Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Of course, what is 'probable' in this particular context inevitably comes down to 'matters of opinion', rather than 'matters of fact'. When what we, the BOI, and the two AMs were searching for was proof!
Let us review the standards of proof generally used when required to "act in judgement on someone else":
The BOI required a standard of 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever'. Pretty clear, and also a standard of proof that the President of the BOI felt unable to satisfy, and therefore made no finding of negligence. Of course his AMs did not feel so encumbered by the lack of 'proof'.
A slightly lower standard of proof, used in courts of law to determine the guilt of the most serious offenders, would be 'beyond reasonable doubt'. Of course, it may be possible to satisfy this standard, without statisfying the much higher standard of 'absolutely NO doubt whatsoever'.
A yet lower standard would be 'a balance of probability'. Perhaps surprisingly to some, this was the standard used by the subsequent Fatal Accident Inquiry at Paisley. Of course this lengthy judicial inquiry (at which all relevant parties received appropriate representation felt unable to criticise either pilot on the basis of the evidence THEN available.
Of course, much more evidence (non disclosed by the MOD at that time!) has subsequently come to light, NON of which favours the position of the MOD! Perhaps the conclusion would have been more critical of the MOD had they disclosed what had been requested!!
I would suggest the above is the true relevance of the word probable in the context of this accident.
Let right be done!
Let us review the standards of proof generally used when required to "act in judgement on someone else":
The BOI required a standard of 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever'. Pretty clear, and also a standard of proof that the President of the BOI felt unable to satisfy, and therefore made no finding of negligence. Of course his AMs did not feel so encumbered by the lack of 'proof'.
A slightly lower standard of proof, used in courts of law to determine the guilt of the most serious offenders, would be 'beyond reasonable doubt'. Of course, it may be possible to satisfy this standard, without statisfying the much higher standard of 'absolutely NO doubt whatsoever'.
A yet lower standard would be 'a balance of probability'. Perhaps surprisingly to some, this was the standard used by the subsequent Fatal Accident Inquiry at Paisley. Of course this lengthy judicial inquiry (at which all relevant parties received appropriate representation felt unable to criticise either pilot on the basis of the evidence THEN available.
Of course, much more evidence (non disclosed by the MOD at that time!) has subsequently come to light, NON of which favours the position of the MOD! Perhaps the conclusion would have been more critical of the MOD had they disclosed what had been requested!!
I would suggest the above is the true relevance of the word probable in the context of this accident.
Let right be done!
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Dear caz
If I may say, you sound like someone who is clutching at straws. If something is possible, it doesn't automatically mean that the opposite is probable (from where did you get that!? Goodness me!)
It just means that either altnerative cannot be discounted. I think that others have said more eloquently than I that if this is true (you cannot argue either way), then it is not logical to favour one argument over another without irrefutable proof. Without a CVR/ADR we end up in cyclical discussion, rapidly chasing one's own tail. Ergo, by the MODs own rules, one cannot determine the actions of the crew of ZD576 as negligence.
C'mon wake up and smell the coffee!
I know a nice Professor by the name of Reason who could offer you a fine cup of eye-opening stimulant!
If I may say, you sound like someone who is clutching at straws. If something is possible, it doesn't automatically mean that the opposite is probable (from where did you get that!? Goodness me!)
It just means that either altnerative cannot be discounted. I think that others have said more eloquently than I that if this is true (you cannot argue either way), then it is not logical to favour one argument over another without irrefutable proof. Without a CVR/ADR we end up in cyclical discussion, rapidly chasing one's own tail. Ergo, by the MODs own rules, one cannot determine the actions of the crew of ZD576 as negligence.
C'mon wake up and smell the coffee!
I know a nice Professor by the name of Reason who could offer you a fine cup of eye-opening stimulant!
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flipster
What we have here is a classic case of negligence by people who were, because of operational requirements, placed in a position of authority beyond their capabilities. This is demonstrated by the crews allotted for the various tasks allocated to the detatchment that day.
