Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Caz,
I accept you will not reply to this question because of the risk of giving credence to flipsters character assessment but can you accurately describe what the weather conditions were when
"the waypoint change occurred 0.81 NM prior to the first waypoint on the Mull"
I accept you will not reply to this question because of the risk of giving credence to flipsters character assessment but can you accurately describe what the weather conditions were when
"the waypoint change occurred 0.81 NM prior to the first waypoint on the Mull"
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Caz,
Nope, try again! I think you'll find I'm correct - please bear in mind that S-TANS was NOT certified as crashworthy - it was not a 'black box', so we are back in the realms of 'not positively determined'!
Either way, it is accepted (by most that matter) that for a WP change- at whatever range, the crew would have had to have been 'visual' with WP A, its general area and/or surroundings, such that by a small turn to the left of 10-15 degs, they would have been navigating to WP B at Corran, by keeping clear of the Mull to seaward (where the weather was arguably clear). As many have said before, trying to out climb the Mull and using WP B would have been non-sensical, which is why no-one alive knows what caused them to inadvertently enter cloud after WP change. A ADR/CVR might have given the BOI a clue but because such a device was not fitted, we'll never know.
Apparently, the decison not to fit ADR/CVR had also been Day's some time before - anyone care to comment? If it was, then Day did have a vested interest in ensuring that the lack of ADR/CVR did not cloud the judgement of the ROs.....hmmmm?
I am still confused as why BOI did not ask the question about alternative forms of transport?
Nope, try again! I think you'll find I'm correct - please bear in mind that S-TANS was NOT certified as crashworthy - it was not a 'black box', so we are back in the realms of 'not positively determined'!
Either way, it is accepted (by most that matter) that for a WP change- at whatever range, the crew would have had to have been 'visual' with WP A, its general area and/or surroundings, such that by a small turn to the left of 10-15 degs, they would have been navigating to WP B at Corran, by keeping clear of the Mull to seaward (where the weather was arguably clear). As many have said before, trying to out climb the Mull and using WP B would have been non-sensical, which is why no-one alive knows what caused them to inadvertently enter cloud after WP change. A ADR/CVR might have given the BOI a clue but because such a device was not fitted, we'll never know.
Apparently, the decison not to fit ADR/CVR had also been Day's some time before - anyone care to comment? If it was, then Day did have a vested interest in ensuring that the lack of ADR/CVR did not cloud the judgement of the ROs.....hmmmm?
I am still confused as why BOI did not ask the question about alternative forms of transport?
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Chinook
Seldom. Not quite clear what point your are trying to make when you ask: "Sorry to trouble with another question but does anyone know what the actual weather was 100 yards away from Mr Ellacott, ie at the crash site?" JP
And is the CVR/ADR now fitted?
Perhaps someone could confirm HUMS is indeed crashworthy to the same degree a "normal" ADR/CVR is? My admittedly limited recollection is that HUMS was not designed to be a combined ADR/CVR. Perhaps that intention changed.
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Pulse 1
Your post 4430 does not make any sense to me:
Quote " At Point B, about one mile away from Point B and close to where Mr Holbrook was".
Point A was on the Mull and Point B was Corran.
Can you elucidate please?
Why are there 2 "Point B"s???
Your post 4430 does not make any sense to me:
Quote " At Point B, about one mile away from Point B and close to where Mr Holbrook was".
Point A was on the Mull and Point B was Corran.
Can you elucidate please?
Why are there 2 "Point B"s???
Last edited by cazatou; 19th May 2009 at 19:25.
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Likewise how can you state the WP change was .81 nm short of WP A???? Doh!
Mine is a 'best guess', extracted from S-TANS and given to BOI/HoL. This figure certainly has its limitations but it has been quoted as accurately as '1.75nm from WPA' .......but I have no idea from where you got your figure!
The bottom line is we just don't know - me, you, the AAIB, the BOI nor even Johnny Wrotten in all his 'wisdom'. That is why all this talk is supposition and conjecture - it can never be positively determined and why 'with no doubt whatsoever' cannot ever be proven.
QED
Mine is a 'best guess', extracted from S-TANS and given to BOI/HoL. This figure certainly has its limitations but it has been quoted as accurately as '1.75nm from WPA' .......but I have no idea from where you got your figure!
The bottom line is we just don't know - me, you, the AAIB, the BOI nor even Johnny Wrotten in all his 'wisdom'. That is why all this talk is supposition and conjecture - it can never be positively determined and why 'with no doubt whatsoever' cannot ever be proven.
