Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Olive,
Just a couple of thoughts with regards your post,
"With two competent pilots in the cockpit of an aircraft that has not climbed to safety altitude and has not turned away from rising terrain in deteriorating weather, the conclusion here appears sound."
Sounds like you have the same reservations that I have on this subject.
"If it had been a single seat fast jet without passengers and crew, then "cause unknown" might be appropriate, but not here"
Perhaps you could share with us the "known" cause of this accident, and of course provide proof beyond any doubt whatsoever to substantiate it.
Just a couple of thoughts with regards your post,
"With two competent pilots in the cockpit of an aircraft that has not climbed to safety altitude and has not turned away from rising terrain in deteriorating weather, the conclusion here appears sound."
Sounds like you have the same reservations that I have on this subject.
"If it had been a single seat fast jet without passengers and crew, then "cause unknown" might be appropriate, but not here"
Perhaps you could share with us the "known" cause of this accident, and of course provide proof beyond any doubt whatsoever to substantiate it.
Last edited by Seldomfitforpurpose; 9th Apr 2009 at 17:57. Reason: For Fitter 2
Sffp
I agree 90%. I would agree totally if the paragraph read:
Perhaps you could share with us the "known" cause of this accident, and of course provide proof beyond any doubt whatsoever to substantiate it.
Perhaps you could share with us the "known" cause of this accident, and of course provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt to substantiate it.
Perhaps you could share with us the "known" cause of this accident, and of course provide proof beyond any doubt whatsoever to substantiate it.
A really irritating PPRuNer
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Firstly, my apologies to you all for the prolonged absence. It was brought about by a complete computer meltdown which is now sorted. I am grateful for those who have kept the momentum of the thread going over the past few weeks.
As you already know from the Telegraph article, the Campaign has not been idle. There is still yet more to come.
Reading back over the thread since my last post, I have been intrigued by the different locations where it is claimed the negligence took place. From the planning of the sortie, to breakfast, to prior to the waypoint change (wherever that was actually made), to just after the waypoint change, to well… it doesn’t really matter where – they were just negligent.
Quite a discussion about breakfast, but, in actual fact, all the Board could say was that they were unable to ascertain whether breakfast had been taken by Jonathan Tapper. At no point was it stated that he had not eaten. Another assumption put to bed, I hope.
Olive Oil, welcome to the thread. You stated that had it been a fast jet without passengers and crew then “cause unknown” might be appropriate. Are you suggesting that the Chinook verdict is based purely upon the fact that it was carrying passengers? I think you could actually be onto something there. After all, when reviewing two Boards of Inquiry some fifteen days apart and, despite overwhelming evidence to the cause of the accident of the fast jet (due to ADR and CVR being fitted) the Reviewing Officers made comments such as, “Regardless of the circumstances of this particular accident, I agree that [removed] should be absolved from blame.”, “It is therefore because there is no scope for conjecture… that I find any consideration of human failings to be academic and fruitless. Despite the wealth of detailed evidence, we are confounded and under these particular circumstances I consider it is futile to indulge in hypothesis.” and “Why they therefore elected to ignore the safe options open to them and pursue the one imposing the ultimate danger, we shall never know.”
However, in a Chinook (not fitted with ADR and CVR), the Reviewing Officers, just fifteen days earlier, had commented, “Without the irrefutable evidence which is provided by an ADR and a CVR, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise detail of the sequence of events in the minutes and seconds immediately prior to impact.” and “In my judgement, none of the possible factors and scenarios are so strong that they would have been likely to prevent such an experienced crew from maintaining safe flight.”
Speculation and judgement have no place in a finding which requires absolutely no doubt whatsoever, and the differences in the application of standards in these two accidents confuse me. I asked the MoD for clarification of these issues several years ago but Mr Ingram MP stated he was not prepared to answer my comparative analysis on a point-by-point basis. He did, however, make comment that it might be considered that the Chinook crew owed a “duty of care” to the passengers, and that the need to exercise that care could lead, perhaps, to a greater need to consider whether negligence had occurred.
The Campaign has, and will, continue to press the MoD and the Secretary of State for Defence to face up to the shortcomings of their case against Jon Tapper and Rick Cook and to do the honourable thing and remove the unfounded allegation of negligence that has been laid against these men for the past fourteen years and ten months.