The two experienced Chinook Pilots were allocated to the in-theatre support tasks and the inexperienced (on Chinook) RN Pilot was allocated (with an RAF Navigator) to the VIP task. This 2nd crew (quite rightly) declared themselves unsuitable for the task in view of the weather
The 2 pilots of ZD576 had not done the planning for the sortie - but they obviously did not check the Lat/Long postions entered into the Nav System. That alone warrents the finding of "Gross Negligence".
What we have here is a classic case of negligence by people who were, because of operational requirements, placed in a position of authority beyond their capabilities. This is demonstrated by the crews allotted for the various tasks allocated to the detatchment that day.
The two experienced Chinook Pilots were allocated to the in-theatre support tasks and the inexperienced (on Chinook) RN Pilot was allocated (with an RAF Navigator) to the VIP task. This 2nd crew (quite rightly) declared themselves unsuitable for the task in view of the weather
The 2 pilots of ZD576 had not done the planning for the sortie - but they obviously did not check the Lat/Long postions entered into the Nav System. That alone warrents the finding of "Gross Negligence".
cazatou:
Classic "cazzing" if you don't mind me saying so. What is obvious to you is not to me. What is obvious to me is not to Walter. What is obvious to Walter is not to...well you get the idea I'm sure. The truth is you don't know caz. You think you do but in truth you don't. I don't. Nobody don't, ...er, does. That alone warrants the finding of "Gross Negligence" to be overturned.
..they obviously did not check the Lat/Long postions entered into the Nav System. That alone warrents the finding of "Gross Negligence".
What we have here is a classic case of negligence by people who were……………………. placed in a position of authority beyond their capabilities.
Correct. And I’m not talking about the aircrew. The failure of Duty of Care, amounting to gross negligence, took place before that day.
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Chugalug2
If it is not obvious to you - well, we are on a totally different line of thought.
I am just grateful that I was never in the position of being a passenger in an aeroplane flown by you.
If it is not obvious to you - well, we are on a totally different line of thought.
I am just grateful that I was never in the position of being a passenger in an aeroplane flown by you.
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Caz,
Can fully understand why you are ignoring the catering questions but how does the use of probable, your words sir, satisfy the verdict in this case?
""in the light of more recent work it is possible that something untoward was going on in the cockpit."
Therefore it is probable that nothing untoward was going on in the cockpit."
Can fully understand why you are ignoring the catering questions but how does the use of probable, your words sir, satisfy the verdict in this case?
""in the light of more recent work it is possible that something untoward was going on in the cockpit."
Therefore it is probable that nothing untoward was going on in the cockpit."
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Caz,
Conjecture: the formation of an opninion on incomplete grounds.
The grounds surrounding the demise of the crew of ZD576 are incomplete and will always remain so because there was no ADR nor CVR (as in Herc XV193). If conjecture, the finding of gross negligence is not possible (nor even probable).....
Q.E.D.
Conjecture: the formation of an opninion on incomplete grounds.
The grounds surrounding the demise of the crew of ZD576 are incomplete and will always remain so because there was no ADR nor CVR (as in Herc XV193). If conjecture, the finding of gross negligence is not possible (nor even probable).....
Q.E.D.
Avoid imitations
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The 2 pilots of ZD576 had not done the planning for the sortie - but they obviously did not check the Lat/Long postions entered into the Nav System. That alone warrents the finding of "Gross Negligence".
Why is it obvious?
In any event, this was a VFR flight and therefore the nav system wasn't actually required. I flew RAF helicopters and fixed wing aircraft without a nav system of any sort fitted, instructed on them, too. Sometimes we flew through five or six thousand feet of solid cloud to VMC on top to instruct or transit. Does that make me grossly negligent? If so, it was widespread and mandated by the RAF because that was the job.