QED
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Chinook
Seldom. Apologies if my question was not clear to you, but put another way, why do you think it is important/significant, ie why does it matter, what might it tell us about this affair? JP
cazatou,
Read dalek's post above. He says the same thing but much more simply and clearly than I have.
Any further argument from you will convince me that you are either being very stupid or, more likely, being deliberately obtuse.
Read dalek's post above. He says the same thing but much more simply and clearly than I have.
Any further argument from you will convince me that you are either being very stupid or, more likely, being deliberately obtuse.
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JP,
As there appears to be no hard evidence with regards to the actual weather at the impact site and, as you yourself have previously agreed, there is not a shred of factual evidence as to what could actually be seen from the aircrafts cockpit windows, I simply wondered how any one can say hand on heart that the crew definitely busted their weather minima?
As there appears to be no hard evidence with regards to the actual weather at the impact site and, as you yourself have previously agreed, there is not a shred of factual evidence as to what could actually be seen from the aircrafts cockpit windows, I simply wondered how any one can say hand on heart that the crew definitely busted their weather minima?
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Caz
I think Pulse's use of 'point A' and 'point B' may have led you to be confused. He was not talking about Waypoint A nor Waypoint B, although that is what you obviously have inferred and I can see that it is easy for someone to be confused by such terminology (note how I have resisted the temptation to be rude!).
Pulse's 'point A' is on the Mull and his 'point B' is about 1-2 miles offshore, where the ac would have been at the time of the WP change on the S-TANS, and not very far at all from the yachtie.
(I'm sure Pulse will admit that he could have been a bit clearer.)
What many people are trying to point out to you is that you are probably right in saying that the weather was 'pants' at all the various places that the witnesses described on the Mull and at the eventual crash site - up the hillside in low stratus.
BUT.... you seem to be unable to grasp that as the crew were approaching the Mull, the weather offshore (where the WP change was probably made) was suitable for VFR (even if Mr Holbrook's first assessment was correct) and the worst of the weather was confined to the land - eg upslope stratus. In all likelihood, the weather offshore could have been even better than that initially assessed by Mr Holbrook and why it is perfectly possible, if not probable, that the crew decided to continue 'VFR below' and change S-TANS to WP B. Because of the WP change before the Mull, it is much more likley that this was the decision rather than to fly a cruise climb into IMC at 150kts (or even the more likely IAS of 135 kts) into probable icing conditions, quite often worse in stratus on maritime coasts than one would normally think possible (BTDT), and almost certainly outside the limited RTS of 4 deg C at anything above approx 2500ft.
Also, the BOI seems not to have thought of the possibility that, once IMC and at the immediate leg SAlt of 2800ft (if that is how SH/SF crews calculated SAlt), the crew would probably have been faced little chance of regaining LL, which would have necessitated a further climb to the SAlt for the rest of the legs - nearer 6000ft. All of which pre-disposed against the option of a cruise climb, undermining the BOIs list of probable causes and fixation on inappropriate ROC.
The big problem you and others seem to be unable to grasp is that something stopped the crew from maintaining VFR below and turning only slightly left towards Corran. Why was this? Distraction, UFCM, Engine Runaway Up, AFCS fault, visual illusions etc etc?
WE JUST DON'T KNOW.
SFFP - I think one could safely say the weather at the point of impact (approx 8-900 ft up the hill) was 'pants' - Caz's impressive list of witnesses show that much but what many don't seem to understand is how or why the ac climbed over 500 ft into cloud from 3-400ft over the sea, while trying to turn left. For sure, the selection of a cruise climb (with or without an appropriate ROC) is but one option that the crew would have had open to them but as I reasoned above, I think this less likely than staying VFR below and keeping to the west. But without ADR/CVR we don't know and never will.
I think Pulse's use of 'point A' and 'point B' may have led you to be confused. He was not talking about Waypoint A nor Waypoint B, although that is what you obviously have inferred and I can see that it is easy for someone to be confused by such terminology (note how I have resisted the temptation to be rude!).
Pulse's 'point A' is on the Mull and his 'point B' is about 1-2 miles offshore, where the ac would have been at the time of the WP change on the S-TANS, and not very far at all from the yachtie.
(I'm sure Pulse will admit that he could have been a bit clearer.)
What many people are trying to point out to you is that you are probably right in saying that the weather was 'pants' at all the various places that the witnesses described on the Mull and at the eventual crash site - up the hillside in low stratus.