It's good to be back!
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
As you already know from the Telegraph article, the Campaign has not been idle. There is still yet more to come.
Reading back over the thread since my last post, I have been intrigued by the different locations where it is claimed the negligence took place. From the planning of the sortie, to breakfast, to prior to the waypoint change (wherever that was actually made), to just after the waypoint change, to well… it doesn’t really matter where – they were just negligent.
Quite a discussion about breakfast, but, in actual fact, all the Board could say was that they were unable to ascertain whether breakfast had been taken by Jonathan Tapper. At no point was it stated that he had not eaten. Another assumption put to bed, I hope.
Olive Oil, welcome to the thread. You stated that had it been a fast jet without passengers and crew then “cause unknown” might be appropriate. Are you suggesting that the Chinook verdict is based purely upon the fact that it was carrying passengers? I think you could actually be onto something there. After all, when reviewing two Boards of Inquiry some fifteen days apart and, despite overwhelming evidence to the cause of the accident of the fast jet (due to ADR and CVR being fitted) the Reviewing Officers made comments such as, “Regardless of the circumstances of this particular accident, I agree that [removed] should be absolved from blame.”, “It is therefore because there is no scope for conjecture… that I find any consideration of human failings to be academic and fruitless. Despite the wealth of detailed evidence, we are confounded and under these particular circumstances I consider it is futile to indulge in hypothesis.” and “Why they therefore elected to ignore the safe options open to them and pursue the one imposing the ultimate danger, we shall never know.”
However, in a Chinook (not fitted with ADR and CVR), the Reviewing Officers, just fifteen days earlier, had commented, “Without the irrefutable evidence which is provided by an ADR and a CVR, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise detail of the sequence of events in the minutes and seconds immediately prior to impact.” and “In my judgement, none of the possible factors and scenarios are so strong that they would have been likely to prevent such an experienced crew from maintaining safe flight.”
Speculation and judgement have no place in a finding which requires absolutely no doubt whatsoever, and the differences in the application of standards in these two accidents confuse me. I asked the MoD for clarification of these issues several years ago but Mr Ingram MP stated he was not prepared to answer my comparative analysis on a point-by-point basis. He did, however, make comment that it might be considered that the Chinook crew owed a “duty of care” to the passengers, and that the need to exercise that care could lead, perhaps, to a greater need to consider whether negligence had occurred.
The Campaign has, and will, continue to press the MoD and the Secretary of State for Defence to face up to the shortcomings of their case against Jon Tapper and Rick Cook and to do the honourable thing and remove the unfounded allegation of negligence that has been laid against these men for the past fourteen years and ten months.
It's good to be back!
My best, as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
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Chug wrote: <<This is a story of the intentional dismemberment of the airworthiness protection of the UK Military Airfleet. >>
Perhaps this is a pragmatic approach when a complex aircraft is purchased from overseas. Although I do not believe airworthiness was a relevant issue in this crash I thought I would bring you all to reality regarding your endless discussions about it – having worked in a defence industry, I can tell you that the CC/QA (call it what you will) function is hard enough when the kit is manufactured “in house” with the design engineers readily available to the QA guys and that on systems nowhere near as complex as a twin rotor helo – the numbers of QA staff seemed to outweigh the engineers and we had to give them much of our time such an onerous task it is – if you do not build the thing yourself you have very little chance to maintain rigorous, meaningful CC – and apart from keeping you all running around in ever decreasing circles, the airworthiness issue is not going to achieve anything.
In this particular incident the FADEC has drawn much attention – that the engines were found at matched power and that data stored in one of the engine management computers did not record any excessive transients should put this one to bed.
Regarding any other possible control problems, as others have said, they were already very close in when they changed waypoints and made the fatal turn to the right – it was not a control problem that got them into danger and indeed when in the last seconds an evasive manouevre was started the a/c seemed to have responded as expected.
So you are not going to get anywhere with blaming the aircraft – especially with the strong political need at the time to assure the public that sabotage was not an issue as the pilots were at fault beyond any doubt whatsoever – that's why the verdict was so unjustly harsh as, in strict legal terms, it implied just that – had there been any realistic chance of blaming the aircraft to a similar degree of certainty, perhaps the powers that be could have taken that option back then – the case the Mull group has put forward is nothing like enough to get them to change horses now.