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And I do believe this carries more weight....
MoD takes blame for 14 military deaths in Nimrod blast
Admission that the spy plane was 'not airworthy' creates a legal landmark
Lawyers predicted that the MoD's unusual decision to admit that it had breached the duty of care it owed to the men could have important ramifications for the families of other deceased servicemen and women bringing separate legal claims against the government.
The surprise admission is made in defence documents filed by the MoD at the High Court in response to a legal action brought by the mothers of two of the Nimrod's crew, Sergeant Benjamin Knight, 25, and Flight Lieutenant Steven Swarbrick, 28.
The mothers allege that the government did not offer adequate protection to their sons by failing to minimise the risks of a fire breaking out on board the RAF Nimrod XV230, which exploded on 2 September 2006, in Afghanistan, killing all on board.
Evidence presented at the inquest into the men's deaths highlighted a series of faults with the plane, which exploded after an airborne refuelling operation. Coroner Andrew Walker heard how the plane had no fire detection and suppression system and that its ventilation ducts were prone to overheat.
The MoD's admission is likely to trigger six-figure compensation payouts to the Knight and Swarbrick families and give hope to other families of the Nimrod crew who are bringing an action against the MoD in the Scottish courts. The MoD is also facing claims that it equipped troops with inadequate body armour and poorly protected Land Rovers.
John Cooper, QC, the families' barrister, denied that the case was primarily about compensation. "The families want accountability in this case," Cooper said. "That is their primary motive for pursuing this matter to the end."
The families maintain that the MoD failed to respect article two of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to life. Last year, a judge ruled that the ECHR imposed obligations on states to minimise the risks posed to service personnel, even when serving abroad.
In its defence document, the MoD contests the claim under article two, but accepts that there was a duty on it "to ensure the aircraft was airworthy" and admits "the aircraft was not airworthy". The document states: "The defendant owed to the deceased a duty of care and the accident was caused by a breach of that duty of care."
This week, the government will ground all Nimrods that have not had their engine bay hot-air ducts replaced, a move that lawyers suggest is recognition that the crash was an accident waiting to happen. "In our view, there is a minimum requirement that all equipment provided to personnel is fit for its intended purpose," said John Cronin, senior associate with Smithfield Partners.
"Just because a serviceman is operating in a theatre of war does not remove the government's responsibility under article two of the European Convention on Human Rights. The announcement by the MoD of its intention to withdraw the Nimrod fleet from service would seem to reflect its tacit acknowledgement that the aircraft is not safe."
A ruling by the High Court that the MoD breached article two would raise complex questions about the extent to which the government was liable for the deaths of some military personnel killed overseas. "If we are successful, there will have to be a change in thinking on the part of the MoD," Cronin said.
Graham Knight, the father of Ben Knight, said: "We are delighted with the fact they have realised they had no choice but to admit their failings, even if it has taken so long."
An MoD spokeswoman said: "When compensation claims are received, they are considered on the basis of whether or not the MoD has a legal liability to pay compensation. Where there is a proven legal liability, compensation is paid."
MoD takes blame for 14 military deaths in Nimrod blast
Admission that the spy plane was 'not airworthy' creates a legal landmark
- Jamie Doward and Mark Townsend
- The Observer, Sunday 29 March 2009
- Article history
Lawyers predicted that the MoD's unusual decision to admit that it had breached the duty of care it owed to the men could have important ramifications for the families of other deceased servicemen and women bringing separate legal claims against the government.
The surprise admission is made in defence documents filed by the MoD at the High Court in response to a legal action brought by the mothers of two of the Nimrod's crew, Sergeant Benjamin Knight, 25, and Flight Lieutenant Steven Swarbrick, 28.
The mothers allege that the government did not offer adequate protection to their sons by failing to minimise the risks of a fire breaking out on board the RAF Nimrod XV230, which exploded on 2 September 2006, in Afghanistan, killing all on board.
