensed radio system and it was causing massive interference to an electronic system 50 yards away. So perhaps it's not unreasonable to speculate on the effect of a Plod pocketfone on a FADEC a few inches away.......
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Nav Error
This was one of the first things that the BOI addressed. The only mobile network that could have disrupted navigation systems was ORANGE and NO such mobiles were found in the wreckage.
I also have some difficulty with the idea of someone trying to use a mobile in a helicopter at low level in those days.
This was one of the first things that the BOI addressed. The only mobile network that could have disrupted navigation systems was ORANGE and NO such mobiles were found in the wreckage.
I also have some difficulty with the idea of someone trying to use a mobile in a helicopter at low level in those days.
I also have some difficulty with the idea of someone trying to use a mobile in a helicopter at low level in those days.
I am interested that you do not seem to have similar difficulty with the idea of two highly trained and skilled pilots flying in IMC so close to high ground.
Mobile phones have always caused interference to certain electronics either when they are called, or when they hand over from one station to another, exactly what any phone would have been doing as you cross from NI to Scotland if it was switched on.
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pulse 1
I am aware that I am treading on dangerous ground here but I fear that you are amalgamating the terms "highly trained" and "highly skilled."
As someone who was involved in Flying Training for 25 years I can assure you that they are not one and the same.!!!!!
The RAF has 4 categories of Pilot Ability which are:
1. Below the Average
2. Average
3. Above the Average
4. Exceptional
Paul Brickhill (in his biography of Douglas Bader) describes a flying test that Bader undertook in 1940 when he was assessed as "Above the Average" which he describes as an RAF euphemsim for a "Natural Pilot".
He then goes on to say that "there is only one higher assessment "Exceptional" which is so rare " as to be almost a myth".
Neither of the Pilots on this aircraft had been assessed at a higher level than that shown at 2 ( Average).
I am aware that I am treading on dangerous ground here but I fear that you are amalgamating the terms "highly trained" and "highly skilled."
As someone who was involved in Flying Training for 25 years I can assure you that they are not one and the same.!!!!!
The RAF has 4 categories of Pilot Ability which are:
1. Below the Average
2. Average
3. Above the Average
4. Exceptional
Paul Brickhill (in his biography of Douglas Bader) describes a flying test that Bader undertook in 1940 when he was assessed as "Above the Average" which he describes as an RAF euphemsim for a "Natural Pilot".
He then goes on to say that "there is only one higher assessment "Exceptional" which is so rare " as to be almost a myth".
Neither of the Pilots on this aircraft had been assessed at a higher level than that shown at 2 ( Average).
Kilo52,
I would have hoped that, within the context of this discussion, all military pilots are highly trained and skilled when it comes to avoiding CFIT. If they are not, those responsible for their selection and training should be seriously questioned. I accept that some are better than others and I also know that this does not make it impossible for it to have happened here.
My comment was more designed to highlight your difficulty in accepting poor discipline by a mobile phone user with no training compared to that of any pilot, and especially a professional pilot.
Enough of semantics. What is much more important is the strong possibility that any live mobile phone on that aircraft would have transmitted a signal in that area as it transferred between stations.
E.g. The tape player on every car I've ever had, with the exception of my present car, has made an awful noise every time I pass from one area to another if my phone is on. I do not have to be using it.
I would have hoped that, within the context of this discussion, all military pilots are highly trained and skilled when it comes to avoiding CFIT. If they are not, those responsible for their selection and training should be seriously questioned. I accept that some are better than others and I also know that this does not make it impossible for it to have happened here.
My comment was more designed to highlight your difficulty in accepting poor discipline by a mobile phone user with no training compared to that of any pilot, and especially a professional pilot.
Enough of semantics. What is much more important is the strong possibility that any live mobile phone on that aircraft would have transmitted a signal in that area as it transferred between stations.
E.g. The tape player on every car I've ever had, with the exception of my present car, has made an awful noise every time I pass from one area to another if my phone is on. I do not have to be using it.
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Pulse
As I said, the BOI sought expert advice on this matter which is included as an annex to the BOI report. The conclusion of the report was that there was no mobile phone or other device on board capable of interferring with flight, engine or navigation facilities.
As regards discipline, when they took off from RAF Aldergrove no crew member had eaten a meal for at least 10 hours, the Captain had failed to complete the required "outbrief" with the Duty Authorising Officer and nobody knows to this day what the intention of the crew was had they reached Inverness safely. No booking had been made for overnight accommodation; nor had approval been sought from HQNI for the aircraft to nightstop out of theatre. Equally they had not sought a further extension of crew duty time to enable them to return to base. In this context you will note that the BOI suggested that the high speed of the aircraft prior to impact was an attempt to reduce crew duty overrun to a minimum. Neither of the pilots had taken night-stopping kit with them.