Perhaps if you all could have applied your collective wisdom to a constructive analysis we may have progressed somewhat. All that is known about this crash is consistent with them approaching a known landing area but overshooting – if you had followed this argument that I have put on this thread many times with the chartwork, reading and checking Boeing's “Analysis of Available Data”, and visiting the site in various weather conditions perhaps you too could see the obvious. If they had been given an extra task that has not so far been declared then the whole case must be reopened – put your minds to it – what is there to lose?
Perhaps this is a pragmatic approach when a complex aircraft is purchased from overseas. Although I do not believe airworthiness was a relevant issue in this crash I thought I would bring you all to reality regarding your endless discussions about it – having worked in a defence industry, I can tell you that the CC/QA (call it what you will) function is hard enough when the kit is manufactured “in house” with the design engineers readily available to the QA guys and that on systems nowhere near as complex as a twin rotor helo – the numbers of QA staff seemed to outweigh the engineers and we had to give them much of our time such an onerous task it is – if you do not build the thing yourself you have very little chance to maintain rigorous, meaningful CC – and apart from keeping you all running around in ever decreasing circles, the airworthiness issue is not going to achieve anything.
In this particular incident the FADEC has drawn much attention – that the engines were found at matched power and that data stored in one of the engine management computers did not record any excessive transients should put this one to bed.
Regarding any other possible control problems, as others have said, they were already very close in when they changed waypoints and made the fatal turn to the right – it was not a control problem that got them into danger and indeed when in the last seconds an evasive manouevre was started the a/c seemed to have responded as expected.
So you are not going to get anywhere with blaming the aircraft – especially with the strong political need at the time to assure the public that sabotage was not an issue as the pilots were at fault beyond any doubt whatsoever – that's why the verdict was so unjustly harsh as, in strict legal terms, it implied just that – had there been any realistic chance of blaming the aircraft to a similar degree of certainty, perhaps the powers that be could have taken that option back then – the case the Mull group has put forward is nothing like enough to get them to change horses now.
Perhaps if you all could have applied your collective wisdom to a constructive analysis we may have progressed somewhat. All that is known about this crash is consistent with them approaching a known landing area but overshooting – if you had followed this argument that I have put on this thread many times with the chartwork, reading and checking Boeing's “Analysis of Available Data”, and visiting the site in various weather conditions perhaps you too could see the obvious. If they had been given an extra task that has not so far been declared then the whole case must be reopened – put your minds to it – what is there to lose?
Walter
Thank you.
My aim in noting MoD's acknowledged failure to implement their own airworthiness regs is not to claim this was the sole cause of the accident, but to highlight the fact that there were many underlying contributory factors which, in a legal sense, would introduce reasonable doubt. That is, falling well short of the requirement of "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". Such contributory factors are the ever increasing "holes" in the model so excellently described by flipster a while ago, and they are seldom if ever explored in detail by BOIs or Coroners. And certainly not by MoD. The devil is in this detail
As the Board of Inquiry said;
To me, that introduces doubt. Perhaps someone could advise how the Reviewing Officers dealt with this when overturning the "verdict", as they must surely have refuted this statement.
Thank you.
My aim in noting MoD's acknowledged failure to implement their own airworthiness regs is not to claim this was the sole cause of the accident, but to highlight the fact that there were many underlying contributory factors which, in a legal sense, would introduce reasonable doubt. That is, falling well short of the requirement of "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". Such contributory factors are the ever increasing "holes" in the model so excellently described by flipster a while ago, and they are seldom if ever explored in detail by BOIs or Coroners. And certainly not by MoD. The devil is in this detail
As the Board of Inquiry said;
“There were two entries in the Supplementary Flight Servicing Register that had potential relevance to the accident: Serial 2, SI/CHK/57 on the security of the DECU connectors…….”
To me, that introduces doubt. Perhaps someone could advise how the Reviewing Officers dealt with this when overturning the "verdict", as they must surely have refuted this statement.