BUT.... you seem to be unable to grasp that as the crew were approaching the Mull, the weather offshore (where the WP change was probably made) was suitable for VFR (even if Mr Holbrook's first assessment was correct) and the worst of the weather was confined to the land - eg upslope stratus. In all likelihood, the weather offshore could have been even better than that initially assessed by Mr Holbrook and why it is perfectly possible, if not probable, that the crew decided to continue 'VFR below' and change S-TANS to WP B. Because of the WP change before the Mull, it is much more likley that this was the decision rather than to fly a cruise climb into IMC at 150kts (or even the more likely IAS of 135 kts) into probable icing conditions, quite often worse in stratus on maritime coasts than one would normally think possible (BTDT), and almost certainly outside the limited RTS of 4 deg C at anything above approx 2500ft.
Also, the BOI seems not to have thought of the possibility that, once IMC and at the immediate leg SAlt of 2800ft (if that is how SH/SF crews calculated SAlt), the crew would probably have been faced little chance of regaining LL, which would have necessitated a further climb to the SAlt for the rest of the legs - nearer 6000ft. All of which pre-disposed against the option of a cruise climb, undermining the BOIs list of probable causes and fixation on inappropriate ROC.
The big problem you and others seem to be unable to grasp is that something stopped the crew from maintaining VFR below and turning only slightly left towards Corran. Why was this? Distraction, UFCM, Engine Runaway Up, AFCS fault, visual illusions etc etc?
WE JUST DON'T KNOW.
SFFP - I think one could safely say the weather at the point of impact (approx 8-900 ft up the hill) was 'pants' - Caz's impressive list of witnesses show that much but what many don't seem to understand is how or why the ac climbed over 500 ft into cloud from 3-400ft over the sea, while trying to turn left. For sure, the selection of a cruise climb (with or without an appropriate ROC) is but one option that the crew would have had open to them but as I reasoned above, I think this less likely than staying VFR below and keeping to the west. But without ADR/CVR we don't know and never will.
Last edited by flipster; 19th May 2009 at 18:10.
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flipster
Perhaps you should try reading some of the relevant reports:-
Data from the SuperTANS system, which was performing normally at powerdown, shows that the airspeed immediately prior to impact was approx 135 knots.
The Aircraft maintained its intended flightpath up to the waypoint change.
The flight on average was conducted at an essentially constant airspeed that tended towards the high end of the normal cruise speed range.
The first waypoint was not the lighthouse but a point some 280 metres to the SE of the lighthouse - HLS?
A small inaccuracy between the GPS position and true position meant that the aircraft's heading was taking it towards the higher ground to the east of the lighthouse.
All the reports of eye-witnesses on the Mull indicated that the weather there was unsuitable for flight under VFR.
Perhaps you should try reading some of the relevant reports:-
Data from the SuperTANS system, which was performing normally at powerdown, shows that the airspeed immediately prior to impact was approx 135 knots.
The Aircraft maintained its intended flightpath up to the waypoint change.
The flight on average was conducted at an essentially constant airspeed that tended towards the high end of the normal cruise speed range.
The first waypoint was not the lighthouse but a point some 280 metres to the SE of the lighthouse - HLS?
A small inaccuracy between the GPS position and true position meant that the aircraft's heading was taking it towards the higher ground to the east of the lighthouse.
All the reports of eye-witnesses on the Mull indicated that the weather there was unsuitable for flight under VFR.
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Caz
You said:
I believe I can speak for all of us campaigning against the finding of Gross Negligence that none of us has a problem with the evidence of those on the hillside at the time that the visibility there was definitely not suitable for VFR flight.
But, and it's a big but, the fact that the acft hit the hillside does not prove that the crew was trying to fly VFR over the land, nor does it prove that they attempted a cruise climb, LL wx abort or any other 'negligent' manoeuvre.
Whilst I have no idea how accurate Mr Holbrook's observations were, it certainly seems likely that VFR was both possible and legal a relatively short distance from the shore. Having flown in the area (albeit not on that day nor in a Chinook) on numerous occasions, it is common to have cloud shrouding the hills in mist with excellent VFR conditions over the sea. It is also normal to plan a route using unique turning points that have vertical extent but then to turn prior to reaching them, thus reducing overall flight time. The selection of the next waypoint at Corran is evidence that this is what the crew intended on this occasion; the impact of the acft on the hillside is not, on the other hand, evidence that the crew intended to overfly the planned turning point, be that VFR at low level or in a climb to Safety Altitude.