Furthermore, the photocopy of the chart left behind at Aldergrove for the DAO shows that the planning was not in the handwriting of any of the crewmembers of the fatal flight; but was that of the RN Exchange Officer who was the Captain of the other Detatchment crew.
As I said, the BOI sought expert advice on this matter which is included as an annex to the BOI report. The conclusion of the report was that there was no mobile phone or other device on board capable of interferring with flight, engine or navigation facilities.
As regards discipline, when they took off from RAF Aldergrove no crew member had eaten a meal for at least 10 hours, the Captain had failed to complete the required "outbrief" with the Duty Authorising Officer and nobody knows to this day what the intention of the crew was had they reached Inverness safely. No booking had been made for overnight accommodation; nor had approval been sought from HQNI for the aircraft to nightstop out of theatre. Equally they had not sought a further extension of crew duty time to enable them to return to base. In this context you will note that the BOI suggested that the high speed of the aircraft prior to impact was an attempt to reduce crew duty overrun to a minimum. Neither of the pilots had taken night-stopping kit with them.
Furthermore, the photocopy of the chart left behind at Aldergrove for the DAO shows that the planning was not in the handwriting of any of the crewmembers of the fatal flight; but was that of the RN Exchange Officer who was the Captain of the other Detatchment crew.
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kilo52
You really are twisting the very limited evidence available, in a way that has a very depressing familiarity about it!!!
You are obviously moderately familiar with the BOI investigation. Though perhaps not so familiar with the many subsequent inquiries that have found serious flaws in the original.
You state categorically that "no crew member had eaten a meal for at least 10 hours."
Interesting!
Ignoring the implication that hunger was a causal factor in the accident. The question remains, where is the evidence to support this claim??
Answer - It does not exist! (I have seen no evidence regarding their stomach contents - If this forms a crucial part of the investigation, perhaps it may still be recorded somewhere!!)
Perhaps you meant to say, no witnesses gave 'conclusive' evidence as to the crew's eating arrangements subsequent to breakfast!
But that doesn't fit your agenda does it!
As far as 'failing to complete the required outbrief with the DAO' is concerned, I can only assume that you (as well as I) know precisely why that was (why don't you remind our readers?)
I am sure you will also take the opportunity to clarify that this 'omission' was not the fault of the crew at all!
You may also care to explain that the reason the crew left a photocopy of "A" chart (Nobody has EVER suggested this was "THE" map they were using for navigation!) was a laudable attempt by them to provide the DAO with the best 'outbriefing' they could during his absence from post!!
This chart had indeed been prepared by Lt K. (RN). You know why, and you also know it is irrelevant, since nobody knows what maps (Yes, probably more than one!) were being used in the aircraft!
As far as booking accomodation, or seeking approval for nightstopping the aircraft out of theatre, or indeed extending crew duty time, was concerned, you are absolutely right.
"Nobody knows to this day what the intention of the crew was."
Either would have been legal, and perfectly understandable!
You will of course take the opportunity to confirm that at the time of the accident NO limits had been exceeded, nor would they have been by the time the crew arrived at their destination!!
Many of course did note the supposition by the BOI that the apparent high speed of the aircraft 'immediately' prior to impact was an attempt to reduce crew duty overrun to a minimum.
But since you told us -
"Nobody knows to this day what the intention of the crew was."
I guess it remains firmly in the realms of supposition, and I along with many others may 'suppose' something completely different!
So what FACTS were we able to glean from your posting, which was presented in a wrapper implying some form of 'indiscipline' in the crew concerned!!
The only thing I see is that:
No limits were exceeded.
The crew did everything they could to comply with outbriefing requirements in an 'operational' theatre.
Precious little evidence is available in many areas that would have given us a clearer picture of what exactly was happening in the cockpit of ZD576 as it approached the Mull of Kintyre at 1800 on 2nd June 1994!
We can agree can't we?
Incidentally, I note your assertion that the pilots were both assessed as 'average'.
I need to do a little research on that, since (with the greatest respect) I'm not sure I can take your claims at face value.
Almost a decade ago - How depressing.
You really are twisting the very limited evidence available, in a way that has a very depressing familiarity about it!!!
You are obviously moderately familiar with the BOI investigation. Though perhaps not so familiar with the many subsequent inquiries that have found serious flaws in the original.
