Pulse
As I said, the BOI sought expert advice on this matter which is included as an annex to the BOI report. The conclusion of the report was that there was no mobile phone or other device on board capable of interferring with flight, engine or navigation facilities.
As regards discipline, when they took off from RAF Aldergrove no crew member had eaten a meal for at least 10 hours, the Captain had failed to complete the required "outbrief" with the Duty Authorising Officer and nobody knows to this day what the intention of the crew was had they reached Inverness safely. No booking had been made for overnight accommodation; nor had approval been sought from HQNI for the aircraft to nightstop out of theatre. Equally they had not sought a further extension of crew duty time to enable them to return to base. In this context you will note that the BOI suggested that the high speed of the aircraft prior to impact was an attempt to reduce crew duty overrun to a minimum. Neither of the pilots had taken night-stopping kit with them.
Furthermore, the photocopy of the chart left behind at Aldergrove for the DAO shows that the planning was not in the handwriting of any of the crewmembers of the fatal flight; but was that of the RN Exchange Officer who was the Captain of the other Detatchment crew.