There is plenty of evidence of technical failures on the Chinook fleet that may explain why the acft finished up right of track rather then pointing in a new straight line towards Corran, but there is no evidence of the crew ignoring this safest course of action, nor of them deliberately attempting a cruise climb, IMC, to impact the hill. This lack of evidence renders a finding of Gross Negligence 'beyond any doubt whatsoever' ridiculous!
You said:
All the reports of eye-witnesses on the Mull indicated that the weather there was unsuitable for flight under VFR.
But, and it's a big but, the fact that the acft hit the hillside does not prove that the crew was trying to fly VFR over the land, nor does it prove that they attempted a cruise climb, LL wx abort or any other 'negligent' manoeuvre.
Whilst I have no idea how accurate Mr Holbrook's observations were, it certainly seems likely that VFR was both possible and legal a relatively short distance from the shore. Having flown in the area (albeit not on that day nor in a Chinook) on numerous occasions, it is common to have cloud shrouding the hills in mist with excellent VFR conditions over the sea. It is also normal to plan a route using unique turning points that have vertical extent but then to turn prior to reaching them, thus reducing overall flight time. The selection of the next waypoint at Corran is evidence that this is what the crew intended on this occasion; the impact of the acft on the hillside is not, on the other hand, evidence that the crew intended to overfly the planned turning point, be that VFR at low level or in a climb to Safety Altitude.
There is plenty of evidence of technical failures on the Chinook fleet that may explain why the acft finished up right of track rather then pointing in a new straight line towards Corran, but there is no evidence of the crew ignoring this safest course of action, nor of them deliberately attempting a cruise climb, IMC, to impact the hill. This lack of evidence renders a finding of Gross Negligence 'beyond any doubt whatsoever' ridiculous!
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Caz,
Nope, you ARE daft!
I'm sorry, I've tried to be helpful but you seem to be incapable of grasping the most basic explanations/postulations of other possible sequences leading to the crash. I freely accept that some of the things you suggest are possible and we are entitled to take opposing views but it is obvious that you find it hard to acccept that someone else just might have a point. That, in itself, is very sad because you are denying yourself so much.
I can take some comfort from the fact that I seem to share the same view as the original BOI, the Scottish Sherriff's Inquiry, the HoL Inquiry, the the Public Accounts Committee, former Defence Ministers and even ex PMs, not to mention numerous ex and serving aircrew. You, however, slavishly adhere to the trite and blinkered stubborness of your former bosses. While we are both entitled to our views, my underlying appreciation of the accident is that we will never, ever know for certain - why is that so hard for someone like you (and them) to accept? It is only an admission that you are, in fact, human.
It is not a big step but it takes courage to cast off your self-made chains of deceit - I know you can do it and you know you owe it yourself - I guarantee that you will feel so much of a better person for doing it. Go on, don't let us all down, be a human-being and give yourself a big boost and say
"I don't know for sure"!
There, that wasn't hard, was it? Welcome to the human race!
Nope, you ARE daft!
I'm sorry, I've tried to be helpful but you seem to be incapable of grasping the most basic explanations/postulations of other possible sequences leading to the crash. I freely accept that some of the things you suggest are possible and we are entitled to take opposing views but it is obvious that you find it hard to acccept that someone else just might have a point. That, in itself, is very sad because you are denying yourself so much.
I can take some comfort from the fact that I seem to share the same view as the original BOI, the Scottish Sherriff's Inquiry, the HoL Inquiry, the the Public Accounts Committee, former Defence Ministers and even ex PMs, not to mention numerous ex and serving aircrew. You, however, slavishly adhere to the trite and blinkered stubborness of your former bosses. While we are both entitled to our views, my underlying appreciation of the accident is that we will never, ever know for certain - why is that so hard for someone like you (and them) to accept? It is only an admission that you are, in fact, human.
It is not a big step but it takes courage to cast off your self-made chains of deceit - I know you can do it and you know you owe it yourself - I guarantee that you will feel so much of a better person for doing it. Go on, don't let us all down, be a human-being and give yourself a big boost and say
"I don't know for sure"!
There, that wasn't hard, was it? Welcome to the human race!
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You do not have to be in bad weather for it to affect you – it was masking the detail and large topographic features of a hazard (flying VFR at their altitude) – making visual judgment of distance off impossible at a high closing speed.