You state categorically that "no crew member had eaten a meal for at least 10 hours."
Interesting!
Ignoring the implication that hunger was a causal factor in the accident. The question remains, where is the evidence to support this claim??
Answer - It does not exist! (I have seen no evidence regarding their stomach contents - If this forms a crucial part of the investigation, perhaps it may still be recorded somewhere!!)
Perhaps you meant to say, no witnesses gave 'conclusive' evidence as to the crew's eating arrangements subsequent to breakfast!
But that doesn't fit your agenda does it!
As far as 'failing to complete the required outbrief with the DAO' is concerned, I can only assume that you (as well as I) know precisely why that was (why don't you remind our readers?)
I am sure you will also take the opportunity to clarify that this 'omission' was not the fault of the crew at all!
You may also care to explain that the reason the crew left a photocopy of "A" chart (Nobody has EVER suggested this was "THE" map they were using for navigation!) was a laudable attempt by them to provide the DAO with the best 'outbriefing' they could during his absence from post!!
This chart had indeed been prepared by Lt K. (RN). You know why, and you also know it is irrelevant, since nobody knows what maps (Yes, probably more than one!) were being used in the aircraft!
As far as booking accomodation, or seeking approval for nightstopping the aircraft out of theatre, or indeed extending crew duty time, was concerned, you are absolutely right.
"Nobody knows to this day what the intention of the crew was."
Either would have been legal, and perfectly understandable!
You will of course take the opportunity to confirm that at the time of the accident NO limits had been exceeded, nor would they have been by the time the crew arrived at their destination!!
Many of course did note the supposition by the BOI that the apparent high speed of the aircraft 'immediately' prior to impact was an attempt to reduce crew duty overrun to a minimum.
But since you told us -
"Nobody knows to this day what the intention of the crew was."
I guess it remains firmly in the realms of supposition, and I along with many others may 'suppose' something completely different!
So what FACTS were we able to glean from your posting, which was presented in a wrapper implying some form of 'indiscipline' in the crew concerned!!
The only thing I see is that:
No limits were exceeded.
The crew did everything they could to comply with outbriefing requirements in an 'operational' theatre.
Precious little evidence is available in many areas that would have given us a clearer picture of what exactly was happening in the cockpit of ZD576 as it approached the Mull of Kintyre at 1800 on 2nd June 1994!
We can agree can't we?
Incidentally, I note your assertion that the pilots were both assessed as 'average'.
I need to do a little research on that, since (with the greatest respect) I'm not sure I can take your claims at face value.
Almost a decade ago - How depressing.
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Hi Kilo 52,
I trust that all is well with you.
I still accept your viewpoint. However, you have to agree that quite a bit of your argument is speculation based on limited actual known fact - just as my viewpoint is.
No one knows with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, what caused the accident. I agree that we all know (with absolute certainty) the end result, but not what went before. Therefore, the verdict is unsustainable.
To answer your point on pilot assessments, the following is taken from a transcript of the Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry:
Early on in his evidence H was asked to speak to the official RAF records in relation to Flt Lt Tapper and Flt Lt Cook which were incorporated in Annexe C to the Board of Inquiry's report. According to these records T had most recently been assessed as High Average and Combat Ready. He had a total of 3,062 flying hours in helicopters of which 683 had been in Chinook helicopters. Flt Lt Cook had most recently been assessed as Above Average and Combat Ready. He had a total of 2,789 flying hours in helicopters of which 2,492 had been in Chinook helicopters.
I hope this answers any questions on crew assessments.
My regards to all, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
I trust that all is well with you.
I still accept your viewpoint. However, you have to agree that quite a bit of your argument is speculation based on limited actual known fact - just as my viewpoint is.
No one knows with absolutely no doubt whatsoever, what caused the accident. I agree that we all know (with absolute certainty) the end result, but not what went before. Therefore, the verdict is unsustainable.
To answer your point on pilot assessments, the following is taken from a transcript of the Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry:
Early on in his evidence H was asked to speak to the official RAF records in relation to Flt Lt Tapper and Flt Lt Cook which were incorporated in Annexe C to the Board of Inquiry's report. According to these records T had most recently been assessed as High Average and Combat Ready. He had a total of 3,062 flying hours in helicopters of which 683 had been in Chinook helicopters. Flt Lt Cook had most recently been assessed as Above Average and Combat Ready. He had a total of 2,789 flying hours in helicopters of which 2,492 had been in Chinook helicopters.
I hope this answers any questions on crew assessments.