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JP,
Nice to see you back on the boards again sir, just wondered if you had had chance to look at post #4140 from the 23 March where I asked you
"Is there anyone alive today who actually knows exactly what happened on that fateful day?"
Quite a straight forward question really, just wondered if you felt up to giving us your opinion on it?
Nice to see you back on the boards again sir, just wondered if you had had chance to look at post #4140 from the 23 March where I asked you
"Is there anyone alive today who actually knows exactly what happened on that fateful day?"
Quite a straight forward question really, just wondered if you felt up to giving us your opinion on it?
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Let me remind you that sabotage or other hostile action was confidently dismissed by the authorities rather quickly after the crash;
then we had the damning of the pilots with a judgment that implied to the world that there was absolutely no doubt whatsoever that it was a case of pilot error;
remember that throughouty the early inquiries there were suggestions that the crew were incompatible, that they were in a hurry, that they were listening to a pop station, etc, etc.
From what you all know and have campaigned to correct, these pilots were not incompetent or cavalier and there has not been anything to show that they had been to support the above official view; what this official view did do was to deflect public concerns regarding other causes of the crash and perhaps defuse possible public unrest over the loss of the security team – with hindsight, is there any other plausible reason for that unjust decision to have been made and so strongly maintained?.
The Mull group's strategy to rectify the (unjust) blame on the pilots seems to be restricted to casting doubt over the airworthiness of the aircraft: despite its track record of being a reliable, invaluable workhorse and suggesting that partway through a simple flight some transient control issue (for which there is no evidence whatsoever) just happened to occur when they were near an obvious spot for a bushwacking of some sort and to which they seemingly intentionally closely approached; further, no effort has been made to seriously address why they had instruments set for a landing at a known landing site for such aircraft nor why they were using an exercise callsign for the flight, why the radio call to Scotmil was unanswered (perhaps a prearranged call for someone else to receive?), etc, etc.
The a/c had approached closer than was wise or necessary in the prevailing conditions for a ferry flight just passing by the Mull; they had ditched the waypoint that should have been of use to them (perhaps this was just a way of telling the world that they were using something else just in case?), turned right (into the higher ground) and started to slow down (significant reduction in airspeed as per Boeing's analysis); their path from the point of waypoint change to the crash site was the optimum approach heading for a known site (for which waypoint A would have been an obvious inner marker) and which was found set on the HP's course selector of his HSI; and the HP's baro alt was set for QFE at for it's elevation (a RADALT alarm was set at minimum as per an immediate landing in marginal conditions).
All that is known about this crash is explained by them deliberately approaching a known landing site with the intention to either land or pass closely (for whatever reason) but someone or something that was giving them range and bearing who/which should have been on the landing site but was actually ½ a mile or so up the hill such that they had turned right a bit early and misjudged their closing range in conditions which prevented reasonable visual judgment that could have contradicted their (mis)guidance.
Given who was on board, the possibility of any such exercise being wilfully misused should have been considered – they were opposed to the peace process.that has been foisted upon the whole island of Ireland and they represented a significant obstacle to its implementation. I do not hold any hope for the pilots' names to be cleared in the immediate future while there is considerable, growing anger about the peace process's effects on the communities concerned – people would like to know how the possibility of sabotage was so summarily dismissed when all these years later the cause of this crash is still wide open.
then we had the damning of the pilots with a judgment that implied to the world that there was absolutely no doubt whatsoever that it was a case of pilot error;
remember that throughouty the early inquiries there were suggestions that the crew were incompatible, that they were in a hurry, that they were listening to a pop station, etc, etc.
From what you all know and have campaigned to correct, these pilots were not incompetent or cavalier and there has not been anything to show that they had been to support the above official view; what this official view did do was to deflect public concerns regarding other causes of the crash and perhaps defuse possible public unrest over the loss of the security team – with hindsight, is there any other plausible reason for that unjust decision to have been made and so strongly maintained?.
The Mull group's strategy to rectify the (unjust) blame on the pilots seems to be restricted to casting doubt over the airworthiness of the aircraft: despite its track record of being a reliable, invaluable workhorse and suggesting that partway through a simple flight some transient control issue (for which there is no evidence whatsoever) just happened to occur when they were near an obvious spot for a bushwacking of some sort and to which they seemingly intentionally closely approached; further, no effort has been made to seriously address why they had instruments set for a landing at a known landing site for such aircraft nor why they were using an exercise callsign for the flight, why the radio call to Scotmil was unanswered (perhaps a prearranged call for someone else to receive?), etc, etc.