As the captain had earlier expressed reservations over the SuperTANS's accuracy, he would not have approached as close as the position of waypoint change at their speed and heading unless he had reason to do so.
If you care to spend some time up there at the right time of year you would perhaps understand this.
Given that they appeared to have been set up (heading, slowing down, altimeters, etc) to land at that known LZ for Chinooks (where Flt Lt Tapper had landed before and for which waypoint A was ideal as a virtual inner marker in the nav system), how is it that you cannot contemplate the obvious as a strong possibility?
The selection of waypoint B at that point made no sense if they were just passing en route – they would have been losing their immediate/close reference in their Nav system and a change to the heading to Corran would have taken them over still higher ground than the crash site - it was perhaps more like they were dumping waypoint A from the system as it conflicted with some other reference they had. I have posted annotated maps some time ago that make this clear.
There must be those among you who knew of equipment around at the time that could have been worthy of a demo – what have you to lose by at least discussing it?
As the captain had earlier expressed reservations over the SuperTANS's accuracy, he would not have approached as close as the position of waypoint change at their speed and heading unless he had reason to do so.
If you care to spend some time up there at the right time of year you would perhaps understand this.
Given that they appeared to have been set up (heading, slowing down, altimeters, etc) to land at that known LZ for Chinooks (where Flt Lt Tapper had landed before and for which waypoint A was ideal as a virtual inner marker in the nav system), how is it that you cannot contemplate the obvious as a strong possibility?
The selection of waypoint B at that point made no sense if they were just passing en route – they would have been losing their immediate/close reference in their Nav system and a change to the heading to Corran would have taken them over still higher ground than the crash site - it was perhaps more like they were dumping waypoint A from the system as it conflicted with some other reference they had. I have posted annotated maps some time ago that make this clear.
There must be those among you who knew of equipment around at the time that could have been worthy of a demo – what have you to lose by at least discussing it?
Last edited by walter kennedy; 19th May 2009 at 20:56. Reason: additional note
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Walt,
It may come as a suprise to you that the landing speed for a helo is not 135-150 kts!
However, they may have slowed a bit, the headings are a bit strange, as is the ROC and power settings and the weather was certainly a factor. However the WP change, I think, rules out a climb to VFR on top and also your proposed unplanned, unauth'd LZ. That said, I cannot prove it either way, as nobody can and certainly 'with no doubt whatsoever'. I believe that the PRC112 would have been a possible contender - basically a clever locator beacon for downed aircrew and special people. I think I recall that the HC2 was fitted with such a receiver? You'd have to ask the experts but I'm not sure they'd be too forthcoming! In those days, it would have been a very basic piece of kit but now its quite swept up!
Product Details - AN/PRC-112G Transceiver - AN/PRC-112 Overview
flip
It may come as a suprise to you that the landing speed for a helo is not 135-150 kts!
However, they may have slowed a bit, the headings are a bit strange, as is the ROC and power settings and the weather was certainly a factor. However the WP change, I think, rules out a climb to VFR on top and also your proposed unplanned, unauth'd LZ. That said, I cannot prove it either way, as nobody can and certainly 'with no doubt whatsoever'. I believe that the PRC112 would have been a possible contender - basically a clever locator beacon for downed aircrew and special people. I think I recall that the HC2 was fitted with such a receiver? You'd have to ask the experts but I'm not sure they'd be too forthcoming! In those days, it would have been a very basic piece of kit but now its quite swept up!
Product Details - AN/PRC-112G Transceiver - AN/PRC-112 Overview
flip
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flipster
I must confess surprise at your use of the word "daft" to describe me.
Nobody has described me previously as being "mild or meek"* - perhaps you do not realise that this merely confirms some peoples view that you do not understand the meanings of the words you read or use.
*OED meaning of "daft"
I must confess surprise at your use of the word "daft" to describe me.
Nobody has described me previously as being "mild or meek"* - perhaps you do not realise that this merely confirms some peoples view that you do not understand the meanings of the words you read or use.
*OED meaning of "daft"
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Caz,
Maybe it's you who has some difficulty understanding the meaning of some of our more commonly used words.
Daft - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
If you have a look at the above link, where it refers to an old english derived word, I think that this is probably what Flipster meant, but I suspect you already knew that.
Maybe it's you who has some difficulty understanding the meaning of some of our more commonly used words.
Daft - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
If you have a look at the above link, where it refers to an old english derived word, I think that this is probably what Flipster meant, but I suspect you already knew that.