My regards to all, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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K52
I am able to recall that the officer in charge of the SF flight at the time of the accident made a statement to the effect that pilots had to be assessed as 'above average' before being considered for selection to the flight.
Please could you tell me on what basis you make the claim that they where assessed as 'average', so I can make further investigations.
Thanks.
Brian - The "Oracle" as ever!
I am able to recall that the officer in charge of the SF flight at the time of the accident made a statement to the effect that pilots had to be assessed as 'above average' before being considered for selection to the flight.
Please could you tell me on what basis you make the claim that they where assessed as 'average', so I can make further investigations.
Thanks.
Brian - The "Oracle" as ever!
Avoid imitations
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K52,
There you go again. Your insinuation of the 18th seems to be that the two pilots were "no more than average" in an apparent attempt to cast some sort of slur. You are correct in stating that you are "on dangerous ground here", especially as you appear to be letting your own opinion get in the way of fact once more.
I can personally vouch that one of the two pilots was sharper than most, his assessments verify that. You should know better than to cast a slur on a fellow aviator, especially one who is no longer able to defend himself from it.
I think most of us would now agree that any one of a number of scenarios could be moulded to fit the available but incomplete evidence. Had the MOD stated that "The most likely scenario is.... (your own or my own opinion here), but due to the lack of compelling evidence the true cause of the accident cannot be determined" or similar, this campaign would never have been required.
There you go again. Your insinuation of the 18th seems to be that the two pilots were "no more than average" in an apparent attempt to cast some sort of slur. You are correct in stating that you are "on dangerous ground here", especially as you appear to be letting your own opinion get in the way of fact once more.
I can personally vouch that one of the two pilots was sharper than most, his assessments verify that. You should know better than to cast a slur on a fellow aviator, especially one who is no longer able to defend himself from it.
I think most of us would now agree that any one of a number of scenarios could be moulded to fit the available but incomplete evidence. Had the MOD stated that "The most likely scenario is.... (your own or my own opinion here), but due to the lack of compelling evidence the true cause of the accident cannot be determined" or similar, this campaign would never have been required.
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There really has been an awful lot of irrelevant trivia discussed on this thread for a long time. Maybe I could address a few of the issues.
The whole discussion of the mis-plotted lighthouse and TANS accuracy is over blown. The route across to the Mull provides only one clear navigation point whose Grid reference is easily discerned to enter into the TANS and that is the lighthouse. However, as it is up on the hill, nobody ever actually intends to overfly it. Having just flown at low level over the sea, one simply follows the coastline for a further couple of minutes to coast in. The crew were aware of the general cloud base and would never have intended to fly over the light house and on over the highest ground in a straight line, although that would have been on their map no doubt.
As they approached poor weather, the easiest and safest option would have been to stay over the water to the left of the Mull as had probably been their intention. In my opinion, there must have been a compelling reason to elect to fly over the land! Rick and John were excellent operators and neither complacent enough to fail to challenge so obviously a strange action.
At that level and position, there is no ATC coverage until you clear the high ground and speak to Macrihanish. HF is hardly a reliable means of comms even if already tuned. To operate at low level over the water was a simple task for this crew and comments re low level aborts show an absolutely fundamental misunderstanding of helo operations. They would not have put the aircraft in such a situation unless there was a dire necessity to do so.
The crew and not eaten in the mess since breakfast but the squadron had a well stocked kitchen which was used by all pilots (unless they had sloped of to the mess for lunch, not intending to return). Most importantly, it was free in the squadron!
The crewman had definitely prepared their own maps because I was in flight planning and saw them do it. I do not know if they were making any for the pilots. Whether they copied Ian’s route or not is irrelevant, as for the critical leg the planning requirements were as already stated.
It was squadron policy to outbrief with the DA if possible. It was also extremely common for them not to do so. The Chinook crews flew a different A/C, were tasked separately and came from a different squadron with entirely different SOP’s, save the general rules pertaining to the NI flying order book. Often their tasks were outside of times that a DA was present and most importantly, they self authorised anyway.
As has been stated Rick was Above average and John High average primarily as he was new to one of the most demanding roles in the entire RAF. John had been assessed as Above the Average on his previous full tour in NI.
Yes the crew clearly intended to return that night as the forecast weather was perfectly acceptable for the sortie given their experience and clearance. When they left they appeared entirely relaxed and professionally prepared for the trip.
