Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Following Orders
I see that on the Puma accident thread, regular contributor and self appointed sage Cazatou has opined:
Presumably he now will approve of those who ignored all the rules, and prematurely released to service an unairworthy aircraft being named and shamed.
Although, as he also claims
I suppose he feels that obeying orders from an Air Rank officer is sufficient excuse. Funny, I thought we stamped on that one at Nuremberg.
I do believe that it is possible that the penny has finally dropped for SFFP - not to knowingly bend or break the Rules is to act Professionally!!
To act otherwise is crass stupidity deserving of the most severe condemnation.
To act otherwise is crass stupidity deserving of the most severe condemnation.
Although, as he also claims
It seems to me that there is one word missing from a lot of posts on this subject, a word that is at the heart of the Military Ethos :
DISCIPLINE
DISCIPLINE
The Government and MoD have constantly hidden behind the mantra that "there is nothing new" and refused to agree to further investigation into the Mull case.
Is not the H-C report something new? Is it not now incumbent on the Government to allow challenge to every statement and finding by the MoD/RAF which relates to aircraft safety and airworthiness?
Should not the findings of the RO's be immediately put aside until a new inquiry is carried out?
Is not the H-C report something new? Is it not now incumbent on the Government to allow challenge to every statement and finding by the MoD/RAF which relates to aircraft safety and airworthiness?
Should not the findings of the RO's be immediately put aside until a new inquiry is carried out?
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Nothing new
There seems to be some misunderstanding .
H-C was about the Nimrod not ZD576.
Some many years and type difference.
H-C was not asked to look at Zd576 . Issue closed from MOD POV.
Regards
AC
H-C was about the Nimrod not ZD576.
Some many years and type difference.
H-C was not asked to look at Zd576 . Issue closed from MOD POV.
Regards
AC
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Fitter 2
Re your little jibe suggesting I was a "self appointed sage". Sorry, I was appointed to the Post of FS1 by Staff Officers acting on behalf of the Air Secretary. Perhaps my 30+ years of experience as a Pilot - as well as being a QFI, an IRE and an "A" Cat Transport Captain and Examiner - had something to do with it?
Perhaps, as you know better, you would like to share the details of your qualifications with us?
Re your little jibe suggesting I was a "self appointed sage". Sorry, I was appointed to the Post of FS1 by Staff Officers acting on behalf of the Air Secretary. Perhaps my 30+ years of experience as a Pilot - as well as being a QFI, an IRE and an "A" Cat Transport Captain and Examiner - had something to do with it?
Perhaps, as you know better, you would like to share the details of your qualifications with us?
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Read the book, Atlantic Cowboy, read the book. Mr Haddon-Cave has lifted the covers off of the MOD's scandalous neglect of UK Military Airworthiness and has charged the MOD to rebuild that system so that the scandal can be put right. Perhaps the introduction of the Chinook Mk2 into RAF service was an even bigger scandal than the tragedy of Nimrod XV230, and how the MOD and the RAF conduct themselves from now on in answer to the call to revisit the Air Marshals' finding on the crash of Chinook ZD576 will set the scene for their response to Mr. Haddon-Cave QC. If it is along the lines that you suggest I think that confidence in the MOD as parent to the newly proposed MAA will be at zero. If that is the case then Military Airworthiness will remain compromised.
AA,
I think that the misunderstanding is on your side if you believe that H-C's criticisms of the RAF/MoD are only relevant to a specific Nimrod. If you have read it, you seem to have completely missed the point.
You would be similarly misguided if you believed that all of the problems exposed so well by H-C suddenly started after the 1998 Defence Review. The lack of airworthiness of the Chinook Mk2 in 1994 proves that. Thanks to H-C, we now know that nothing the MoD says about airworthiness and safety has any value whatsoever.
I think that the misunderstanding is on your side if you believe that H-C's criticisms of the RAF/MoD are only relevant to a specific Nimrod. If you have read it, you seem to have completely missed the point.
You would be similarly misguided if you believed that all of the problems exposed so well by H-C suddenly started after the 1998 Defence Review. The lack of airworthiness of the Chinook Mk2 in 1994 proves that. Thanks to H-C, we now know that nothing the MoD says about airworthiness and safety has any value whatsoever.
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Cazatou,
Thank you for clarifying your background.
You have asked me several times about my helicopter experience and I have replied.
I have asked you several times if you have had any helicopter time and you have not replied.
I therefore assume you have no helicopter experience.
Thank you for clarifying your background.
You have asked me several times about my helicopter experience and I have replied.
I have asked you several times if you have had any helicopter time and you have not replied.