The a/c had approached closer than was wise or necessary in the prevailing conditions for a ferry flight just passing by the Mull; they had ditched the waypoint that should have been of use to them (perhaps this was just a way of telling the world that they were using something else just in case?), turned right (into the higher ground) and started to slow down (significant reduction in airspeed as per Boeing's analysis); their path from the point of waypoint change to the crash site was the optimum approach heading for a known site (for which waypoint A would have been an obvious inner marker) and which was found set on the HP's course selector of his HSI; and the HP's baro alt was set for QFE at for it's elevation (a RADALT alarm was set at minimum as per an immediate landing in marginal conditions).
All that is known about this crash is explained by them deliberately approaching a known landing site with the intention to either land or pass closely (for whatever reason) but someone or something that was giving them range and bearing who/which should have been on the landing site but was actually ½ a mile or so up the hill such that they had turned right a bit early and misjudged their closing range in conditions which prevented reasonable visual judgment that could have contradicted their (mis)guidance.
Given who was on board, the possibility of any such exercise being wilfully misused should have been considered – they were opposed to the peace process.that has been foisted upon the whole island of Ireland and they represented a significant obstacle to its implementation. I do not hold any hope for the pilots' names to be cleared in the immediate future while there is considerable, growing anger about the peace process's effects on the communities concerned – people would like to know how the possibility of sabotage was so summarily dismissed when all these years later the cause of this crash is still wide open.
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JP,
No need for a pm Sir, the question is simplicity itself and should only take you a brief moment to answer, and I doubt very much that your response would bore those who have an interest in this thread.
No need for a pm Sir, the question is simplicity itself and should only take you a brief moment to answer, and I doubt very much that your response would bore those who have an interest in this thread.
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JP,
No pm recieved this end Sir and I would never dare be so rude as to ignore a missive from you.
But as I said no pm is required as a simple answer in this open forum would suffice
No pm recieved this end Sir and I would never dare be so rude as to ignore a missive from you.
But as I said no pm is required as a simple answer in this open forum would suffice
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Chinook
Seldom. Sorry about that; something wrong with my PC or yours. Since my PM was lost, what I said in it was that of course no-one knows exactly what happened during that flight, just to give one example, what conversations took place between the two pilots?. But the one thing we do know (without any doubt whatever) is that at waypoint change the crew had already broken the airmanship rules governing flight either in VMC or in IMC. This was the negligence.
A question for you, though it deals with the probable reason the crew 'got it wrong' (see Gpt Crawford's letter) and certainly does not explain the earlier breach of rules: have you studied Annexes J and K to the MOD Response to the Mull Group submission, showing the intended track and the actual track, and the consequent difference in the height of the hill ahead? What do you make of that?
With all good wishes as always, JP
A question for you, though it deals with the probable reason the crew 'got it wrong' (see Gpt Crawford's letter) and certainly does not explain the earlier breach of rules: have you studied Annexes J and K to the MOD Response to the Mull Group submission, showing the intended track and the actual track, and the consequent difference in the height of the hill ahead? What do you make of that?
With all good wishes as always, JP
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JP
In asserting:
Can you tell us on what evidence, vis a vis, weather, you are relying upon to satisfy the standard of proof of:
For myself, I have seen no evidence whatever of weather at that point, other than circumstantial. Only one witness had a useful perspective of that point in space. That being Holbrook, who has stated that the weather was relatively clear below the cloud which presumably is what enveloped all other witnesses?
After 4 weeks of courtroom evidence, Sheriff Sir Steven Young agreed with the position I have just stated. He did not agree with yours!
In asserting:
that at waypoint change the crew had already broken the airmanship rules governing flight either in VMC or in IMC.
(without any doubt whatever)
After 4 weeks of courtroom evidence, Sheriff Sir Steven Young agreed with the position I have just stated. He did not agree with yours!
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Whichever you prefer. I said it was 'circumstantial'. and most definitely not with absolutely no doubt whatsoever.