Evidence presented at the inquest into the men's deaths highlighted a series of faults with the plane, which exploded after an airborne refuelling operation. Coroner Andrew Walker heard how the plane had no fire detection and suppression system and that its ventilation ducts were prone to overheat.
The MoD's admission is likely to trigger six-figure compensation payouts to the Knight and Swarbrick families and give hope to other families of the Nimrod crew who are bringing an action against the MoD in the Scottish courts. The MoD is also facing claims that it equipped troops with inadequate body armour and poorly protected Land Rovers.
John Cooper, QC, the families' barrister, denied that the case was primarily about compensation. "The families want accountability in this case," Cooper said. "That is their primary motive for pursuing this matter to the end."
The families maintain that the MoD failed to respect article two of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to life. Last year, a judge ruled that the ECHR imposed obligations on states to minimise the risks posed to service personnel, even when serving abroad.
In its defence document, the MoD contests the claim under article two, but accepts that there was a duty on it "to ensure the aircraft was airworthy" and admits "the aircraft was not airworthy". The document states: "The defendant owed to the deceased a duty of care and the accident was caused by a breach of that duty of care."
This week, the government will ground all Nimrods that have not had their engine bay hot-air ducts replaced, a move that lawyers suggest is recognition that the crash was an accident waiting to happen. "In our view, there is a minimum requirement that all equipment provided to personnel is fit for its intended purpose," said John Cronin, senior associate with Smithfield Partners.
"Just because a serviceman is operating in a theatre of war does not remove the government's responsibility under article two of the European Convention on Human Rights. The announcement by the MoD of its intention to withdraw the Nimrod fleet from service would seem to reflect its tacit acknowledgement that the aircraft is not safe."
A ruling by the High Court that the MoD breached article two would raise complex questions about the extent to which the government was liable for the deaths of some military personnel killed overseas. "If we are successful, there will have to be a change in thinking on the part of the MoD," Cronin said.
Graham Knight, the father of Ben Knight, said: "We are delighted with the fact they have realised they had no choice but to admit their failings, even if it has taken so long."
An MoD spokeswoman said: "When compensation claims are received, they are considered on the basis of whether or not the MoD has a legal liability to pay compensation. Where there is a proven legal liability, compensation is paid."
I hope this works……….
This is an edited (for clarity) version of the airworthiness delegation pertaining to Chinook (and all other aircraft and their equipment) at the time. (As far as my jaded memory permits!). I acknowledge titles changed almost daily at the time, but anyone remotely familiar with the MoD structure will recognise most of them. It illustrates 4 Star down to 1 Star.
Now, a simple question. In how many of those departments/directorates etc was it known that airworthiness was being compromised due to the policy changes implemented in the preceding years? (e.g. The mandated regulation to maintain airworthiness shall be ignored, but those with delegation shall still sign to say the obligation has been met).
As of 1993, I can get to 13 of those listed here. By 1998 that increases by a further 2. Many of today’s IPTs can trace their lineage directly to these directorates. Of course, there were those like AAEE (Boscombe Down) who were doing the complaining, and being ignored. For example, when they grounded the PE Fleet the week before the crash.
Other departments, like Aircraft Technical Pubs, are omitted because they only reacted to funded tasking – as funding was withdrawn, APs (including ACMs and FRCs) weren’t kept up to date. Nevertheless, the top man in such support areas would have a duty to report the impact of such cuts. (I use ATP merely as an example and do not infer they did anything wrong. Quite the contrary, they complained bitterly).
Just a simple illustration of another side of the coin that no-one, to my knowledge, has ever delved into on this or any other accident. You will appreciate all this applies equally to C130, Nimrod, Tornado etc etc.
This is an edited (for clarity) version of the airworthiness delegation pertaining to Chinook (and all other aircraft and their equipment) at the time. (As far as my jaded memory permits!). I acknowledge titles changed almost daily at the time, but anyone remotely familiar with the MoD structure will recognise most of them. It illustrates 4 Star down to 1 Star.