I therefore assume you have no helicopter experience.
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All this talk of airworthiness, what can it achieve?
Take the software aspect – current thinking about complex software is that it is nigh on impossible to be sure of completely de-bugging it – what chance would those checking out that FADEC software at the time have had of making it anymore safer beyond what it was even when the anomalies that they had raised had been sorted? The questions regarding what significant improvements had been made to that software between this crash date and the accumulation of thousands of hours of subsequent HC2 flying still beg specific answers.
The control jam theory seems weak in the light of Boeing's removing its recommendation for regular inspection of the bonding in the “broom cupboard”, as if any such jamming could have been in so many axes as to prevent appropriate evasive manouevres and indeed with an inherrently unstable a/c continuing apparently straight and level on an apparently intended course – the lighthouse keeper's testimony that there was no perceived change in engine note right up to impact suggests no struggle for control and the final evasive manouevre made perfect sense in the event of being surprised by the closure with the ground. The matched power settings reinforce the 'keeper's observation.
How about considering a scenario that fits all that is known about this flight?
The photo below looks down at the LZ I have described in previous posts:
035 (mag – the course of their final leg) runs approximately 11 O'clock to 5 O'clock
A pass directly over this LZ (enough to demonstrate the capability of the CPLS system, for example) or a wave-off even if the intention had been to actually land, conditions permitting, would have been safe on this heading and at their approach altitude as, with no need to climb into the orographic cloud and no need for an increase in power, they merely had to veer off to the left, swinging around the back of the lighthouse, dropping down the slope as they would have (with their power settings) to the clear sea.
The track they actually made (035 but displaced to the right) took them full on to higher ground that did not slope off to the left and the gradient of which increased abruptly (they hit a mini cliff).
I cannot envisage such an experienced and able crew risking getting it wrong – they had to have been trusting some local aid to have been lining them up with that LZ – the only candidate I can think of is a PRC112 – any other ideas?
Take the software aspect – current thinking about complex software is that it is nigh on impossible to be sure of completely de-bugging it – what chance would those checking out that FADEC software at the time have had of making it anymore safer beyond what it was even when the anomalies that they had raised had been sorted? The questions regarding what significant improvements had been made to that software between this crash date and the accumulation of thousands of hours of subsequent HC2 flying still beg specific answers.
The control jam theory seems weak in the light of Boeing's removing its recommendation for regular inspection of the bonding in the “broom cupboard”, as if any such jamming could have been in so many axes as to prevent appropriate evasive manouevres and indeed with an inherrently unstable a/c continuing apparently straight and level on an apparently intended course – the lighthouse keeper's testimony that there was no perceived change in engine note right up to impact suggests no struggle for control and the final evasive manouevre made perfect sense in the event of being surprised by the closure with the ground. The matched power settings reinforce the 'keeper's observation.
How about considering a scenario that fits all that is known about this flight?
The photo below looks down at the LZ I have described in previous posts:
035 (mag – the course of their final leg) runs approximately 11 O'clock to 5 O'clock
A pass directly over this LZ (enough to demonstrate the capability of the CPLS system, for example) or a wave-off even if the intention had been to actually land, conditions permitting, would have been safe on this heading and at their approach altitude as, with no need to climb into the orographic cloud and no need for an increase in power, they merely had to veer off to the left, swinging around the back of the lighthouse, dropping down the slope as they would have (with their power settings) to the clear sea.
The track they actually made (035 but displaced to the right) took them full on to higher ground that did not slope off to the left and the gradient of which increased abruptly (they hit a mini cliff).
I cannot envisage such an experienced and able crew risking getting it wrong – they had to have been trusting some local aid to have been lining them up with that LZ – the only candidate I can think of is a PRC112 – any other ideas?
Last edited by walter kennedy; 2nd Nov 2009 at 19:50. Reason: addition picture
.....any other ideas?
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Walter, this was a bus run; nothing more. What interest would a bunch of senior security personnel (all non-aviators) have in any perceived specific helicopter capability?
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Cows
As Beagle seems to know “those in the know” perhaps you could ask him what new capability the HC2s had that could have been worth demonstrating/exercising a pin-point approach to a site with fixed local weather – then perhaps you could rethink who was on board and whether a demo of such a capability could be sold to them, especially as a training component was often included in such flights and it would not have changed their schedule.
Oh, and your confident statement “...this was a bus run; nothing more.” - why, when they already had a safe route for a bus run (Ald, wptH, wptB), did they cross the Antrim hills in marginal weather conditions and confidently approach the Mull so closely yet having the intention (as evidenced by the selection of wptB and a crs of 028 on the navigator's HoSI) of soon heading back to the safe track (partway along H to B)? This excursion couldn't have been for the scenery that day.