I simply wish to understand, on whose evidence the crew were guilty of negligence at waypoint change? That's all.
I simply wish to understand, on whose evidence the crew were guilty of negligence at waypoint change? That's all.
For background, from HoL Inquiry 2002:
The second was Mr Holbrook, the yachtsman, whose initial statement to the Strathclyde Police contained an expression of opinion "that the helicopter pilot would have been in a position to clearly see the local land mass". In his statement to the Board Mr Holbrook said that the aircraft was well below cloud level and visibility was about a mile limited by haze. At the time he was about two nautical miles south west of the lighthouse. He was asked three questions by the Board of which one was relevant to weather, namely whether he could see the physical features of the cliff on the Mull. To this he replied "no".
64. When he gave evidence at the FAI Mr Holbrook expressed the opinion that the pilot could have seen "the location of the Mull lighthouse" and described the low cloud as "hugging the Mull" (Sheriff's determination, p 110 of HL Paper 25(ii)). He was criticised by the Ministry of Defence for having given different versions of his account to the Board and the FAI.
64. When he gave evidence at the FAI Mr Holbrook expressed the opinion that the pilot could have seen "the location of the Mull lighthouse" and described the low cloud as "hugging the Mull" (Sheriff's determination, p 110 of HL Paper 25(ii)). He was criticised by the Ministry of Defence for having given different versions of his account to the Board and the FAI.
Last edited by chinook240; 12th Apr 2009 at 17:51.
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JP,
Sorry but I am even more confused now, on one hand you tell us that
"of course no-one knows exactly what happened during that flight, just to give one example"
but then go on to say
"the one thing we do know (without any doubt whatever) is that at waypoint change the crew had already broken the airmanship rules governing flight either in VMC or in IMC"
If no-one knows exactly what happened during that flight how can anyone arrive at "at waypoint change the crew had already broken the airmanship rules"
Especially as no one alive actually knows what could be seen from the Chinook flight deck windows.
Sorry but I am even more confused now, on one hand you tell us that
"of course no-one knows exactly what happened during that flight, just to give one example"
but then go on to say
"the one thing we do know (without any doubt whatever) is that at waypoint change the crew had already broken the airmanship rules governing flight either in VMC or in IMC"
If no-one knows exactly what happened during that flight how can anyone arrive at "at waypoint change the crew had already broken the airmanship rules"
Especially as no one alive actually knows what could be seen from the Chinook flight deck windows.
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chinook240
I have no idea how your response progresses the issue. I can only imagine you are attempting to cast doubt on the reliability of the yachtsman's evidence regarding the weather. Perhaps we can leave that debate for the moment, and return to the crucial question in the light of the most recent postings?
I simply wish to understand, on whose evidence the crew were guilty of negligence at waypoint change? That's all.
Could JP or C240 help us?
I have no idea how your response progresses the issue. I can only imagine you are attempting to cast doubt on the reliability of the yachtsman's evidence regarding the weather. Perhaps we can leave that debate for the moment, and return to the crucial question in the light of the most recent postings?
I simply wish to understand, on whose evidence the crew were guilty of negligence at waypoint change? That's all.
Could JP or C240 help us?
JP/MoD
The claim that "negligence had already taken place at the waypoint" is completely discredited by the fact the protection afforded by the legal obligation of Duty of Care had already been denied the crew and pax - by the same people. That, I submit, was an act of gross negligence. That these people are allowed to judge their own case defies natural justice.
Not a lot of comment on that. Too many Stars involved. Better blame the deceased.
Everyone is entitled to an opinion, but it remains just that. Only, I do not really see an opinion borne of independent thought; only a blind adherence to the discredited party line and verbatim quotes of same.
The claim that "negligence had already taken place at the waypoint" is completely discredited by the fact the protection afforded by the legal obligation of Duty of Care had already been denied the crew and pax - by the same people. That, I submit, was an act of gross negligence. That these people are allowed to judge their own case defies natural justice.
Not a lot of comment on that. Too many Stars involved. Better blame the deceased.
Everyone is entitled to an opinion, but it remains just that. Only, I do not really see an opinion borne of independent thought; only a blind adherence to the discredited party line and verbatim quotes of same.