The whole discussion of the mis-plotted lighthouse and TANS accuracy is over blown. The route across to the Mull provides only one clear navigation point whose Grid reference is easily discerned to enter into the TANS and that is the lighthouse. However, as it is up on the hill, nobody ever actually intends to overfly it. Having just flown at low level over the sea, one simply follows the coastline for a further couple of minutes to coast in. The crew were aware of the general cloud base and would never have intended to fly over the light house and on over the highest ground in a straight line, although that would have been on their map no doubt.
As they approached poor weather, the easiest and safest option would have been to stay over the water to the left of the Mull as had probably been their intention. In my opinion, there must have been a compelling reason to elect to fly over the land! Rick and John were excellent operators and neither complacent enough to fail to challenge so obviously a strange action.
At that level and position, there is no ATC coverage until you clear the high ground and speak to Macrihanish. HF is hardly a reliable means of comms even if already tuned. To operate at low level over the water was a simple task for this crew and comments re low level aborts show an absolutely fundamental misunderstanding of helo operations. They would not have put the aircraft in such a situation unless there was a dire necessity to do so.
The crew and not eaten in the mess since breakfast but the squadron had a well stocked kitchen which was used by all pilots (unless they had sloped of to the mess for lunch, not intending to return). Most importantly, it was free in the squadron!
The crewman had definitely prepared their own maps because I was in flight planning and saw them do it. I do not know if they were making any for the pilots. Whether they copied Ian’s route or not is irrelevant, as for the critical leg the planning requirements were as already stated.
It was squadron policy to outbrief with the DA if possible. It was also extremely common for them not to do so. The Chinook crews flew a different A/C, were tasked separately and came from a different squadron with entirely different SOP’s, save the general rules pertaining to the NI flying order book. Often their tasks were outside of times that a DA was present and most importantly, they self authorised anyway.
As has been stated Rick was Above average and John High average primarily as he was new to one of the most demanding roles in the entire RAF. John had been assessed as Above the Average on his previous full tour in NI.
Yes the crew clearly intended to return that night as the forecast weather was perfectly acceptable for the sortie given their experience and clearance. When they left they appeared entirely relaxed and professionally prepared for the trip.
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I had a lunch with the crew not long before take off, they were both well above average pilots. Everybody knew that......
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Not sure if this has been picked up on this thread yet (there are rather a lot of pages to go through!), but it has been announced that ACM Sir John Day is to leave the RAF this summer. AM Brian Burridge will replace him as head of Strike Command on 31 July. No details on what ACM Day plans to do after leaving, but I guess he still won't be taking questions about the Chinook accident!
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sprucemoose
Interesting,
guess kilo52 will have a little more time for internet surfing from 31 July!!
Ah well, no great loss.
Wonder if his Mull debacle (appalling judgement!) had an impact on him not going any further??
Shame.
Interesting,
guess kilo52 will have a little more time for internet surfing from 31 July!!
Ah well, no great loss.
Wonder if his Mull debacle (appalling judgement!) had an impact on him not going any further??
Shame.
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Apologies if this has been mentioned before (it's a very long thread), the weather at the southern end of the great glen down as far as the mull in the hours after the accident was such that you went from flying along in acceptable vis to finding yourself IMC at 100ft without warning. Real gold fish bowl, flat grey sea, poor light, drizzle turning into sea/coastal fog patches. As mentioned the changes were without warning, if those conditions existed around the mull at the time of the accident, and the evidence seems to suggest that, it would be the easiest thing in the world not to have visual with the coast until very late in the day.
There was also a report either immediately before or very shortly after of a Chinook on a low level navex finding a discrepency of 2nm between the position given by its GPS driven nav kit and its actual position over the ground. Add this to all the other known FACTS and I just cannot see how there can be the "no doubt whatsoever" about the cause which would allow a finding of gross negligence by the 2 air officers ( the board led by a highly experienced president was not convinced).
The Scottich Fatal Accident Inquiry verdict, unlike a coroners court I think, was legally valid and conducted by someone trained in the workings of judicial process. The Sheriff conducting it interestingly came to a different conclusion to the 2 air officers, whose opinion is more legally valid?
There was also a report either immediately before or very shortly after of a Chinook on a low level navex finding a discrepency of 2nm between the position given by its GPS driven nav kit and its actual position over the ground. Add this to all the other known FACTS and I just cannot see how there can be the "no doubt whatsoever" about the cause which would allow a finding of gross negligence by the 2 air officers ( the board led by a highly experienced president was not convinced).
The Scottich Fatal Accident Inquiry verdict, unlike a coroners court I think, was legally valid and conducted by someone trained in the workings of judicial process. The Sheriff conducting it interestingly came to a different conclusion to the 2 air officers, whose opinion is more legally valid?