As Beagle seems to know “those in the know” perhaps you could ask him what new capability the HC2s had that could have been worth demonstrating/exercising a pin-point approach to a site with fixed local weather – then perhaps you could rethink who was on board and whether a demo of such a capability could be sold to them, especially as a training component was often included in such flights and it would not have changed their schedule.
Oh, and your confident statement “...this was a bus run; nothing more.” - why, when they already had a safe route for a bus run (Ald, wptH, wptB), did they cross the Antrim hills in marginal weather conditions and confidently approach the Mull so closely yet having the intention (as evidenced by the selection of wptB and a crs of 028 on the navigator's HoSI) of soon heading back to the safe track (partway along H to B)? This excursion couldn't have been for the scenery that day.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 4th Nov 2009 at 18:51. Reason: addition
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walter
1. There was no Controller of Aircraft Release for the use of PRC 112 in British Military Aircraft.
2. There was, therefore, no clearance for PRC 112 to be used in the Chinook Mk2 of the Royal Air Force.
3. If, despite this, it could be proved that the Pilots agreed to carry out a PRC 112 assisted "Fly By" on the Mull that day; then there will be few (if any) contributors to this thread who would dissent with the Finding of Negligence.
1. There was no Controller of Aircraft Release for the use of PRC 112 in British Military Aircraft.
2. There was, therefore, no clearance for PRC 112 to be used in the Chinook Mk2 of the Royal Air Force.
3. If, despite this, it could be proved that the Pilots agreed to carry out a PRC 112 assisted "Fly By" on the Mull that day; then there will be few (if any) contributors to this thread who would dissent with the Finding of Negligence.
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Caz, we may disagree on other aspects of this case but regarding the whole PRC112/LZ argument I wholeheartedly agree with you. Unfortunately Walter is sat there accusing many of us of being myopic whilst consistently pursuing his one and only, almost outlandish hypothesis.
Walt, as many have said before - let it go.
Walt, as many have said before - let it go.
Avoid imitations
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Especially bearing in mind the small number of hours the crew had on the Mk2, and their concerns over the safety of the type, a homing demonstration in marginal weather would surely not be on the agenda; the crew would be only interested in conventional navigation to the destination.
Bearing in mind the nav kit on board, a lat. & long. passed over the radio is far more useful, btw. I can think of no reason why these passengers would be interested in a homing demonstration in the first place. From the passenger seats they would have no way of observing and assessing the technique of any type of homing, or even seeing out of the front of the aircraft.
As I have pointed out to WK on more than one occasion, if the use of this equipment was the "real" mission, why would the captain ask for a Mk1 Chinook for the flight, which definitely did not have the equipment fitted?
Bearing in mind the nav kit on board, a lat. & long. passed over the radio is far more useful, btw. I can think of no reason why these passengers would be interested in a homing demonstration in the first place. From the passenger seats they would have no way of observing and assessing the technique of any type of homing, or even seeing out of the front of the aircraft.
As I have pointed out to WK on more than one occasion, if the use of this equipment was the "real" mission, why would the captain ask for a Mk1 Chinook for the flight, which definitely did not have the equipment fitted?
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ShyTorque
Thank you for focussing on pertinent points.
<<... if the use of this equipment was the "real" mission, why would the captain ask for a Mk1 Chinook for the flight, which definitely did not have the equipment fitted?>>
An excellent point – brings us back to who above Flt Lt Tapper set up the flight changing from 2 helos to the one Chinook in the first place (I raised this planning aspect some time ago but no-one is prepared to discuss this on this thread) – that person's version of the briefing would be of great value - perhaps he (JT) had misgivings about the demo and was looking for an honourable cop-out?
.
<<Especially bearing in mind the small number of hours the crew had on the Mk2, and their concerns over the safety of the type, a homing demonstration in marginal weather would surely not be on the agenda; the crew would be only interested in conventional navigation to the destination.>>
Then why did they not stick to the safe route pre-planned by Lt K? (Ald-wptH-wptB.)
.