Now, a simple question. In how many of those departments/directorates etc was it known that airworthiness was being compromised due to the policy changes implemented in the preceding years? (e.g. The mandated regulation to maintain airworthiness shall be ignored, but those with delegation shall still sign to say the obligation has been met).
As of 1993, I can get to 13 of those listed here. By 1998 that increases by a further 2. Many of today’s IPTs can trace their lineage directly to these directorates. Of course, there were those like AAEE (Boscombe Down) who were doing the complaining, and being ignored. For example, when they grounded the PE Fleet the week before the crash.
Other departments, like Aircraft Technical Pubs, are omitted because they only reacted to funded tasking – as funding was withdrawn, APs (including ACMs and FRCs) weren’t kept up to date. Nevertheless, the top man in such support areas would have a duty to report the impact of such cuts. (I use ATP merely as an example and do not infer they did anything wrong. Quite the contrary, they complained bitterly).
Just a simple illustration of another side of the coin that no-one, to my knowledge, has ever delved into on this or any other accident. You will appreciate all this applies equally to C130, Nimrod, Tornado etc etc.
Never has failure been so graphically illustrated as in your diagram, tucumseh. "Thought for Today" on Radio4 this morning was based on "Systemic Failure" as illustrated by this and other avoidable accidents featured on this forum. The conclusion that the speaker drew was that a sign above every head honcho's door should read, "Yes means Yes, and No means No". A marked contrast to that adhered to by the MOD as you describe it, where when signing off airworthiness enforcement, "Yes" means "No". This system is totally discredited and very dangerous. It must be replaced with an independent MAA ASAP.
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Re the headline
While such headlines may give people a little comfort, I fear that such words are a little counter-intuitive. The legal beagles may say that 'blame' is apportioned to the MoD (damn lawyers!). It may have been better if the media had said;
Unfortunately, that does NOT grab the headlines!
Now, if it seems that the MoD is accepting responsibility for not implementing their own regulations in the case of the Nimrod, perhaps the Hercules and Chinook are similarly tainted? If the process of flight safety and accident investigation is to hold water, that possibility must be investigated to prevent recurrence of accidents such as that befell XV230, XV197 and maybe, ZD576.
Additionally, further 'open and honest' investigations may decide if anyone within the airworthiness process was deemed to be 'negligent' - for example, repeatedly ignoring advice on the failings of their system. I suspect that people like Tuc would have many pertinent points to make to any such investigation. I also suspect that the truth will out.
"MoD takes blame for 14 military deaths in Nimrod blast"
"Inadequate and poorly funded MoD airworthiness processes were a major contributory cause in the accident of XV230. No blame is yet attached to the personnel within that process".
Now, if it seems that the MoD is accepting responsibility for not implementing their own regulations in the case of the Nimrod, perhaps the Hercules and Chinook are similarly tainted? If the process of flight safety and accident investigation is to hold water, that possibility must be investigated to prevent recurrence of accidents such as that befell XV230, XV197 and maybe, ZD576.
Additionally, further 'open and honest' investigations may decide if anyone within the airworthiness process was deemed to be 'negligent' - for example, repeatedly ignoring advice on the failings of their system. I suspect that people like Tuc would have many pertinent points to make to any such investigation. I also suspect that the truth will out.
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This is demonstrated by the crews allotted for the various tasks allocated to the detatchment that day.
The two experienced Chinook Pilots were allocated to the in-theatre support tasks and the inexperienced (on Chinook) RN Pilot was allocated (with an RAF Navigator) to the VIP task.
The two experienced Chinook Pilots were allocated to the in-theatre support tasks and the inexperienced (on Chinook) RN Pilot was allocated (with an RAF Navigator) to the VIP task.