<<Bearing in mind the nav kit on board, a lat. & long. passed over the radio is far more useful, btw.>>
Flt Lt Tapper would not have trusted the STANS as close in as the position of waypoint change, at their speed, with those conditions on the ground ahead. They had waypoint A already which is (rounded to convenient-to-memorise lat & long) a few tens of yards from the LZ yet which they replaced with wpt B well short of it. As I have described previously, combined with 028 on the navigator's (JT) HoSI, this suggests that they intended heading for the safe, clear track after their activity at the Mull rather than the nonsensical assertion that they would have just turned to B at that point (check out that route). For the several parameters I have given on previous occassions, it seemed that they thought they were lined up with and intended to land or close pass that LZ – they would not have attempted this without some local point reference that they trusted – even in clear conditions, that landscape is bereft of familiar objects making any fast approach there hairy by visual judgement alone (remember that warning for ops in South Georgia – something about in clear vis distances can be very hard to judge – same thing of no familiar objects). After a sea crossing, the STANS could be expected to be out by half a mile or more – Flt Lt Tapper had warned others in his flight of this concern. Because of this a “lat. & long. passed over the radio” would not have been of any use – add to this the possibility of error in the position given, poss error in the understanding of the TX, and the poss error in typing it in while on the move and you can see it's a no-brainer – as I have said all along, the one thing helo pilots tend to trust above all other references is a DME system of some sort located locally, a good example being a TACAN on a heli-deck, and of course the CPLS working off a PRC112 gave the HC2s a local all weather capability of sorts. But don't get hung up on this specific equipment – it is still only my guess as a candidate equipment and I did ask for other ideas – what matters is that the various parameters that we have strongly suggest an excursion to the Mull as part of an extra as yet undisclosed activity – getting that agreed upon is a tack to getting them cleared – beyond that, it may lead to a fuller inquiry leading to real justice.
.
<<I can think of no reason why these passengers would be interested in a homing demonstration in the first place. From the passenger seats they would have no way of observing and assessing the technique of any type of homing, or even seeing out of the front of the aircraft.>>
I rather think that several of them could have been sold a demo of the capability of getting in quick for an extraction in adverse conditions – whether they looked out of their windows or not, they could have been informed of the conditions and how things were progressing – perhaps as they swung around the lighthouse at speed they could have been told to look out, that they had got directly there, etc – anyway, it wasn't going to upset their schedule and the RAF was short of flying hours for pure training so like it or lump it – just so long as they accepted all the security eggs (them) being stuffed into one basket (the Mk2) and being flown towards the isolated Mull - whoever put this flight together must have had the same concerns that you raised here, ShyTorque, but with enough chutzpah it worked out.
Thank you for focussing on pertinent points.
<<... if the use of this equipment was the "real" mission, why would the captain ask for a Mk1 Chinook for the flight, which definitely did not have the equipment fitted?>>
An excellent point – brings us back to who above Flt Lt Tapper set up the flight changing from 2 helos to the one Chinook in the first place (I raised this planning aspect some time ago but no-one is prepared to discuss this on this thread) – that person's version of the briefing would be of great value - perhaps he (JT) had misgivings about the demo and was looking for an honourable cop-out?
.
<<Especially bearing in mind the small number of hours the crew had on the Mk2, and their concerns over the safety of the type, a homing demonstration in marginal weather would surely not be on the agenda; the crew would be only interested in conventional navigation to the destination.>>
Then why did they not stick to the safe route pre-planned by Lt K? (Ald-wptH-wptB.)
.
<<Bearing in mind the nav kit on board, a lat. & long. passed over the radio is far more useful, btw.>>
Flt Lt Tapper would not have trusted the STANS as close in as the position of waypoint change, at their speed, with those conditions on the ground ahead. They had waypoint A already which is (rounded to convenient-to-memorise lat & long) a few tens of yards from the LZ yet which they replaced with wpt B well short of it. As I have described previously, combined with 028 on the navigator's (JT) HoSI, this suggests that they intended heading for the safe, clear track after their activity at the Mull rather than the nonsensical assertion that they would have just turned to B at that point (check out that route). For the several parameters I have given on previous occassions, it seemed that they thought they were lined up with and intended to land or close pass that LZ – they would not have attempted this without some local point reference that they trusted – even in clear conditions, that landscape is bereft of familiar objects making any fast approach there hairy by visual judgement alone (remember that warning for ops in South Georgia – something about in clear vis distances can be very hard to judge – same thing of no familiar objects). After a sea crossing, the STANS could be expected to be out by half a mile or more – Flt Lt Tapper had warned others in his flight of this concern. Because of this a “lat. & long. passed over the radio” would not have been of any use – add to this the possibility of error in the position given, poss error in the understanding of the TX, and the poss error in typing it in while on the move and you can see it's a no-brainer – as I have said all along, the one thing helo pilots tend to trust above all other references is a DME system of some sort located locally, a good example being a TACAN on a heli-deck, and of course the CPLS working off a PRC112 gave the HC2s a local all weather capability of sorts. But don't get hung up on this specific equipment – it is still only my guess as a candidate equipment and I did ask for other ideas – what matters is that the various parameters that we have strongly suggest an excursion to the Mull as part of an extra as yet undisclosed activity – getting that agreed upon is a tack to getting them cleared – beyond that, it may lead to a fuller inquiry leading to real justice.