Is it not more appropriate to allocate your experienced crew to the higher threat in theatre tasks and put the less experienced crew onto the low threat out of theatre A to B trip.
EG
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ExGrunt
It is quite simple - you do not allocate a Pilot straight out of the OCU to fly HM the Queen whilst using the Units experienced Pilots to deliver the rations to a forward operating base. A bit OTT perhaps - but the principle is the same.
Equally, why use both your experienced Pilots on a routine in theatre resupply sortie and delegate the VIP task to an RN Pilot with extremely limited experience on the Chinook whose other Flt Deck crew member was an RAF Navigator.
I have no intention in trying to denigrate Lt K or his Navigator - but the simple fact is that Lt K did not have sufficient experience on the Chinook to be even considered as suitable for a VIP task. The role of the detatchment was support for the Army - it is that role for which Lt K should have been programmed.
It is quite simple - you do not allocate a Pilot straight out of the OCU to fly HM the Queen whilst using the Units experienced Pilots to deliver the rations to a forward operating base. A bit OTT perhaps - but the principle is the same.
Equally, why use both your experienced Pilots on a routine in theatre resupply sortie and delegate the VIP task to an RN Pilot with extremely limited experience on the Chinook whose other Flt Deck crew member was an RAF Navigator.
I have no intention in trying to denigrate Lt K or his Navigator - but the simple fact is that Lt K did not have sufficient experience on the Chinook to be even considered as suitable for a VIP task. The role of the detatchment was support for the Army - it is that role for which Lt K should have been programmed.
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Ex grunt, your argument is sound. It is simply the perception of the crews available for tasking that is different.
The allocation of crew is decided 'in house'. On that day the crews, themselves determined who would do the NI task, and who would do the VIP task.
Remember, all CH47 crews deployed to NI in the pre-cease fire days were fully up to speed and competent in operating in that theatre.
Therefore, if you have a VIP task of some importance for the resolution of the 'conflict' that you are presently involved in, would you not put forward the crew with the extra bit of experience? Bearing in mind the crew that is carrying out the NI tasking is more than capable of doing so?
The allocation of crew is decided 'in house'. On that day the crews, themselves determined who would do the NI task, and who would do the VIP task.
Remember, all CH47 crews deployed to NI in the pre-cease fire days were fully up to speed and competent in operating in that theatre.
Therefore, if you have a VIP task of some importance for the resolution of the 'conflict' that you are presently involved in, would you not put forward the crew with the extra bit of experience? Bearing in mind the crew that is carrying out the NI tasking is more than capable of doing so?
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Caz,
You are saying that the det was not configured nor manned to a sufficient level to support two such concurrent tasks; thanks for that, I suspect you are right. However, this is only one of a number of possible smaller holes in the swiss cheese that may have predisposed the crew to the crash. In turn, this further re-inforces the fact that the findings of negligence were totally inappropriate.
You are saying that the det was not configured nor manned to a sufficient level to support two such concurrent tasks; thanks for that, I suspect you are right. However, this is only one of a number of possible smaller holes in the swiss cheese that may have predisposed the crew to the crash. In turn, this further re-inforces the fact that the findings of negligence were totally inappropriate.
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flipster
I Believe you are reading between the lines too much....I have no doubt that the crews deployed to NI at that point in time were more than capable to carry out the assigned sorties. They were more than able to carry out the assigned sorties, on both fronts.
Why would you even bother posting:
'You are saying that the det was not configured nor manned to a sufficient level to support two such concurrent tasks; thanks for that, I suspect you are right.'
least said soonest solved! aah well....
I Believe you are reading between the lines too much....I have no doubt that the crews deployed to NI at that point in time were more than capable to carry out the assigned sorties. They were more than able to carry out the assigned sorties, on both fronts.
Why would you even bother posting:
'You are saying that the det was not configured nor manned to a sufficient level to support two such concurrent tasks; thanks for that, I suspect you are right.'
least said soonest solved! aah well....