.
<<I can think of no reason why these passengers would be interested in a homing demonstration in the first place. From the passenger seats they would have no way of observing and assessing the technique of any type of homing, or even seeing out of the front of the aircraft.>>
I rather think that several of them could have been sold a demo of the capability of getting in quick for an extraction in adverse conditions – whether they looked out of their windows or not, they could have been informed of the conditions and how things were progressing – perhaps as they swung around the lighthouse at speed they could have been told to look out, that they had got directly there, etc – anyway, it wasn't going to upset their schedule and the RAF was short of flying hours for pure training so like it or lump it – just so long as they accepted all the security eggs (them) being stuffed into one basket (the Mk2) and being flown towards the isolated Mull - whoever put this flight together must have had the same concerns that you raised here, ShyTorque, but with enough chutzpah it worked out.
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Walter
Originally 2 Puma's were allocated to the Task - but that was changed as 2 Puma's can respond to 2 separate Security Incidents at any time; whereas 1 Chinook (which could only respond to 1 Incident at a time) could carry all the Passengers which would have required 2 Puma's.
IT WAS AS SIMPLE AS THAT
Originally 2 Puma's were allocated to the Task - but that was changed as 2 Puma's can respond to 2 separate Security Incidents at any time; whereas 1 Chinook (which could only respond to 1 Incident at a time) could carry all the Passengers which would have required 2 Puma's.
IT WAS AS SIMPLE AS THAT
Caz
While I agree with the gist of your post, that Walter’s LZ theory is unlikely to be a factor, it cannot be discounted when posts like this highlight the appalling failings in the aircraft release process.
1. There was no Controller of Aircraft Release for the use of PRC 112 in British Military Aircraft.
2. There was, therefore, no clearance for PRC 112 to be used in the Chinook Mk2 of the Royal Air Force.
2. There was, therefore, no clearance for PRC 112 to be used in the Chinook Mk2 of the Royal Air Force.
- The PRC112 would not need Controller Air Release as it is a hand held radio used by ground forces. The airborne component is, commonly, AN/ARS-6(V). Collectively the system is known as AN/AYD-1 PLS. Fitted at Station 130 or thereabouts, I understand.
- If an equipment does not have CA Release, it most certainly does NOT follow that it (a) does not have clearance for use in the aircraft or (b) was not in the aircraft.
Last edited by tucumseh; 8th Nov 2009 at 05:25.
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Caz
It was not that simple.
Look at the timing – the other crews were not aware of the change until the day before yet Flt Lt Tapper must have had some realistic time for him to have thought a request for a MK1 could be accommodated.
Also, someone on this thread (who appeared to have had some standing/cred) let it slip some time back that there had been an intention to use a Chinook some weeks before the event.
The officer at the level above Flt Lt Tapper who oversaw the planning, etc would have been a useful witness at at least one of the inquiries, one would have thought.
Tec
Thanks for the example regarding CAR – I would like to add that it was very much a self contained system and that the first batch delivered were in a “palletised” form such that the on-board component could be easily moved between Chinook MK2s. It was intrinsically accurate such that it worked accurately or it did not work at all – you plugged it in and if readings were apparently of the right order then it could safely be assumed that they were accurate (more accurate than radar in range and +/-4deg in bearing with the integral UHF antennae acting as a direction finder).
It was not that simple.
Look at the timing – the other crews were not aware of the change until the day before yet Flt Lt Tapper must have had some realistic time for him to have thought a request for a MK1 could be accommodated.
Also, someone on this thread (who appeared to have had some standing/cred) let it slip some time back that there had been an intention to use a Chinook some weeks before the event.
The officer at the level above Flt Lt Tapper who oversaw the planning, etc would have been a useful witness at at least one of the inquiries, one would have thought.
Tec
Thanks for the example regarding CAR – I would like to add that it was very much a self contained system and that the first batch delivered were in a “palletised” form such that the on-board component could be easily moved between Chinook MK2s. It was intrinsically accurate such that it worked accurately or it did not work at all – you plugged it in and if readings were apparently of the right order then it could safely be assumed that they were accurate (more accurate than radar in range and +/-4deg in bearing with the integral UHF antennae acting as a direction finder).